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Global Leadership Comes at a Price

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China as a Double-Bind Regulatory State
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Abstract

This chapter analyses the third source of the party-state’s double-bind logic: the contradiction between preserving domestic information control and seeking global leadership. As China is reaching the centre of the global stage more than ever before, the pressure of the international public opinion matters for pushing China to behave in a less authoritarian manner, including in the field of the information control. The party-state has tried to mitigate international pressure, including the diffusion of the cyberspace sovereignty doctrine and the mobilisation of a jingoistic rhetoric. However, neither strategy has been fully effective to shield the country from international pressure. This article shows that by allying themselves with the international and the domestic public opinions, private ISM firms can obtain margins of manoeuvring and reduce their costs of committing noncompliance.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Liu, Shanyun & Li, Bin, “The Filtering Software on the Computer Can Be Disinstalled, More Than 80% of the Netizens Consider the Software as Violating Privacy,” Sohu.com, 10 June 2009, http://news.sohu.com/20090610/n264437676.shtml.

  2. 2.

    “At the National External Propaganda Work Conference, Jiang Zemin emphasized that we should stand on a higher starting point and improve the external propaganda work; we must form a strong propaganda force which is commensurate with the international status and prestige of our country and which better serves the Open Doors policy and the modernization; Hu Jintao, Li Lanqing and others attended the conference,” People’s Daily, 27 February 1999, p. 1.

  3. 3.

    “Gong Fangbin: Mao Zedong Enabled Chinese People to Stand Up, Deng Xiaoping Made Chinese People Rich, Xi Jinping Will Make Chinese People Strong,” People.com.cn, 21 October 2014, http://theory.people.com.cn/n/2014/1021/c49150-25876113.html.

  4. 4.

    “Vaccine Diplomacy Boosts Russia’s and China’s Global Standing,” The Economist, 29 April 2021, https://www.zawya.com/en/economy/vaccine-diplomacy-sees-russia-boost-its-geopolitical-leverage-sfp2mwic.

  5. 5.

    “At the 30th Collective Study Session of the Politburo of the CCCCP, Xi Jinping Emphasizes the Reinforcement and Improvement of International Communication to Show a True, Tridimensional and Complete China,” Xinhuanet, 1 June 2021,

    http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/leaders/2021-06/01/c_1127517461.htm.

  6. 6.

    “Taking the Right of International Discourses and Effectively Disseminating the Voice of China—an Analysis of Xi Jinping’s Ideas and Concepts on External Propaganda,” Xinhuanet, 6 April 2016, http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2016-04/06/c_1118542256.ht.

  7. 7.

    Ramzy, Austin & Buckley, Chris, “Absolutely No Mercy: Leaked Files Expose How China Organised Mass Detentions of Muslims,” The New York Times, 16 November 2019.

  8. 8.

    Ibid.

  9. 9.

    “Chine: une enquête fait état de 380 centres de détention de Ouïgours au Xinjiang,” Le Monde, 24 September 2020.

  10. 10.

    Hill, Matthew, Campagnale, David & Gunter, Joel, “Their Goal Is to Destroy Everyone: Uighur Camp Detainees Allege Systematic Rape,” BBC News, 2 February 2021.

  11. 11.

    Xi, Jinping, “Speech at the 30th Collective Study Session of the Politburo of the CCCCP,” cnr.cn, 31 May 2021, http://news.cnr.cn/native/gd/20210601/t20210601_525501556.shtml.

  12. 12.

    “Transcript of the Fourth Xinjiang-related Press Conference Organised by Xinjiang Autonomous Region in Beijing,” Foreign Ministry of China, 10 February 2021, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/cedk/chn/zgwj/t1856252.htm.

  13. 13.

    “Mr Wang Wenbin, Spokesperson of Foreign Ministry of China, Presides the Routine Press Conference on 23 February 2021,” Foreign Ministry of China, 23 February 2021, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/fyrbt_673021/t1856054.shtml.

  14. 14.

    Bandurski, David, “Re-defining Cyberspace,” China Media Project, 7 October 2015.

  15. 15.

    “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Qin Gang’s Regular Press Conference on 27 March 2008,” Foreign Ministry of China, 27 March 2008, https://www.mfa.gov.cn/ce/ceus//eng/fyrth/t419160.htm.

  16. 16.

    Interview O-06/07/2020.

  17. 17.

    Interview B2-19/12/2019.

  18. 18.

    Interview B1-19/12/2019.

  19. 19.

    Retrieved on 28 January 2022 on https://pincong.rocks/video/1513.

  20. 20.

    Interview B-18/12/2019.

  21. 21.

    “Zi Zhongjun: When ‘ism’ Adds to ‘Patriot’, Patriotism Has a Coercive and Utilitarian Nature,” Xinhuanet, 23 May 2014, http://www.xinhuanet.com/book/2014-05/23/c_126537512.htm.

  22. 22.

    “Foreign Ministry of China: in International Relation Practices, It Is Very Common that States Organise Reciprocal Visits and Exchanges in Various Forms,” Sohu.com, 9 June 2021, https://www.sohu.com/a/471268756_162758.

  23. 23.

    “Li Guangman: Why Do the Articles of Chinese Self-Media Writers Cause Anxiety of a ‘Cultural Revolution 2.0’,” BBC, 13 September 2021, https://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/simp/chinese-news-58500007.

  24. 24.

    Interview B1-21/12/2019.

  25. 25.

    “Speech of Xi Jinping at the celebration ceremony of the 100th anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party,” Xinhuanet, 1 July 2021, https://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2021-07/01/content_5621847.htm.

  26. 26.

    Interview O-24/09/2020.

  27. 27.

    Interview B-23/12/2019.

  28. 28.

    “Special Interview with the Former Content Moderator at Sina Weibo: How China Is Building an Online ‘Ministry of Truth’,” VOA, 12 August 2020, https://www.voachinese.com/a/internet-censorship-20200812/5540475.html.

  29. 29.

    “China Has Signed 205 Cooperation Documents on the Joint Construction of One Belt One Road,” Ministry of Commerce, 30 January 2021, https://www.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/xwzx/gnxw/163241.htm.

  30. 30.

    “After Being Scolded for 4 Hours, the Two Virtual Idols Created by the Communist Youth League Were the Most Short-Lived”, DW news,18 February 2020, https://blog.dwnews.com/post-1308899.html.

  31. 31.

    Weibo of Deng Xueping, posted on 15 February 2020, retrieved on 9 February 2022 on https://m.weibo.cn/status/4472210771011559?display=0&retcode=6102.

  32. 32.

    “Yan Lianke: After This Catastrophe, Let’s Get a Good Memory,” speech of Yan Lianke at Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, 21 February 2020, https://theinitium.com/article/20200221-mainland-coronavirus-yanlianke/?utm_medium=copy.

  33. 33.

    Sun, Meijuan, “A Review of Foreign Media Reports on Coronavirus—Interview with Professor Cheng Meidong, Professor at the School of Marxism at Peking University,” 1 June 2021, http://ex.cssn.cn/zx/bwyc/202006/t20200601_5137166.shtml.

  34. 34.

    Yuan, Li, “Coronavirus Crisis Shows China’s Governance Failure,” The New York Times, 4 February 2020.

  35. 35.

    Yuan, Li, “Coronavirus Weakens China’s Powerful Propaganda Machine,” The New York Times, 27 February 2020, https://cn.nytimes.com/china/20200227/china-coronavirus-propaganda/

  36. 36.

    “How Does the Covid-19 Crisis Tarnishe the Chinese Prestige of Being a ‘Rising Big Power’,” BBC, 20 March 2020, https://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/simp/chinese-news-51942287.

  37. 37.

    Ibid.

  38. 38.

    Jin, Zhe, “The CCP Spared No Efforts to Shake off Its Responsibility for the Coronavirus,” VOA, 8 April 2020, https://www.voachinese.com/a/China-Ongoing-Disinformation-Campaign-20200407/5363459.html.

  39. 39.

    “Spokesperson of the Beijing Municipal Government: The Coronavirus Outbreak Directly Related to Xinfadi Is Brought under Control,” Xinhuanet, 25 June 2020, http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2020-06/25/content_5521705.htm.

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Ma, A. (2024). Global Leadership Comes at a Price. In: China as a Double-Bind Regulatory State. Palgrave Macmillan, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-8857-0_7

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