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Time-dependent cooperation in games

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Differential Games and Applications

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Control and Information Sciences ((LNCIS,volume 119))

Abstract

The behaviour of players in a dynamic game is considered if they are entitled to —and agree upon-cooperation. This cooperation will depend on time, and during time intervals in which there is no cooperation, the Nash-mode of play is assumed. Cooperation occurs if all players benefit by it.

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References

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Technical Mathematics and Informatics, Delft University of Technology, P.O. Box 356, 2600 AJ, Delft, The Netherlands

    L. Gao (visitor), A. Jakubowski (visitor), M. B. Klompstra & G. J. Olsder

  2. Northeast University of Technology, Shenyang, China

    L. Gao (visitor)

  3. Polish Academy of Sciences, Warsaw, Poland

    A. Jakubowski (visitor)

Authors
  1. L. Gao
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  2. A. Jakubowski
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  3. M. B. Klompstra
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  4. G. J. Olsder
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Editor information

Tamer S. Başar Pierre Bernhard

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© 1989 Springer-Verlag

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Gao, L., Jakubowski, A., Klompstra, M.B., Olsder, G.J. (1989). Time-dependent cooperation in games. In: Başar, T.S., Bernhard, P. (eds) Differential Games and Applications. Lecture Notes in Control and Information Sciences, vol 119. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/BFb0004270

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BFb0004270

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-50758-1

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-46079-4

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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