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Assessing multiple beliefs according to one body of evidence — Why it may be necessary, and how we might do it correctly

  • 1. Mathematical Theory Of Evidence
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Uncertainty in Knowledge Bases (IPMU 1990)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCS,volume 521))

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Abstract

Dempster's rule of combination, the main inference mechanism of the Dempster-Shafer theory of belief functions [Shafer 76; Smets 88], requires that the belief functions to be combined must be "independent". This independence assumption is usually understood to be composed of two parts: (1) the uniqueness assumption, which states that each belief function to be combined is based on a unique body of evidence, and (2) the evidential independence (or distinctness) assumption, which states that we must be able to argue about the independence of all these different bodies of evidence. In this paper, we suggest that the uniqueness assumption is not necessary, and that it should be alright if we can come up with "independent specifications" of beliefs.

This work was supported in part by the DRUMS project funded by the Commission of the European Communities under the ESPRIT II-Program, Basic Research Project 3085.

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References

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Bernadette Bouchon-Meunier Ronald R. Yager Lotfi A. Zadeh

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© 1991 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Hsia, YT. (1991). Assessing multiple beliefs according to one body of evidence — Why it may be necessary, and how we might do it correctly. In: Bouchon-Meunier, B., Yager, R.R., Zadeh, L.A. (eds) Uncertainty in Knowledge Bases. IPMU 1990. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 521. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/BFb0028150

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BFb0028150

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  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-54346-6

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-47580-4

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