Keywords

Prince Sisowath Thomico is a cousin of Cambodian King Norodom Sihamoni. He was a personal aide of King-Father Sihanouk and a spokesman of the Royal Palace, and has been politically active in a range of political movements and parties, including royalist party FUNCINPEC and, most recently, opposition Cambodia National Rescue Party (CNRP). He currently serves as senator.

In 1993, royalist party FUNCINPEC won Cambodia’s first national elections after more than two decades of civil war—in a wave of popular enthusiasm for the monarchy (reintroduced the same year) that could not be detached from the popularity of king Sihanouk himself. How do you consider popular expectations on the monarchy and royalists to have changed over the past three decades?

In 1993, older people of my generation [Prince Thomico was born in 1952, ed.’s note], and the generation before, could remember what society was like before Lon Nol, before 1970. I think that there were two things. First, there was a kind of nostalgia of the past. People wanted to get past the war, the civil war, the divisions and so on, and go back to where we were before 1970.

Second, it was not only nostalgia. It was a willingness to start again from where we had been in 1970. Because at that time, we had a very liberal society. Even though then-prince Sihanouk was accused of autocracy, it was a free society, you know, a liberated society. I think that people wanted to go back to that. So, they supported the monarchy which was represented by Sihanouk. It was a real willingness to get back to the past and start from where we were in 1970, and forget those 23 years of civil war and divisions.

So what do you think happened during the 30 years that have passed since then?

Afterwards, I think that the FUNCINPEC did not deliver on its promises. I think there was a lot of disillusion among the people, who found out that the promises made during the electoral campaign were not fulfilled by the FUNCINPEC. So, I think that for the elections which came after, especially in 1998, the people were not very happy. The FUNCINPEC broke, you know, into the FUNCINPEC and the Sam Rainsy Party (SRP) [in 1994, Sam Rainsy was expelled from FUNCINPEC, and in 1995 he founded the Khmer Nation Party which would become the SRP, ed.’s note]. This presented that gap, which widened little by little, between the people who really were monarchist, and the people, younger people, represented by Sam Rainsy—because there was a generational gap as well. The FUNCINPEC was represented by the King—even though the power was held by Prince Ranariddh, then actually, the monarchy was represented by King Sihanouk. And, on the other side, you had younger people, represented by Sam Rainsy, who split from the main front of the FUNCINPEC. Those younger people didn’t really know society before 1970—most of them were born either during the Khmer Republic, or afterwards—some SRP leaders were even born during the Khmer Rouge. So, you know, they did not know society from before. They had no link, nothing bound them, to the monarchy.

I guess Sam Rainsy was born in 1949. Do you mean that there were not many from that generation, that the majority of that contingent were younger?

What is very interesting, in that respect, is that the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) people who are older—even now, the leadership of the CPP is older than the leadership of the opposition party—appear to be more monarchist than the opposition party. I know some of them who are profoundly monarchist, even though they belong to the CPP. So, there is that paradox, that former Communists are more linked to the monarchy and more royalist than the younger generation, who originally came from the royalist party.

In terms of a rift between the royalists and what I would call the democrats—including what used to be SRP—you describe it as a sort of generational gap. Do you think there is a deeper ideological divide in terms of the democrats’ intermittent engagement with liberalism, which distances them from monarchical ideas?

Let’s take a look at Cambodian society and Cambodian politics. Well, it’s completely true that Cambodian politics is governed by an autocracy. You know, all the powers are concentrated in Samdech Hun Sen. But otherwise, there is a free economy, there is a free society. Well, we have some limitations. But, you know, compared to some former Communist countries, we are still more liberal than them. And it takes time, you know, to build up democracy. In my opinion, democracy was betrayed by the democratic parties of Cambodia—to begin with, the FUNCINPEC and the SRP, and afterwards the Cambodia National Rescue Party (CNRP). They were supposed to represent democracy, but I think that there is a denial, a betrayal, of democracy within those parties. The opposition says that Hun Sen has been in power for more than 30 years, right? The leader of the opposition party, Sam Rainsy, has been leading for over 30 years as well. No change, no change in the hierarchy of the opposition party and no change in the hierarchy of the CPP.

During the CNRP, it was quite a bit different. Because Kem Sokha brought in new blood, you see. More conservative, more linked to the right, traditional Cambodian right, such as Son Sann. Son Sann was a royalist as well—even though he didn’t advocate the same policies as Prince Sihanouk or afterwards Prince Ranariddh, he was still profoundly royalist. So, I think that there is a split, there is a rift in Cambodian society. But, the rift is not between the CPP and the opposition: the rift is between the conservatives—whether leftist, represented by the CPP, or rightist, represented by the FUNCINPEC and part of the opposition represented by Kem Sokha—and, on the other side, the SRP, which represents the real Republicans and anti-royalist, anti-monarchy people.

With Sihanouk as a constitutional monarch, political royalism—as detached from Sihanouk—was free to be claimed by any political actor. This also reflects how historical Cambodian ideas of kingship can be understood more broadly as models of legitimate leadership, reflecting relative merit. There are also competing models of kingship, to be selectively invoked. This has resulted at times in a veritable competition over which political party has been the most “royalist”, with the CPP able to supplant royals in defining royalism. Do you think it is still meaningful to speak about royalist political ideas, and if so, how?

Cambodian history went through several phases between 1947 and 1993. Let me explain. When King Sihanouk was enthroned in 1941, he was an absolute monarch, such as Louis XIV in France, or even the tsar in Russia. In 1947 we had our first Constitution, which made Cambodia a constitutional monarchy. We had a period of transition, between 1947 and 1955. At that time, Sihanouk was king, and there were political parties, especially the Democratic Party, represented first by Prince Youtevong, and then by Ieu Koeus, Sim Var, In Tam and Son Sann, and so on. And you had other parties: the Liberal Party, etc.

But King Sihanouk thought that everything was chaos, Cambodian politics was chaos, so he ended the constitutional monarchy experiment in 1955. When he abdicated the throne to his parents, he continued to be King, and to govern. It meant putting King Suramarit and Queen Kossamak on the throne, and letting (King) Sihanouk become the real leader. Sihanouk was altogether King, you know—people used to call him Preah Karuna (Your Majesty), even though he had abdicated. So, he was at the same time the King and the political leader. The parentheses began in 1955: we went back to before 1947. Legally, Cambodia was still a constitutional monarchy, with a monarch who reigns but does not govern. But, just because of the personality of King Sihanouk, of Prince Sihanouk, then it was still a kind of absolute monarchy—he was monarch, and he was governing under the umbrella of the Sangkum Reastr Niyum.

So, the constitutional history of Cambodia was put between parentheses from 1955 up until 1993. We have the Khmer Republic [1970–1975], Democratic Kampuchea [1975–1979], and then the People’s Republic of Cambodia [1979–1989]. But [in 1993], we came back to 1947. If you look at the Constitutions of 1947 and of 1993, there is not much difference. Differences were brought by French constitutional lawyers, professors, who wrote the French 5th Republic constitution into the Constitution of Cambodia. But the principles were the principles that were lifted in 1947. So, from 1993 onwards, we learnt what a constitutional monarchy could be, what it could look like.

At that time, FUNCINPEC people were expecting King Sihanouk to have a more active role. But, Prince Ranariddh, because of his personality, wanted to lead and to govern. So, that was the problem. I think that if in 1993, Prince Ranariddh and Sam Rainsy (because Sam Rainsy was part of the team at that time) had the King be more active in politics, there wouldn’t have been two prime ministers. Hun Sen would have willingly worked with King Sihanouk. They worked together—they conducted negotiations during 4 years from 1987 up until 1991, just to get things done. So, I think that Hun Sen respected King Sihanouk, and was willing to work with him. But, since he saw that Prince Ranariddh was not willing to cooperate, and instead wanted to govern and impose his views and so on, there were these problems between the CPP and the FUNCINPEC at that time.

It is always said that it was Sihanouk who proposed the power-sharing formula?

Yes, that’s right. And since King Sihanouk was sidelined by Ranariddh, it was only natural for Hun Sen to defend his stance, and the stance of the CPP.

Does that mean that the expectation from some quarters within the FUNCINPEC was that Sihanouk would be the leader of the FUNCINPEC at the same time as he was King?

His role was inscribed in the constitution: he was the arbiter, the referee. But, because of the stance of Ranariddh, it did not occur.

Do you think Sihanouk would have liked to take a more active role at the time?

Yes. He always reproached his son for sidelining him, for putting him aside. It was always a reproach by King Sihanouk towards his son.

So what could royalism mean today with FUNCINPEC all but gone—I mean, the party has been revived but does not really carry any weight?

Everybody is learning. Sihamoni is learning. He is a transitional king. Because succeeding his father is very difficult. He doesn’t have the personality and the historical legitimacy of his father. So, for him, his role is that of a transitional king. Before him, there was Sihanouk; after him, we don’t know. We don’t know whether we will have another king in Cambodia, or if we will have a republic. So, King Sihamoni could be a transitional king, before the next king, or he could be a transitional king, before the proclamation of a republic in Cambodia. We don’t know. Nobody knows, actually. You can ask the CPP, they wouldn’t know. Even them, they don’t know.

You don’t think it has been decided yet?

It hasn’t been decided yet.

So, so far, I think that Sihamoni is the representative of royalism in Cambodia.

The King himself, then. It is easy to make a conceptual separation between the king and political parties—that is the line of thinking that constitutional monarchy relies on. You have the monarch and then you have political royalism. But you think that even to find political royalism in today’s Cambodia you would have to look to the king?

You know, I think that Cambodian society, Cambodian politicians, have to learn what a constitutional monarchy is. They don’t have the experience of Sweden, for example. Sweden has learnt what constitutional monarchy is. And Swedish people don’t expect the king to govern or to step in when there are political disputes. And here, we still have opposition members who want the king to step in. So, even though the role of the king is defined in the Constitution, people don’t understand. They still expect the King to have a more active role, the same role as King Sihanouk.

Sure. I guess this goes back to what you said, that Cambodia never before had a King who wasn’t also the leader, or aspired to be. And in that sense, it is King Sihamoni’s model that is anomalous. Do you think that this transition maybe leads back to the merger of political leadership and kingship—meaning that the political leader is the King? If the King is not the political leader, can the political leader become the King?

Yes, that’s right. Monarchy doesn’t mean kingship, you see? So long as the monarch, the king, doesn’t have any power, that is not kingship. The personality of Sihamoni is that he doesn’t want to get involved at all in politics—he has never been involved in politics, even though he was very close to his Father. And he doesn’t want to get involved in politics. He wants to start a real constitutional monarchy in Cambodia.

Do you think that is his project?

Yeah, that’s his project, his mission. I would like to tell you what he told me in 2004, when he was enthroned. At that time, I was King Sihanouk’s private assistant, but because Sihamoni had no experience, he asked me to come and help him. And he told me: I don’t want to get involved. As far as the press is concerned, I want you to deal with the press. And I tried to help him with the press, with the relations with the political parties, and so on. It was his belief and his profound stance that he didn’t want to get involved in politics. He wants to represent Cambodia. He wants to represent the people of Cambodia, whoever they are: either of the opposition or the ruling party. He doesn’t want to get involved at all, he just wants to represent Cambodia and the people of Cambodia, that’s it.

So, with the constitutional monarch that we now have in place then, what would royalist political ideas mean in this context?

If the people who are still royalist can teach Cambodian people, can send a message, can communicate, that the King is a symbol of the Cambodian nation, of Cambodian unity, if Sihamoni can be the symbol of Cambodian unity, then I think that the monarchy can go on in Cambodia, just like in North European countries. The king there is just the representative of the nation, of the people.

It is apolitical.

Apolitical.

So in terms of political ideas, there is no possibility of having royalist political ideas then?

Yes. But, for this to happen, there is still a very long way to go. We cannot compare the Cambodian monarchy today with European monarchies, because the political structures in Europe and in Cambodia are very different. In Europe, you have political structures which guarantee the freedom of political parties, of free speech, and so on, and you have entities, such as the courts, that are independent. In Cambodia, that’s not there. We have political parties, but as long as the courts will be under one political party, then royalism will be at risk, because the king will not be seen as a referee. The monarchy and the king have to be the ultimate recourse; now, they are not.

Royalist political ideas, then, would mean enabling the king to serve as the ultimate referee?

Yes, in Cambodia for now.

The CPP has supported itself on royal references in deepening authoritarianism since 2017. Prime Minister Hun Sen and the party have portrayed themselves as inheritors of the heritage of King-Father Sihanouk, such as his admonition for national unity. At the same time, Hun Sen has also performed rituals with royal overtones. Do you think that these royal references will continue to be important to the CPP for time to come? Or, will these royal references fade away with the demise of FUNCINPEC and a more circumscribed role for the royal family?

As I told you, the monarchy is represented by the CPP as well as by FUNCINPEC, because of the generational demography of those two parties. But not only because of that. The CPP has a past as a Communist party. It was founded in 1951 as a Communist party, the Kampuchean People’s Revolutionary Party. And as far as Hun Sen is concerned, his main goal is to find another legacy, another legitimacy. The CPP still celebrate their birth in 1951, just to tell Cambodian people that the party was born in 1951. There are no more references to the ideology: I mean to Marxism, Leninism, Maoism, whatever. There are no more references to Communism. So, the CPP has to find its legitimacy. And the monarchy, the rituals of the monarchy, gives them this opportunity. You know, the oknhas [tycoons] and the excellencies need that, just to cut their roots from Communism. I think that they need monarchy just for that, to give them legitimacy with the Cambodian people and with history as well.

It is a win–win situation for them. First of all, they need historical and sociological legacy and legitimacy. At the same time, they make use of the King and of the throne in order to tell the opposition and the Cambodian people that they are the defenders of the monarchy, and of the throne. And that’s one of the reasons why, you know, the opposition party has to play very well. Ever since I joined the opposition, I told Kem Sokha and Sam Rainsy: go and meet the King. Constitutionally, the prime minister has to meet the King every month. You, as the main opposition party, go and meet the King; report to him every month so that the King can be seen to be above the political parties, and so that Hun Sen and the CPP cannot make use of the King. But, for whatever reason, Sam Rainsy never accepted. It could have been different! It could have been very different if the opposition party went to meet the King every month, to report the situation. The relations between the Cambodian opposition and followers of the opposition, and their feeling towards the King, would have been different. But because of Sam Rainsy, this wasn’t done. Kem Sokha was willing, and whenever he couldn’t go to the royal palace for ceremonies, he would send his daughter, Kem Monovithya, to attend those.

One example of notions of a royalist pedigree that the CPP rests on to support its rule is the “Thank you peace” (orkon santepheap) discourse, which the government is promoting as part of deepening authoritarianism. This arguably has royal overtones, recalling Sihanouk’s role as father of peace. How do you consider that ideas of peace and national unity are evolving, if you compare with Sihanouk’s vision?

I think that peace was always the main concern of King Sihanouk, and of Prince Sihanouk. The reason that he wanted Cambodia to become neutral after independence was to preserve the peace, because at that time there was the Cold War global bloc conflict, and on the regional level, you had the Vietnam war, which was just a proxy war. He wanted to avoid Cambodia stepping into the conflict, which was why he joined the non-aligned movement, in 1956. Peace was always the main concern of Sihanouk.

And, for Hun Sen, the motto “Thank you peace” is just meant to say that every achievement which has been made is due to peace. It is correct that the CPP under Hun Sen and King Sihanouk during the Sangkum Reastr Niyum have had about the same concerns, you see: peace and unity. But the context is quite different. We don’t have this bloc conflict now, and so it was easy to have peace. We haven’t had armed rebellion. During the Sangkum Reastr Niyum, we had armed rebellion, from one side the Khmer Serei, and from the other, the Khmer Rouge. So, the political conflict is quite different today. But Hun Sen is making use of the peace, just to show that every achievement has been attained through peace. The only thing that he hasn’t achieved is unity; there is still much extremism in Cambodian society.

You are the royal family member who has remained politically active for the longest. Reflecting Cambodia’s changing historical fortunes, you have supported a range of political projects—from Republicanism in the 1970s, to seeking to revive royalism by going back to the King-Father’s Sangkum Reastr Niyum-era thought, when I first met you in the 2000s. The latest party you joined, however, was the CNRP. In your view, what remaining value do political ideas of a royal lineage hold for Cambodia at this moment in time? Or have those notions already been supplanted by a new and different struggle?

To answer your question is very easy. I would like to draw a parallel with King Sihanouk. King Sihanouk used to make movies. In each of his movies, he was depicting Cambodia, he was talking about Cambodia, and Cambodia was the star of all his movies. For me it was the same. I joined a number of political parties, but I had only two concerns: peace and unity. Whatever the regime—because monarchies can be dictatorships, such as Nepal used to be, and republics can be dictatorships as well, and on the other side, monarchies can be democracies, such as the European monarchies, which are the most advanced democracies in the world, even more advanced than America, whatever American people might think. My only concern, whatever the party, was to give the message that whatever you think, whatever you do, you have to have one goal, and that goal is to give peace to the Cambodian people, so that Cambodian people can develop. And get united towards that goal. You can have different ideas, you can have different ideologies, as long as we have a common goal and that goal is the welfare of the Cambodian people, the wellbeing of the Cambodian people. This was my discourse, this was my message, whether it was under Lon Nol or with the FUNCINPEC, and lately with the CNRP. I never joined the SRP.

This was always my concern. And this was the political stance of King Sihanouk himself: peace, unity, development. He tried to achieve the three during the Sangkum Reastr Niyum. Peace: being neutral, not getting involved in the bloc conflict. Cambodian people’s unity: that’s the reason why he made a gathering of parties. The Sangkum Reastr Niyum was not a political party, it was a gathering of political parties. And development: during the Sangkum Reastr Niyum, King Sihanouk made every effort to develop the country. What we see now is about the same. Peace, unity, and development.

These are the keywords?

These are still the keywords. But we didn’t have the same political discourse during the Sangkum as now. During the Sangkum, I think the political stances were more mature than they are now. I don’t think there was that extremism during the Sangkum, so it was much easier for the King to gather the people, and only the people who were members of armed rebellion did not join—those were minorities. But now, I think that Cambodian politics is more extremist. On one side there is the extremism of Sam Rainsy’s people, on the other side, the supporters of Hun Sen. So, I think that peace has been achieved on the regional level, but not as a society. There cannot be peace when there is no justice. And my stance will still be to try to have my voice heard. I would like to push for justice: social justice, economic justice, and political justice in Cambodian society.

One parallel that is often made is that the Sangkum Reastr Niyum was an autocracy, and that today’s Cambodia is also an autocracy. The same keywords seem to be important now as then…

They are different kinds of autocracies. Autocracy during King Sihanouk was almost legitimate—he was the King, and supported by the people of Cambodia. Under the Sangkum Reastr Niyum, whatever can be said about it, there was a kind of freedom. People could vote, for voting they were not under threat. As for now, political parties are not… there is no freedom I think, that is the first difference. The second difference is that Sihanouk did not feel insecure. So, he didn’t have to make use of the courts against political opponents. As for now, the real problem facing the courts in Cambodia is the CPP. The CPP feels insecure and makes use of the courts to remain in power. That’s the big difference. And as long as the CPP will make use of the courts, then they will never achieve unity in Cambodian society and, as I said, the role of the King will be shaken as well. The court and the King are referees. The courts are social referees, economic referees and political referees. If the courts don’t play their role, then it’s up to the King, but he is not in a position to play the role as a referee. So as long as the courts will be under the CPP, the royalists and the monarchy in Cambodia will be under threat and will be jeopardised.

You just said that you think that King-Father Sihanouk enjoyed greater legitimacy than the current government does. How do you think that royalist ideas have marked ideas of legitimate leadership that we see in Cambodia today?

I think that there is no more royalist message. You see, the old messages, the earlier messages, just refer to the king, and that’s not enough. It’s not enough to secure the… how to say… the ideology of royalism and monarchy. It’s not enough to secure the relevance of the king and of the monarchy. It’s not sufficient to secure the long-lastingness of the king. Because there is no message, no royalist message, and no political party whatsoever has a royalist message, whether the CPP or the FUNCINPEC: both parties just make use of the King. “We need the king, we need Cambodia to be a kingdom, a monarchy”. But they don’t explain why. This is the political message that is lacking now among Cambodian political parties.

It seems to me that the CPP has gained in legitimacy over the past few years and are much more popular now than they were at the start of the current electoral term, when the CNRP had recently been dissolved. Do you see royalist ideas having a part? Might this hail back to those royalist ideas of peace and national unity that the CPP claim to have embraced?

The CPP cannot be legitimate when there is no opposition. For as long as the opposition is banned, as long as Kem Sokha is not free, the CPP will not be legitimate. Just because an opposition party is allowed… The Candlelight Party, for example, is just a shadow of itself, as long as the leader is not there…. So, no, I don’t think the CPP is legitimate. I think that the elections which were held in 2017 showed that people did not support the CPP. Their votes were split, and this was only commune elections, not even national elections. So, I think that since 2018 the CPP is not legitimate and even though they need the royal legacy, even though they need the royal legitimacy, they do not spread the royalist, monarchist message. They just communicate through the king, but there is nothing in their political messages that is a reference to monarchy and royalism.

So, how would you characterise—of course it would necessarily be a gross generalisation—but how would you outline popular ideas about legitimate leadership in Cambodia today? Do you see that anything remains from the royalist times?

I think that until 1970, no one in Cambodia thought of a society without a king. Since 1993, no political party, nobody, ever even tried to come back to that period before 1970 and explain what monarchy, what royalism could be. It was always references to King Sihanouk, that’s it, but no message. If you look at the communication of the FUNCINPEC, from then until now, nothing is of relevance to the Cambodian society under monarchy, you see. I think that the idea of monarchy has to be rebuilt from now on, from the roots up.

Do you think there is a void in terms of models of legitimate leadership? Is there no clear idea anymore of what is legitimate?

The King will be legitimate when there is no more contestation of his role. But for as long as there is a discussion about his role, then he will be shaky, he will be jeopardised. So, we have to make sure that his role is not discussed, that he is accepted as the king, and Cambodian society can move on and build a lasting monarchy.

In the same spirit: no political party in European monarchies make any reference to the king or the queen. They don’t need to, because they know that those societies accept the king or the queen as they are, the king and the queen as institutions. So, there is no discussion about the role of the king or the queen. And now in Cambodia, the only royalist message is just a reference to the King—not as an institution, but as a person.

There is a void, represented by the lack of political message explaining what monarchy is, what the role of the king is, what the roles of political parties are, and so on. Everything has to be synchronised somehow, you know. It’s part of a mechanism. Everything has to move together: the king, political parties, the institutions. But now, the parts are not moving together. You have the government, you have the courts, you have the king, you have the political parties. Those elements do not move together. Once all those elements move together in harmony, then we can say that Cambodia is a lasting monarchy.

It is very nebulous what people actually think, what actually holds legitimacy in a society, right? Even the politicians don’t know—there is an information gap.

We are living in transition. Sihamoni is transitional. The CPP is in transition. They have to transition from a communist party to a legitimate party. The opposition, you know, there is no legal opposition, there is society as a whole. So, the CPP is looking for its legitimacy, the opposition is looking for its way, and the king is trying to find his way as well.

What do you think are traits associated with leadership that hold large-scale legitimacy in Cambodia today? I am thinking for example of peace promotion, would that be something that incontestably gives legitimacy? Are there other traits?

We don’t know, because there are so many ways. As far as the CPP is concerned, it can take the example of China or Vietnam, or it can take Singapore as a model. They are transitioning, they are trying to find their way. And the opposition has to find its way, and the king has to find his way as well. Because all those are moving parts, and the only non-moving part is the king. So, the king has to find his balance. It’s difficult for him, it’s difficult for everybody.

How do you anticipate the future of political royalism and of the royal family? Of political ideals associated with the monarchy?

I don’t have any idea—just like I told you, Sihamoni is a transitional king. We don’t know what will happen after him—whether there will be another king, or a republic. So, I don’t know. I’m just trying to promote what monarchy could and should be in Cambodia, that’s my only purpose. Based on peace, unity and justice. Those have to be the three feet, the three supports of the monarchy in Cambodia.

Do you have a sense of how the King feels that things have evolved under his reign, since that conversation you had back in 2004?

I don’t really know how the king feels. I think he feels more comfortable, more secure. But don’t ask him to defend his role.

He is always depicted as a reluctant monarch.

He still is. Just because of those moving parts, you see. Once all those parts are stabilised, then you can have a stable king, a stable monarchy.

Eighteen years is a long time to be in transition… Earlier this month, on the 15th of October, I attended the commemorative meditation ceremony organised by the Union of Youth Federations of Cambodia (UYFC) for the 10-year death anniversary of the King-Father, at Wat Botum. Most CPP youth leaders participated.

As I said, they [the CPP] have to have legitimacy in Cambodian society. The two institutions which can give them this legitimacy are the king and religion. So, this ceremony, next to the Royal Palace, was to reach both religion and king.

Yes. When I attended the ceremony, it looked to me as if the association between monarchy and power has been reversed: monarchy leads to power—but here it was power that leads to monarchy. It wasn’t even about appropriating royal symbols anymore: it was more about CPP youth leaders performing a regal function. To me it was very impressive. It looked as if they were performing kingship.

They are, yeah. As I said, the CPP has to find legitimacy, but at the same time they are making use of the king and the monarchy. They have to anchor themselves in the roots of Cambodian society, which used to be a very royalist society, a very religious society. So, they make use of this to build their own legitimacy… And at the same time, they make use of those key institutions to increase their power.

Right. So the question should really be, being a legitimate political leader, if not royal, does that sort of point in the direction of the monarchy?

Yes, but once again, you are asking about the role of the opposition. In that context, what is the message of the opposition? There is a void, you see. So, it is very important for the opposition to be clear—and so far, they haven’t been.