A multi-recastable ticket scheme for electronic elections

Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 1163)


In this paper, we propose a multi-recastable ticket scheme for electronic elections based on blind signatures. In our election scheme, every voter of a group can obtain an m-castable ticket (m-ticket). Through the m-ticket, the voter can participate in m different designated elections held in this group. In each of the m elections, the voter can cast his vote by making appropriate modifications to the m-ticket. To obtain an m-ticket from the authority, only one round of registration is required for the voter. It turns out that our scheme greatly reduces the network traffic between the voters and the authority. The security of our scheme relies on the difficulty of solving the square roots of an integer in Z n * . In the proposed scheme, the identities of voters are protected against the authority by means of the blind signature techniques, and it is infeasible for an intruder to forge any legal vote in this scheme due to the properties of quadratic residues.


Blind Signature Extraction Stage Quadratic Residue Blind Signature Scheme Election Scheme 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 1996

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Electrical EngineeringNational Taiwan UniversityTaipeiTaiwan, R.O.C.

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