Keywords

Introduction

Indonesia—the largest Muslim-majority country and the third largest democracy in the world—has long been hailed as a success story where Islam and democracy have been able to accommodate each other, and where moderate Islamic groups and intellectuals have been thought to dominate Islamic discourse. This image has been reinforced by Indonesia’s two largest Islamic organisations, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah, which have long commanded significant authority on the right to interpret and speak for Islam in Indonesian society. Islamic intellectuals such as Abdurrahman Wahid, Nurcholish Madjid, and Ahmad Syafii MaarifFootnote 1 have promoted moderate religious discourses. Institutions such as the National Islamic Educational Institutes (IAIN) have trained tens of thousands of Islamic religious teachers according to a curriculum that integrated Islamic thought with Western-influenced social science and humanities. These were taken by observers as evidence that moderate Islam was the dominant Islamic discourse in Indonesia over the past three decades (Hefner, 2000; Hefner & Abidin, 2021).

However, this consensus has come under a strong challenge after the 2016–2017 Defending Islam rallies. During these events, a total of approximately one million people were mobilised by a coalition of conservative and hard-line Islamist groups against the Jakarta Governor Basuki Tjahaja Purnama. The rallies created a shockwave throughout the nation, as they demonstrated that the influence of Islamism in Indonesian politics was much stronger than what was previously thought. The 2019 presidential election campaign, marked by divisive and sectarian rhetoric between conservative Islamist and moderate Islamic political activists, further reinforced the contention between the two groups first seen during the Defending Islam rallies.

The rising influence of Islamist organisations in Indonesia and the concomitant slow yet steady decline in religious authority of moderate Islamic groups, including NU and Muhammadiyah, have attracted much attention in recent scholarship on Indonesian Islam, including by Van Bruinessen (2014, 2015), Hadiz (2016), Mietzner and Muhtadi (2018), Arifianto (2020b), and Sebastian et al. (2021). The findings from these works, while insightful to understand the current situation, also raise new research questions: How do moderate groups respond to increasing ideological and political competition from Islamist competitors? What kind of tactics do they deploy against their rivals? Do the Islamist pressures undermine moderate and democratic norms that the moderate organisations have promoted in Indonesian political discourses over the past few decades? These are important questions for scholars studying political Islam at a time in which adherence to democratic norms and values are widely thought to be declining throughout much of the world, including in Indonesia.

The chapter aims to answer these research questions through an examination of NU and Muhammadiyah responses towards rising conservative Islamism in Indonesia and how the internal dynamics and the relations of each group with President Jokowi’s regime help to shape their divergent responses. It is structured as follows. The first section reviews recent literature on previous scholarship on political Islam in Indonesia. It argues much of this scholarship is dominated by interest-based explanation, which is limited by its inattentiveness towards theological norms that often serve as raison d’être for political motivation and action of various Islamic groups. Then I outline a new framework based upon a political theology approach and develop a typology of Islamic groups to analyse how moderate groups—particularly NU and Muhammadiyah—seek to promote their interpretation of Islam in Indonesian society despite facing challenges from their Islamic rivals.

The second section gives a brief history of NU and Muhammadiyah, discussing the evolution of their political theology over the past four decades. The third section discusses the ideological and political challenges posed by new Islamist groups. The fourth section discusses NU and Muhammadiyah divergent responses to these challenges and contextualises them in light of their respective political theologies. The final section discusses the insights provided by the NU and Muhammadiyah cases and how these contribute to the broader literature on political theology and political Islam.

Political Theology: Understanding Political Islam in Indonesia

In order to reach a nuanced understanding of why and how moderate groups combat growing Islamic conservatism in Indonesian society, scholars need to move beyond what I would categorise as ‘thin’ interest-based explanations that are frequently utilised in recent scholarships on political Islam in Indonesia.Footnote 2 To fully understand the rationales behind moderate group’s counter-Islamism actions, we need to closely examine ‘thick’ ideological-based variables such as political theology—defined as “shared ideas about legitimate political authority, which is situated in core doctrinal teachings, yet adapted to circumstances of time and place” (Philpott, 2007: 505). This involves “interpreting and analysing politics –institutional arrangements, sources of authority, patterns of order, purposes, and justifications of rule, and so forth– in the context of theological concepts and categories” (Bain, 2020: 3).

Political theology is not a static set of beliefs that are largely unchanged throughout time and space, rather, it is continuously evolving and influenced both “by historical development and by the circumstances of time and place” (Philpott, 2007: 508). Hence it may vary between different factions within a similar religious tradition, even though these might draw legitimacy and resources from an identical scriptural text or from a similar dogma being passed down from one generation of believers to the next.

In order for a particular political theology to prevail and dominate discourse—whether within a given religious group or in society in general—it needs to be endorsed and promoted by norm entrepreneurs. These are individuals or collective actors “who invent or deploy ideas and information to produce significant structural change” (Goddard, 2009: 251). These entrepreneurs act as brokers, defined as “actors who bridge structural holes in fragmented networks, who maintain ties with actors who would otherwise remain unconnected” (Goddard, 2009: 257). Their success depends on their ability to occupy strategic positions within a structure (i.e. organisations) which gives them flexibility compared to other network actors, their capacity to introduce new ideas and norms (i.e. political theology), and their capability to ensure these ideas and norms are diffused throughout the fragmented network structures (Goddard, 2009: 263).

In this chapter, I argue that norm brokers have played a significant role by introducing and promoting new ideas and theologies within Islamic organisations including NU and Muhammadiyah—organisations which are internally divided into different ideological and political factions, not to mention different religious leaders. Norm brokers played a crucial role in the introduction of moderate Islamic ideas within NU and Muhammadiyah during the 1980s and 1990s, and in the instrumentalisation of these ideas by both organisations as they faced an increasing competition from Islamist rivals during the 2010s. This leads to my argument that political theology is an important explanatory variable for the strategy and decisions taken by religious groups when facing ideological competition. Political theology may complement, and in certain contexts substitute, interest-based theoretical explanations.Footnote 3

In what follows, I define Islamists as those who subscribe to a political theology which articulates “the idea of the necessity of establishing an Islamic government (…) which implements the shari’a (Islamic law)” (Ismail, 2004: 616). I disaggregate this definition further into two separate categories: conservative and hard-line Islamists. Conservative Islamists are individuals or groups of Muslims who believe in the orthodox—often literal—interpretation of Islamic texts, according to the Qur’an and the sayings of the Prophet (sunnah). This includes a belief in the application of Islamic law (sharia) as a societal, legal, and political foundation of a Muslim-majority state. However, conservative Islamists usually advocate for the implementation of these beliefs through peaceful and democratic means such as participating in elections, parliamentary debates, and peaceful protests. Examples include Islamist political parties such as the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), quasi-official clerical associations such as the Indonesian Ulama Council (MUI), and factions within NU and Muhammadiyah that subscribe to a more conservative political theology. This contrasts with hard-line Islamists, who often pursue their agenda to implement orthodox interpretation of Islamic teachings through physically threatening verbal rhetoric and/or physical violence against religious minorities and ideological opponents. Examples include the infamous Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) and Islamist terrorist groups such as Jamaah Islamiyah (JI) and Jamaah Ansharut Daulah (JAD).

Meanwhile, moderate Islamic organisations—in this case, NU and Muhammadiyah—are those which lend support to the following norms: (1) promote contextualised interpretations of Islamic texts rather than those based on literalist ones, (2) support democratic political norms and institutions—including willingness to participate in a free and fair election—while rejecting efforts to enact and implement Islamic principles in state and society, and (3) promote tolerance towards religious minorities, both Muslim as well as non-Muslim. Admittedly, moderate is a value-laden term,Footnote 4 and the application of moderate policies within each Islamic organisation is often problematic—as many members of the organisation reject the aforementioned norms either in whole or in part. Hence, one can measure whether an organisation is committed to moderation by analysing whether it has consistently followed a set of ‘moderate’ premises it has committed to follow within a certain time period (say a decade or more).

Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah as Moderate Islamic Organisations

Indonesia’s democratic experience cannot be understood apart from the role played by two of its Islamic civil society organisations—NU and Muhammadiyah. Both have deep roots within Indonesian civil society, having existed for more than a century.Footnote 5 During the rule of Suharto (1966–1998), both organisations were among the few that remained relatively independent from the regime’s iron grip. Hence, both NU and Muhammadiyah became autonomous civil society organisations and independent centres of intellectual and political life, both during the twilight of the Suharto era and after his downfall in 1998.

NU and Muhammadiyah also play a role beyond Islamic religious propagation. They are particularly active in the provision of education, healthcare, and other social services to Indonesians, irrespective of the recipients’ ethnic and religious background.Footnote 6 Since the 1998 Reformasi, leaders and activists from both organisations have also played a more overt political role through parties linked with them, namely the National Awakening Party (PKB) for NU and the National Mandate Party (PAN) for Muhammadiyah. Through these political parties, NU and Muhammadiyah have lobbied for favourable legislation, gained cabinet minister positions, and secured state patronage for their respective constituencies.

NU’s political theology is based upon the Islamic texts contained in the Qur’an, the hadiths, writings of classical Islamic jurists (qiya), and consensus among contemporary ulama (ijma). Its theology is also influenced by localised customs and rituals originating from Javanese cultural traditions. These localised rituals include slametan—communal prayers to celebrate the birth of a child, marriage, and other family events—and tahlilan, prayers recited to commemorate deceased family members or relatives. Altogether these features characterise the core of the traditionalist Islamic theology that helps to shape NU’s political outlook.

According to Rumadi, current director of the Institute for the Study and Development of Human Resources (Lakpesdam),Footnote 7 NU is committed to respecting indigenous Indonesian culture, since it believes religion is “not only formed by texts and divine revelation, but also by local culture” (Rumadi, 2015: 130). Based upon these understandings, Ahmad Siddiq, NU supreme leader (rais aam) from 1984 to 1991, argued that NU followers ought to follow four Islamic principles, namely al-tawassut (moderation), al-tasamu (tolerance), al-tawazun (balance), and al-i’tidal (justice) (Burhani, 2012: 570) and place them as a foundation of NU’s effort to promote theological moderation as initiated by his counterpart, NU chairman Abdurrahman Wahid, during the mid-1980s. These norms also shaped NU’s political outlook, as they showed that beyond its 1984 adaptation of the Indonesian national ideology Pancasila, the organisation is credibly committed to promote religious and political moderation. This is done in spite of the actions of the Suharto regime, which threatened the organisation with further repression if it refused to adopt Pancasila as its ideology (Bush, 2009).

These four principles were championed by ‘norm brokers’ within the NU to transform the organisation’s political theology during the early 1980s. This was a crucial period because their reinterpretation helped to transform NU from an Islamic organisation advocating the adaptation of Islamic principles as a foundation of the Indonesian nation-state to one which believed NU could support an Indonesian state based upon secular nationalist principles (Bush, 2009). The most prominent ‘norm broker’ was the late Abdurrahman Wahid, who was the NU general chairman from 1984 to 1999. Wahid responded to the Suharto regime’s call for the NU to prove that it did not oppose the regime by firstly agreeing to adopt Pancasila. In 1984, NU thus abandoned its prior support for Indonesia to become an Islamic state and declared its support for Pancasila (Bush, 2009: 54–55). Wahid helped to introduce and promote a political theology centred on moderation, tolerance, and support for democracy in the organisation, based on the teachings of prominent NU clerics including Ahmad Siddiq.

During his 15-year chairmanship, Wahid contributed to transform the organisation from a conservative to a moderate Islamic entity. This entailed advocating moderate norms such as religious tolerance and pluralism in the Indonesian public sphere, against a significant number of NU clerics and followers. The institution of these norms within NU put the organisation in direct contrast with the Suharto regime, which aligned with elements of conservative Islamists to seek legitimacy for continuing its authoritarian rule throughout the 1990s (Hefner, 2000).

In 2015, the four aforementioned principles were reinterpreted by Said Aqil Siradj—NU chairman in 2010–2021—as integral principles of Islam Nusantara (‘Archipelagic Islam’) which combines classical Islamic thought, its interpretation (tafsir) by generations of NU clerics (including by Wahid and Siddiq, as outlined above), and a whole host of rituals and practices originated from pre-Islamic Java—all of which reinforced NU’s vision that Islam as practised by NU is moderate and compatible with Indonesian nationalism and its diverse traditional cultures (Hasyim, 2018).

During the 2015 NU national congress (muktamar) in Jombang, NU chairman Siradj announced a new theological innovation, Islam Nusantara, designed to consolidate the moderates’ hold over NU in the face of growing ideological challenges. Derived from the term pribumisasi Islam (Islamic indigenisation) introduced by Wahid (2015), its proponents explained it as a synthesis combining traditionalist Islamic theology with local customs, rituals, and traditions. As NU chairman Said Aqil Siradj stated:

Islam Nusantara is an Indonesian-style Islam, which adopts Sunni Islam (Ahlusunnah wal jamaah) principles, promotes tolerance, strengthens Islam as a blessing for humanity (rahmatan lil alamin), and is based on the principles of balance (tawazun), moderation (tawassut), tolerance (tasamu), and justice (i’tidal). (Hasyim, 2018)

Siradj further elaborated that Islam Nusantara places the NU in between two ideological poles, “the radical pole which is very rigid or strict and confrontational, and a liberal pole which is very compromising, permissive, and hedonist” (Siradj, 2010). Consequently, Islam Nusantara serves as an alternative to the Islamist vision that rejects any compatibility between Islamic teachings and non-Islamic ideologies and argues that fundamental reform of the Indonesian society requires the adoption of Islamic principles at individual, family, society, and state levels.

Similarly, Muhammadiyah has sought to renew Islamic theology through a contextualised interpretation within contemporary society (Arifianto, 2012). During the first two decades of Muhammadiyah’s existence (1912 to the 1930s), there were tensions between two streams of political theologies within the organisation. Norm brokers who argued that the organisation’s mission was to promote Islamic reforms through social and charitable missions (Fauzia, 2017) opposed others who argued for a purist interpretation of Islam, sought to expel ‘heretical innovations’ (bid’ah) and largely rejected non-Islamic ideas and value systems (Federspiel, 1970: 71). While the first position was the prevalent viewpoint within the organisation during the first decade of its existence, the later view began to predominate from the 1930s onwards when conservative clerics, including Haji Rasul (father of Hamka, the first chairman of the Indonesian Ulema Council [MUI], 1975 to 1981) exerted influence within the organisation. In addition, the rising influence of Wahhabism in Saudi Arabia; and the founding of NU in 1926, also pushed Muhammadiyah in a theologically conservative direction which it maintained until the 1990s (Burhani, 2006).

Beginning in the early 2000s, norm brokers including Ahmad Syafii Maarif (chairman of Muhammadiyah from 1998 to 2005) and Moeslim Abdurrahman (an intellectual who co-founded the Muhammadiyah-linked Maarif Institute) sought to change the conservative theological viewpoint. They deployed new methods to interpret religious texts, such as hermeneutics, and put such texts in contemporary contexts—incorporating insights from modern sciences and social theory as part of Muhammadiyah theology (Arifianto, 2012: 169–170). Young Muhammadiyah activists called for the organisation to embark on a theological reform similar to what NU had started in the 1980s, in order to adapt the organisation’s political theology to the Indonesian rapid socio-political transition and to adjust to the country’s increasingly multi-religious and multi-cultural dimension (Arifianto, 2012: 171–172).

Maarif and Abdurrahman wished for Muhammadiyah to become more tolerant towards non-Islamic faith and to engage in alternative forms of proselytisation called ‘cultural propagation’ (dakwah kultural), centred on the promotion of interfaith cooperation to resolve common social problems like poverty and social injustice and the promotion of socio-economic empowerment for the poor and other marginalised groups (Burhani, 2018a: 444–445). Dakwah kultural was also aimed to counter conservative Islamists within Muhammadiyah who rejected the accommodation of Islam with local culture and traditions (Burhani, 2018a: 445).

Under the chairmanship of Syafii Maarif, the organisation consequently underwent a major theological reform in which it adopted moderate norms such as religious tolerance and pluralism, especially towards non-Muslims. However, counter-reactions from more conservative Muhammadiyah activists were significant. This was revealed in an internal survey which indicated that approximately 43 per cent of the organisation’s regional leaders considered Muhammadiyah activists from its progressive wing to have deviated from the basic tenets of Islamic teachings as propagated by the organisation (Burhani, 2018a: 445).

Growing Islamism and Its Effects Within NU and Muhammadiyah

Political Islam has since Indonesia’s 1998 democratic transition been characterised by an ongoing struggle between moderate Islamic proponents within NU and Muhammadiyah, their opponents within both organisations, and their Islamist rivals who advocate for further integration of orthodox Islamic principles into the Indonesian state and society. The struggle between moderates and Islamists has taken place at both ideational and interpersonal levels. Many Islamists have referred to moderate interpretations as an “invasion of ideas” (ghazwul fikri), while moderates have been concerned that Islamists are engaging in a campaign “to Arabise Indonesian Islam and wipe out local practices and liberal interpretations that had been influential among wide segments of the population” (Van Bruinessen, 2015: 47–48). This culminated in the 2016–2017 Action to Defend Islam (Aksi Bela Islam) rallies which successfully ousted former Jakarta governor Basuki Tjahaja Purnama—a Chinese-descent Christian Indonesian—from public office. Scholars who studied the roots of these rallies concluded that during the previous decade, Islamist groups had managed to propagate their ideas effectively through innovative, new outlets, such as campus preaching organisations, the Internet and social media, and popular propagation (da’wa) activities held in large shopping malls, government ministries, and state-owned enterprises (Arifianto, 2019, 2020a; Slama, 2017).

While NU and Muhammadiyah have been consistent (at least in their official statements) in their efforts to promote moderate norms such as democracy and religious tolerance over the past two decades, they face increasing competition from newer and more conservative Islamic groups. Benefiting from the open political space of the Reformasi era, dozens of Islamist groups—ranging from the Muslim Brotherhood-influenced Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), Hizb ut-Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), and various streams of Salafi movements—were established and received legal recognition to propagate their interpretations to the Indonesian Muslim faithful (umma).

In addition to the ideological challenge from new Islamist organisations, NU and Muhammadiyah also face a strong ideological challenge from within their own ranks, by clerics and activists adhering to more conservative viewpoints. This fragmentation erodes the authority of top leaders to speak on behalf of the Indonesian Muslim umma. Muhammadiyah has consequently lost many of its members over the past decade to PKS, HTI, and various Salafi groups. A recent public opinion survey indicates that only 5 per cent of Indonesian Muslims self-identify as Muhammadiyah followers (Mietzner & Muhtadi, 2020: 71). This is approximately equal to 12 million Muslims, a number far below the 30 million figure often claimed by the organisation’s leaders.

In South Sulawesi province, many former Muhammadiyah followers have left for Wahdah Islamiyah—a quasi-Salafi Islamist organisation which has rapidly gained members and support from local politicians in its two decades of official existence (Nubowo, 2021: 183–184). Remaining Muhammadiyah members often express sympathy towards the positions advocated by Wahdah Islamiyah and other Islamist groups.

In 2006, Muhammadiyah leadership issued a decree which required all of its members to be primarily loyal to Muhammadiyah rather than any other Islamic organisation. Muhammadiyah’s official position—that it is primarily a religious and socio-cultural, but not a political organisation—has motivated many of its followers to join more conservative and politicised Islamic organisations like PKS, HTI, and the Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI). This is because those groups’ mission to ‘purify Islam’ as both a religious and political ideology (al-din wa al-dawlah) is more overt than that of Muhammadiyah (Burhani, 2018a: 451). For instance, MMI openly declares in its constitution that it seeks to transform Indonesia into an Islamic State (Ahnaf, 2020), while HTI seeks to make the Indonesian state part of a global Islamic caliphate (Arifianto, 2019; Muhtadi, 2009).

Within NU, the most serious ideological challenge against its moderate leadership comes from within its own ranks. A new faction called ‘Straight Path NU’ (NU Garis Lurus, NUGL), founded in 2015, seeks to overturn the moderate norms of religious tolerance and pluralism introduced by Wahid in 1984. NU Garis Lurus proponents believe that such norms have “violated the original teachings of NU founder Hasyim Asy’ari and hence are not compatible with Islam” (Iqbal, 2020: 100). Founded by several junior NU clerics with theological training from the Middle East, the faction commands millions of followers both in person and on social media.

While former chairman Said Aqil and NU leadership board members tend to dismiss NUGL as representing a small minority of “militants” within NU, this faction in reality consists of a sizeable network of locally influential NU clerics united against the moderate Islam agenda promoted by the NU leadership (Kayane, 2020: 84–91). NUGL-affiliated clerics and activists managed to have a strong presence in the 2015 NU muktamar in Jombang. Even though they did not manage to defeat Said Aqil in his re-election bid during the muktamar, they signalled the NU leadership that they were backed by a significant number of kyai who were dissatisfied with his leadership (Kayane, 2020: 88–91). They also indicated to the NU leadership that moderates were no longer ideologically dominant among the rank-and-file.

NU and Muhammadiyah’s Strategy to Counter the Islamist Challenge

Faced with increasing competition from new and conservative Islamist organisations, both NU and Muhammadiyah have reformulated and repackaged their political ideologies so as to win back their ex-followers. The two organisations pursue, however, different strategies. NU has come out very strongly to oppose these new Islamist groups, particularly against FPI and HTI, labelling them as ‘radical’ and alien to the moderate Islamic values compatible with Indonesian sensibilities. It also has closely aligned itself with the Indonesian state to curb these groups’ influence. Meanwhile, while also condemning these new conservative groups, Muhammadiyah tends to seek a middle ground in its dealings with them, while avoiding a close relationship with the state.

NU utilised its newly rebranded ideology Islam Nusantara to differentiate itself from Islamist-leaning organisations. From the very start, Islam Nusantara has thus been framed by NU leaders as an antidote to the perceived ‘radicalism’ of Indonesian Islam that is thought to have come from the influence of Islamist groups influenced by transnational ideologies. These groups—HTI, Tarbiyah movement linked with PKS, and various Salafi groups—are often lumped together as ‘Wahhabis’ or ‘Saudi-Islamists’ by Islam Nusantara proponents within the NU. The NU’s acceptance of unorthodox customs and traditions has enabled its leaders to differentiate the organisation from other Sunni Islamic groups. For instance, senior NU kyai Mustofa Bisri declares that:

…genuine Islam, Islam Nusantara….has been supplanted by Saudi Islam, a grasping and materialistic Islam, coarse, cruel and savage. The Wahhabi view is just a ghoulish nightmare that keeps the world awake at night, trembling in horror. (Loveard, 2016)

Groups such as HTI, PKS, and various Salafi groups were portrayed by NU senior clerics as “agents of Arabization” (Burhani, 2018b: 5). The ideological and political struggle between NU and these groups is considered by many NU activists as “being at least as important, if not more so, than violent struggles in the Middle East and South Asia and even efforts to counter domestic violent extremist groups” (Woodward, 2017: 240).

Many critics within NU have opposed Siradj’s promotion of Islam Nusantara, including his predecessor, the late Hasyim Muzadi. Siradj’s faction is however in full control of NU leadership board and has side-lined critics without difficulty. The blocking of NU Garis Lurus website by the Indonesian Ministry of Communication allegedly came at the NU leadership’s request (Iqbal, 2020). Hence, even though NU has a significant Islamist contingent, its leadership has been willing to use strongarm tactics to push NUGL back into a marginal public space.

NU’s attempt to promote a moderate political theology through Islam Nusantara also relies on a close alliance with the Indonesian state, as seen in the strong endorsement by and support for Islam Nusantara from the Joko Widodo (‘Jokowi’) government. This has emboldened NU to take tough—sometimes violent—measures to exclude Islamist opponents from the public sphere. For instance, Banser, a militia group affiliated with Ansor—the NU youth wing—has frequently disrupted HTI-sponsored gatherings and forcefully disbanded da’wa activities conducted by popular Islamist preachers such as Felix Siauw, considered to have close ties with HTI (Burhani, 2018b: 18). Ansor’s tactic to disrupt peaceful activities has been criticised by human rights activists. For one activist, this tactic “echoes the strategies adopted by the Indonesian Army to disrupt the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) activities during the mid-1960s” before it launched a massacre against PKI members and activists in 1965 and 1966.Footnote 8

In sum, NU has adopted an aggressive strategy to counter the perceived conservative Islamist challenge against its ideological and political hegemony over the right to speak on behalf of Indonesian Muslims. In line with how the organisation has historically sought to differentiate itself from other Indonesian Islamic organisations, NU promotes a distinction between itself and conservative Islamist organisations whom it accuses of bringing ‘foreign’ (Arabic) influences to divide Indonesian Muslims and to establish an Islamic or a caliphate state in Indonesia. This logic undergirds confrontational NU campaigns to disrupt the activities of Islamist organisations perceived as rival contenders to win the hearts and minds of Indonesian Muslims, particularly the millennial generation (Arifianto, 2019).

Muhammadiyah, on the other hand, promotes less confrontational strategies vis-à-vis conservative and hard-line Islamist groups. In response to NU’s propagation of Islam Nusantara from 2015, Muhammadiyah rebranded its ideology as “Islam with Progress” (Islam Berkemajuan) during its national congress (muktamar) held in Makassar during the same year. Muhammadiyah leaders have criticised Islam Nusantara’s defence of local cultural traditions, arguing that some traditions are incompatible with Islamic values and scientific progress.Footnote 9 Islam Berkemajuan, by contrast, emphasises the compatibility between the basic tenets of Islamic principles; Indonesian nationalism; and knowledge obtained from scientific research. The theological foundation of Islam Berkemajuan is said to be based upon:

…the theology of ‘kindness’ (Al-Ma’un) to bring actual proselytization (da’wa) and renewal (tajdid) in the living struggle for the Islamic community, nationality, and universal humanity. Islamic transformation with progress is a religious perspective which is derived from the Qur’an, Sunnah, and the utilization of independent reasoning (ijtihad) in the context of a complex 21st century modern lifestyle. (Muhammadiyah, 2015: 64)

The decree also declares that Islam Berkemajuan is a rejection of the expression of violence in any form, including terrorism, and aims to promote religious tolerance and Islamic moderation:

Islam Berkemajuan is Islam that promotes anti-war, anti-terrorism, anti-violence, anti-repression, and anti-backwardness…. It positively supports ethnic, racial, communal and cultural diversityFootnote 10 by promoting the message of peace, tolerance, and middle way (wassatiyat) in every walks of life. (Muhammadiyah, 2015: 64–65)

In addition to Islam Berkemajuan, the 2015 Muhammadiyah muktamar also issued a decree affirming the organisation’s loyalty to the Pancasila and to Indonesia as a unitary nationalist state (NKRI). It declared that “Pancasila is a national consensus (dar al-ahdi) and a national creed (dar al-syahadah) to make Indonesia a safe and peaceful nation (dar-al-salam)” (Muhammadiyah, 2015: 67). It further affirmed that: “While Pancasila is not a religion… [it] is Islamic because the substance of all its principles is fully compatible with Islamic teachings and values” (Muhammadiyah, 2015: 68). The Islam Berkemajuan and the Dar-al-ahdi-al-Syahadah decrees rejected the Islamists’ call for the establishment of an Islamic state, in particular, those of HTI to make Indonesia part of a global caliphate.

However, Muhammadiyah’s effort to combat growing Islamic conservatism within the organisation is ambiguous. Unlike NU, Muhammadiyah’s theologically diverse leadership structure consists of members from both moderate and conservative factions. Haedar Nashir—the current Muhammadiyah chairman (since 2015)—has a reputation for speaking out against the “infiltration” of Muhammadiyah by conservative Islamist groups.Footnote 11 He is considered to have been instrumental behind the issuance of the Islam Berkemajuan theology during the 2015 muktamar. However, the Muhammadiyah national board also comprises theologically conservative members, including at different times the late Yunahar Ilyas, Dahlan Rais, and Goodwill Zubir. In decision-making, a consensus acceptable to all needs to be reached.

Some Muhammadiyah members harbour sympathies for PKS, HTI, and various Salafi groups, with some regional board members and their affiliates (amal usaha) even thought to be members of one of the later organisations. Abdul Mukti, Muhammadiyah general secretary, stated that any Muhammadiyah national and regional leaders must profess complete loyalty to the organisation if they wish to retain their leadership position:

If you are interested in HTI, MMI, PKS, Salafism, or something similar, please leave Muhammadiyah…Muhammadiyah never ‘fires’ its followers. But it does not mean bringing other ideologies into Muhammadiyah will be acceptable. Such behaviour is a violation of the organisational ethics. (Nashir et al., 2019: 9)

A significant number of Muhammadiyah members—particularly those from the younger generation—sympathise with conservative Islamist groups supporting the 2016–2017 Defending Islam (or 212) movement. For instance, Muhammadiyah Youth Wing (Pemuda Muhammadiyah) and its militia Kokam supported the 212 rallies and helped provide security protection for prominent 212-linked preachers such as Bachtiar Nasir and Felix Siauw, so their da’wa activities would not be disrupted by Ansor/Banser (Burhani, 2021: 87).

The Muhammadiyah leadership asserts that it is aware that many younger members have secondary affiliations with the aforementioned groups and that many also participated in the 212 movement. In fact, Muhammadiyah-affiliated preachers who were also leaders of the 212 movement—such as Bachtiar Nasir—are believed to be more popular among its rank-and-file members compared to the organisation’s top leaders.Footnote 12

When the Jokowi administration issued the special regulation (Perppu) which authorised it to ban HTI in July 2017, Muhammadiyah reaffirmed its commitment to the Pancasila and condemned HTI for seeking to promote an Islamic caliphate “which threatens to overturn an existing political system within a Muslim-majority state” (Muhammadiyah, 2017). However, the youth wing, Pemuda Muhammadiyah, issued a separate statement that it disagreed with the Perppu, stating that “it opposes judgmental and punitive measures against an ideology”. It also stated that while Muhammadiyah opposes the caliphate-based political system advocated by HTI, it supports the latter’s effort to promote “a humanitarian civilization based upon Islam” (Antaranews, 2017).

While some moderate Muhammadiyah leaders have called for a stronger stance against the Islamists (Nashir, 2007), more conservative members—particularly those from the younger generation—clearly wanted the organisation to accommodate the Islamists’ political agenda expressed in the 212 rallies and to take a stance against the Indonesian state in general and the Jokowi government in particular. The organisation’s leadership seemingly now follows a “middle way” between continuing Muhammadiyah’s theologically moderate position in regard to issues such as inter-religious dialogue and tolerance, and outspokenness against the Jokowi government.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have analysed how two Indonesian Islamic organisations with moderate political theology—namely Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah—utilise their theological resources to deal with the challenge against their ideological hegemony over Islam in Indonesia posed by newer and more conservative Islamist groups. I argue that political theology helps explain the moderate Islamic organisations’ motivation, and provides the rationale for their actions responding to growing Islamic conservatism in Indonesia. This account of the more moderate organisations’ motivations and actions is more nuanced than ‘thin’ explanations that argues the activists of these organisations are motivated to counter the Islamists due to their interests in gaining political power and patronage from the state (Hadiz, 2016; Mietzner & Muhtadi, 2020).

The above close examination of how NU and Muhammadiyah have sought to counter their conservative Islamist challengers through political theologies demonstrates that the two organisations have had varying levels of success. Both NU and Muhammadiyah experience a strong pushback from conservative Islamists internally as well as externally. They, respectively, introduced the moderate ideologies of Islam Nusantara and Islam Berkemajuan, which are compatible with Indonesian nationalism and cultural traditions. Both ideologies are also utilised to counter the Islamist’s ideological narratives aimed to lure their followers away from NU and Muhammadiyah.

Nahdlatul Ulama appears to be more successful in its countermeasures against Islamism, because its political theology makes it easier for the organisation to differentiate itself from that of the later groups. It also has a moderate leadership hierarchy that is ideologically cohesive and able to control the organisation at the national level—notwithstanding the existence of rival factions, like NUGL, with more conservative theological views. The NU leadership was therefore able to effectively implement Islam Nusantara ideology and to pursue an alliance with the Jokowi regime to marginalise its rivals within the Indonesian Islamic public sphere. However, NU has also promoted harsh rhetoric in its campaign against conservative Islamists and deployed exclusivist and sometimes violent tactics through its youth wing Ansor to disrupt and marginalise FPI, HTI, and other Islamist rivals.

On the other hand, Muhammadiyah has given mixed and ambivalent responses to growing Islamic conservatism within its own ranks. Its political theology, which has historically promoted the purification of ‘heretical innovations’ (bid’ah) and a close relationship between Islam and politics, shares similarities with those of Islamist groups such as PKS and HTI. The moderate faction within the organisation that has advocated for a more inclusive political theology faces significant resistance from conservative Islamist factions. Muhammadiyah has an ideologically diverse leadership board with members from both moderate and conservative backgrounds, arguably making its leadership more inclusive and representative of rank-and-file members’ theological diversity than that of NU. However, this diversity also serves as a stumbling block for the organisation, preventing it from articulating a coherent response towards the growing influence of Islamism within its ranks.

To conclude, NU has been more successful than Muhammadiyah in its effort to counter the challenge from conservative Islamists against its authority in post-Reformasi Indonesia. This is due to its more heterodox and nuanced Islamic interpretations, which make it more easily distinguishable. In addition, NU’s leadership is committed to promoting moderate Islam by marginalising ideological challenges from NUGL and Islamist-leaning NU clerics. However, this relies on the organisation’s close alignment with the Jokowi government, which arguably reduces NU’s credibility as a promoter of moderate norms and democracy in Indonesia. The repression of Islamist groups such as HTI, considered by the government to be ‘politically troublesome’, is particularly problematic.

Meanwhile, Muhammadiyah is able to retain its role as an independent civil society organisation which promotes democracy and freedom of expression for all Indonesians, including conservative Islamists. It also has a more diverse leadership than NU, comprising members from broader theological perspectives. This diversity in theological and political views, however, comes at the price of accommodating conservative leaders and activists, resulting in the inability of the organisation to discipline some of its senior leaders and rank-and-file followers who participated in the 212 protests and collaborated extensively with other Islamist organisations in other occasions in recent years.