Abstract
In this paper we consider an oligopoly market in which the resource is nonrenewable and exhaustible. We restrict ourselves to the case of linear demand and quadratic extraction costs. The game ends whenever the stock of resource is exhausted, therefore the final time T is determined by the condition x(T)=0.
For a common resource both open-loop and feedback Nash equilibria are treated in cases where the time does (dynamic case) and does not (static case) play an explicit role. Also open-loop coalitions for both a common resource and private resources are considered.
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© 1991 Springer-Verlag
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Klompstra, M.B. (1991). A nonzero-sum game with variable final time. In: Hämäläinen, R.P., Ehtamo, H.K. (eds) Dynamic Games in Economic Analysis. Lecture Notes in Control and Information Sciences, vol 157. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/BFb0006235
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BFb0006235
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