Keywords

Introduction

Militaries as security service-providers have enjoyed monopolies of violence and in some countries have been leading political actors. They are imbued with the resources of labor, material, ideology, and symbolism in their soldiering, weapons, mission, and pageantry. As armed laborers, their purpose is to defend their nation-state while protecting regimes in power and are privileged to enjoy being honored as heroes. However, militaries of every country are vernacular forces with different cultural-historical histories which have been chronologically shaped by varying levels of authoritarian legacies, popular acceptance, and roles in championing national integration. When militaries go to war or prosecute counterinsurgency, they tend to enjoy legal impunity. All militaries, as societal institutions, are influenced by military norms. However, the political norms of militaries (or military norms) have generally shifted over time. Where sultanistic personalities (inside or outside of militaries) exert enormous influence over senior armed forces officials, then militaries sometimes re-align from disciplined defense of state and regime to becoming subordinate to such patrons.

Such has been the case in Southeast Asia where armed forces have been conditioned by political norm change which is still ongoing. Following decolonization, the militaries of Southeast Asian countries became subject to political norm dynamics in terms of shifting practices—which affected their political roles—across time. In the cases of Vietnam, Lao PDR, Cambodia, and Brunei, militaries became entrenched under single party structures or absolute monarchies. In Singapore and Malaysia, the armed forces became mostly dominated by hegemonic parties. Militaries in the Philippines, Timor-Leste, and Indonesia (though the latter’s post-1998 military is still somewhat autonomous) have come under more democratic civilian control. Thailand and BurmaFootnote 1 represent two regional countries where the military has been the dominant actor. But in all cases, militaries have spearheaded security, state-building, and development. They have possessed overlapping registers of identification and belonging in the sense of loyalty to nation-state, loyalty to regime, and loyalty to the corps. They have been traditional, vernacular forces redefining but also redefined by associated political norms. The transformation in their norms has changed their roles.

This chapter argues, based upon a New Institutionalism framework, that Thai and Burma militaries have followed a path in which changes in self-identification have led to political norm shifts that have then contributed to changing military roles. Thus, the evolution of military norms in Thailand and Burma has been a function of structure and agency, with Thai military norms legitimizing the military’s positioning as a junior partner of monarchy in dominating Thailand, while Burma’s military norms have legitimized its sole lording over Burma. In Thailand, following its role in overthrowing absolute monarchy, the military became more factionalized amidst national emergencies and ironically came to depend on the country’s popular monarchy for legitimacy, dressing itself in royalist norms to maintain its near preeminence. For Burma, after leading the country out of colonialism, through insurgencies, following its 1962 coup, and beset by sanctions, the military adopted norms of intra-military control which became ingrained through hierarchical personalism. Imbued with a siege mentality against civilian challenges, it overthrew a 2011–2021 superficial democracy and again seized power in 2021, resurrecting its norms of military control based upon a perceived privilege of monopoly over politics and the economy. In both countries, what were the norms which were established to guide militaries, how did they originate, and how did they affect militaries? How did they shift over time? How are military norms continuing to influence militaries in Thailand and Burma? This chapter will address these questions. Following this Introduction, the chapter examines literature on military norms, offering a New Institutionalist perspective. It then looks at the case of Thailand. This is followed by the case of Burma. The chapter offers its comparative findings in the conclusion.

Military Norms and New Institutionalism

Literature on military norms has broadly discussed military professionalism in terms of a military which effectively provides security but also obediently accepts civilian control.

Huntington postulated a politically neutral professionalism, un-warped by participation in politics, isolated from society, and concerned with the efficient achievement of its tasks of expertise in violence, responsibility to its client (the state) and corporate unity (Huntington, 1957: 7–18; 71). What Huntington calls “objective civilian control (or maximizing military professionalism) not only reduces the power of the military to the lowest possible level vis-a-vis all civilian groups, it also maximizes the likelihood of achieving military security (ibid.).”

Huntington was not without his critics. Janowitz (1964) disagreed with Huntington, arguing that military professionalism must be sensitive to politics, integrated within society, and that subjective, rather than objective, civilian control is preferable so as to ensure civilian supremacy over the military. Subjective civilian control is concerned with inculcating political values and practices into the military, as an institution and profession. Militaries tend to obey civilians because of “meaningful integration with civilian values (Janowitz, 1964: 420).” Nevertheless, Finer (1962) noted that “many highly professional officer corps have intervened in politics—the German and Japanese cases are notorious…The fact is, however, that…belief in …civil supremacy…has been historically effective only in those countries where civilians have imposed it, and through superior forces reinforced their legitimacy over time with socio-economic performance that conformed to mass expectations (Finer, 1962: 20–26).”

Military academies have served as essential centers for the inculcation and transmission of military norms, values, and beliefs. These schools shape and define cadets’ identities and worldviews, often ensuring the coherence of military attitudes across multiple generations of students. Indeed, academies can shape military norms to the extent that officers may feel that their values are superior to those of governments in office, contributing to the potential for military coups (Finer, 1962; Geddes, 2003; Janowitz, 1977; Nordlinger, 1977; Stepan, 1971). Military socialization within academies can affect corps hierarchy, discipline, cohesiveness, ideology, and consciousness, sometimes leading to conflicts with civilian governments (Geddes, 2003: 54; Nordlinger, 1977). Education through academies can enhance the chances of a coup through (1) the building up of shared norms among school classmates and (2) the creation of networks of trust among officer schoolmates, both of which are necessary for conducting coups (Böhmelt et al., 2019). Academies can also inculcate national security doctrines which rationalize political intervention in society (Stepan, 1973).

Nevertheless, focusing upon trust and networks begs the question as to how norms, values, and beliefs develop within a political structure across time. New Institutionalism (NI) offers a lens through which the norms of politically powerful institutions such as the military have developed across time (Croissant et al., 2013). Two NI variants (Historical and Sociological Institutionalism) are particularly instructive. Historical Institutionalism or HI seeks to explain the evolutionary chronology of institutional persistence and change, stressing how institutions shape not only strategies but also the development of preferences, goals, and interests (Steinmo et al., 1992: 9). The approach offers explanations about how events in history either constrained or offered opportunities that affected institutional resilience or transformation. Beginning from the institutional point of origin, initial institutional patterns become chronologically reinforced, producing persistent impacts upon contemporary configurations (Pierson, 2004). According to this framework, military norms have evolved across time, influenced by historical institutionalist factors of historical legacies, path dependence, and critical junctures. Historical legacies are prior contextual conditions of the past, which, once created, become quite self-reproducing, and entrenching (Collier & Collier, 1991; Pierson, 2004). Path dependence is an evolutionary trajectory whereby, once actors make certain institutional choices, “the costs of reversal are very high. There will be other choice points, but the entrenchments of certain institutional arrangements obstruct an easy reversal of the initial choice” (Levi, 1997: 28). Path dependence is central to other historical institutionalist factors because other factors can only help determine, strengthen, or weaken the path—but these factors are themselves not the path. Critical junctures are “short, time-defined periods, where antecedent conditions allow contingent choices that set a specific trajectory of institutional modification that is difficult to reverse (Page, 2006: 88).”

Meanwhile, Sociological institutionalism highlights “the ways in which institutions develop through culture—perhaps through tradition, myth, or ritual—and are thus culturally constructed (Hall & Taylor, 1996: 13–17).” Sociological institutionalists ask not what utilities caused an institution to be created, but instead, what cultural factors lead to its creation (Nichols, 1998: 482–483). The approach views institutions in terms of symbols, “cognitive scripts and moral templates that provide the ‘frames of meaning’ guiding human action (Hall & Taylor, 1996: 13–14).” Institutions also tend to socially construct norms, identity, and preferred behaviors, with change occurring when change becomes socially legitimate. Epistemic communities, using such norms of social expectation to affect human behavior, are influenced by, but also influence, political culture.

Ideational factors define what civilians and soldiers consider to be legitimate behavior (Croissant et al., 2013: 54). For civilians, if “the political culture of the overall society” accepts military intervention across society, then it will be more likely to occur; for soldiers, where their military mindset openly allows intrusions across civilian affairs as “guardians of the nation,” then it will more likely happen (Croissant et al., 2013: 54; Loveman, 1999). Political norms thus affect both civilians and military officials alike. For the latter, such norms are institutional frames of interpretation which socially evolve while exerting an effect on military mindsets, becoming military norms. Such norms are also influenced by identities of belonging and loyalty: nation-state, ruling regime, and corps. Indeed, within security services, patronage and clientelism can also influence military norms. The path dependence of dominant military norms—as social institutions—begins at the inception of militaries. But the character of these norms is influenced by historical legacies—of authoritarianism and relative mass obedience. As militaries persist as bureaucratic institutions over time, they become susceptible to changes in their norms and behaviors—which are themselves swayed by changing military doctrines, patrons, and needs. Militaries can also be influenced by civilian pressures toward achieving civilian control, degree of military cohesion, and level of any national emergencies (Croissant et al., 2013: 51–56). Where an abrupt change or critical juncture in military unity occurs, then there can be a realignment in the path of a military’s “institutional ethos” (McCoy, 1999: 346). Militaries resistant to democratic change in military norms tend to rank loyalty to nation-state, king, or military service ahead of subservience to civilian governments. Such militaries are prone to stage coups or strengthen autocratic superstructures. Ultimately, dimensions of both historical institutionalism and sociological institutionalism help to understand how changing military norms can alter the roles of militaries.

Thailand’s Military: From Royal Servant to Unrivaled Autocrat and Back

The path of Thailand’s powerful military originated in 1852, when Siamese King Rama IV (1851–1868) created a permanent standing army. There subsequently developed a navy, police, and air force existing under an autocratic absolute monarchy. Though the king relied upon these forces for security, they depended upon him for budgeting and legitimacy. Military norms were overshadowed by the ideational pageantry of monarchization, or total subservience to monarchy, since the military was directly linked to the palace. It acted as a “monarchised military” (Chambers & Waitoolkiat, 2016: 6), a social construction enshrined into law which:

defines the military in terms of ideological dynamics, symbols, rituals, and processes which enhance its legitimacy. The monarchized military derives the legitimacy of its authority from historical–cultural legacies, whereby soldiers secured a patrimonial monarchy that evolved to oversee a capitalist, monarchized state (ibid.).

Under monarchized military education, “cadets were deeply indoctrinated in loyalty to the king, the military, and the country” (Battye, 1974: 498). But with esprit de corps stirred by a reverence for Japan’s then-militarism-nationalism, the indoctrination of cadets in the essentiality of military institutions infused norms of military honor and nationalism that began to churn against royal absolutism (ibid.: 500).

In 1932, military officers joined civilian bureaucrats in overthrowing the absolute monarchy, establishing a semi-authoritarian polity with limited elections. The experience represented a critical juncture because the armed forces became the unrivaled institution of power across the country. Historical legacies of authoritarianism, combined with the breakdown in royal cohesion and the 1929–1933 national emergency of economic depression, provided conditions which produced a realignment in the path dependence of dominant clout from monarchy to military. Regarding royalism, only symbols of ornamental obedience to monarchy persisted. Military norms became imbued with state-led nationalistic and militaristic dogma, where the soldier was a national hero, protection of nation-state was paramount, and irredentist-fascist conceptions of a dominant Thai warrior race were ubiquitous. Military education was heavily influenced by martial modes from Japan and Germany. The height of this militarism-fascism came under the regime of Field Marshal Phibun Songkram (1938–1944) (Murashima, 1986: 70; Wright, 1991: 97–98). Though Thai civilians briefly established electoral democracy in 1946, it was decimated by a palace-endorsed 1947 military coup which prevented any critical juncture disrupting the path of entrenched, post-1932, militarist norms in the armed forces.

The post-1947 putsch period was lorded over by an alliance between the military and re-emergent monarchy (as junior partner), both reliant on the United States. In 1949, the US West Point system of military education began to slightly influence Thai military norms. Armed forces dogma became centered on anti-communism, developmental militarism, and, less prominently, monarchization (Chambers, 2020a, 2020b: 74). The focus on security led again to the peripheralization of monarchy and ascendance of military and police between 1951 and 1957. Beginning in 1952, Washington initiated the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program which boosted networking between the US and Thai militaries and augmented Thai military capacities, but was unsuccessful in its attempt to instill values of civilian control, democracy, and professionalism into soldiers (Chambers, 2013: 24).

Thailand’s 1957 coup transformed Thai military norms significantly. Coup-leader Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat re-established monarchy as central to the military credo, producing more influence for monarchy and more legitimacy for military. Nevertheless, the armed forces remained the dominant partner (Chaloemtiarana, 2007: 119). Washington’s implicit backing for Sarit’s coup suggested that the US did not necessarily support civilian control.

The continuing path dependence of military dominion was reflected in the 1960 Defense Act, under which the military would be specifically utilized to safeguard the monarchy, combat insurrection, develop the country, and protect national interests (Chambers, 2020a, 2020b: 76). Anti-communism became a Cold War raison d'être, merging the interests of the military, monarchy, and the United States. During 1964–1976, US soldiers were barracked in Thailand as part of anti-communist missions in Southeast Asia, while communist insurgency prevailed during 1965–1983. In pursuing Counterinsurgency (COIN), Thailand’s military used COIN doctrinal tactics,Footnote 2 which included use of repression and rural development projects to win hearts and minds—with US support. Counterinsurgency also gave the armed forces a rationale for limiting civilian control.

The October 14, 1973, end of military dictatorship offered opportunities for limited transitions in military norms. Societal pressures for democracy and the rise of progressive army chief Gen. Krit Sivara suggested that the military would finally accept elected civilian control. Gen. Krit’s support for military norms favoring civilian control forced a role change in the military—it retreated to the barracks (Zimmerman, 1978: 51). But Krit died suddenly in 1976; Thailand was beset by growing turbulence; both the King and the United States became receptive to renewed autocracy; and elements within Thailand’s army were plotting takeovers. These factors led to a bloody October 6 massacre of students which enabled another military coup.

Nevertheless, intense military factionalism prevented any group from taking charge, thus permitting the palace to rule the country through favored ultra-rightist civilian Thanin Kravichien. But subservience to monarchy was at the time not a role acceptable to military leaders and Thanin was ultimately overthrown in a 1977 coup. The 1977 coup was not thoroughly endorsed by the king, enhancing tension between palace and then-Premier Gen. Kriangsak Chomanand (Handley, 2006: 277).

During this time, military norms were intensely debated in the increasingly factionalized armed forces. Though anti-communism, developmental militarism, and monarchy remained important, senior officers were bitterly divided between those wanting a return to the pre-1973 period of military dominance and others (aligned with the late Gen. Krit) who preferred civilian rule over a powerful military. Meanwhile, there were several cliques of younger officers. Two were ideologically progressive. The first, the “Young Turks,” castigated the capitalism of corrupt businesspeople/politicians, who made communism appeal to peasants, and advocated military tutelage under which clean social reforms could commence (Bunbongkarn, 1987: 13). Another group, “Democratic Soldiers,” sought to develop the countryside; win the hearts and minds of Thai communists; as well as boost the democratization of Thai society and military norms (ibid.: 15).

Unity returned to military ideology with the palace-engineered ascension to the premiership of General Prem Tinsulanonda in 1980. Prem was a popular, anti-communist, arch-royalist army general, highly trusted by King Bhumipol. A 1981 coup against Prem failed due to its lack of royal support. No coup thereafter could be successful without monarchy’s endorsement. Thereupon, the military assumed the role of junior associate to monarchy in a mutual power partnership over Thailand. This partnership buttressed the dominance of monarchization over any military norm in Thailand. Prem’s informal clique advocated limited democracy and was called “Professional Soldiers” (Ockey, 2007: 104). The military thereupon reached its highest stage of monarchization since 1932. Though Prem stepped down in 1988, 1991 saw soldiers again stage a coup ostensibly to safeguard the palace. By that time, military norms were so permeated by royalism that it determined military roles: in May 1992, King Bhumipol verbally could (and did) force military strongman Gen. Suchinda Kraprayoon to resign the premiership and retire into oblivion. This, combined with Prem’s continuing presence, the Cold War’s 1991 end and a May 18–19, 1992, military massacre of civilians, vastly expanded royalist norms throughout the armed forces and diminished the military’s own prestige—except in serving monarchy (Chambers & Waitoolkiat, 2016: 7).

From 1992 until 2006, Thailand was led by elected governments, though the country was a guided democracy, since the King and Prem (sitting on the King’s Privy Council) dominated the realm. During this period, monarchization followed by security sector reform and support for democracy, became central features of military ideology. The military was now partly monitored by an elected parliament. From 1998 until 2001, Army Chief Surayud instituted military downsizing and greater transparency of military budgets (McCargo and Pathmanand, 2005: 132).

Highly popular Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra (2001–2006) attempted to place the military under his personal control, tinkering with military factions. During this time, there were efforts to make elected civilian control the central military norm. Most of Thaksin’s core military appointees perceived that their professional roles required them to answer to the elected Premier ↓ Thaksin. Meanwhile, because of his influence across the military, Thaksin was able to appoint his cousin as Army Commander. However, amidst enormous opposition to Thaksin from disaffected military factions and the palace itself, the army ousted him on September 19, 2006, claiming that he had challenged the king (Royal Thai Army, 2006). The event eroded normative military backing for unbridled civilian control once and for all (Chambers, 2020a, 2020b: 79).

Following the 2006 coup, military norms resumed their focus on monarchization and developmental militarism, reflecting the continuing path of a powerful though monarchized military. Junta leaders oversaw the enactment of a 2007 constitution which established a half-elected Senate; weakened political parties; and near military autonomy over its affairs. Still, pro-Thaksin political parties were able to win the next three elections (2007, 2011, and 2014). The military as an institution increasingly concentrated on the norm of safeguarding monarchy. Here was a value which most Thai people would support. The military thus began to take a leading role in launching criminal accusations of lèse-majesté (insulting the king) using Criminal Code Article 112. As such, the military sought to legitimize its role as defender of monarchy and thus enhance military clout across society (Chachavalpongpun, 2011).

On May 22, 2014, Army Chief Gen. Prayuth Chan-ocha overthrew Thailand’s elected pro-Thaksin Pheu Thai government. The coup leaders belonged to the Queen’s Tiger Guard faction and a leading motive for the coup was again that the ousted elected government had challenged monarchical power. The new National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) junta asserted that it would reestablish peace and restore the rightful position of the monarchy (Baliga, 2014; NCPO, 2014). Political disunity and conflict had disrupted the political order under the monarchy and necessitated the coup (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2014). It was thus essential for the military to intervene to stabilize Thailand under greater guidance by monarchy and military. Through its 2014–2019 junta, the NCPO carried out the role of maintaining autocracy while it transformed military norms so that they explicitly emphasized monarchization and developmental militarism under a national security credo. Its ability to overturn popular civilian rule and rule by decree demonstrated that monarchized military authoritarianism as a cognitive script could persist since no critical juncture emerged after 1932 to alter this path and place it on a course toward more democratized military norms. The military importantly oversaw the 2016 royal succession of King Rama X—Maha Vajiralongkorn, remaining loyal to the palace.

The junta also enacted the 2017 constitution which mandated a completely junta-appointed Senate to help select a Premier (Charuvastra, 2017). Any amendments to the constitution required one-third of the junta-appointed senators’ votes to pass. The constitution also allowed unelected candidates as Prime Minister, including ex-junta leaders or ex-military personnel. In this way, NCPO head Prayuth was “elected” Prime Minister in 2019. Though popular elections occurred, democracy was limited. The same individuals leading the 2014–2019 junta remained in power in Thailand’s post-2019 era ↓ Generals Prayuth, Prawit Wongsuwan, and Anupong Paochinda. They had been leading figures in Thailand’s military since 2006 and firmly opposed progressive/liberal changes in military values. Thus, the autocratic, arch-royalist, military norms of the 2014–2019 junta persisted astride Thailand’s post-2019 façade democracy. This post-2014 elevation of the monarchized military’s power was wholeheartedly supported by the king. However, post-2016 King Rama X attempted to enhance royal control over the military and its norms even further by making the army’s 1st Division Infantry Division into a palace appendage; establishing a separate Royal Security Command; and creating a royally endorsed army faction called “Red Rims (Chambers, 2020a, 2020b).”

Ultimately, because Thailand’s armed forces fulfilled its role as monarchized military, its persevering path of power—as an underling to the palace—continued unabated. In 2022, arch-royalism followed by developmental militarism continued to outweigh other military norms.

Burma’s Military: From Post-Colonial Guardian to Despot

With a long pre-colonial history of Burman kings using repression to consolidate power, historical legacies of autocracy long permeated Burma’s past. Under British colonialism (1885–1948), the monarchy was forcibly terminated, and colonial forces were tasked with quelling Burman uprisings. Though a British Burma Army mostly possessing ethnic minority soldiers had been established in 1937, the path of Burma’s powerful, Burman-dominated modern military, as it has continuously existed until the present day, began in 1941, during World War II.

Following initial training by the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA), the Burma Independence Army (BIA) was formed. Advised by IJA’s Suzuki Keiji, and led by Aung San (father of Aung San Suu Kyi), in 1942 it embarked as a guerilla force alongside the Japanese against allied soldiers in British Burma. As victory approached, the BIA morphed into the Burma Defence Army and then, following Japan’s establishment of the State of Burma in August 1943, the Burma National Army (BNA) was founded. General Aung San became Defense Minister whereas General Ne Win commanded the BNA, which was mostly comprised of Burman-ethnicity recruits. Under the Japanese, Burmese forces engaged in some violent massacres of ethnic minorities, especially the Rohingya and Karen (HRW, 2013; Selth, 1986: 491). In August 1942, the Japanese created an Officer Training School in Yangon (Aung, 2020). During this time, military norms were heavily influenced by the Japanese martial ethic of Bushido combined with Burman nationalism—ingredients which strengthened the path dependence of a robust, militaristic culture. The BNA became the most powerful institution for the Burmese.

In March 1945, the BNA under the leadership of Aung San rebelled against Japan, and joined the Allies. The BNA became the Patriotic Burmese Forces (PBF). When British colonization temporarily returned following World War II, the British unsuccessfully sought to integrate the PBF into a new British-controlled National Burma Army (NBA) which included Burman and non-Burman recruits. If the British had been successful in the integration efforts, they would likely have been able to influence the nationalistic military norms imbued within the BNA/PBF. As such, the NBA offered a brief but unsuccessful challenge to the PBF. Burma achieved independence from the British in January 1948. But BIA founder, colonial premier, and father-of-the-nation Aung San was assassinated in July 1947. His death weakened moderate voices in the fledgling armed forces, in Burmese, “Tatmadaw,” which took that name at 1948 independence. Moreover, the Tatmadaw increasingly came to be dominated by the hardline General Ne Win (Seekins, 2007: 19–24). Viewed by many Burmese (and viewing itself) as the deliverer of independence, savior from communism, and Burman-centric unifier against ethnic minority secessionist threats, the post-1948 Tatmadaw quickly became the sturdiest part of Burma’s early state bureaucracy. Its officers were xenophobic in worldview partly because of their combat against racial groups along the borders, but also because of US-supported Nationalist Chinese anti-communist soldiers who fled to and occupied parts of Burma during the 1950s. Tatmadaw soldiers viewed themselves (and were viewed by many Burmese) as indispensable champions of the nation. The Tatmadaw’s Defence Services Academy, established in 1955, inculcated graduating officers from the Army, Navy, and Air Force, with the values of defending and leading the nation (Hla, 2001). Increasingly, Tatmadaw officers perceived civilian rulers as uselessly corrupt. Military norms reflected a growing belief that the military could and should manage the state alone (Steinberg, 2021: 2). As this belief became dominant across the Tatmadaw, a cognitive path dependence commenced whereby the military thought itself most capable and deserving of lording over the country.

Nevertheless, initially, the Tatmadaw served Burma’s democratically elected governments starting from 1948 independence. Under Prime Minister U Nu, civilian administration was weak, party politics was volatile, and ethnic minorities were suspicious of the central government. U Nu instituted a foreign policy of neutralism, seeking to keep Burma free from external conflicts. Yet, instability along the borders continued unabated. Thus, the military under General Ne Win found itself fighting multiple ethnic secessionist wars on a growing number of fronts. Still, the Tatmadaw’s first military doctrine, originated during the early 1950s, advocated strong anti-communism, containing China and “coping with foreign invasion, rather than suppressing insurgency” (Myoe, 2009: 17). For the Tatmadaw, U Nu’s government seemed to be excessively weak in the face of encroaching communism. Thus, it pressured the prime minister to step aside and allow Ne Win to rule between 1958 and 1960 (Myoe, 2009: 56).

New elections brought Nu again to the premiership, but Ne Win’s 1962 coup ended civilian control altogether. Meant to stanch what the Tatmadaw felt was the civilian-led disintegration of Burma, the overthrow of democracy institutionalized the Tatmadaw’s complete control over the country for the next fifty years. Ne Win appears to have been seen as a descendant of (and the heir to) Burman kings (Taylor, 2015: 11). Following the putsch, severe autocratic rule mixed with ideological rigidity was instituted. Ne Win enacted what he called the “Burmese Path to Socialism,” establishing a one-party socialist state, with state-led autarky, a xenophobia-based reduction of relations with other countries, and Tatmadaw control of the country. The isolated, nationalistic neo-stratocracy was imbued with “extreme personalisation of power—a traditional and continuing aspect of Burmese authority” (Steinberg, 2021: 2). By 1964 the Tatmadaw’s doctrinal emphasis had shifted to counterinsurgency alongside preparation to fight a foreign invasion, with the military stressing a scorched earth counterinsurgency policy of “Total People’s War” (Myoe, 2009: 19–23). Nevertheless, Ne Win maintained contacts with a select number of countries. Indeed, he visited the United States in 1966 and maintained close ties with Thailand’s military leadership.

In 1974, Ne Win administratively transformed his regime, though he remained in sole control. The Pyithu Hluttaw or People’s Assembly governed the affairs of state, though actual power was centered in the Council of State, alongside the Burma Socialist Program Party, a military proxy party. The Assembly, Council, and party all answered to Ne Win, who, even though resigning from the military in 1974, became State Council chair and President of Burma. Though no longer an active-duty military official, he continued to dominate the Tatmadaw.

Meanwhile, the Tatmadaw maintained total control over the country. By 1988 it had decimated Burma’s economy. The military responded to the proliferation of civilian demonstrations in August 1988 by brutally suppressing them. The result was Western sanctions and a pariah status for Burma among the international community. Meanwhile, a new generation of Tatmadaw leaders, assembled as the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), had usurped power from Ne Win. SLORC immediately established a new military doctrine dubbed “people’s war under modern conditions.” Given the world’s loathing of the Tatmadaw, the doctrine expressed the need to oppose external security threats (Myoe, 2009: 196). The military norms during this period incrementally adjusted toward a siege mentality of the state and regime alike against external and internal threats. The result was the dualization of society: the Tatmadaw as the guardian “us” versus civilian Burmese “them,”—potential state enemies (Callahan, 1999: 56). Therefore, the path dependence of Tatmadaw overlordship, rationalized as the custodian and champion of national security traced back to World War II and national independence, persisted. Military norms only changed with regard to method of managing Tatmadaw power over civilians, rather than in terms of Tatmadaw ever becoming accountable to these.

SLORC did allow somewhat fair elections to take place in May 1990. In fact, the junta had promised an election following the 1988 crackdown. But this did not necessarily reflect a move toward progressive norms in Tatmadaw thinking. Instead, as the election approached, SLORC head Saw Maung, apparently perturbed about the growing public outpouring for democratization, was very ambiguous about what might transpire if SLORC lost the election. When the National League for Democracy (NLD) scored a landslide victory and demanded control over the legislature, the junta’s reaction was surprise, suspicion, and rejection, corresponding to the military’s perennial distrust of civilians (Tonkin, 2007: 40–49). SLORC had already placed NLD head Aung San Suu Kyi (ASSK), daughter of father-of-the-nation and father-of-the-Tatmadaw, Aung San, under house arrest. 1990 set the stage for a much more pronounced “bunker mentality” by the junta against international and domestic opponents. In 1997, SLORC was reconstituted as the State Peace and Development Committee (SPDC), reflecting the ascension to power of younger senior officers led by Gen. Than Shwe, who had succeeded Saw Maung in 1992 (Refworld, 1998). Also in 1997, despite its military-dominated pariah status, ASEAN allowed Burma to join the organization.

In February 1999, SPDC leaders declared the defense policy and missions of the Tatmadaw. Emphasizing the importance of “non-disintegration of the Union; non-disintegration of national solidarity; and perpetuation of national sovereignty,” the SPDC declared that it was preparing for a “disciplined, flourishing democracy,” a nationalistic, somewhat socialistic market economy, and a modern, strong military which would safeguard the national interest, avoid external dependence while preventing interference in Burma’s internal affairs, and make the armed forces the hub for the strength of the country (Myoe, 2009: 3).

These changing military norms allowed for apparent movement toward a slight relaxation of rigid autocracy. Indeed, Intelligence head Gen. Khin Nyunt, Prime Minister since 2003, had begun to start a “road map” toward democracy. However, in the case of the Tatmadaw, institutional persistence overcame any moves toward institutional change. Hardliners in the Tatmadaw saw Kyin Nyunt as too moderate and moved to clip his wings. Amidst reports of an intra-SPDC struggle, he was arrested in 2004 (Zaw, 2004). In 2005, the increasingly hardline-led SPDC moved the seat of government from Yangon to the more defensive location of Naypyitaw. In 2007, it ordered a bloody crackdown on protesting Buddhist monks.

But in the mid-2000s, amidst intensifying cleavages within the SPDC, its leader Than Shwe, a committed hardliner, began to support moves toward a watered-down democracy where the Tatmadaw would remain autonomous. Than Shwe was apparently supportive of the transition partly to protect himself and his family from being targeted by future military leaders. Military moderates such as Gen. Thein Sein pushed toward democratization partly on the advice of the business community (Clapp, 2015: 5–6). Impelled by changing norms and pressure from ASEAN, in 2008, the SPDC enacted a constitution (following a dubious referendum) under which elections could occur, but which would allocate 25 percent of parliament to Tatmadaw representatives, require over 75 percent of parliament’s approval for constitutional amendments, and indirectly forbade Aung San Suu Kyi from becoming president.

In November 2010, principal Tatmadaw-backed political party Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) won an election which the NLD boycotted. Afterward, Aung San Suu Kyi was released from house arrest. In 2011, the USDP’s Gen. Thein Sein took office as President and the SPDC was dissolved. Encouraged by the United States and European Union, Thein Sein implemented reforms which incrementally improved political space. In 2012, Aung San Suu Kyi was elected to the legislature in a by-election. In March 2015, an agreement was tentatively reached between the Tatmadaw and 16 insurgent groups. Though Thein Sein was considered a military moderate, he saw the Tatmadaw in the role of serving the interests of the people by safeguarding national security and continuing to be involved in national politics, rather than by submitting to civilian control (Fisher, 2015).

In November 2015, the NLD won a resounding election victory, resulting in its domination of parliament and formation of a government. Since Aung San Suu Kyi had been banned from holding the presidency, two of her loyalists successively held it and she instead held the position of State Counselor. In 2017 an NLD legal expert, who had found constitutional methods to reduce Tatmadaw political power, was assassinated by individuals linked to the military (Moe et al., 2017). During 2017–2020, a struggle grew between the Tatmadaw and NLD over constitutional amendments, with the Tatmadaw unsuccessfully seeking more military power, the NLD unsuccessfully seeking more civilian control (Chambers, 2021). But the November 2020 election, which resulted in another NLD parliamentary super-majority, ensured that the NLD would have more chances to legally challenge Tatmadaw clout. Claiming electoral corruption, on February 1, 2021, Tatmadaw commander Gen. Min Aung Hlaing led a coup, instituted military rule which ended the country’s “disciplined democracy,” and returned Burma to Tatmadaw hardliner preferences of military control. Despite significant opposition, at the time of writing in 2022, junta control continues. The resurrection of autocracy in Burma should not be surprising because Tatmadaw norms perceive the military as the national guardian and manager of the state.

Three factors continue to define the Tatmadaw: its claimed legitimacy as the iconic, anti-foreign, anti-colonial champion of Burman-led nationalism; its durability of united corporate identity across time; and its intense distrust of civilian leaders and the civilian population (Myint, 2021). Tatmadaw internal unity continues to be anchored by ideological symbolism that it is the country’s savior; military elite access to economic resources; and the creation of the Tatmadaw “family” where soldiers train and farm together; their wives attend meetings with fellow military wives; their children go to military schools together; and commanders pyramidically control the finances of soldiers (Kyaw, 2021). Meanwhile, the 2015–2020 government’s attempt to control the military reawakened the Tatmadaw’s long-held suspicions of civilians. The 2021 coup also showed that military unity was too cohesive to permit a critical juncture toward democratization. Authoritarian legacies and a continuing path dependence whereby the state was mostly dominated by the autocratic, insulated Tatmadaw, also prevented any such transition from occurring. From 1962 until today, the Tatmadaw’s military values have only been influenced in ways aimed to enhance military interest. Its norms have identified it as Burma’s necessary leader: in national security, developmentalism, and politics. As such, no critical juncture allowing for civilian control over the Tatmadaw in terms of institutionalized organization of norms change ever occurred in Burma.

Conclusion

The militaries of Thailand and Burma remain two of the most powerful in Southeast Asia. Their history has involved the evolution of norms, values, and interests which have rationalized their development as both national guardians and power beneficiaries. At the beginning of this chapter, three questions were asked: In Thailand and Burma, what were the norms established to guide the militaries, how did they originate, and how did they affect the militaries? How did these norms shift over time? How do norms continue to influence the militaries of these two countries?

In answer to the first question, initial military norms were meant to instill a mindset for effectively overseeing the capacities of a security force. In the case of Thailand, these norms derived from the needs of a kingdom. For Burma, they originated from the necessities of a guerilla force built from scratch. These norms affected the militaries in different ways. In Thailand, the military initially was a royal servant. But the path of its power led it to overturn monarchical absolutism and seek to rule alone. Realizing a need for royal legitimacy, it accepted monarchy as a junior power partner. But finally, the monarchy’s ideology was so influential for the military that it became the palace’s junior partner. As for Burma, the military was always the most powerful center of resistance to colonialism, foreign interference, or rebellion. Thus, after 14 years of independence, the military fomented a coup in 1962 and generally continued in power until 2011. During the following ten years of limited democracy (2011–2021), military autonomy persevered. By 2021, given that the military was cohesive enough in valuing a dominant political role, another coup could oust another semi-democracy.

In answer to the second question, in both Thailand and Burma, historical legacies had entrenched a path dependence of powerful militaries dominated by cognitive scripts of martial ideologies. But both militaries’ norms shifted over time based on surrounding circumstances. For Thailand, in 1932 an absolute monarchy appeared to have overcentralized power amidst an economic emergency. An anti-royalist military coup was the result. But military coups occurred again and again, as the armed forces saw a special role for itself as coup-maker to spearhead military developmentalism and, increasingly, protector of the kingdom. This reflected a norm shift following the 1932 critical juncture. Eventually, as the military became extremely factionalized, the monarchy in 1980 became military unifier, with the result that the armed forces became junior partner to monarchy in a power relationship. Burma’s military went through fewer steps than did the Thai military. The Tatmadaw was only created during World War II. For Burma’s military, leading the country out of colonialism was akin to Thailand’s military-led ascension from palace control. The Tatmadaw only allowed frail civilian control during 1948–1962. Afterward, the norms of military dominance and control influenced the Tatmadaw’s role to be either administrator of society (1962–1988; 1988–2011; 2021–Present) or behind-the-scenes influencer (2011–2021). No critical juncture has brought about civilian control over military norms in either country.

In answer to the third question, military norms in Thailand and Burma—rationalizing a leading role for autocratic armed forces—have become so entrenched that these norms have become powerful cognitive scripts, which have persisted in building up the perceptions of soldiers and their societies that these militaries deserve political power. Such a mindset will help to sustain the path of military clout while preventing the achievement of more political space for civilians in the two countries anytime soon.

Both Historical and Sociological Institutionalism have thus been crucial in explaining how particular military norms—as cognitive scripts—have evolved across time to condition the behavior of two armed forces. Based upon these two variants of New Institutionalism, this chapter has argued that the evolution of military norms in Thailand and Burma has been determined by path dependence in which changes in self-identification have led to political norm shifts that have then contributed to changing military roles. The history of military norms in these two countries has been a function of structure and agency, with Thai monarchized military norms legitimizing the military’s positioning of what has come to be its junior partnership to monarchy in dominating Thailand; while Burma’s autocratic military norms have legitimized what has almost always been its topmost overlordship over Burma. Neither country has experienced a critical juncture toward civilian control, with Thai military clout explained through the lens of royal necessity while Tatmadaw behavior has reflected its singular, siege mentality drive for survival. Such norms correspond with socially constructed martial roles which will linger on into the future and be difficult to change. The continuing interventions of these militaries demonstrate that their adventurism derives from values and norms, and that any changes in their thinking will require an unprecedented historical circumstance—unlikely to happen anytime soon.