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Keeping the SZK-verifier honest unconditionally

Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 1294)

Abstract

This paper shows that using direct properties of a zero-knowledge protocol itself, one may impose a honest behavior on the verifier (without additional cryptographic tools). The main technical contribution is showing that if a language L has an Arthur-Merlin (i.e. public coins) honest-verifier statistical SZK proof system then L has an (any-verifier) SZK proof system when we use a non-uniform simulation model of SZK (where the simulation view and protocol view can be made statistically closer than any given polynomial given as a parameter). Three basic questions regarding statistical zero-knowledge (SZK) are solved in this model:
  • If L has a honest-verifier SZK proof then L has an any-verifier nonuniform simulation SZK proof.

  • If L has an SZK proof then L has an non-uniform simulation SZK proof.

  • If L has a private-coin SZK proof then L has a public-coin nonuniform simulation SZK proof.

Keywords

Proof System Random String Commitment Scheme Common Input Cheat Behavior 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 1997

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Computer Science and Engineering Dep.University of California San DiegoLa Jolla
  2. 2.NTT LaboratoriesNippon Telegraph and Telephone CorporationKanagawa-kenJapan
  3. 3.CertCoNew York

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