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A key escrow system of the RSA cryptosystem

  • Yoshiki Sameshima
Key Management
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 1396)

Abstract

This paper focuses a key escrow system of the RSA cryptosystem that protects user privacy with the following properties; (1) neither investigation agency nor key escrow agent accesses private key of user directly, (2) investigation agency can decrypt user data of restricted time period and communication entities, and (3) split private keys of user are deposited correctly in multiple key escrow agents without any information leakage of the private key with help of a zero-knowledge interactive protocol. The security of the whole system is discussed as well as the performance of the zero-knowledge interactive protocol.

Keywords

Data Encryption Target User Average Response Time Encrypt Data Investigative Agency 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1998

Authors and Affiliations

  • Yoshiki Sameshima
    • 1
  1. 1.R & D DepartmentHitachi Software Engineering Co., Ltd.YokohamaJapan

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