Keywords

Introduction

The International Branch Campus (IBC) is one of Uzbekistan’s fastest expanding higher education (HE) sectors. Uzbekistan has more IBCs than any other post-Soviet country, which makes it fertile ground for researching the internationalization of HE. The first two IBCs, the Westminster International University in Tashkent and Plekhanov Russian Economics University, were founded in 2002. However, by 2017 only seven IBCs from five countries (UK, Italy, S. Korea, Singapore, and Russia) operated in the country. Within the last five years, IBCs increased more than fourfold. Russian universities account for the largest share of this surge. Until 2016, there were only three Russian IBCs, reaching 14 by 2022. By contrast, western countries such as the USA, the UK, and Italy have only one IBC each, raising further questions as to why Uzbekistan particularly relies on Russian universities to internationalize its HE system.

There are different interpretations of IBCs across the world, and there is no commonly accepted definition of the term (Becker, 2010). The most comprehensive and widely used definition, however, comes from the Observatory on Borderless Higher Education (OBHE) and Cross-Border Education Research Team (C-BERT): ‘an entity that is owned, at least in part, by a foreign education provider; operated in the name of the foreign education provider; and provides an entire academic program, substantially on-site, leading to a degree awarded by the foreign education provider’ (Garrett et al., 2016, p. 8), which fits with the description of Russian IBC, as stated in the agreement between Uzbekistan and Russia on establishing branch campuses.

The HE relations between the former Soviet countries and the operation of Russian IBCs are under-investigated areas. The scarcity of information about the benefits for the countries integrating IBCs necessitates investigating the case in the context of host countries (Knight & McNamara, 2015), including Uzbekistan. Thus, this study aims to identify the contributions of Russian IBCs to the development of HE and understand the long-term potential implications for the country’s educational, socio-economic, and political development. The research brings a critical political economy perspective in a field framed within a knowledge economy paradigm, and highlights the under-researched perspective of the Central Asia (CA) region with a focus on Russian IBCs.

CA countries and Russia have different social, economic, and political contexts, but their relationships are shaped by their political and economic interests as well as Soviet legacies and nation building aspirations (Chankseliani, 2020). Nevertheless, Russia still plays a significant role in the region in terms of political, economic, and cultural partnerships, and trade. Likewise, Central Asian education systems are also partly bound to Russia’s. In educational cooperation with CA countries, Russia has one significant advantage over other countries, namely the Russian language. Accordingly, other CA countries also host several Russian IBCs: Kazakhstan has four, Tajikistan has three and Kyrgyzstan accommodates two.Footnote 1 Thus, this study is important for other CA states, as they can learn from the Uzbek experience.

The main concern with current policy is that there is a lack of understanding of how IBCs may contribute to the development of local HE. In this research, I argue that Russian IBCs serve Russia’s political and economic interests rather than contributing to Uzbekistan’s academic interests and the internationalization of HE. By examining the wider literature on IBCs and the policy agendas of both countries, for the first time, this research will assess the implications of importing Russian HE from a political economy perspective. In view of these, the research will examine the following two questions:

  1. (1)

    What are the policy agendas of Uzbekistan in inviting Russian universities to establish branch campuses and what are the policy agendas of the home country (Russia)?

  2. (2)

    How do the administrative and academic staff of Russian IBCs perceive the contributions of these branches to the development of HE in Uzbekistan?

Conceptual Framework and Literature Review

Policymaking in education is a complex process which involves multiple agencies, discourses, and motivations. To grasp the complexity of education policymaking, it is necessary to identify ideologies and influences in more detail (Ball, 2012). A growing body of research shows that education policies and interventions are not just influenced by design, but also by numerous contextual factors (Novelli et al., 2017). A thorough understanding of such subtleties requires a multiscale approach that takes local, national, and global dynamics into account in national policies and practices (Fritz et al., 2009; Novelli et al., 2017). With this in mind, I employ a political economy analysis (PEA) which explores political, cultural, social, and economic influences shaping education systems, policymaking, and educational interventions (Novelli et al., 2014). A key principle of the PEA is that educational systems and outcomes are not inseparable from political and economic systems and power relations.

Considering the complexity and diversity of IBCs, and the political, cultural, and historical context of HE import–export relations, I employed Qiang’s (2003) and Knight’s (2012) typology of internationalization rationales as a conceptual framework to deconstruct the policy agendas of both countries, define what factors have been prioritized or overlooked, and assess their potential implications for the development of HE. The framework helped to identify and categorize the rationales according to political, economic, academic, and socio-cultural aspects, and understand the relation of these factors to the expansion of Russian IBCs.

The literature reveals various rationales for establishing IBCs from the perspective of home countries, with a focus on financial, reputational, and academic factors (Girdzijauskaite & Radzeviciene, 2014). Some authors highlight the political, socio-cultural, and economic aspects of internationalizing HE, including national and institutional motivations (de Wit, 2002; Knight, 2012). Universities in western countries are primarily interested in generating profits by establishing their satellites abroad (Becker, 2010), while others seek to develop their international reputation in an increasingly competitive education market (Knight, 2012; Verbik, 2007). At the same time, national governments, including Russia (Abbasov, 2022; Chankseliani, 2020) and China (He & Wilkins, 2019), are more attracted to the idea of establishing and preserving political links and soft power in the regions of their interest through IBCs.

By contrast, for host countries, as stated by Knight and McNamara (2015), IBCs provide the opportunity of expanding access to HE and diversifying educational options. The authors also highlighted the growing role of IBCs in increasing the research output and developing the domestic knowledge economy. Others specified that countries import HE to enhance capacity building, develop curriculum and pedagogy (Knight & Liu, 2019), modernize the economy, establish education hubs, develop research (Wilkins, 2016), reverse the brain drain, generate income, and transfer technology (Shams & Huisman, 2012).

There are some critiques of IBCs as well. For instance, Altbach and de Wit (2020) expressed their doubt about the use of IBCs in developing HE system, arguing that IBCs operate in their own settings and are restricted by the educational agenda of home universities. Other authors have criticized the quality of programmes IBCs offer and raised their concerns on political and ideological issues (Becker, 2010; Wilkins, 2016). The rapid development of IBCs has also been criticized for generating an imbalance of power between sending and receiving countries (Altbach, 2010; He & Wilkins, 2019).

The role of Russian universities in developing cross-border education is often ignored despite Russia being one of the main providers of IBCs in the world. Research on Russian IBCs is under-represented in the global literature, with only two studies addressing the topic directly. Chankseliani’s (2020) exploratory study, for instance, focuses on the politics of exporting Russian IBCs in post-Soviet spaces employing neo-imperialism and internationalization concepts. Although the study lacks empirical evidence, she states that neo-imperial ambitions with a view to dominate political and cultural domains have driven Russian educational expansion in the former Soviet republics rather than economic factors. Abbasov (2022), on the other hand, studied six branches of Lomonosov Moscow State University (LMSU) through HE regionalism and demonstrated divergent aspects of Russian IBCs from western models in terms of five thematic categories: governance, access, standards, faculty, and larger community. The key difference, he argues, is the prevalence of private HE in the Western model versus public HE in the Russian model. This confirms Chankseliani’s study that the ‘publicness’ of Russian HE has been the main indicator of Russia’s political aspirations and soft power. Although these two studies present intriguing insights which help to draw a general picture of Russian IBCs and the ideological motives from the perspective of the sending country, the literature on IBCs rarely considers the ways in which these rationales may, in turn, impact on wider questions of access, equity, quality, and justice or the development of HE in host countries in general as IBCs may represent strong private interests, as well as intentions to maintain political and cultural influence (Chankseliani, 2020).

Methodology

I used a qualitative method to collect comprehensive data about the phenomenon. I first examined publicly available documents, such as the decrees of the President and the Cabinet of Ministers (Uzbekistan), speeches, reports, state action plans, media reports, and other policy papers (of both countries) to understand how policy documents address the role of Russian IBCs. Through the critical discourse analysis of 74 macro- and meso-documents (based on purposive sampling), which included certain justifications and/or motivations, I aimed to identify the themes related to the status and rationales of establishing Russian IBCs, the essentials of the partnership, responsibilities, and duties of both sides. In addition, I conducted semi-structured interviews with an official of the Ministry of HE, the university administrators (three people) and two lecturers of selected Russian IBCs to triangulate the findings and study their perceptions about the contribution of Russian IBCs to the development of HE.

The study employed a combination of opportunistic and snowball samplings. Initially, I contacted my colleagues, friends, and some relatives to identify people they know working at Russian IBCs and their willingness to participate in my study. I made a list of 14 people from four IBCs before I started my field trip. However, four people refused to participate when they were handed the subject information sheet and consent form considering my topic too sensitive. Three people requested to see my interview questions prior to the interview and all of them gave a negative response the next day. One person decided to withdraw from the study in the middle of my interview, stating that she was not able to respond to my questions. However, she referred to another person working in the same place, who participated in the interview. I made several changes to my interview questions to make them less sensitive and even removed the phrase ‘political economy analysis’ from my title on the subject information sheet. I eventually ended up with five people from three Russian IBCs and one person from the Ministry of HE.

Data Collection and Analysis

This project used different data collection methods—interviews, macro- and meso-level documents, and relevant literature. Given interviews are widely used as a data collection tool in qualitative research to gather information about participants’ views, and perceptions, this study used semi-structured interviews as it is the best means of extrapolating the information needed (Merriam & Tisdell, 2015). To collect macro- and meso-level documents, I accessed the websites of Russian IBCs and home universities and the websites of the Ministry of HE and other government institutions to identify relevant documents.

Data from the participants was collected in September 2022. The validity of the obtained data was verified through the triangulation of chosen methods. To increase trustworthiness, the coded themes were reviewed based on the feedback received from the PEER Network CA Hub members and mentors during two workshops. They provided the etic viewpoint on the investigated phenomenon to complement the emic perspective of the author.

The collected data were analysed and organized according to the guidelines of General Analytical Framework for CDA by Mullet (2018). First, relevant macro- and meso-level documents were collected and analysed using critical discourse analysis to investigate the textual documents (Fairclough, 2013) and identify the policy agendas of home and host countries in establishing Russian IBCs in Uzbekistan. Second, audio-recorded interviews were transcribed after interviews were conducted and translated into English. The interviews were analysed using NVivo12 software. During the coding process, the thematic categories were used to align with the second research question.

Findings

Drivers of Expansion

The rationales of establishing IBCs vary depending on sending and receiving countries. To understand the agendas of home (Russian) and host (Uzbekistan) countries, the author used Qiang’s (2003) and Knight’s (2012) typology of rationales for internationalization at the national level. The analysis of legal and policy documents, agreements, media reports, articles, the speeches of officials, and individual interviews revealed multiple rationales and motivations for establishing Russian IBCs. These rationales were framed in the table that comprises political, socio-cultural, economic, and academic aspects (Table 11.1). Although some of the rationales might overlap, it is a useful tool to visualize and juxtapose the overall picture of the rationales at different levels. Based on these findings (and including interviews), the author developed 5 main policy agendas which are discussed below.

Table 11.1 The rationales of home and host countries for establishing IBCs in Uzbekistan
Full size table

Policy Agenda 1: There Is a Shortage of University Places in Uzbekistan and IBCs Can Fill the Demand Quickly

One of the main problems, stated in the Concept of developing HE, was the low level of access to HE in Uzbekistan. The gross enrolment ratio (GER) was consistently below 9% for decades, even though the population of the country increased from about 21 million in 1991 to nearly 32 million by 2016 (World Bank, n.d.). Therefore, to meet this urgent need, the government projected to increase the access to 50% by 2030 (PD No. 5847, 2019). Establishing new IBCs was seen as one of the quick solutions, but this is a complex procedure which may take years to negotiate with home institutions. The first Uzbekistan-Russia Education forum and the agreement on establishing Russian IBCs simplified this procedure and accelerated the expansion of Russian IBCs. The interview results also approved the undersupply of university places as the main reason. One participant stated that it was a huge mistake to keep the GER below 9%, ‘because most of our population is young and they were left neglected over the years: uneducated, unemployed… So, the current policies are being implemented to mitigate this crisis’ (A1_M_1).

Policy Agenda 2: There Is An Undersupply in Certain Industries—IBCs Can Fill the Void and Provide Employment Quickly

Along with educational reforms, Uzbekistan started massive economic reforms in 2016 which include expanding the oil and gas sector (e.g. establishment of Uzbekistan GTL plant), modernizing the mining industry, opening machinery and heavy equipment factories, building a nuclear power station, among others. There are newly emerging professions in the industry sector but most of the programmes offered by local HEIs do not meet the industry’s needs. IBCs, in this regard, can offer new educational programmes by bringing the best practices of foreign institutions. It was not just symbolic to name the first Education forum ‘New personnel for a new economy’. The forum was attended not only by rectors of HEIs but also by the representatives of key industry sectors. The stakeholders of both sides discussed opening branch campuses which can train professionals particularly for certain industrial sectors. The former Minister of HE, A. Toshkulov, also mentioned this contribution of Russian IBCs noting that: ‘We regard this as a significant contribution made by the Russian side to the training of qualified personnel for the economy of our country’ (Sputnik Uzbekistan, 2021).

Policy Agenda 3: Internationalization of HE and further Integration with Russia, Europe, and the World Is in Uzbekistan’s Interests

Internationalization is a core aspect of bringing foreign education to one’s native soil. This is explicitly articulated in policy documents and the Concept of developing HE. The decrees on establishing Russian IBCs also include a wide range of internationalization aspects, including creating international academic standards, modernizing the facilities of universities, enhancing research, introducing new disciplines, building partnerships, academic mobility, and student exchange. Equally, the government hoped to mitigate the brain drain effect of youth by establishing IBCs at home because they can be an effective means of talent retention. By doing so, the authorities also aimed at retaining study investments in the country.

Apart from that, the government had an ambitious plan to create a regional education hub in CA and attract international students by establishing branches of leading universities (PD No. 5847, 2019). The administration of two Russian IBCs remarked that they have intentions to accept students from Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in the future, highlighting the absence of branches in these countries. The Ministry official also expressed a similar point stating that expansion of the Russian IBCs was a strategic action to attract students from neighbouring countries.

Policy Agenda 4: Enhancing Learning and Teaching of the Russian Language

The language policy is another factor why the focus was on expanding Russian IBCs specifically. Even though the Russian language is not an official language in Uzbekistan, it is widely used in government offices and business, and taught as the second language at public schools. It is also used as a language of inter-ethnic communication. Switching to the Latin alphabet and the exodus of Russian-speaking people in the 1990s considerably diminished the role of the Russian language, especially in rural areas. This, in turn, resulted in the weakening of Russian language at schools in regions. Therefore, one of the missions of expanding Russian IBCs was to improve the teaching and learning of the Russian language, as was discussed in the second Education Forum. During the forum, the Ministry of Education of the Russian Federation reported the launch of a large-scale project ‘Klass’ and ‘Malysh’ with the participation of a charitable foundation of a Russian oligarch (of Uzbek origin), Alisher Usmonov, to expand access to quality teaching in the Russian language (Minprosvesheniya, 2021). Usmonov is also attributed to finance the establishment of two branches, Moscow State Institute of International Relations and Russian State Pedagogical University (RSPU), and the latter was purposely opened to enhance the teaching of Russian.

The role of the Russian language was also highlighted as a main factor by interviewees. Interestingly, one of the respondents linked the language problem with the practice of Uzbek migrants in the Russian Federation:

We have millions of Uzbek migrants working in Russia, and most of them don’t know Russian well and struggle with finding a job or daily lives because of the poor Russian language education they received at school. So, the Hertsen University branch was opened to enhance learning and teaching the Russian language from the pre-school level. (A1_M_1)

There is strong support for developing the language by the Russian-speaking intelligentsia as well. Russian has been a lingua franca in academia for decades and still has a dominant status in specific fields such as hard sciences. Since Uzbek science is largely grounded in the Soviet system, the dependence of HE on Russian academia is still visible. The interviews also demonstrated how the authorities and the older generation of academics were bound to the Russian education system, and therefore actively supported the expansion of Russian IBCs. For example, one of the interviewees pointed out how Uzbekistan’s education system is tightly connected to Russian system, stating that:

Most of the references, books, and textbooks used at local HEIs and even their courses/programs are translated or borrowed from Russian universities. Our Academy of Sciences, Higher Attestation Committee and even the Ministry [of HE] follow the same system in Russia. Because the Russian education system is one of the best, like it was in the Soviet period, most established scholars and policymakers favour and collaborate with the Russian education system. (L1_F_4)

This is also indicative of romanticizing Soviet education and can explain the demand for education in Russian language as ‘Soviet education is still explicitly described as the “good old” system, offering hope to overcome the current educational crisis’ (Silova, 2011, p. 10).

Policy Agenda 5: Securing Supply of Labour, Geopolitical Influence, Aspirations to Recreate the Greater Russia in Russia’s Interest

The Russian government sees the export of HE as soft power to increase its political influence and control in countries of their interest (Chankseliani, 2020). The political ideology and imperial ambitions of Russia are widely discussed topics in the current literature. Before the collapse of the Soviet Union, Soviet education played a significant role in uniting all former socialist countries through the ideology of communism against western capitalist countries. The fall of the Soviet Union and the representation of Russia as an ‘aggressor state’ are the two main factors that made the current government to rethink their education policies and expand their soft power through Russian language, education (IBCs), and public diplomacy to rebuild the positive image of Russia (Semedov & Kurbatova, 2020). In addition, Rosstrudnichestvo, the federal agency of Russia which coordinates the public diplomacy activities, is also involved in the process. The Russian media reports this educational cooperation as ‘humanitarian cooperation’. However, this ‘humanitarian’ cooperation is not philanthropic aid for the people of Uzbekistan, but it is more political as the core mission of Rosstrudnichestvo is to support Russian ‘compatriots’ intellectually and professionally in foreign countries and forge new relationships through compatriots (Semedov & Kurbatova, 2020). Finally, expanding IBCs in the post-Soviet space is significant from a geopolitical perspective, as Russia aims to create a single Eurasian HE region against China’s Belt and Road initiative (Leskina & Sabzalieva, 2021).

In addition to political advantages, IBCs have a greater economic return to the Russian Federation. First, Russian universities are not investing in building premises, providing equipment and facilities, and maintenance of branch campuses. Due to the agreement of establishing Russian IBCs, the Uzbekistan side takes the responsibility of financing the material resources of the campuses, paying teachers’ salaries, and funding the tuition fees of students like local HEIs. So, there is no risk of economic failure for Russian universities. Secondly, Russia still sees Uzbekistan as a raw-material base for its economy as it was in the Soviet period. Natural resources of Uzbekistan have always been strategically important for Russia. From this perspective, Russia is training qualified personnel for key industrial sectors in Uzbekistan through IBCs as most of the Russian IBCs are industry oriented: mining, metallurgy, oil and gas, (nuclear) power engineering, machinery, chemistry, and material science. Some of the Russian IBCs are directly tied to these industrial sectors as a mechanism of preparing the workforce which is clear evidence of Soviet legacy. Historically, Soviet HE served as a nationwide feeder of a professional workforce for each industrial sector or social service (Kuraev, 2016). This in turn, increases the dependence of the Uzbek economy to Russian HE, because once the chain of this ‘conveyor’ is broken, it will affect the local economy as well. So, these IBCs are contributing not only to the economy of Uzbekistan, but also benefit the Russian economy in the long term. Even more interesting is that some of the Russian giant companies, such as Gazprom, already hold shares in these strategic industrial sectors. This means some of the Russian IBCs may be directly contributing to the Russian economy. Thirdly, as students receive education solely in Russian, it is highly likely that they may choose Russia as a career destination in the future, eventually leading to brain drain. One might argue that students graduating from these institutions may opt to build their careers outside the Russian Federation. However, it is also important to note that countries agreed on qualification recognition in 2019 (Lex.uz, 2019). For graduates who received education in Russian as a medium of instruction, employment opportunities in Russia are much higher than in any other country.

Overall, the review of policy documents and media reports demonstrates that the expansion of Russian IBCs involves several home and host-country agendas. It shows that the education forums were the key moment for the rapid expansion of Russian IBCs. The emergence of Russian branch campuses, as compared to other IBCs in the country, was predominantly politically driven and the involvement of the governments played a main role in this cooperative engagement. This cooperation is not limited to creating IBCs. In fact, the number of signed partnerships with local HEIs during the education forums shows that the Russian side wants more integration of the Russian education system into local HE, and eventually more control of academia and soft power by preparing the future ‘elites’ (Sadovnichiy, 2017). Therefore, educational collaboration in the form of IBCs is more beneficial to Russian stakeholders rather than assisting to achieve the desired objectives of the Uzbek side.

The Effectiveness of IBCs

The interviews also provided some insights about general features of Russian IBCs and their role in HE development. The overall perceptions of all respondents regarding the Russian IBCs were positive, but some of them considered that the current number of Russian branches was more than sufficient. When asked about the contributions, respondents could not provide examples except preparing personnel in specific fields and introducing new programmes. The study avoids making claims on the ineffectiveness of Russian IBCs and the quality of education they provide, yet based on the interviews with lecturers and administration, two general themes emerged which might explain some deficiencies of these institutions.

First, incorporating Russian education through IBCs seems to be largely inefficient. The governance of IBCs is very similar to home institutions’ management system: centralized, bureaucratic, and relies on one-person management (controlled by local rectors). The local stakeholders are usually not involved in decision-making, although the administration stated that they have the right to make suggestions. The main concern, however, is related to teaching the core subjects. All administrative staff informed that there is a regulation requiring 60% of the courses (only core programmes) to be taught by academic staff from home institutions. These staff work at IBCs as seconded academic staff teaching remotely or providing short-term (maximum one month) intensive classes in person. Local staff, on the other hand, provide mostly host-country courses, such as the Uzbek language, history, and English. Although the administration justified the reliance on fly-in-fly-out staff with the expertise and qualifications of Russian faculty, local lecturers raised the issues of inefficient learning and disruption of local teachers’ teaching schedule:

During that one month, students will have the courses of those professors only and other modules are halted. The professors teach one-semester/year material in a month intensively and assess students by written exams or oral zachets [a simplified form of knowledge evaluation at the end of the semester/course]. And these classes are held every day non-stop and for students of course this will be boring and ineffective as they will lose their motivation and interest. Students complain as they get tired and demotivated. (L2_M_5)

In addition, all participants noted that Russian IBCs were only teaching oriented without a focus on research. Even though the function of research has been particularly emphasized in policy documents, the findings show that the research activity is impractical in Russian IBCs as they are highly reliant on fly-in-fly-out faculty. Limited collegiality between local staff and the faculty of home institutions also curbed the research collaboration, which resulted in low level of research productivity. The only positive aspect, as mentioned by the administration, was the supervision of graduating students by high profile professors from home universities.

Second, Russian IBCs have become more local rather than international. One of the respondents remarked the division of roles in managing the IBCs as an offset against political influence: making the home university accountable for only academic matters. This structure, in turn, made the Russian IBCs bound to local authorities and act like local HEIs. One of the lecturers described this as follows:

I think we are also becoming more local. Even students recognized that we act more like local universities. Discipline is very strong, even in dormitories. Attendance is mandatory. We have parental meetings to control students. Uniforms are strictly regulated. We have the same regulations as local universities in this respect. (L1_F_4)

As outlined above, tight regulations, uniforms, parental meetings, strong discipline, and strict attendance regulations are all common patterns that can be observed in local HEIs. Other participants also pointed out similar directives but one of the administration staff expressed this in a stronger way, saying ‘uniformity is must, and no divergence is tolerated’. These features are not alien to Russian universities too as most of them are attributed to Soviet legacy and referred to as ‘the army-style organisational format’ (Kuraev, 2016, p. 183).

However, it would be wrong to ignore the contribution of Russian HE to the capacity development of certain subjects in the receiving country too. Indeed, Russian education has great potential in certain fields and the universities like LMSU, St. Petersburg State University, and National University of Science and Technology are leading universities in the region. When establishing the branches of such top universities, the policymakers also probably assumed that they would bring the same quality. Yet, when it comes to IBCs, they are generally believed to be incapable of replicating the standards of home universities, especially ‘the ethos of home campus’ (Altbach & de Wit, 2020, p. 15). Considering the funding constraints and the reliance of Russian IBCs on fly-in-fly-out staff, the quality of education remains under question. Thus, importing Russian HE to Uzbekistan has become a tool of developing public diplomacy and cultural links between countries and serving the benefits of a small Russian-speaking community rather than developing internationalization strategies by bringing the home country’s pedagogies and education policies.

Conclusions

Overall, the findings indicate that Uzbekistan’s main target was fulfilling the shortage of university places, training professionals for industry purposes, internationalizing and integrating with other countries, and enhancing the Russian language, whereas Russia seems to be interested in political control, supporting the compatriots, and training the labour force for certain industry sectors which are mutually beneficial. At the same time, the identified agendas reveal some other factors that played a major role in the progression of policies, such as the involvement of government, the support from an older generation of academics, and the influence of Russian-speaking intelligentsia. This also explains that strengthening HE partnerships with Russia and the expansion of IBCs was based on mutual agreement. Indeed, Uzbekistan is dependent on Russian education in many ways. However, policymakers should be aware of the implications of close cooperation with an existing regional hegemonic power as related political and economic risks may increase the dependency of the country on Russian HE.

There is much discrepancy in the rhetoric of establishing Russian IBCs versus the realization of policies (implementation). Interviews with local staff disclosed several characteristics that diminish Russian IBCs’ effectiveness in realizing certain internationalization objectives, such as research activity, quality of teaching, and international collaboration. The reliance on fly-in-fly-out faculty is also alarming as the sustainability of IBCs rests on the stability of academic staff. The expansion of programmes and students will require the availability of more staff. Exceptional events like the Russia-Ukraine war and the isolation of Russian HE can make the situation even worse.

The study has several limitations. The small number of interviews does not represent all Russian IBCs; therefore, the study avoids generalizing conclusions about the quality of education for all IBCs. There is a need for extensive research to identify the quality of education at all IBCs and their potential implications for the development of HE. Future research may include studying the motivations of students for selecting Russian IBCs, and their perceptions regarding the quality of education and services. Additionally, researchers may focus on the new players in the IBC market, such as South Korea and India, the countries which have increased their presence in recent years.