Abstract
I have sketched a model of belief updating and belief revision motivated by concerns about the logic of belief and belief reports. In this model beliefs are assumed to have a complex structure and to be related together within the cognitive state in quite intricate ways. The structure is built up modified during belief updating and during revision. The model of beliefs is much more complex than that presupposed in the classical theory of belief revision such as propounded by Alchourron, Makinson and Gardenfors. Nevertheless, at least some of the developments of the classical theory may be carried over to this more complex model.
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© 1991 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Asher, N. (1991). Discourse representation theory and belief dynamics. In: Fuhrmann, A., Morreau, M. (eds) The Logic of Theory Change. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 465. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/BFb0018426
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BFb0018426
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