Arbitrated unconditionally secure authentication scheme with multi-senders
Previously, Desmedt and Seberry developed a practical proven secure authentication scheme with arbitration. Their scheme, however, only provides an environment for a single sender. Nevertheless, in real applications, many senders may collaboratively send a message to the receiver and convince the receiver that the message is actually transmitted by them. In this paper, we present an efficient scheme which (a) is unconditionally secure against denial by the senders having sent a message and (b) reduces the size of evidence for the authentic message in a multi-senders environment.
KeywordsAuthentication Scheme Unconditionally Secure Message Authentication Code
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