Keywords

As trade expanded and Western pressure on Southeast Asia increased throughout the nineteenth century, the sole way for Southeast Asian polities to preserve some political independence was by introducing Western institutional and economic frames so as to avoid these being imposed by force. The Westerners promoted abstractions—Nation-State, Liberal State—that were particularly noxious for Southeast Asian societies, since they tended to modify the link of subordination between the King and the State. This state of affairs induced the development of a more depersonalised administration; by inventing administrative nationality and effective borders delimitations, citizenship and ethnicity were created from scratch. With modernisation, a new class of executives took shape: first, the military, with the creation of permanent armies, then civilians, with the development of legal codes of Romano-Germanic inspiration and Western training. These new elites resented not only the resilience of traditional hierarchies, but also the yoke of colonial administrations. Kingship was increasingly perceived in the Malay world as both compromised by its collaboration with the invasive colonial governments—which denied democracy beyond their metropolitan territories—and antithetic to the ideologies conveyed by the same colonial West, such as the teleology of progress, its application of modernisation (Mikaelian, 2022) and its economic correlate, so-called development.

Western colonial presence could thus have been expected to obliterate Southeast Asian kingship—colonised or not—by the time of independence. Yet, four kingdoms remain in contemporary ASEAN, namely Thailand, Cambodia, Brunei, and Malaysia. The Malay Sultanates persisted within the Federation of Malaya (1948–1963), before and after independence; subsequently, after its enlargement as Malaysia in 1963, the Federation maintained the model of a constitutional rotating kingship. Federal Malaysia today includes 9 sultanates out of 13 states, making it a contemporary laboratory of modern Malay kingship. To examine the resilience of kingship in contemporary Malaysia, it is necessary to first go beyond present legislation to evaluate the cultural legitimacy of Malay kingship through its historical and semantic dimensions, which place kingship—alongside Islam—at the core of Malay identity. Thereafter, I will examine the construction of the Federal and States constitutional framework. Finally, I shall explain how contemporary Malay kingship has been able to maintain its legitimacy since the 1960s by using three emblematic tools enabled by modernisation: education, networking, and entrepreneurship.

Malay Kingship: Cultural Semantics

The fundamentals of modern Malay kingship (kerajaan Melayu, Andaya, 2001: 315–330)—starting with the Malaka sultanate up to its destruction by the Portuguese—can be grasped through its myth of foundation (Chambert-Loir, 2005), Sulalat al-Salatin (genealogy of Kings, aka Sejarah Melayu) compiled for the first time around 1612 (Chambert-Loir, 2017) from ancient lore. It first relates the beginning of the Malaka dynasty: the enthronement of Sri Tri Buana (the forefather of Malay kings) in Palembang; then, following one of the numerous versions of the chronicle,Footnote 1 the foundation of Malaka by Raja Iskandar, Sri Tri Buana’s great-great-grandson, in the late fourteenth century and the miraculous conversion to Islam of Raja Iskandar’s son, Raja Tengah, during his sleep.

Turning the clock back again, the mention of Palembang in the Sejarah Melayu refers to Srivijaya: excavations undertaken by P. Y. Manguin (1987, 2019) locate the epicentre of this ancient Malay kingdom in Palembang. There is no indigenous or narrative source which describes the organisation of Indianised kingship in Srivijaya other than the epigraphs (de Casparis, 1956; Griffiths, 2018), particularly the Telaga Batu (c. 686), which mention titles. However, it is possible to reconstruct some pieces of the puzzle by combining the various epigraphic documents with Indian, Chinese and especially Arab sources, and to compare the results with the latest archaeological data. Judging from these scarce and fragmented elements, Srivijaya’s kingship was based on a conception of space in terms of river basin, of which the king occupied the mouth. The mahārāja of Srivijaya, who bore the ancient Malay title of (h)āji (king) and whose usual address, judging by seventh-century inscriptions, was punta hiyang “Your Holiness”, managed the riparian communities outside the royal domain through local chiefs. Downstream (hilir) was a social space controlled through datu(k)/dato; as for the upstream (hulu, mountainous uncontrolled space), it escaped the tutelage of the king as long as it supplied the army and the royal domain with manpower.

A high place of Sanskrit culture, Srivijaya practised Tantric Buddhism and became a powerful thalassocracy. The expeditions of the rival Indian Chola (Thanjavur) empire against Srivijaya during the eleventh century triggered a progressive decline of its commercial network. In the fourteenth century, the Siamese gradually took over the principalities of the Malay Peninsula; following the rejection of Javanese hegemony, Palembang was destroyed by Majapahit. The last scion of the Srivijaya lineage fled to Singapore, where he rebuilt an Indianised kingship. To resist the joint pressure of the Javanese and Siamese kingdoms, who held him in a vice-like grip, the third king of Singapore (Linehan, 1947) plaid the card of the Indo-Muslim networks, in the wake of Islamised Pasai or Perlak in north Sumatra. With the conversion of the founder of Malaka, who took the name of Iskandar and the title of Sultan, Islam was now anchored on both sides of the Malaka Strait. It was only with the foundation of Malaka that the world “Melayu,” which previously had designated a kingdom in Sumatra, qualified the Muslim rulers of Malaka and their local Muslim subjects (Andaya, 2001).

The impact of this change of paradigm on kingship can be seen in the terminology related to political power in the oldest Malay texts written in Jawi script, which date back to the end of the fourteenth century, and have been indexed by the Malay Concordance Project.Footnote 2 These are the Hikayat Bayan Budiman (c. 1370), Hikayat Amir Hamzah (c. 1380), and Hikayat Raja Pasai (c. 1390)Footnote 3—the first two have been adapted from Indo-Persian models, and the latter is purely Malay. In this corpus, five words are used to designate the king: Yang di-Pertuan “the one who has been made the lord” (16 occurrences in the first two texts); the ancient Malay word āji (25); the Indianised term raja (119); the Arabic title of sulṭān (342); and the vernacular Malay tuanku (‘my lord’, 524Footnote 4), of which use appears similar to those the Siamese chao. The indigenous word tuanku is thus more present than sulṭān in the corpus; sulṭān is three times more frequent than raja, while the ancient Malay āji was only marginally present.

From the beginning of the sixteenth century (as shown by the Sejarah Melayu), princes sometimes hold the title of pangeran (pengiran), etymologically “the one who controls the downstream (h)ilir”—a title of Javanese origin, still in use in Brunei today. Far from being merely a semantic vestige, this term indicates a certain institutional topology, as all Malay sultanates (including Brunei) developed along rivers, from mouth to upstream. It was the raja that determined the polity and not the territory that made the king: kerajaan [where there is a raja] (Milner, 1981) refers to the government, as well as the kingdom.Footnote 5

Returning to the King himself, judging by the previous lexical remarks and in particular the use of the word raja (a title is still in use by the ruler of Perlis and by Perak’s royals), it can be hypothesised that the Islamisation of kingship resulted in its partial desacralisation. Kingship lost its function as a link between the world of Gods and the world of Men: sultan means “the one who has power”. However, available Malay sources depict a much more nuanced positioning of the Malay King. Not only did Malay kingship became consubstantial with Islam, as shown by the motto “Sultan, Shah [King in Persian] and nāṣir al-dunyā wa’l-dīn [helper of the World and Religion]” (Milner, 1981) minted on the first Malaka coins, but, as his Abbasid and Persian forebears, the Malay king was considered as zillullahi fil-’alam [Allah’s shadow on Earth]Footnote 6: “the imam of all human beings because all the Kings bring the order of the Prophet SAW, because the King is the shadow of Allah ta ‘ala and replaces the Prophet”.Footnote 7 As such, the cap halilintarFootnote 8 given to the sultans of Perak (who pin it on their headgear) during their installation bears the inscription “Sultan Muhammad ShahFootnote 9 Dzil Allah fil-Alam”—a ritual performed anew in May 2015 for Sultan Nazrin Shah.

Even more subtly, Malay kingship maintained up to present court rituals with partly Brahmanic structures (de Vienne, 2021). In six out of the nine Malaya sultanates (Johor, Perak, Pahang, Selangor, Negeri Sembilan and Kelantan),Footnote 10 in the chiefdoms of Negeri Sembilan and in Brunei, enthronement includes a rite of lustration (istiadat bersiram, comparable to the one performed in Thailand which there gave its name to the coronation ceremony or ratchaphisekFootnote 11)—even though the religious dimension of all celebrations relating to Malay kingship is fully Islamised, with prayers all along the ceremonies and the presence of clerics reading al-Quran.

Malay kingship is thus a multifaceted symbolic device at the crossroads of an Indian legacy, Islam as a State religion, and local custom (adat-istiadat), which confers to the royal institution a full cultural legitimacy as the nexus of Malay identity. This is illustrated by the name given to national ideology in Brunei: Melayu Islam Beraja “Malay=Muslim and having a king”.

Institutionalising Malay Sultanates Within a Malayan Kingdom

The Attrition of Kings

Notwithstanding their identarian legitimacy, the survival of Malaysia’s princely states was far from obvious. The residential system implemented by the British since the treaty of Pangkor (1874) progressively restrained the effective power of the Malay rulers vis-à-vis custom and Islam in the protectorates (Perak, Selangor, Negeri Sembilan and since 1888, Pahang), the resident administering in the rulers’ name. The setting up of the Federated Malay States (FMS) in 1895 further reduced the function of the rulers to rubber-stamping the Resident-General’s decisions,Footnote 12 the latter becoming the head executive of all the states in 1896. A first durbarFootnote 13 (conference of FMS rulers) convened in 1897. Conversely, the five unfederated Malay states remained independent—formally. In Johor, though sultan Abu Bakar implemented administrative reforms and granted a constitution in 1894 declaring the sultanate a sovereign state, his son Ibrahim, lured by British rhetoric, applied for an adviser in 1909. Five years later, he consented to the advisor’s supervision by the Governor of the Straits Settlements (aka High Commissioner), but resisted further encroachments. Kedah, having been financially rescued by Siam in 1905, had to accept the creation of a State Council and appointment of a financial advisor by Bangkok. As Siam transferred its suzerainty over Kedah, Perlis, Kelantan and Terengganu to the British in 1909, the four states fell under British orb, though remaining as Johor independent—but infeudated—states, which resulted in the presence of a British adviser too. In any case, the five unfederated Malay rulers preserved much more effective political power than those of the Federated Malay States. Terengganu even adopted a constitution by its own in 1911. British grip induced an upsurge of Malay nationalism and the creation (among others) of the Kesatuan Melayu Muda (KMM, Young Malay Union) in 1938.

Things changed when the Japanese Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere expanded to Southeast Asia in 1942. Johor fell under the direct supervision of Sionan, aka Singapore, in July 1942; the other Malay states became provinces ruled by a Japanese governor under the Malaya Military Administration (MMA), which included the other side of the Malacca strait, their rulers losing their kingly status (Suwannathat-Pian, 2010: 102) and (in the unfederated Malay States) their political prerogatives. Two months later, however, the Japanese accepted the use of honorific titles by the former rulers; in January 1943 they recognised their authority over Islamic affairs and restored their pensions. In October 1943, the MMA abandoned Sumatra, while the suzerainty of the four northern sultanates was first retroceded to Thailand, then to the British in August 1945. At the end of the Japanese occupancy, who set up Malay chief ministers answering directly to their Japanese supervisors, the role of the Malay rulers was reduced to almost nothing but historical reminiscences.

The British wanted both to refrain from recognising any Malay ruler before evaluating his war-time behaviour, and compel all Malay rulers to surrender their sovereignty, meaning that if and only if the latter accepted to abandon their rights they could be confirmed as rulers—though the constitutions of Johor and Terengganu explicitly forbade their rulers to do so. Moreover, as not all of the rulers’ councils had been consulted either, the rulers’ signature could be contested. For the first time in history, all Malay States would be federated in a single structure, the Malayan Union, including two former Straits Settlements, Malacca and Penang. As the question of citizenship for non-Malays raised the opposition of Malay nationalists, these joined efforts with the rulers to abolish the Malayan Union plan. Hence the foundation of UMNO (United Malays National Organisation) at Johor’s Istana Besar (Grand Palace) on May 11, 1946. As declared by Dato’ Onn bin Jafaar (UMNO’s first president) the following day (12 May 1946) at the Palace, “the rulers of this Malay land will never again ignore their subjects […]” (Suwannathat-Pian, 2010: 124). This new paradigm was illustrated by demonstrations against the rulers of Kedah and Kelantan at the end of 1947, over the right of the sultans to appoint a chief-minister disavowed by UMNO and its allies.

Malaya was “saddled with opposing interests” (YAM Rajah Azlan Shah, 1982): Chinese and Indians deplored Malays’ “special rights”; the rulers feared losing the political prerogatives that had just been returned to them, considering the fate of Indian princely states (Tunku Abdul Rahman, 1977: 27); and Malay nationalists wanted both supremacy and democracy. The Federation of Malaya agreement on February 1, 1948 restored the pre-war status of the rulers and created a Conference of Rulers, including both the sultans and the chief ministers of each state. Open competition between the rulers and UMNO started in 1949, for the championship of the special rights of the Malays and the balance between Federal and State jurisdictions. First elections to the Federal Legislative CouncilFootnote 14 were held in July 1955. The task to write a federal constitution was entrusted to the Reid Commission,Footnote 15 which started working in Malaya from June 1956 up to February 1957. The draft constitution produced by the Reid Commission was then reviewed by a working party including representatives from the BarisanFootnote 16 and the rulers. The latter demanded the restoration of some of their former rights, such as the appointment of their proper Menteri Besar (Chief Minister) and State executive council. The Barisan’s leader, Tunku Abdul Rahman, himself from princely background but at odds with his royal half-brother Sultan Badlishah, systematically opposed the attribution of any political functions to the rulers beyond “Muslim religion and Malay custom”. Due to disagreement over the repartition of financial resources between Federal and State budgets, the rulers’ representatives (who championed the States’ interests) even boycotted the 17th working meeting (Fernando, 2014). As a result, “the Merdeka |Independence] Constitution became a masterpiece of compromise” (Azlan Shah, 1982: 256).

King and Royal Rulers

The 1957 Constitution instituted a rotating royal head of State: the King (Yang di-Pertuan AgongFootnote 17) who may resign at any time or be removed from office by the Conference of Rulers. The King and his deputy (Timbalan Yang di-Pertuan Agong) are appointed by the Majlis Raja Raja (Conference of Rulers, here the sole nine sultans, excluding the governors of the four other statesFootnote 18) for a 5-year term, demonstrating the statutory precedence of sultans over governors.

The process is directly inspired by the former rotation of the rulers of Negeri Sembilan. This was a federation of nine territories or luak—following a quinary symbolism made of two times four territories plus that of Sri Menanti which constituted the centre—to which were added three territories of third rank. The total 12 territories were placed under the guardianship of the Yang di-Pertuan Besar (abbreviated in Yamtuan Besar) (Josselin de Jong, 1980: 151–163), who was chosen among the nine dynasties, and until 1830, also by the ruler of Pagar Ruyong (i.e. Minangkabau country in Sumatra). The Yamtuan Besar married the daughter of their predecessor upon their arrival in Sri Menanti. After twenty years of internal conflicts between the main luak (1869–1887), the system was reactivated by the British, who reconstituted the confederation of Negeri Sembilan (1889) and then reintroduced (1898) the function of Yang di-Pertuan Besar, this time conferring on it—in order to avoid further conflicts—a lineage dimension. The Yang di-Pertuan Besar had to be chosen from the descendants of the penultimate sovereign of the previous confederation (Encyclopedia of Malaysia, 2011).

According to the 1957 Constitution, the Agong fulfils three main functions:

  1. 1.

    Religious. As Islam is the religion of the Federation, in States that do not have a royal ruler (i.e., Malacca, Penang, Sarawak and Sabah), and in the three territories managed by the Federal authorities (Kuala Lumpur, Putrajaya and Labuan), the function as the head of Islam is exercised by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong (Federal Constitution, 3 § 2, 3 and 5). The royal rulers of States may ask the Yang di-Pertuan Agong to represent them in the exercise of their function as religious leader at the federal level.

  2. 2.

    Symbolic. The King is the Supreme Commander of the Federation Armed Forces, and as the ruler of the Federation, he has the power of mercy: pardoning and reducing sentences for persons convicted by court-martial and the courts of the federal territories (Constitution, art. 42 § 1)—assisted by a single Pardons Board for the three territories (ibid., § 11).

  3. 3.

    Political. The King both summons ParliamentFootnote 19 at regular intervals (less than 6 months between the last sitting in one session and the first sitting in the next) and may on request of the Prime Minister prorogue or dissolve the Parliament (art. 40 § 2). He has 30 days to give assent or return a bill, explaining his decision in the latter case. He chooses the Prime Minister from the majority of the House of Representatives, while ministers are designated on advice of the Prime Minister. As the Chief executive of the kingdom, the King acts on advice of the Cabinet only (art. 40 § 1); he is thus entitled, at his request, to any information concerning the government. After consultation with the Conference of Rulers (including the four governors), he nominates the Election Commission (7 members). At his discretion, he can withhold his consent to Parliament dissolution,Footnote 20 or convene a meeting of the Conference of Rulers (restricted to the 9 sultans) to discuss their positions and honours. He may proclaim a state of emergency (art. 150) too, and govern by ordinances, notwithstanding that proclamation and ordinances may be revoked by Parliament. The King appoints two-thirds of the Senators (44 out of 68): 40 persons who have rendered distinguished public service or achieved distinction, or represent the interests of Aborigines (orang asli), plus two members for the federal territory of Kula Lumpur and one each for Labuan and Putrajaya (art. 45). After consultation with the Chief Minister of the State concerned, the King appoints the four Yang di-Pertua Negeri (governors of Malacca, Penang, Sarawak, and Sabah for a term of four years.

The power and functions of the princely rulers are similar to those of the Federal King, but at the regional scale of the states. Regardless of constitutional specificities (Harding, 2012), all Malaysian sovereigns are in their respective states the head of Islam—meaning that they appoint the State religious officials, mufti, judges and officers of the Syariah courts, and issue accreditations with the assistance of their Islamic Religious Council, as well as the warrant of the special rights of Malays. They choose their chief minister (menteri besar) among the majority of the States’ Parliaments, and on his advice appoint between four and ten ministers. If rulers have the right to pardon offences committed in their respective states, it is only after consultation with the State’s Bureau of pardon, of which they are chairpersons. On request of their chief minister, they can give or withhold their consent to the dissolution of State Parliament. As chief executives, rulers can only act in accordance with the decisions of the local Executive Council (Government), with the exception of the provisions affecting the succession to the throne which follow adat (Malay custom), such as the roles of Malay customary dignitaries and Negeri Sembilan ruling chiefs which may not be amended by Federal or State Legislatures.

Following their respective constitutions, in all Malaysian States with a royal ruler, the chief minister must be an ethnic Malay professing Islam. This enshrines the ketuanan (lordship) of the autochthonous (strict equivalent of bumiputera) Malays into the logics of both Kingship and Constitutions—although the ruler may dispense with this requirement if he estimates necessary to do so, which has never happened so far (Tay, 2018). In the nine sultanates, the land rights of the Malays are protected through Malay reservations,Footnote 21 which today represent a total of 3,237,485 ha (24.5% of Peninsular Malaysia); in the event of any doubt related to the dealing of such lands, the Menteri Besar refers the matter to the Sultan, whose decision will be final.Footnote 22 This makes the Ruler the embodiment of Malay land ownership.

Unfortunately for the royal rulers, their powers were reduced in 1993 by amendments depriving all of them, including the Yang di-Pertuan Agong, of immunity.Footnote 23 The measure was endorsed by the Conference of Rulers, then chaired by Sultan Azlan Shah of Perak—himself a highly respected authority on Malaysian law as he had been Lord President of the Federal Court, the highest judicial post in Malaysia, up to his ascent on the Perak throne in 1984. Since then, at the request of the attorney-general (art. 183), Their Royal Highnesses might be investigated (which implies resignation) and tried in their personal capacity. Established in 1993, the Special Court (art 182 § 2–3)Footnote 24 has the exclusive right to try all offences committed in the Federation by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong or the Ruler of a State (Federal Constitution, 2010, art. 182 § 1–4), and all civil cases by or against the Yang di-Pertuan Agong or the Ruler of a State.

This loss of immunity brought about the modification of provisions relating to pardon (art. 42 § 12–13). If pardon is to be exercised for a Yang di-Pertua, his wife or children, such powers shall be implemented by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong on the advice of the Pardon Board of the respective State. For the Yang di-Pertuan Agong, a Ruler, or their Consorts, pardon shall be heard by the Conference of Rulers,Footnote 25 who shall consider any written opinion delivered by the Attorney General. For the children of the Agong or a Ruler, pardon shall be heard by the specific Ruler delegated by the Conference of Rulers, in accordance with the advice of the relevant Pardons Board. The Ruler, Yang di-Pertua or Agong, if concerned, will thus be excluded from the Conference of Rulers. Prime Minister Mahathir’s cabinet added a final touch to these amendments, by suppressing all extra-constitutional privileges enjoyed by rulers, such as the Agong’s weekly audience with the Prime Minister, the financing of extra-budgetary expenses, special hospital quarters, and royal vehicles plates.

The 1993 amendments left the royal rulers weaker than ever, to a point where Western-trained political observers predicted that Malaysian kingship might disappear (Ahmad Fauzi Abdul Hamid, 2013) during the following two decades. Yet, Malay royal institution survived the 1997–1999 Asian financial crisis, as well as the September 11 stupor, the 2008 general elections and even the UMNO’s collapse in 2018. As HRH Sultan Azlan Shah (2004, 257) wrote presciently in 1982, “one cannot deny the role played by the Rulers behind the scene”.

Explaining Resilience: Kingship vs Malaysia

Since the first making of the Federation, Malay Kingship appears increasingly challenged by political and economic development (Syed Husin Ali, 2013).Footnote 26 Even if the Malay population of Peninsular Malaysia increased from a mere 50% of its total population in 1957 up to 72.5% in the last census (2020), thus inflating the political weight of Malays, following Raja Nazrin Shah (2004) “the question is bound to be asked whether the Rulers … [remain] the exclusive preserve of just the one community, the Malays”. Moreover, urbanisation (77.7% of Malaysians lived in cities in 2021, to be compared with 42.8% in 1981) and inter-city mobility have substantially severed the territorial link between the ruler and his subjects during the last four decades, all the more so as in most states (Perak, Pahang, Perlis, Kelantan, Negeri Sembilan, Selangor and Johor) economic capital is distinct from the royal seat. By consequence, the royal rulers must build their legitimacy not only among other ethnic groups than Malays (which might also imply distancing themselves from UMNO) but also among Malays. As Nazrin Shah already wrote in 2004, “todays’ generation […] are more likely to be sceptical of the relevance and value of the monarchy”.

Facing these new challenges, the royal aristocracyFootnote 27 had no other choice but follow the mainstream developments of Malaysia, i.e., developing skills and taking on careers previously unknown to them.

Careers Before Crowns

Royals have gone into professional careers—for three reasons. At a difference from European kingship, such as that in France up to 1870, in most States the throne is not automatically inherited by the ruler’s eldest son. In Kedah, the successor is the eldest male in the agnatic line of descent of Sultan Badlishah (1894-r.1943/1958). In Perak, according to the 1948 Constitution,Footnote 28 the successor is the prince holding the title of Raja Muda, notwithstanding the fact that the ruler cannot remove the titles and ranks conferred by his predecessor. Once the Raja Muda ascends the throne, the Raja di-Hilir becomes the new Raja Muda, and so on, according to the order of precedence.Footnote 29 In Negeri Sembilan, the Yamtuan Besar is elected among the princes of Sri Menanti by the main chiefs. In five other States, succession is theoretically determined by male primogeniture among the descendants of a specific ruler,Footnote 30 though since the 1920s most of the rulers—but not all—have been succeeded by their eldest son or surviving brother or uncle. Only in modern Johor, the succession of the recent Temenggong Bugis dynasty (Trocki, 2007) follows male primogeniture of the ruling sultan, as upon his accession to the Johor throne, the sovereign chooses his heir apparent, and can replace him (1895 Constitution, art. 7).

The second factor of change has been the increasing life-expectancy, which prompted a late accession to the throne for seven out of today’s nine rulers: Tungku Sallehudin (Kedah) was 75 years old; Tuanku Muhriz (Negeri Sembilan) 70; Tengku Abdullah (Pahang) 60; Nazrin Shah (Perak) 58; Syed Sirajuddin (Perlis) 57; Tengku Idris Shah (Selangor) 56; and Tengku Ibrahim Iskandar (Johor) 52 years old when ascending the throne.

The third factor is economic. The royals of the previous generations had numerous children, as polygyny was widely practised in princely circles (and still is), which reduced the value of heirlooms according to the various adat laws. If the royal families of Johor and Selangor are more than wealthy, not all royal families are, particularly not their lesser branches. To accommodate the present Malaysian standards of living, most of the royals thus need to work, all the more so given that the ruler’s sons might not inherit any share of the royal assets.

All these factors pushed even the high-ranking princes to develop both new competences (higher education) and engage in proper careers. Looking to today’s rulers, three of them followed a military path (Sultan Abdullah of Pahang, who retired as brigadier-general; Sultan Sallehudin of Kedah, as colonel; Raja Syed Sirajuddin of Perlis, as major). Tuanku Muhriz (Negeri Sembilan) worked for the private sector (banking, advertising, and manufacturing) and remains director of the Bangkok Bank; Raja Nazrin Shah, for Petronas and the Malaysia International Islamic Financial Centre; Tuanku Mizan Zainal Abidin (Terengganu) worked as a government officer. The previous generation of rulers included, beside militaries, several lawyers, first of all Sultan Azlan, Nazrin Shah’s father. If three of the present rulers graduated from Sandhurst, the British military academy, and one from its Indian equivalent, others studied at University: Tuanku Muhriz in law (LLB); Tengku Abdullah (Pahang) and Tuanku Mizan Zainal Abidin (Terengganu, also graduated from Sandhurst), in international relations (BA); Muhammad Faris Petra (Kelantan) in Islamic Studies (Oxford, but without proper degree). Two rulers only (from the two wealthiest royal families, which might in itself constitute an explanation) did not get any proper academic degree: Sultan Sharafuddin Idris Shah (Selangor), an accomplished sportsman; and Sultan Ibrahim IskandarFootnote 31 (Johor), who followed various military trainings and a program on Southeast strategic studies and international law of the sea at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy (Boston). The academically most accomplished ruler is Sultan Nazrin Shah, with a BA in Philosophy, politics, and economics from Oxford; a master in public administration from the prestigious Kennedy School of Government (Harvard) and a PhD in political economy (Harvard).

To sum up, as far as higher education and careers are concerned, rulers and their close relatives do not differ much from Malay middle or upper-class commoners—notwithstanding that the Malay (and not Malaysian) sociological landscape remains both hierarchical and formal, as shown by the use of royal speech (with a specific vocabulary and terms of address reserved for royals), and the fact that hierarchy is based on status more than on wealth. Peninsular Malaysia royal rulers may engage with political and civil-society leaders on an equal intellectual (or professional) footing, if they wish or need to do so, thus adding a new “practical” legitimacy based on specific skills to their intrinsic cultural legitimacy.

The New Usefulness of Rulers

Rulers became particularly solicited by politicians following the crisis triggered by the weakening of both UMNO and Barisan after the 1MDB scandalFootnote 32 driven by then-PM Najib Razak. For the first time since independence, an opposition coalition, the Pakatan Harapan (Alliance of Hope),Footnote 33 won general elections in 2018, and Mahathir (then 92 years old) once again became Prime Minister. As tensions inside the coalition increased in January 2020 due to the imminent resignation of Mahathir and the lack of support for his presumed successor, Anwar Ibrahim, the King, Sultan Abdullah of Pahang, summoned 90 MPs to individual audiences. After numerous discussions within political parties and negotiation between them, and Mahathir challenging Muhyiddin Yassin, head of the party Bersatu, the Pakatan Harapan government collapsed on 29 February 2020 following the withdrawal from the coalition of 26 Bersatu MPs and the resignation of 11 MPs from Anwar Ibrahim’sFootnote 34 Parti Keadilan Rakyat (PKR). As the COVID-19 pandemic increased pressure on the new Prime Minister Muhyiddin, the King, who had previously declined the PM’s request, declared a state of emergency on January 12, 2021, suspending Parliament up to July, and allowing the government to continue to run the country. Tensions developed between the PM and the King; the King, who wanted to limit the duration of the Parliament closure (Delfolie, 2022) for institutional reasons (first and foremost, the respect of democracy), repeatedly called for reconvening the Parliament. Prime Minister Muhyiddin finally lost majority support and resigned on August 16, 2021. Once again, the Agong had to meet with MPs to clarify the situation inside the Assembly, while the pandemic made parliamentary elections impossible. The Deputy-Prime Minister, Ismail Sabri Yaakob, was finally designated as Prime Minister, putting UMNO (supported by PAS, the Islamic party, and Bersatu) back in the lead. The parliamentary truce did not last long, as Ismail’s coalition government (Barisan [BN], Perikatan Nasional [PN], PAS, and Gerakan) became increasingly criticised for his weak response to floodings in December 2021. The decline in purchasing power then pushed the Prime Minister to request a dissolution of the Assembly, granted by the King on 10 October 2022. As the following election in November 2022 did not produce a simple majority, and negotiations between the major political grouping were not conclusive, the King once again had to step in to push for a unity government, which was bartered between BN, and Pakatan Harapan (PH), supported by two counterparts from Sarawak and Sabah and other small parties—as the PN refused to join (Delfolie, 2023; Yeoh, 2022). The result was the appointment of Anwar Ibrahim as Prime Minister by King Abdullah on 24 November 2022. The King made clear that he hoped to not have to designate a fifth Prime Minister before the end of his tenure (January 2024). The collapse of UMNO, since 2018 thus increased the influence of the Agong, making His Majesty a power broker—by default, but effective.

At the State level, a similar crisis had already occurred in Selangor in 2014, due to the replacement of outgoing Menteri Besar Khalid Ibrahim, member of the Keadilan party who as such belonged to the Pakatan Rakyat coalition that had won the local elections both in 2008 and 2013. The resignation of the assembly member from Kajang district paved the way for Anwar Ibrahim; as he had been disqualified by the reversal of his acquittal on sodomy charges a few weeks before the by-election, he was replaced by his wife (and founder of Keadilan), Wan Azizah, who pushed her candidacy as chief minister. The PAS (though also a member of the Pakatan Rakyat coalition) rejected her nomination, mostly because of her gender. After eight months of negotiations, Sultan Sharafuddin finally appointed Azmin Ali, deputy-president of Keadilan, as a fait accompli (Mohamed Nawab, 2014).

Given that six states (Kedah, Penang, Selangor, Negeri Sembilan, Kelantan, and Terengganu) have elected their assembly between July and August 2023, their royal rulers might  have to follow the same path as the former Agong sultan Abdullah  of Pahang (the present Agong being since January 2024 sultan Ibrahim of Johor) in a short future. Such political intertwining might explain the acquisition by HRH the Sultan of SelangorFootnote 35 in 2022 of a painting depicting Malaysian politicians in Parliament as apes and frogs—a work of art which arguably none of his European counterparts would have dared to buy. The purchase was welcomed by some “Daulat Tuanku” (“Power to the King”) postings by amused netizens.

In all cases, the royal intervention contributed to overcome political deadlocks that had shown the limits of representative democracy, and conversely positioned royal rulers as arbiters, thus increasing their political leverage. One testimony among many others of this kingly leverage might be the political survival of the princely Tengku Zafrul Abul Aziz, a scion of the Sultans of Deli (East Sumatra) on his father’s (Tengku Abul Aziz, a prosperous businessman) side; his mother, Raja Datuk Zaharaton (connected to Perak’s royal family) was the former director-general of the Economic Planning Unit; and his wife belongs to the Selangor and Negeri Sembilan ruling families. Former treasurer of Selangor’s UMNO, Tengku Zafrul, an investment banker who developed both Maybank and CIMB corporate sectors, became successively minister of Finance in Muhyiddin’s and Ismail Sabri’s cabinets (March 2020–November 2022), then Anwar’s minister of International Trade and Industry (MITI) (December 2022–). Since 2004, Tengku Zafrul has been depicted as a close friend of sultan Abdullah of Pahang.

Networking and Entrepreneurship

The case of the brilliant—but rather unpopular (Mat, 2023)—Tengku Zafrul (master of finance, University of Exeter; MBA from Tsinghua University, Beijing) is a good illustration of the workings of Malay kingship, which goes far beyond its official institutional frame. Malay royal families (including in Brunei and Sumatra) are all related and linked through various female lines to their forebears of the Malaka sultanate. Owing to the practice over generations of polygyny, they participate in the greatest kinship network of Malaysia, of which memory is preserved through genealogies, thus irrigating the Bumiputera component of Malaysian society. As a consequence of both traditional kinship networks, and modern education and careers, royals and their relatives are today found in all sectors, from politics and justice (such as Tun Tengku Maimun Tuan Mat, Malaysia attorney-general, see Delfolie, 2023) to medics.

To give but a few examples, Tunku Abdul Rahman, the founding father of Malaya’s independence who worked to strictly limit the role of sultans to that of constitutional rulers, was the 7th son and one of the 45 children of Sultan Abdul Hamid Halim Shah, the 26th ruler of Kedah. Tuanku Zara Salim, the present Queen Consort of Perak, is the granddaughter of the Tunku’s full sister. Following mainstream political trends, Tengku Azlan Abu Bakar, uncle of Sultan Abdullah of Pahang, has been an MP for 14 years (1999–2013) under the banner of UMNO, then joined Mahathir’s Bersatu in 2018, before reintegrating alongside many into UMNO in 2021.

In the 1960s, royals inscribed kingship in the core of Bumiputera capitalism, of which Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah,Footnote 36 himself son of a former chief minister of Kelantan and great-grandson of Sultan Muhammad III of Kelantan, was a major promoter. As such, Tengku Arif Bendahara (TAB) Tengku Ibrahim Sultan Abu Bakar (1938–1987), brother of Sultan Ahmad Shah of Pahang, launched TAB Group as a holding company in 1969 (Ling, 1992). Founded in 1960 by Tunku Tan Sri Abdullah from the Negeri Sembilan ruling family, the Melawar Equities Group today operates several publically listed companies, in Malaysia and overseas, in the financial and manufacturing sectors.

The development of princely capitalism was facilitated by the promotion of Bumiputera entrepreneurship by the New Economic Policy (NEP) in 1971. Tuanku Ja’afar ibni Almarhum Tuanku Abdul Rahman, who ascended the throne of Negeri Sembilan in 1967, founded Syarikat Pesaka Antah, a holding society, in 1974; the Antah group turned public in 1983. TAB, Antah GroupFootnote 37 and several other enterprises founded by royals remained profitable up to the COVID-19 pandemic. Kingship also participates in Bumiputera business at a modest scale through princes working as executives in Malaysian companies,Footnote 38 big and small, state and private.

Up to present, the wealthiest of Malayan rulers is Sultan Ibrahim of Johor, with an investment portfolio which includes a 20% stake in RedTone (mobile phone), 15% in U Mobile, 15% in MOL Access (electronic payment), 10% of 7-Eleven Malaysia, and 20% of Berjaya Time Square in Kuala Lumpur [The Edge, December 27, 2013): a total worth estimated close to $ 1 billion in 2017 (Ellis, 2017). The Sultan’s daughter, Tun Aminah, is presently non-executive chairman of Berjaya’s board, of which all directors are female.

Conclusion: A Rejuvenation at Risk

Over the last decades, Malaysian kingship underwent a major rejuvenation at the crossroad of institutional implementation and socio-economic development, which conferred to the royal institution a new leverage extending far beyond its cultural dimension and the symbolic role and limited functions and resources allocated by the Federal and States constitutions.

Such an evolution is not exempt of risks, as the more royal leverage is at work, the more it can be contested, thus placing kingship at the core of the political arena. The growing influence of royal rulers seems to be increasingly challenged by PAS and radical clerics, though the sultans are constitutionally the head of religion in their respective states. Sultan Sharafuddin was in open conflict with PAS in June 2022, after Minister in the Prime Minister’s Department for religious affairs, Datuk Idris Ahmad (PAS’s vice-president), asked Muslims not to attend the Japanese Bon Odori Festival, a yearly event in Selangor, arguing that it presented unislamic religious symbolism. Even if fellow rulers did not intervene directly on the issue, they multiplied appeals to politicians to stop banking on hate and religion, both directly and through the Council of Rulers (as in November 2022). Hosting the 6th World Conference on Islamic Thought and Civilization (WCIT) in Perak in October 2022, Sultan Nazrin Shah praised multiculturalism, and two months later, called for immediate action to stop ethnic and religious extremism. In January 2023, Sultan Ibrahim forbade talk of politics in Johor’s mosques and oratories—a ban already implemented in Selangor in 2010. He was followed by the sultans of Terengganu and Perak in March, then supported by PM Anwar Ibrahim.

Besides protecting non-Muslim citizens—a task which is in conformity with their traditional role since the founding of the Malaka sultanate—the royal rulers appear more and more interested in global issues, such as environment and climate change. The most original initiative in this respect was the establishment in 2012 of the Sultan Mizan Antarctic Research Foundation (YPASM) which supports Malaysian research missions, under the patronage of the Sultan of Terengganu. In Malaysia, the preservation of environment is a politically “neutral” topic benefiting from a large consensus.

However, even if the presence of numerous minor royals across society at large does not pose a problem, the excessive proximity of sovereigns to the business world can prove to be detrimental in the long term. The various constitutions, which place the rulers above politics, do not specifically mention their relationship to economy or business. But the more royal rulers and first-ranking princes engage in business, the higher the risk of conflict between them and the Menteri Besar and State assembly, which represent local people and their interests.

As such, Sultan Ibrahim’s financial participation in the development of new urban complexes in Iskandar Malaysia, the country’s oldest economic corridor launched by the Federal Government in 2006 and promoted as Malaysia’s next Shenzhen, turned out to be highly controversial. Sultan Ibrahim sold 116 acres of prime seafront land in Johor Bahru (previously converted from State land to Sultanate land) in December 2013, for MYR 4.5 billion (1.08 USD billion) to Guangzhou R&F Properties, to be developed as “Princess Cove”. Johor Bahru now hosts six Chinese development projects, including the Forest City (in which Sultan Ibrahim indirectly holds 25.7% of equity), designed on four reclaimed islets, which was subject to the PRC’s imposition of capital control in March 2017, and limitation of foreign citizens home-buying in Malaysia since UMNO’s collapse in 2018 and the covid-19 pandemic. These projects drew criticism due to their strong impact both on the environment and on the traditional way of living of the Malay population, and have been regularly used by Malay politicians to gain support from the electorate, mingling identity resentment against fellow Malaysian Chinese citizens with due concern about PRC’s ambitions in the Malaka-Singapore strait (Delfolie et al., 2016). As Iskandar Malaysia’s “Flagship Zone A” is supervised both by the Johor government and the Sultan himself (when it comes to his own properties), and “Flagship Zone B” is supervised by the Federal government (Lim & Ng, 2022), the two zones might compete for foreign investors (mostly Chinese), while the stakeholders involved are regularly instrumentalised by politicians.

Sultan Ibrahim (brother-in-law of his predecessor, Sultan Abdullah of Pahang) is presently Agong. According to the Federal Constitution, the King must not “actively engage in any commercial enterprise” (Constitution, art. 34 § 3). In Johor, he is replaced by the regent, Crown Prince Tunku Ismail Idris, who himself owns significant stakes in companies participating in the reclamation projects of Tanjong Piai, including oil storage facilities.

Maintaining the balance between multiple stakes will thus not be easy  for the King. The possible request for royal pardon by ex-PM Najib Razak, who currently serves a 12-year prison term for the 1MDB corruption scandal, might play against royal neutrality. Even if Malaka sultans—as their Insulindian counterparts—participated in the financing of cargoes during the “age of commerce”, an excessive taste for lucre from royal rulers could presently threaten the royal institution itself: even in 2024, “subjects are roots and the ruler is like a tree, without roots, he cannot stand.”Footnote 39