Belief revision through the belief-function formalism in a multi-agent environment

  • Aldo Franco Dragoni
  • Paolo Giorgini
Part IV: Theories
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 1193)


The abilities of detecting contradictions and rearranging the cognitive space in order to cope with them are important to be embedded in the BDI architecture of an agent acting in a complex and dynamic world. However, to be accomplished in a multi-agent environment, “belief revision” must depart considerably from its original definitions. According to us, the main changes should be the following ones:
  1. 1.

    replacing the “priority to the incoming information principle” with the “recoverability principle”: any previously believed piece of information must belong to the current cognitive state whenever it is possible

  2. 2.

    dealing not just with pieces of information but with couples <source, information> since the reliability of the source affects the credibility of the information and vice-versa.


The “belief-function” formalism is here accepted as a simple and intuitive way to transfer the sources' reliability to the information's credibility.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1997

Authors and Affiliations

  • Aldo Franco Dragoni
    • 1
  • Paolo Giorgini
    • 1
  1. 1.Istituto di InformaticaUniversità di AnconaAnconaItaly

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