Record encryption in distributed databases

  • Thomas Hardjono
Section 9 Applications
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 453)


This paper investigates a possible application of the Rivest-Shamir-Adleman cryptosystem for the encryption of records in a distributed database system. A simple scheme is presented in which sites of the distributed database share a common modulus, while keeping another local secret modulus.


Data encryption Security Database systems Distributed database systems 

CR Categories

E.3 H.2.0 H.3 


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1990

Authors and Affiliations

  • Thomas Hardjono
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Computer Science University CollegeUniversity of New South Wales Australian Defence Force AcademyCanberraAustralia

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