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Capability or Intention: Ambition and Restraint in China’s Military Build-Up

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Chinese Statecraft in a Changing World
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Abstract

As China’s global influence expands, what will be the shape and content of its global ambitions? Will China seek to expand its power through territorial acquisition, co-opting client states, or trade? Most crucially, under what circumstances will China regard as situations where it has no choice but to threaten, or even use military force? To answer those questions, this chapter aims to provide a framework through which to view changes and continuities of China’s intent behind its military build-up. The argument is that China’s ‘invasion-prone’ geography, conservative worldview, pragmatic military strategy and historical lessons demonstrate that war and territorial expansion do not assure enduring security, and may even lead to a decline in central power. This has fostered a Chinese strategic tradition that leans more towards defence than offence, and coexistence rather than aggression. The primary motive behind strengthening China’s military capability is to build a deterrent force. The intended outcome is to induce any potential rivals to reconsider their presumptions of assured victory when intervening in China’s peripheral regions, thereby fostering conflict resolution through non-military or soft-power approaches.

“The highest victory is to defeat the enemy without ever fighting.” (Sun, 2022)

—Sun Tzu, The Art of War

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Zhang and Buzan (2012).

  2. 2.

    Marshall (2015a).

  3. 3.

    David (2007).

  4. 4.

    Fairbank and Frank (1974).

  5. 5.

    Kennedy (2017).

  6. 6.

    Ibid.

  7. 7.

    Ibid.

  8. 8.

    Ibid. p 28.

  9. 9.

    Chen (2013).

  10. 10.

    Ibid.

  11. 11.

    Ibid.

  12. 12.

    Nathan and Scobell (2012).

  13. 13.

    Sima (2011).

  14. 14.

    McLaughlin (2016).

  15. 15.

    Chen (2013).

  16. 16.

    Ibid.

  17. 17.

    Zhao (2012).

  18. 18.

    McLaughlin (2016).

  19. 19.

    Ibid. p38.

  20. 20.

    Ibid. p38.

  21. 21.

    Fearon (1997); Jervis (1978).

  22. 22.

    Fearon (1997).

  23. 23.

    McLaughlin (2016).

  24. 24.

    Jervis (1978); Fravel (2019).

  25. 25.

    Fairbank (1969).

  26. 26.

    Cang (2014).

  27. 27.

    McLaughlin (2016).

  28. 28.

    Ibid.

  29. 29.

    Lee (1984).

  30. 30.

    Ibid.

  31. 31.

    Wei et al. (1973).

  32. 32.

    Sun (2022).

  33. 33.

    McLaughlin (2016 ionRef>).

  34. 34.

    Farmer (2021).

  35. 35.

    Ibid.

  36. 36.

    Ibid.

  37. 37.

    Ibid.

  38. 38.

    Fairbank and Frank (1974).

  39. 39.

    Ibid.

  40. 40.

    Ibid.

  41. 41.

    Robert (1978).

  42. 42.

    Ibid.

  43. 43.

    Song (1994).

  44. 44.

    Brzezinski (1998).

  45. 45.

    Ibid.

  46. 46.

    Ibid.

  47. 47.

    Ibid.

  48. 48.

    Ibid.

  49. 49.

    Allison (2019).

  50. 50.

    Sun (2022).

  51. 51.

    Fairbank and Frank (1974).

  52. 52.

    Ibid.

  53. 53.

    Mott and Kim (2006).

  54. 54.

    Schuman (2020).

  55. 55.

    Ibid.

  56. 56.

    Ibid.

  57. 57.

    Ibid.

  58. 58.

    Milley (2023).

  59. 59.

    Ibid.

  60. 60.

    Ibid.

  61. 61.

    Fang (2015).

  62. 62.

    Ibid.

  63. 63.

    Ibid.

  64. 64.

    Fravel (2019).

  65. 65.

    Campbell (2021).

  66. 66.

    Kissinger (2014).

  67. 67.

    Fravel (2019).

  68. 68.

    Ibid.

  69. 69.

    Ibid.

  70. 70.

    Nathan and Scobell (2012).

  71. 71.

    Ibid.

  72. 72.

    Ibid.

  73. 73.

    Marshall (2015b).

  74. 74.

    Park (2013).

  75. 75.

    Hao and Zhai (1990).

  76. 76.

    The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China (2009).

  77. 77.

    Ibid.

  78. 78.

    The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China (2009); The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China (2023).

  79. 79.

    The Paper (2019).

  80. 80.

    Ibid.

  81. 81.

    Ibid.

  82. 82.

    Jervis (1978).

  83. 83.

    Ibid.

  84. 84.

    Ibid.

  85. 85.

    Zhang et al. (2021).

  86. 86.

    Marshall (2015b).

  87. 87.

    Ibid.

  88. 88.

    Ibid.

  89. 89.

    Campbell (2021).

  90. 90.

    Ibid.

  91. 91.

    Marshall (2015b).

  92. 92.

    Luo et al (2017).

  93. 93.

    History Compilation Committee of Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (1986).

  94. 94.

    Ibid.

  95. 95.

    Hayton (2022).

  96. 96.

    Statistics Bureau of Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (2022).

  97. 97.

    The Economist (2016).

  98. 98.

    The People’s Government of Sichuan Province (2021); People’s Daily (2021).

  99. 99.

    Marshall (2015b).

  100. 100.

    The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China (2015).

  101. 101.

    PetroChina (2015).

  102. 102.

    Ibid.

  103. 103.

    Marshall (2015b).

  104. 104.

    Wilson and Smith (2015).

  105. 105.

    China Renewable Energy Engineering Institute (2021).

  106. 106.

    Xu et al. (2002).

  107. 107.

    Ibid.

  108. 108.

    The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China (2019).

  109. 109.

    Fravel (2019).

  110. 110.

    Fravel (2007).

  111. 111.

    Heath (2018).

  112. 112.

    The Economist (2022).

  113. 113.

    Fravel (2019).

  114. 114.

    Ibid.

  115. 115.

    U.S. Department of Defense (2022).

  116. 116.

    Campbell (2021), p. 20; U.S. Department of Defense (2022).

  117. 117.

    Fravel (2019).

  118. 118.

    Ibid.

  119. 119.

    Campbell (2021).

  120. 120.

    Fravel (2019).

  121. 121.

    Ibid.

  122. 122.

    Ibid.

  123. 123.

    Ibid.

  124. 124.

    Libicki (2009).

  125. 125.

    Fravel (2019).

  126. 126.

    State Council of the People’s Republic of China (n.d.).

  127. 127.

    Xinhua News Agency (2018).

  128. 128.

    Fravel (2020).

  129. 129.

    Ibid.

  130. 130.

    Marshall (2015b).

  131. 131.

    The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China (2019).

  132. 132.

    Campbell (2021).

  133. 133.

    The U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (2020).

  134. 134.

    Wortzel (2014).

  135. 135.

    Fravel (2020).

  136. 136.

    Ibid.

  137. 137.

    Yeo (2021).

  138. 138.

    Ou (2021).

  139. 139.

    Erickson (2019).

  140. 140.

    Campbell (2021), p. 25; Shou (2013).

  141. 141.

    Rudd (2015).

  142. 142.

    Nathan and Scobell (2012).

  143. 143.

    Ibid. p33.

  144. 144.

    McLaughlin (2016).

  145. 145.

    Ibid.

  146. 146.

    Ibid.

  147. 147.

    Ibid.

  148. 148.

    Ibid.

  149. 149.

    Ibid.

  150. 150.

    Andrade (2016).

  151. 151.

    Ibid.

  152. 152.

    Ibid.

  153. 153.

    Ibid.

  154. 154.

    Ibid.

  155. 155.

    Lin and Wuthnow (2022).

  156. 156.

    Ibid.

  157. 157.

    Mastro (2021).

  158. 158.

    Lee (2021).

  159. 159.

    Ibid.

  160. 160.

    Zhao (2023).

  161. 161.

    Fravel (2019).

  162. 162.

    Rudd (2015).

  163. 163.

    U.S. Department of Defense (2022).

  164. 164.

    Ibid.

  165. 165.

    Ibid.

  166. 166.

    Michman and Mizrahi-Arnaud (2017).

  167. 167.

    Kissinger (2012).

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Dong, J. (2023). Capability or Intention: Ambition and Restraint in China’s Military Build-Up. In: Chinese Statecraft in a Changing World. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-6453-6_6

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