Keywords

The Concept of Indigenous Peoples in Southeast Asia

Southeast Asia encompasses a great ethnic diversity. Global Human Rights organisations estimate that around 100 million people identify themselves as indigenous peoples in the region (IWGIA, 2020). However, there is no accurate official data because many of the states in the region do not officially recognise the existence of indigenous peoples within their borders (Erni, 2008). As in Asia more generally, those who self-identify as indigenous—and therefore maintain their original cultures and economic, political and social systems—have typically barely been acculturated by Western powers or by previous pre-colonial societies (Scott, 2009; Tauli-Corpuz, 2008).

The definition of indigenous peoples in international and UN forums and documents, such as the 169 ILO Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention of 1989, has for decades entailed the idea of the ‘original occupants of a territory’. Under such frames the moments of colonisation and decolonisation involving an overseas colonial power became key to the definition of the ‘indigenous’ person or people (Martínez Cobo, 1986). This definition was very much influenced by South and North American experiences, but was problematic when applied to Africa or Asia. In Southeast Asia, ethnic dynamics, patterns of colonial acculturation, legal pluralism and processes of nation-building before and after independence were different from those experienced in Latin America (Inguanzo, 2016).

As a result, some Asian governments do not recognise indigenous peoples’ rights because they refuse ‘to accept that the ones who were least assimilated under the previous colonial regimes should be considered indigenous peoples’ and as a result they ‘still insist that there are no indigenous peoples in their countries or that the whole population is indigenous’ (Tauli-Corpuz, 2008: 78, 80). Although the attitudes of Asian governments towards the validity of the concept of Indigenous Peoples in their states vary considerably, some countries have strongly rejected the concept, such as Myanmar or Indonesia, both in turn influenced by the categorical denial of the concept by China and India (Kingsbury, 1998). These states proclaim themselves strong defenders of indigenous peoples’ rights, but without any obligation towards their own citizens, since they do not recognise the internal presence of indigenous peoples in their territory, only indigenous peoples beyond their borders. The words of the Indonesian delegate Muhammad Anshor, in the vote on the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in 2007, are a perfect example of this position:

Given the fact that the entire population of Indonesia has remained unchanged since the time of its colonisation and subsequent independence, and the fact that Indonesia is a multicultural and multi-ethnic nation that does not discriminate against its people on any grounds, the rights stipulated in this Declaration accorded exclusively to indigenous peoples are not applicable in the context of Indonesia. However, we will continue, in accordance with our national laws, to promote and protect the traditional collective rights of the sub-ethnic communities that we call Masyarakat Adats, which are not equivalent to indigenous peoples as referred to in the Declaration. (General Assembly, 2007)

However, from the late-Suharto era onwards indigenous peoples have advocated for a specifically indigenous identity—adat identity—as a way ‘to strengthen community rights over and against state and corporate claims’ (Afiff & Lowe, 2007). In a similar vein, although the government of Laos does not recognise the presence of indigenous peoples in the country, and refers to them only as ethnic minorities, local and transnational civil society and international organisations on the ground are increasingly using the concept of indigenous peoples (Baird, 2015). In Myanmar, the term ‘taingyinthar’ is claimed not only by the Burmese government to identify ‘truly Burmese’ citizens, but also by ethnic minorities who identify themselves as Indigenous Peoples in international forums (Dunford, 2019).

Thailand, that was never colonised, presents a different case. Defining Indigenous Peoples as the ‘original occupants of a territory’ makes little sense here, demonstrating that this definition:

makes an unjustified distinction between long-distance aggression and short-distance aggression, and it is logically impossible to establish a cut-off distance. Moreover, it assumes that the cultural differences that exist between peoples is a simple linear function of distance, such that mere proximity creates a presumption of shared values. (Daes, 1996)

In the end, all these states oppose the recognition of indigenous peoples within their borders and their associated rights because they are afraid this recognition might jeopardise state and nation-building processes. However, recent research conducted in Southeast Asia has found that such fears are misguided. According to McMurry (2021), recognising indigenous peoples’ lands ‘increases both indigenous self-identification and compliance with the state’.

In fact, some states in the region, notably the Philippines and Malaysia, have incorporated indigenous peoples in their nation-building processes to the extent that indigenous peoples are explicitly recognised in their laws and Constitutions. However, though the Malaysian government has recognised the existence of indigenous peoples both in Sabah and Sarawak, it has been more ambiguous in relation to the indigenous peoples inhabiting the states of Peninsular Malaysia. In fact, the Orang Asli, the indigenous peoples of Peninsular Malaysia, have been excluded from the category of bumiputera, that usually designates ethnic Malays in Peninsular Malaysia and native people in Sabah and Sarawak (Dentan et al., 1997).

Therefore, given the great political, social and cultural diversity that encompasses Southeast Asia, the indigenous peoples of the region, represented and participating in the United Nations workshop on ‘The concept of Indigenous Peoples in Asia’ held in Thailand in March 2007, unanimously agreed on what some of them had already expressed in other international forums:

that a general definition of the concept of indigenous peoples was neither desirable nor necessary. It was agreed that the identification of groups that are to be recognised as indigenous peoples had to be done at the country level in an open process of consultation and discussion. Only this approach, it was stressed, allows for the flexibility needed to do justice to the diverse social, cultural and political contexts encountered in the Asian region. (Erni, 2008)

The State of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in the Region

Legal Recognition

Across the globe, the legal recognition of the rights of indigenous peoples has often taken the form of multiculturalism. According to its advocates (Kymlicka, 1995), the full enjoyment of individual rights is dependent on the recognition of collective socio-economic and political rights for the relevant ethnic and national groups within a particular state, in this case indigenous groups. As a result, the literature on the rights of indigenous peoples focuses on different sets of rights to assess the scope of multiculturalism in diverse legal settings. According to Van Cott (2000) a constitution is multicultural with regard to indigenous peoples, when it recognises: (1) a multi-ethnic society, (2) indigenous customary law, (3) land rights, (4) official indigenous languages, (5) bicultural education for indigenous communities and (6) indigenous political autonomy.

The adoption of this multicultural framework in Asia has been contested, even rejected by some Asian authoritarian leaders that consider multiculturalism as another form of Western moral imperialism (Kymlicka & He, 2006; Miller, 2011). The unequal incorporation of multicultural arrangements in Southeast Asian legal systems is noticeable when Van Cott’s analytical framework is applied to the region, especially in terms of the recognition of the rights of indigenous peoples. Inguanzo (2014) shows how up to 2010, the level of formal recognition of the rights of indigenous peoples was higher in the Philippines, East Malaysia (the states of Sabah and Sarawak), Cambodia and to some extent Indonesia, while very low in Vietnam, Laos, East Timor, West Malaysia, Thailand and Myanmar. As opposed to other regions such as Latin America, in Southeast Asia indigenous cultural rights, such as bicultural education and to a lesser extent the recognition of indigenous languages as official languages, are barely recognised within states.

However, although just a few states acknowledge the existence of indigenous peoples, most states recognise that their societies are multi-ethnic. For example, as explained above, Vietnam, Laos and Myanmar define their states as multi-ethnic, but they consider that all nationals are indigenous to the land. In Thailand, up until the 1980s and 1990s only around 50% of people belonging to the so-called ‘hilltribes’ (upland ethnic minorities identifying themselves as indigenous peoples) had formal citizenship. In fact, even those members of forest communities with formal citizenship inhabiting protected areas lacked substantive citizenship rights such as primary education, health or freedom of mobility or freedom from arbitrary arrest (Vandergeest, 2003).

Land rights of indigenous peoples are better protected in the Philippines, as a result of the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (1997); in the two states of East Malaysia (recognised both in the Malaysian Constitution and the secondary legislation of both states); and to a lesser extent, in Cambodia through the Land Law (2001). In other states land rights are far less protected. The recognition of indigenous customary law and indigenous political autonomy follows the same pattern.

During the last decade (2011–2021), indigenous peoples across the region have witnessed different advances and setbacks in terms of legal recognition of their rights. On the positive side, in 2012 in Indonesia, Aliansi Masyarakat Adat Nusantara (AMAN)—in English, The Indigenous Peoples’ Alliance of the Archipelago, which is the national civil society organisation representing all indigenous movements in Indonesia—successfully requested that the Indonesian Constitutional Court review the Basic Forestry Law of 1967 (already amended in 1999). In its Decision (MK 35/2012), the Constitutional Court ruled that ‘customary forests’ do not belong to the state (Filer et al., 2020), thus widening the legal recognition of the rights of indigenous peoples to forests (Dhiaulhaq & McCarthy, 2020).

In East Timor, Portuguese and Tetum (the majoritarian indigenous language spoken by 25% of the population) are now the official languages of the country, while other minoritarian indigenous languages are not. In 2017, Tetum was explicitly recognised as an official language in the judicial sector, however, most judges and jurists do not speak it and interpreters in indigenous mother-tongue languages remain unavailable (United Nations, 2019b). The Constitution of Timor-Leste also recognises customary law. The 2017 Land Law represents an advancement since it deals with a special regime on the determination of ownership, but complementary legal developments are still needed (United Nations, 2019b).

In Thailand, the impact of new legal developments related to indigenous peoples right to land has been more ambiguous. Historically, indigenous communities in Thailand have suffered military persecution and eviction from their lands and have been denied participation in the management of protected areas where they live (Nepal, 2002). In 2019, two new acts entered into force: the National Land Policy Committee (NLPC) Law and the Community Forestry Law, and two other laws were amended: the National Park Law and the Wildlife Preservation and Protection Act. These four pieces of legislation regulate the relationship between Thai authorities and communities living in or in the vicinity of National Parks. Controversially, the National Parks Act 2019, while considering the participation of indigenous communities in conservation projects within the borders of National Parks, explicitly excludes land rights for such communities, and gives state authorities full control over those projects (United Nations, 2020). Indigenous organisations have also expressed concerns about the process of demarcation, documenting and survey of communities’ land (IWGIA, 2020).

Finally, Myanmar has also witnessed contradictory legal developments in terms of the rights of indigenous peoples. With the limited political liberalisation undergone between 2015 and 2021, the country took some steps in the legal recognition of collective rights related to indigenous peoples. For example, in 2015, Myanmar ratified the International Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). However, Myanmar noteworthily also issued a reservation stating that the right of self-determination recognised in the International Convention should not be applied to any group within the state of Myanmar.Footnote 1

In 2018, Myanmar’s Parliament passed an amendment to the 2012 Vacant, Fallow and Virgin Lands Management Law. The purpose of the amendment was to introduce the requirement of a permit to use the targeted lands. The amended law explicitly recognised customary land and taungya (hill cultivation land) as two exceptions in the application of the amendment. However, procedures for the recognition of these lands were lacking and the terms ‘customary and taungya land’ as well as ‘virgin, fallow and vacant land’ were so broadly defined that the amendment gave administrative and judicial bodies wide discretion to determine whether land is customary or taungya. In response, seven United Nations Special Rapporteurs jointly sent a letter to the Government of Myanmar warning that these potentially arbitrary decisions could easily result in severe violations of the rights of indigenous peoples such as forced evictions of their lands (United Nations, 2019a).

Implementation of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples

As shown in the previous sub-section, the legal recognition of the rights of indigenous peoples in the region is uneven. A further challenge resides in the implementation of these legal rights. This sub-section will examine the main implementation challenges in the region with regard to two rights that indigenous activists across the region raise as crucial: indigenous land rights and indigenous autonomy.

Implementation of Land Rights

Today, across the globe, indigenous land rights and other associated basic human rights are mainly threatened by extractive industries (Anaya, 2013; Burger, 2014). Other industries and businesses also have enormous negative impacts on indigenous peoples. For example, a recent systematic literature review of the socio-economic impacts of large-scale tree plantations found that the most affected region is Southeast Asia (Malkamäki et al., 2018). According to the authors, the main negative impacts involve loss of land, worsening of employment and livelihood conditions and health and food insecurity. This comparative study suggested that land titles can protect against these negative impacts. Since the state of land titling in the region is very uneven, this again suggests that the full enjoyment of land and associated basic human rights varies a great deal from country to country.

In Cambodia, although customary land rights are recognised under the 2001 Land Law, the Cambodian government offers no meaningful consultation nor compensation for activities developed in indigenous land by external actors (Filer et al., 2020), except for those holding land titles (Dwyer, 2015). There are many instances of land grabbing by multi-national and Asia-based companies (Baird, 2014; Thuon, 2018), somehow tolerated by the Cambodian government, which has tried different tactics of reform, repression and re-territorialisation to ensure its own survival (Loughlin & Milne, 2021). As mentioned above, land grabbing and alienation affect indigenous communities in several dimensions. For example, a recent study conducted in Cambodia has found that land alienation has impacted gender relations in indigenous communities in different ways, notably with regard to the division of labour (Frewer, 2017). In neighbouring Laos, land rights of indigenous peoples are usually not respected, and many indigenous communities suffer from forced eviction from their homelands, severely impacting gender relations (Kusakabe et al., 2015) and food security (Friis et al., 2016).

In Indonesia, the implementation gap of land rights is asymmetrical, in part due to the different relationships between indigenous communities and local authorities (Van der Muur, 2018). There have been micro-successes at the local level in terms of cultural rights and attempts to redress past injustices and economic imbalances (Tyson, 2011). However, the implementation of land rights is often contingent upon the political will of district officials, as well as upon access to justice, which is sometimes denied to indigenous communities (Dhiaulhaq & McCarthy, 2020). With regard to the social impacts of industrial tree plantations in the country, these are very irregular across islands, and largely dependent on the intermediating role of the state, but also on the type of plantation (Pirard et al., 2017). As a result, the impact of this type of industry is worse in Kalimantan than in Java. However, developments are also unequal within islands and across companies. For example, the implementation of the Free Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) was initially contested by oil palm companies, but became more accepted once these companies started to sell their products to European markets, where FPIC was valued by customers (Filer et al., 2020).

Also in Malaysia, the fulfilment of land rights is uneven and very much depends on the relationship between state governments and activists on the ground. Most of the times, indigenous communities need to defend their territories and lands rights through litigation, although in Sabah, Selangor and Perak there have been more opportunities for cooperation and mediation between indigenous communities and state governments (Aiken & Leigh, 2011b). On the opposite end of the spectrum, in Sarawak, the state government has issued new legislation to curtail land rights, for example by legally restricting community mapping (Aiken & Leigh, 2011a). As a result, in this state as in most states of peninsular Malaysia, land rights are constantly endangered by the actions of both the state government and corporations (Raman, 2006).

In a similar vein, the decentralised structure of Myanmar has allowed the recognition of indigenous land tenure and indigenous land titles by some states, including Karen state (Dunford, 2019). However, as explained above, this indigenous land tenure is virtually unprotected against business interests due to the Vacant, Fallow and Virgin Lands Management Law.

In the Philippines, the process of recognising land titles is also uneven throughout the country, but the number of indigenous land titles has constantly increased from the early 2000s to 2018 (Mcmurry, 2021). Here, the claims and processes of recognition of ancestral domains are not limited to land, but also include water resources in coastal areas (Capistrano, 2010; Capistrano & Charles, 2012). Finally in Timor-Leste, land legislation concerning customary ownership and registration is still pending. In the meantime, the government has launched different programs to register customary land, but ‘very few communal titles have been registered and concerns have been raised that sacred sites, water resources and other protected areas of communities have not been adequately mapped’ (United Nations, 2019b). Similar to the Philippines, in East Timor, indigenous movements claim that indigenous rights associated to territory are not limited to land, but should also include customary marine tenure (McWilliam, 2002).

Self-Determination and Decentralisation

Throughout the region there are different structures of asymmetric decentralisation (He et al., 2007). Some of them have been designed to enhance indigenous self-government, in regions or states where indigenous populations are concentrated. However, the extent to which these institutionally decentralised structures have fostered indigenous self-determination or indigenous political autonomy is far from clear, and again varies between and within countries.

Malaysia is a federal state where the practice of indigenous self-government is asymmetrical. While on paper the states of Sabah and Sarawak are two autonomous native states recognised under the Constitution, the indigenous peoples of the states of Peninsular Malaysia barely experience the right to self-determination or self-government. In Peninsular Malaysia, it is the Yang di-Pertuan Agong (King) who selects the senator in charge of representing the Orang Asli in the National Parliament (Nordin & Witbrodt, 2012), while state governments appoint indigenous leaders or batins in other instances (Subramaniam, 2011). This means that Orang Asli of Peninsular Malaysia are not even able to select their own leaders. In East Malaysia, indigenous peoples are in principle able to designate their own state leaders. Yet, even if indigenous peoples constitute a majority in these two states and many elected officials are indigenous themselves, this does not necessarily mean that state parliaments and executives are accountable to indigenous communities’ claims. In Sarawak, where many legislators are indigenous, the state assembly has passed several laws curtailing indigenous rights (Aiken & Leigh, 2011a). In both states there have been demands of secession and, as a response, the federal government has tried to impose its power (Case, 2007). Across all Malaysian states, different studies have pointed to the need of including indigenous communities in decision-making processes regarding their lands (Inguanzo, 2022; Raman, 2006).

In other Southeast Asian countries, indigenous peoples inhabiting vast portions of territory have claimed greater political autonomy, including the Karen in Myanmar, the Cordillerans in the Philippines or the Papuans in Indonesia (Bertrand, 2011; Dunford, 2019). In response, special autonomy regimes are granted or foreseen to be granted to some of them. However, in practice these have generally not been implemented. A Cordillera Autonomous Region was foreseen in the Filipino Constitution, but has not been officially recognised yet: the region remains an Administrative region. In Indonesia, special autonomy was granted to West Papua, but the central government exercises harsh control over it and its citizens (United Nations, 2020). The Cordillerans in the Philippines have had a greater ability to influence constitutional debates on self-determination, as compared to Papuans (Bertrand, 2011). In other islands within Indonesia, new decentralisation laws encourage district officials to exploit natural resources as a way of generating their own regional incomes, which usually go against the interests and rights of local indigenous communities (Duncan, 2007). This has quashed hopes that decentralisation could serve as an opportunity to recover indigenous forms of land tenure and governance.

Beyond classic decentralisation structures, some authors have argued that the right to indigenous self-determination may be applied through mechanisms of multi-level governance (Alcantara & Morden, 2019; Doyle, 2020). In that vein, indigenous peoples can participate and have a say on their uses of their land, either through bilateral agreements of co-management or correct implementation of the right to Free, Prior and Informed Consent. However, even in places such as the Philippines, where the rights of indigenous peoples are better protected, most of the time the political will to genuinely empower and support indigenous peoples through these types of arrangement is lacking (Doyle, 2020; Major et al., 2018).

Indigenous Movements’ Successes and Challenges in Upgrading Rights

The resonance of indigenous movements also varies greatly throughout the region (Inguanzo, 2018; Inguanzo & Wright, 2016). In some countries, indigenous movements face a very closed political opportunity structure within their own states and therefore address many of their actions and discourses towards the international community. This is particularly the case in Cambodia (Thuon, 2018) and Myanmar (Dunford, 2019). Similarly, the indigenous movement in Thailand stems from the global indigenous peoples movement and has grown in connection with international organisations (Leepreecha, 2019). In fact, the main regional organisation of indigenous movements, the Asian Indigenous Peoples Pact, is based in Chiang Mai, in northern Thailand. As a result of these frequent interactions with indigenous rights international regimes, the indigenous movement in Thailand has advocated for two interrelated elements: first, being considered indigenous peoples instead of simply ‘hill tribes’, and second, obtaining citizenship rights for indigenous communities (Morton & Baird, 2019; Vandergeest, 2003). Thai indigenous movements were key players during decades, advocating for the review of long-lasting forestry laws that did not recognise their citizenship rights (Morton & Baird, 2019). The relative success of new laws and amendments enacted in 2019 can be understood as a direct result of Thai indigenous movements.

In Indonesia, the indigenous movement commands a great deal of resonance, through AMAN, an organisation representing a nation-wide alliance of indigenous peoples (Duncan, 2007; Van der Muur, 2018). The Indonesian indigenous movement has made important advances, such as the Decision MK 35/2012 of the Constitutional Court, mentioned above. Yet, with regard to specific land conflicts, the indigenous movement usually has lower political leverage than for example peasant movements, both in terms of numbers and resonance of their claims and mobilising discourses (Dhiaulhaq & McCarthy, 2020).

The indigenous movement in neighbouring Malaysia encompasses a set of diverse non-governmental organisations that pursue a wide variety of resistance actions, from blockades, to community organisation, to litigation (Aiken & Leigh, 2011a). Still, the indigenous movement is more resonant in Sabah and Sarawak as compared to states in Peninsular Malaysia (Inguanzo & Wright, 2016). This is due to several factors. Indigenous peoples constitute a minority in West Malaysia, while they form a majority in both Sabah and Sarawak. Indigenous organisations in Peninsular Malaysia have also encountered opposition within civil society, notably from conservationist groups (Aziz et al., 2013).

Finally, in the Philippines, several civil society organisations belonging to the Filipino indigenous movement have been key to advancing the recognition of the rights of indigenous peoples (Inguanzo, 2013, 2018; Lusterio Rico, 2007) and remain so.

Indigenous Movements and Activists Under Threat

Throughout the region, indigenous communities and indigenous rights’ defenders suffer similar forms of violations of their civil and political rights, although the intensity varies across countries and political contexts. Forced displacement of indigenous communities is common in Laos (Kusakabe et al., 2015), Cambodia (Loughlin & Milne, 2021) as well as in West Papua, Indonesia (United Nations, 2020). The problem of forced displacement is aggravated by the militarisation of zones inhabited by indigenous communities. This has been common in Myanmar, Indonesia (specially in West Papua) and the Philippines. Indigenous peoples in the Philippines are located in militarised zones—notably in Cordillera and Mindanao—and therefore suffer the consequences of political violence. However, indigenous communities are themselves involved in processes of peacebuilding and the creation of indigenous peace zones (Macaspac, 2019).

In terms of civil rights, the Government of Laos does not allow civil society organisations to register as non-profit organisations if they are affiliated as ethnic groups, which severely curtails the indigenous movement in the country (Baird, 2015). In Cambodia, NGOs related to land rights are intimidated and human rights defenders have been imprisoned (Loughlin & Milne, 2021). In Thailand, indigenous leaders defending the indigenous land rights have been called traitors by political officials and have received death threats (Morton & Baird, 2019); there has been at least one case of murder and disappearance (IWGIA, 2020). In the Philippines, the Duterte Administration (2016–2022) infamously persecuted human rights and environmental defenders, including indigenous activists (Delina, 2020; Lamchek & Sanchez, 2021). Duterte even accused the former United Nations Special Rapporteur on the rights of Indigenous People, Victoria Tauli-Corpuz, of being a terrorist (OHCHR, 2018). In Malaysia, persecution of indigenous activism has been particularly intense in Sarawak for decades (Aiken & Leigh, 2011a; Amnesty International, 1997, 2018).

Conclusion

As shown in this chapter, the state of the rights of indigenous peoples in Southeast Asia is uneven, both in terms of legal recognition and implementation. The Philippines is the country where these rights are fulfilled to the greatest extent, both on paper and in practice. On the other side of the spectrum, in Myanmar these rights are most at risk. There are also important differences within countries, where some but not all indigenous communities are exposed to external actors who jeopardise their lands and associated rights. Recent changes on the domestic political arena in the countries of the region have yielded both advances and setbacks for the rights of indigenous peoples. These political transformations have either enhanced or inhibited the resonance and actions of indigenous movements on the ground, leading on the one hand to legal and local successes in Indonesia and East Timor, and on the other hand to the persecution of activists in Cambodia and the Philippines.

Nonetheless, the sources and nature of threats to the rights of indigenous peoples closely resemble each other across these different country contexts. Throughout the region, the main challenges to the rights of indigenous peoples come from extractive industries, the agroindustry, armed actors and non-democratic governments. Indigenous peoples face similar violations both of their collective indigenous right to land, and of their civil and political rights as citizens and activists. While indigenous movements adapt their repertoires and specific demands to the different political contexts they are located in, the Asian Indigenous Peoples Pact serves as a platform for presenting a united voice in international forums and for sharing strategies and knowledge among activists.

The COVID-19 pandemic has reinforced existing regional dynamics regarding the rights of indigenous peoples. According to the Asian Indigenous Peoples Pact (2020), the pandemic has had a number of significant impacts on indigenous peoples across the region (AIPP, 2020). First, the COVID-19 pandemic further disrupted the access of indigenous communities to basic services, while culturally appropriate information about the disease was generally lacking. Second, during lockdowns many communities forbade the access of outsiders to their communities and resorted to traditional structures and practices of decision-making, information sharing as well as medicine. These trends are understood to have strengthened indigenous cultural, political and social systems. However, lockdowns also severely affected the economic livelihood of many communities, since access to local markets was often restricted. Surprisingly, lockdowns did not stop land grabbing, but instead accelerated it. Many national and local governments guaranteed the continued activity of extractive and plantation companies, but limited or prohibited indigenous mobilisation, resistance and blockades on the ground.