Keywords

Introduction

Discourses of human rights in Malaysia are complex for many reasons.Footnote 1 Among them are debates on cultural compatibility (Ahmad, 2005; Manan, 1999; Rodan, 2009). Human rights discourse is nonetheless pervasive in society, particularly since the late 1970s with the emergence of human rights focused non-governmental organisations (NGOs). These are often seen by the government as playing an antagonistic role against state interest, or even as a threat to the state (Khoo, 2013). The distribution of civil, political, and economic rights remains contested in the country after the 2018 change of government, which ended more than six decades of Barisan Nasional (BN) rule.Footnote 2 The change of government was short-lived as it was disrupted by political fighting among the political parties both from the ruling and opposition coalitions. The protection of fundamental civil liberties of the Malaysians is spelt out at length under the second part of the Federal Constitution. Nevertheless, some of these freedoms are qualified by an overriding right of the government to decide otherwise, if it wishes, in the interests of national security or public order. The executive power has, in practice, left few guarantees of individual liberties (Khoo, 2014).

Integrating literature on human rights and social movements, this chapter addresses the impact of a social movement on the social construction of rights—an area of research that has received limited empirical attention. While there is a rigorous literature on the formation and development of social movements, how a social movement can challenge power structures in society by evoking a discourse on rights has not been addressed to the same extent. The present chapter extends my previous research on notions of rights in Malaysia (Khoo et al., 2021), which examined how the Bersih movement fostered internal political efficacy that also constructed a rights consciousness. Building upon that article, this chapter examines Bersih’s impact on political rights under a competitive authoritarian regime. In this chapter, political rights refers to one’s ability to participate in civil and political life without fear of discrimination or repression. Such rights include voting in an election and participating freely in political rallies, protests, or political processes (Busse, 2004).

To do so, the chapter first explores how Bersih, established informally in 2005 in the form of a loose network, became a mass movement for free and fair elections and its wider role for political change in Malaysia. It then discusses how the Bersih movement has influenced Malaysians’ political activity from two vantage points: Bersih’s demands and mass mobilisation. The chapter argues that the example of Bersih shows that a social movement can promote awareness of political rights.

Political Change in Malaysia

Malaysia is often described as a competitive authoritarian regime (Giersdorf & Croissant, 2011; Levitsky & Way, 2010). Competitive authoritarian regimes combine democratic institutions and regular elections (Brooker, 2009). While meaningful contestation of power and multiparty elections are the main route to power (Levitsky & Way, 2010), the political playing field is tilted, favouring the ruling coalition (Case, 2011; Hwang, 2003; Slater, 2003).

Like other competitive authoritarian regimes, Malaysia grants civil society limited space to organise and articulate dissent. The government regulates associational activities heavily and tries to either co-opt or curb the mushrooming of secondary associations (Croissant & Lorenz, 2018). During the six decades of BN rule (including its predecessor the Alliance Party), Malaysia experienced the expansion of the executive power at the expense of the independence of the judiciary and legislature, and a gradually shrinking civic space. Elections have been tainted by partisan constituency delineations and polling irregularities, and election campaigns corrupted by bribery, abuse of government machinery and biased behaviour by supposedly independent public institutions (Case, 1993; Ufen, 2009). Political competition has been extensively manipulated at the pre-election stage, by, for instance, the rampant gerrymandering of electoral district boundaries (Saravanamuttu & Mohamad, 2019), the weak implementation of electoral laws (Ong, 2018), violations of civil liberties, and the lack of media freedom. It is said that Malaysia’s centralised political system enhances these advantages, which contributed to the longevity of the BN coalition (Ufen, 2012).

In the years leading up to the 14th General Elections (GE14) in 2018, the Najib Razak government used existing laws such as the Sedition Act to harass and prosecute critics, journalists, activists, opposition leaders and even social media users who protested against his policies and the 1Malaysia Development Berhad (1MDB) corruption scandal. Civil liberties deteriorated, as seen in numerous attacks on government critiques (Teh & Ngu, 2019). These worrying trends were identified in reports published by local and international human rights organisations including Suara Rakyat Malaysia (SUARAM), Human Rights Commission of Malaysia (SUHAKAM) and Human Rights Watch (HRW). Human rights activists were challenged by a discourse characterising human right as culturally relative rather than universal (Liu, 2018). The limited separation of powers resulted in the ruling coalition’s control of enormous financial means, as well as over the bureaucracy, judiciary and media channels. This allowed it to suppress civil liberties (Ufen, 2012) including the freedom of speech, association and assembly, preventing the opposition from effectively channelling social grievances.

GE14 marked a historical shift, as it effectively ended one-party rule by the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) and ushered in a new government led by the Pakatan Harapan (PH) coalition, which promised a reform agenda (Hutchinson & Lee, 2019). Welcoming this change, many human rights activists anticipated a genuine attempt by the new government to reform socioeconomic policies and replace the old political personnel with new faces who had pledged to build a ‘New Malaysia’ (Loh & Netto, 2018). However, such hopefulness for institutional reforms and expanded civic space has faded away. In March 2020, the country witnessed the fall of the PH government, which was replaced by the Perikatan Nasional (PN) coalition until August 2021, when the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) withdrew its support. At the time of writing (September 2022), political stability is maintained through a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) signed between the current government under Prime Minister Ismail Sabri and PH, who returned as the opposition coalition.

Although the PH government did not last long, democratic space nonetheless moved in a positive direction. The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) Democracy Index shows that Malaysia is the only country with a progressing trend in Southeast Asia for 2016–2021, from 69 in 2016 to 39 in 2021.

The literature that attempts to explain political dynamics in Malaysia since 2018 primarily focuses on political parties, whereas the investigation of the influence of civil society and social movements on the political process is limited. This calls for further academic attention to the Coalition for Clean and Fair Elections, best known by its Malay acronym, Bersih (‘clean’), which for years had pushed for changes to, and raised political awareness about, Malaysia’s electoral system (Khoo, 2021). Prior research (Claeys, 2012; Hull, 2001) has shown how social movements frame issues using human rights discourse to mobilise support for their causes, and that social movements can influence rights consciousness within a society (Stammers, 1999). This suggests that Bersih’s impact on human rights over this period should be examined.

The Bersih Movement

Electoral authoritarian regimes hold regular multiparty elections in which an opposition competes, yet the minimum standards required for democracy to function effectively are violated through different manipulative tactics (Schedler, 2002, 2015). Because electoral authoritarian regimes are the most common regime type in the world (Levitsky & Way, 2020; Linz, 2000; Schedler, 2013, 2015), the question of how a social movement can influence broader social norms of political rights in such a context has relevance beyond Malaysia, in the Southeast Asian region and beyond.

Although the Federal Constitution guarantees the fundamental rights of Malaysians in taking part in government, the competitive authoritarian environment has eroded the implementation of political rights. The human rights concept is also contested in Malaysia, centred on debates surrounding the relationship between civil and political rights on the one hand versus economic, social and cultural rights on the other. Promoting a discourse of Asian values, Malaysian elites have emphasised the importance of cultural values and economic development for a framework of human rights in the region (Ciorciari, 2012; Thompson, this volume).

Bersih’s Demands

It is in this context that Bersih has influenced notions and practices of political rights through its demands and impact on mass mobilisation. Bersih started in July 2005 as the Joint Action Committee for Electoral Reform (JACER). In its Joint Communiqué of 23 November 2006, Bersih stated its aim to correct structural flaws, institutional biases and administrative malpractices in the electoral system that systematically and disproportionately favoured the ruling coalition over the opposition parties. (Khoo, 2021). The Joint Communiqué outlined a long-term reform agenda containing eight issue-areas (electoral system reform; election administration; party and candidate nomination; electoral campaigns; access to the media; a caretaker government; the electoral roll; and voting). It pushed three immediate demands: a clean electoral roll; the use of indelible ink; and the abolition of postal votes except for diplomats and other overseas voters. In July 2007, Bersih added a fourth immediate demand: fair access to state-owned media. On 10 November 2007, the first Bersih rally witnessed Malaysians group collectively, forming a powerful and cohesive group with, well-articulated demands, and a surprising major turnout. The movement subsequently organised four major rallies in 2011, 2012, 2015 and 2016.

For its second rally in 2011, Bersih added four additional demands, increasing the number to eight. Two of these brought changes by the 13th General Election (GE13) in 2013. The first demand, a clean-up of the electoral roll, was crucial because it aimed to ensure an accurate reflection of the voting population. Some of the typical irregularities on the electoral roll that had been reported included the records of deceased persons, of multiple persons registered under a single address or of non-existent addresses, commonly known as ‘phantom voters’. The second demand, to reform the postal ballot, emphasised the need for transparency in the postal ballot. This demand brought changes to the Election Regulations on 15 January 2013 that extended postal voting rights to overseas Malaysians, whereas they had previously only been available to public servants, students, uniformed personnel and their spouses. However, there were shortcomings in the GE13. The third demand, for indelible ink, was first implemented in the GE13, and indelible ink has since been used in subsequent elections.

The fourth demand was to extend the campaign period to a minimum of 21 days. This would allow voters more time to gather information and deliberate on their choices and also allow candidates more time to disseminate information to digitally disconnected rural areas. The fifth demand was free and fair access to media. Bersih demanded that the EC place pressure on all media agencies to allocate proportionate and objective coverage for all political parties to ensure fair competition in elections. The sixth demand was to strengthen public institutions such as the judiciary, Attorney General’s Chambers, Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission (MACC), the police and the EC to ensure their independence and impartiality in election-related matters. The seventh demand called for an end to all forms of corruption, including the act of vote buying. The final demand was to stop dirty politics and foster a healthy political competitive environment.

For its third rally in 2012, Bersih demanded the resignation of the existing Electoral Commission (EC), and observation of the GE13 by international observers, on top of the implementation of the eight earlier demands. The EC did not resign, and Malaysia did not invite international election monitoring organisations for the GE13, but the EC adopted an ‘election visit programme’ (EVP) to compensate for the latter. When the 1 Malaysia Development Berhad (1MDB) corruption crisis erupted in 2015, Bersih demanded that then prime minister, Najib Razak, resign immediately to allow for independent investigations, broadening its more technical electoral reform agenda to include elements such as institutional and political reform. This reflected Bersih’s conviction that electoral reform could not be realised without substantive institutional and political reform. The same year, Bersih conducted its fourth rally. Its demands were: free and fair elections; a clean government; the right to dissent; the strengthening parliamentary democracy; saving the economy; and Najib Razak’s resignation. Najib would only step down when UMNO lost the 2018 elections. During the fifth rally in 2016, Bersih pressed the same demands; but shifted from a focus on the economy to the empowerment of Sabah and Sarawak. Some of Bersih’s demands have had an impact on electoral reform in the wake of GE14, held in 2018. For instance, former Bersih steering committee member and electoral expert Wong Chin Huat was included in the Electoral Reform Committee (ERC) created following the GE14 to explore reform needed to strengthen the electoral system. In July 2019, the Parliament approved the amendment of Section 3 (a) and (b) of the Constitution (Amendment) Bill 2019 lowering of the voting age limit from 21 to 18 years. The amendment also involves the implementation of automatic voter registration by the government.

Mass Mobilisation

Mass mobilisation has been significant since the 2005 formation of Bersih, not only through the five Bersih rallies (in 2007, 2011, 2012, 2015 and 2016) but also through various other initiatives related to electoral and institutional reform. The case study of Bersih correlates with Rasler’s (1996) argument that while the short-term effect of repression is a reduction of protest, yet its long-term effect is an increase in protest rate. When Bersih was first conceived, its aim was to advocate for electoral reform by raising awareness through advocacy and education. The decision to organise a street protest only came about after the Bersih Steering Committee had exhausted all other avenues, engaging with the EC through meetings and dialogues. Mass mobilisation in Malaysia was accompanied by transnational activism by overseas Malaysians. During Bersih’s third rally in 2012, for instance, overseas Malaysians in 85 cities across 35 countries also held rallies in the spirit of solidarity (GB website) (Table 32.1).

Table 32.1 Bersih’s demands in 2007, 2011, 2012, 2015 and 2016
Full size table

Despite the unfavourable political conditions and state repression of street protests, as indicated in Table 32.2, Bersih proceeded with five major street rallies from 2007 to 2016 that showcased growing citizens’ mobilisation. The GE14 that witnessed the fall of BN’s hegemony after six decades raised questions about the role and influence of the Bersih movement for regime change. Arguably, Bersih has shown that protests have the potential to cripple the political legitimacy of the state and impose pressure on it to consider their demands (Khoo, 2016).

Table 32.2 Total number of protestors in Bersih rallies from 2007 to 2016
Full size table

State repression was countered by Bersih, which mounted legal challenges and mass media campaigns against violations of the right to assembly and expression, slanders by the mass media against Bersih, and the intimidation and arrests of activists and politicians, including Maria Chin Abdullah, former Bersih co-chair under the Security Offences (Special Measures) Act 2012 (SOSMA) before the fifth Bersih protest in 2016. In her own words (Maria Chin, 2018), “On 18 November 2016, just a day before our fifth rally, I was detained and interrogated like a terrorist for 11 days under the Security Offences (Special Measures) Act. Fourteen activists and politicians, including our office manager Mandeep Singh, were arrested for allegedly attempting to provoke a riot. The then Deputy Prime Minister, Home Minister Zahid Hamidi, accused Bersih, the Malaysian Bar, online portals Malaysiakini and Sarawak Report, and human rights organisation SUARAM of conspiring to start a ‘colour revolution’ to topple the government.” The detention of Maria Chin prior to it sparked tremendous anger among Malaysians. Growing state repression greatly raised the cost of participation in the fifth Bersih rally. This, to some extent, made the mass turn out for the fifth Bersih rally even more significant.

Initiatives by ordinary Malaysians indicate growing political participation. In my book on the Bersih movement (2020), I argue that the political participation by Malaysians, including through Bersih, depends primarily on a combination of accumulated grievances over the BN’s hegemony, in response to which civil society groups have been able to mobilise around human rights issues and reform. This argument locates the drivers of Bersih within society from the bottom-up, but at the same time recognises that institutional structures and other opportunities significantly shape civic activism. There is a positive correlation between participating in the Bersih movement and broader political participation among Malaysians. Bersih participants have ideas on how things should be, criticise political situations, processes and actors and bring their issues to the debate. Political activism, therefore, becomes increasingly approachable for Malaysians. Bersih has created a space in which ordinary citizens play a crucial role (Khoo, 2020).

For instance, Malaysians created various grassroots efforts online to uphold their constitutional right to vote in the GE14. Crowd-funding initiatives raised money to offer free bus rides and help subsidise flight tickets. Twitter hashtags, including #CarpoolGE14, were used to help people carpool with others driving in the same direction. Web platforms such as ‘UndiRabu.com’ (‘Wednesday’s Vote’, in English) and ‘PulangMengundi.com’ (‘Return to Vote’, in English) were created to coordinate the distribution of donations to Malaysians who lacked the financial resources to travel home. Many Malaysians living abroad had received their postal ballots late from the EC, making it almost impossible for them to mail back their vote in time to be counted. Using a Facebook group called ‘GE14: Postal Voters Discussion,’ a group of Malaysians took the initiative to coordinate and send their votes with the help of volunteers flying back to Malaysia for polling day. All these grassroots actions can be seen as acts of resistance by ordinary Malaysians against an election process that was considered not clean. While the Bersih movement did not lead these actions, Bersih empowered people to believe in the act of voting and to participate in the political process. These efforts helped ensure that the voice of Malaysians was heard loud and clear through the ballot.

Bersih’s success produced a profound socio-political transformation: the formation of a national community across ethnic and non-ethnic divides. Mass participation bridged ethnic, urban-rural, generational, gender, territorial and other divides (Khoo, 2021). Moreover, Bersih reached all demographics, not merely a group of people who define themselves as activists. In an interview, the former Bersih co-chair, Ambiga Sreenevasan, thus stated: “Bersih’s biggest success is in uniting Malaysians of all races and removing their fear of expressing themselves and holding public gatherings”. (Sreenevasan, interviewed by Tribe, 2012).

The Impact of Bersih

The Bersih movement thus influences the expansion of political rights in Malaysia, critical to ongoing political change in the country, in two main ways. First, the evolution and expansion of Bersih’s demands from the movement’s formation in 2005 reflect that, despite Bersih being an electoral reform movement, these go beyond merely electoral reform. Bersih’s demands broadly cover institutional and democratic reforms that are important for political rights. These include the demand to allow all electoral candidates free and fair access to the media, as well as demands related to the strengthening of public institutions, ending corruption and dirty politics. Such demands aim to expand participation in civil and political life without fear of discrimination or repression. Bersih’s earlier eight demands for electoral reform were considered more technical and bureaucratic, which led to the modification of its demands in 2015 and 2016, to target broader institutional issues. While there were some changes to Bersih’s demands with each rally, the issues surrounding elections, human rights, the rule of law and democracy remained.

The broadening of Bersih’s demands further suggests that operating in a restricted civil society space under a competitive authoritarian regime, Bersih has adopted a pragmatic approach adapting its demands to the political context. While immediate outcomes might not be achieved, Bersih has built and expanded political awareness that facilitates the expansion of political rights. This also explains how Bersih had some forms of engagement, albeit limited, with the ruling government despite its limitations, thus contributing to the expansion of public participation in political processes (Meyer, 2004).

Second, the phenomenon of mass rallies and protests is a catalyst for promoting democratic values and processes within Malaysia’s wider society and polity. Human rights discourse has become increasingly commonplace and acceptable. This political pressure on authorities (Bosco, 2006) could ensure a continued conversation on institutional reforms that could benefit the people. Political movements, such as Bersih, can mobilise citizens to alter power relations or provoke social change (McAdam et al., 1988). Despite state repression, which deters open mass mobilisation, Bersih’s progression reflects a long-term struggle for institutional reforms, human rights and democracy.

While some argue that repression hinders mass mobilisation due to the added associated costs, others insist that repression increases grievances, which could lead to more united collective action. It has been argued that Bersih had achieved little in demanding the government make meaningful reforms. However, although state repression limited protests, over time, it has also facilitated the continued growth of civil society, which led to the crippling of the government’s political legitimacy (Khoo, 18 November 2016). Bersih is viewed by many as an ‘enemy’ under constant attack from the government and pro-BN groups, including the confrontational countermovement by the Red Shirts supported by UMNO. While BN strategically planned the repression of the Bersih protests, it miscalculated badly on the grievances of the people on the ground this provoked.

The GE14 that brought about the fall of BN’s hegemony after six decades raised questions about the role of the Bersih movement for political change in Malaysia. Bersih has shown that protests can cripple the state’s political legitimacy (Khoo, 2016). Citizens started to question the validity of their votes and demonstrate greater political awareness (Khoo, 2020). The Bersih movement became a mass movement that cut across all levels of society, triggering further repression from the state, but also changing the mindset of the general public. One key indicator is the authorities’ arrests of individuals linked to Bersih. Such repression reflects Bersih’s political potential to overturning the political landscape, by transcending the politics of ethnicity. We also see the increased participation and efforts from the ordinary people, not necessarily attached to civil society, in driving the agenda. There is now widespread acceptance that ordinary citizens play a crucial role in participating in national politics. The expansion of dissenting voices in the public sphere creates political opportunities for Bersih and other civil society groups to galvanise further support.

Conclusion

Since the formation of Bersih, Malaysian politics have been marked by contending discourses of political rights. The political landscape has been characterised by escalating social protests and movements, feeding into political transformation. This chapter sheds light on the expansion of political rights in Malaysia’s competitive authoritarian context. Bersih has brought about momentous changes, including increasing popular awareness of political rights, and popular participation in protests. This has resulted in the expansion of political rights. Such developments have also had a transformative effect on Malaysian political culture.