Auer’s Proposal

James Auer worked as the director for Japanese affairs at the Department of Defense until the end of August 1988. During the nine and a half years he worked at the Pentagon, defense cooperation between Japan and the United States grew significantly stronger. The Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF), with its enhanced antisubmarine warfare capabilities, and the US Navy, with its core carrier strike groups, operated jointly in the North Pacific. Thanks to the clear role and mission sharing established by the Japanese and US Naval forces, the Soviet Navy was unable to act. As he now headed into retirement, Auer was satisfied that the policy of strengthening Japan-US security relations, a policy that he had been instrumental in developing, had helped to bring an end to the Cold War.

The Gulf War began on August 2, 1990, with Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. It proved to be a situation that challenged the fundamentals of Japan’s security arrangements, only 2 years after Auer’s retirement from the Department of Defense. The Japanese government was initially quick to take measures to establish the economic blockade of Iraq and support the deployment of multinational forces in the Persian Gulf, but it took no further tangible actions. A bill on Cooperation with United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Other Operations was drafted, but deliberations stalled, and the bill was scrapped in November.

Even after multinational forces launched military operations against Iraq in January 1991, Japan not only avoided sending combatants, but also failed to contribute any other personnel, including non-combatants or other logistics support. Even a plan to send JASDF transport aircraft to transfer refugees failed to materialize. Twenty-eight countries took part in multinational operations in one form or another, such as Czechoslovakia, recently liberated from the Communist Party’s one-party dictatorship, and small countries like Bangladesh. Despite depending heavily on oil imports from the Middle East, however, Japan did nothing visible. All it did was to contribute $13 billion toward the cost of the Gulf War—approximately 10,000 yen per citizen.

The United States, in particular, was disappointed with Japan for having contributed no personnel, just money, even as many UN member states joined in taking firm measures against the illegal invasion. Some even felt Tokyo’s response created a severe rift in the Japan-US alliance, a sentiment that was not openly expressed because the Gulf War ended in a relatively short time and in an overwhelming victory for the multinational forces.

This was worrying for Auer, who believed, more than anyone, that the Japan-US alliance was essential. Japan-US security arrangements shouldn’t be further undermined by ill will toward Japan for not having taken part in the Gulf War. It’s not too late. Japan needs to take concrete and visible action.

With these thoughts in mind, Auer attended a symposium on Japan-US security affairs held on the outskirts of Washington, D.C. The symposium was hosted by Ambassador Richard Armitage (who was a Special Emissary to Jordan’s King Hussein during the 1991 Gulf War) on February 28, 1991, the day Iraq accepted the ceasefire. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Carl W. Ford, Jr. arrived late, just as the discussion was about to finish. Given the situation, Auer was surprised that he showed up at all. Ford informed the audience that “[t]he Iraqi government has notified the US government that it conducted extensive mining of combat zones.” Auer asked if that information was classified, to which the reply was “not necessarily.” He returned to his accommodations and began writing. The resulting article, titled “Sōkaitei no haken o susumetai: Nihon ga ase o nagaseru zekkō no michi (Recommendation to send minesweepers: the best way for Japan to break a sweat),” was published in the “Seiron (sound argument)” column of the Sankei Shimbun on March 11.

Because President George H. W. Bush valued Japan—which, after Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, provided the largest amount of funding for the Gulf War—it would not be fair to criticize Japan’s contribution as mere “checkbook diplomacy.” Nevertheless, now that the Gulf War was over, Japan had the opportunity to complement its financial contribution with concrete actions. Auer argued his case as follows: “Iraq notified the multinational forces that there are more than a thousand mines on international navigation routes in the Persian Gulf. It will take at least 6 months to remove them with minesweepers.” Although it was reported that the German Navy’s minesweepers would be used, “the best and most skilled minesweepers in the world belong to the JMSDF.” Hence, Japan should dispatch its minesweepers to the Persian Gulf. Auer also listed five specific reasons in support of his position.

First, the Japanese minesweeping forces were capable of carrying out complicated operations. Second, Japan would not be involved in a military conflict since the war was already over. Third, overseas dispatch of minesweepers would be justified by an article of the Self-Defense Forces Act specifying the removal of mines as its mission. Fourth, the dispatch of minesweepers would meet with the approval of countries that had sent their armed forces to the Gulf War. Fifth, the minesweeping operation would be a significant precedent for JSDF peacekeeping operations. Auer argued that if it “wants to be valued as a major world power, Japan needs to decide to take actions that other countries would admire as unselfish.” Furthermore, he said the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Defense Agency “must consider whether Japan now wants to demonstrate that it is willing to break a sweat now that other countries have done so.” If Japan were to declare that it wanted to play a major role in minesweeping navigational routes in the Persian Gulf for Japanese and other vessels, other countries would understand. “I hope Japan’s leaders will earnestly consider this opportunity.”

Auer faxed the article to many of his Japanese friends. One recipient, LDP Diet member Michio Watanabe, instructed his secretary to distribute a copy of the article to all members of his political faction. Furthermore, soon after reading the article, Takujirō Hamada, who had experience serving as the parliamentary vice-minister for foreign affairs, asked the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Treaties Bureau if it was legally possible to send minesweepers. Auer’s article created sizable ripples in Nagata-chō.

Paving the Way for Minesweeper Deployment

Well before Auer’s article, there had been quite a number of Japanese, both in the government and outside it, who felt that Japan should take concrete action during the Gulf War. From the start, the dispatch of Japanese minesweepers to the Persian Gulf had been one option under consideration.

Already in 1987, then Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone had seriously examined the possibility of dispatching JMSDF minesweepers to remove mines laid in the Persian Gulf during the Iran-Iraq War. It was a response to criticism expressed by some members of the US Congress that it was inexcusable for Japan, dependent on imported Middle East oil, to do nothing. Nakasone considered the dispatch to be constitutionally and legally justifiable, but ultimately, it was not implemented due to strong opposition from Chief Cabinet Secretary Masaharu Gotōda, who objected to dispatching the JSDF overseas. However, the MSO retained in its files the results of the specific studies on the organization, supply, and support of the minesweeping forces at the time.

On August 16, 1990, soon after Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, Diet Member Michio Watanabe visited Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu at his official residence and proposed visible cooperation, explaining, “It doesn’t make sense for Japan to be a free rider, doing nothing, while being the most dependent on oil imports.” A reporter pointed out to Watanabe after the meeting that the Nakasone cabinet had examined the possibility of dispatching minesweepers; Watanabe remarked, “Minesweepers are not offensive. They are extremely defensive,” suggesting the dispatch was possible. Watanabe appeared to have gotten the idea from Auer, whom he had known for a few years; already, Auer had begun to advocate the dispatch of minesweepers to a few of his close Japanese friends. The next day, in response to Watanabe’s remark, a government source expressed the view that “[the dispatch of minesweepers] is not currently being considered by the government,” but “it is legally possible.”

Asked in a regular press conference held around that time about possible actions for the JMSDF, its chief of maritime staff (CMS), Makoto Sakuma, made a rather bold remark: “We’ve begun a preliminary investigation into every possible mission.” Sakuma recollects that he made the remark because if he was given a mission, he would have had to carry it out no matter what; it would be irresponsible not to. He says the people around him observed that he would have been fired for saying such a thing just a few years earlier when things were different. In October, a project team undertook research into the specifics of the issue; a key person on the team was director general of the MSO’s Operations and Plans Department, Chiaki Hayashizaki, who would later become the CMS. The results of the previous studies into the possibility of sending minesweepers during the Iran-Iraq War were also reviewed in detail.

Yet the government was rather slow to act. Michio Watanabe’s suggestion fizzled out before long. According to Sakuma, the atmosphere discouraged the Defense Agency from doing anything on the matter throughout 1990. There was even a time when Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense Tomoharu Yoda was instructed not to visit the prime minister’s official residence. Prime Minister Kaifu had no philosophy for dealing with such a crisis and failed to demonstrate leadership. Even as the details of the draft bill on Cooperation with United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Other Operations were being worked out, instructions coming from the Prime Minister’s official residence to the Defense Agency included nonsensical ideas like painting the destroyers white and making the guns unusable by tying them down. Those involved in the matter at the time remember that it was like speaking to beings from another planet. Moreover, the overseas dispatch of the JSDF was opposed not only by dogmatic pacifists like Takako Doi, the leader of the Japan Socialist Party, but also by some within the government.

“Dispatch the Minesweepers”

The mood started to change in the new year, however. For example, Minister of Finance Ryūtarō Hashimoto, who handled Japan’s $13 billion financial contribution, was forced to realize, through talks with Western leaders, that contributing money was not enough. LDP Secretary-General Ichirō Ozawa had a similar opinion. Michio Watanabe was in favor of personnel contributions from the start. When the Gulf War ended with the multinational forces victorious, calls for concrete action on Japan’s part snowballed.

In early February 1991 Hajime Funada, a young LDP Diet member, flew to Washington upon instructions from Ichirō Ozawa to hold unofficial talks with US foreign policy and national security officials about ways for Japan to actively contribute after the Gulf War. Funada was accompanied by the well-connected consultant Hideo Kimura, who knew many American defense personnel. At Funada’s request, James Auer also joined the group. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was aware of their mission, which was coordinated by some officials of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry.

In Washington, Funada had meetings with a number of influential figures involved in US policy toward Japan, including Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Carl Ford, Acting Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Randall M. Fort, Ambassador Richard Armitage, and Senator William “Bill” W. Bradley. They discussed what specific actions Japan should take. Funada also met with diplomats working in the Japanese embassy in Washington, D.C., accompanied by Kimura and Auer, who both proposed again the idea of dispatching minesweepers to the Persian Gulf. At first, US policymakers and Japanese diplomats alike viewed the plan with skepticism. In the course of discussing it, however, the mood shifted, and they began to feel it could be done.

As an aside, some US naval personnel, on hearing that Hajime Funada was visiting Washington, proposed to entertain and show respect for the grandson of Naka Funada, who had been a powerful supporter of the Japan-US security arrangements. Funada therefore postponed his departure by one day and attended a dinner party at the home of retired Captain Rudolph H. Daus in Alexandria, not far from George Washington’s former home in Mount Vernon. Daus was the commanding officer of the guided-missile destroyer USS Parsons of the Seventh Fleet, homeported in Yokosuka. Auer had served Captain Daus for 3 years as the executive officer of that ship in the early 1970s, after having completed his role as a political advisor to the commander, US Naval Forces Japan. Welcoming Funada at Daus’s house were a number of men involved in Japan-US defense cooperation, especially between the JMSDF and the US Navy, among them: former CINCPACFLT Sylvester Robert “Bob” Foley, Jr., who had filled several important posts including commander, US Seventh Fleet, and had a deep connection with Japan; Rear Admiral Dean R. Sackett, former commander, US Naval Forces Japan; Vice Admiral Lando Zech, former commander, US Naval Forces Japan, who had contributed to making the JMSDF’s participation in RIMPAC possible; Commander Torkel Patterson, then in charge of US policy toward Japan in the White House, who previously had served as Rear Admiral Zech’s aide-de-camp and then studied at the University of Tsukuba; and retired Army Captain Michael Powell, the son of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell, who had worked for a while under Auer when the latter was director for Japanese affairs in the Department of Defense.

At the dinner table, Auer told the attendees that Speaker of the House of Representatives Naka Funada was always the first to receive the US Navy’s nuclear-powered submarines and carriers calling at Yokosuka and Sasebo, at times welcoming the ships by going aboard himself, despite fierce domestic opposition. Hajime Funada listened silently to Auer speak about his grandfather.

The next day, on board the All Nippon Airways plane bound for Tokyo, Funada told Kimura that he was determined to do everything in his power to make the dispatch of minesweepers a reality. However, there were many challenges to overcome before that could happen. For example, would insurance cover the JMSDF personnel who took part in minesweeping operations in the Persian Gulf? If by any chance there were casualties, how would they be compensated? “If the minesweepers were dispatched, we would have considerable responsibility for the crew, wouldn’t we? Well, Mr. Kimura, in the worst case, let’s all do everything we can for them, even if it means selling off our personal assets.” Funada said this to Kimura looking unusually serious.

When he arrived back in Japan, Hajime Funada began to explain in earnest the need to dispatch minesweepers to people within the LDP. Day after day, he repeated his explanation to all the influential people he could get hold of. Some of the senior officials at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs felt a sense of crisis, believing there was no alternative, and so they endeavored to build a consensus within the ministry. At the Defense Agency, Shigeru Hatakeyama, director general of the Bureau of Defense Policy, was busy seeking support from various parties. At Kimura’s request, Shunsuke Miyao, Toshiba Corporation’s section chief of international affairs, conveyed the message to key people in Japanese business circles. A few years earlier, Miyao had directed the lobbying effort in Washington, D.C. during the Toshiba-Kongsberg scandal, with the help of Auer and Kimura. As Miyao had been the private secretary to Toshiba’s doyen, Taizō Ishizaka, the former chairman of the Japan Business Federation,Footnote 1 he had connections in the federation and beyond. Democratic Socialist Party (DSP) member of the House of Councillors, Akihisa Terasaki, tried to urge the All Japan Seamen’s Union into action and gain support from other unions. Terasaki had once been a vice president of the Confederation of Japan Automobile Workers’ Unions; he was a close friend of Kimura, who had served as a private secretary to DSP giant Eki Sone (as mentioned in Chap. 3). Furthermore, many people in various sectors of Japanese society called on the LDP and the government to send minesweepers. The novelist Hiroyuki Agawa, my father, for example, wrote a long letter to Mutsuki Katō, the LDP’s chairman of the Policy Affairs Research Council (PARC), urging the dispatch of minesweepers to the Persian Gulf. Toshiba’s Miyao remembers that it was not the achievement of one person; rather, the momentum to dispatch the minesweepers grew spontaneously.

It was in this context that Auer’s article was published in the “Seiron” column of the Sankei Shimbun on March 11. Two days later, Japanese newspapers reported that PARC Chairman Katō, a member of the Watanabe group, had met with his counterparts from the Social Democratic Party of Japan, Komeito, and the DSP, and stated: “The United States has unofficially requested the dispatch [of minesweepers] to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. However, the ministry is keeping the request secret.” According to a senior party official in charge of defense affairs, a former US government official told someone at the LDP that “Japan should dispatch minesweepers.” This LDP person conveyed the request to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Defense Agency. In response to this, a government source stated, “The US government has been requesting the dispatch of minesweepers since the outbreak of the Gulf War; there is no new request at the moment.” While there is no conclusive proof, it appears the former US government official mentioned was Auer. The movement to dispatch minesweepers suddenly gained more steam.

On March 14, Foreign Minister Tarō Nakayama stated in the Budget Committee of the House of Representatives, “[The dispatch of minesweepers] is a non-military operation and not an act of hostility. How to guarantee the safety of Japanese vessels and crew is a matter that the government has to pay attention to.” His attitude was positive. On the same day, Diet member Michio Watanabe argued for the dispatch at the LDP’s National Defense Division and demanded a government decision.

A still reluctant Prime Minister Kaifu gradually became unable to ignore public opinion. On April 8, Japan Business Federation Chairman Gaishi Hiraiwa issued an official statement supporting the dispatch of minesweepers and revealing his intention to lobby the government. The Japan Federation of Employers’ Association, the Petroleum Association of Japan, the Japanese Shipowners’ Association, and the Arabian Oil Company followed. As the Arabian Oil Company was doing business in the region, it could not afford to be indifferent. Around the same time, the efforts by Diet member Terasaki and others bore fruit: the All Japan Seamen’s Union requested that the government dispatch minesweepers. On April 11, a joint meeting of the three LDP defense committeesFootnote 2 passed a resolution to dispatch minesweepers and proposed it to Prime Minister Kaifu and the politicians holding the LDP’s three main posts.Footnote 3

On April 12, Prime Minister Kaifu finally reached a decision, and the Defense Agency was instructed unofficially to prepare for the dispatch of the minesweeping force. On April 16, Defense Agency Director General Yukihiko Ikeda officially ordered CMS Sakuma to begin studying the details regarding the dispatch of minesweepers. It seemed to have taken a lot of coaxing to get the reluctant prime minister to reach this stage. Kaifu kept saying the decision was not yet final, and that he would give a final decision after the second half of the nationwide local elections on April 21. It appeared he was thinking that canceling the dispatch was a possibility, depending on the election results.

Sakuma’s Concerns

The overall responsibility for preparing the minesweeping force for dispatch fell to the CMS, Admiral Makoto Sakuma. Although he had begun studying the issue in the fall of 1990, being at the mercy of the complicated political climate, he was not sure until the very end whether there would be an actual opportunity to dispatch the force. He found it hard to believe, even when the mood changed in March of 1991 and the Defense Agency’s intra-ministerial bureaus communicated that the minesweepers could be dispatched. He went so far as to ask Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense Yoda to “[p]lease confirm it with Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs [Takakazu] Kuriyama.” However, Sakuma proceeded to make full-scale preparations because it became clear at this point that the Defense Agency’s intra-ministerial bureaus had a firm understanding that there was no alternative.

Sakuma acted swiftly, beginning with the preparations that lay within his authority. To move resources and personnel, the approval of the head of the Defense Agency was necessary, so he visited Director General Ikeda to ask for provisional permission. Ikeda understood the circumstances very well and arranged to make it as easy as possible for Sakuma to prepare. Sakuma says it was easy to work for a director general like Ikeda.

There were two reasons compelling Sakuma to make haste. The first was the timing of the dispatch of minesweepers. In response to the ceasefire on February 28, minesweepers from the United States, the United Kingdom, Saudi Arabia, and Belgium had already arrived in the mined zones in the Persian Gulf and were engaged in minesweeping. Germany, France, Italy, and the Netherlands also announced the dispatch of their minesweeping forces early in March, and they were already starting to arrive in the area. Even the most delayed minesweepers belonging to the German Navy would start work at the end of April. If the Japanese minesweepers were to depart too late, there was a possibility that there would be no mines left to sweep once they had traveled all that way to reach the Persian Gulf. Even if they were dispatched with the intention of contributing to the Gulf War’s postwar process with their labor and sweat, the Japanese minesweepers might have to return home having achieved nothing.

The second reason to rush was the weather. In the Indian Ocean, the monsoon arrives and the cyclones come after April, making for rough seas. Small minesweepers of less than 500 tons are built on the assumption that they will mainly operate along the coast of Japan; they are not built to navigate the ocean. Studies during the Iran-Iraq War showed that they had suitable transoceanic capability and would not capsize easily in a storm. But they were slow; unlike larger destroyers, they had no reserve power. They had no way of making up for any delays due to stormy weather. If that were to happen, their arrival in the Persian Gulf would be later still. Ideally, the minesweepers should arrive by the end of March, but this was not possible for political reasons. Frustrated by the lack of resolution exhibited by politicians postponing the decision with an eye to the election, Sakuma went ahead with the preparations.

While he prepared, Sakuma was most concerned about the possibility of casualties during the dispatch. Disposing of mines is very dangerous work. Accidents can happen even when preparations are perfect. There is still no national consensus on dispatching the JMSDF overseas. If minesweepers went overseas absent a national consensus and there were casualties during the operation, the JMSDF would also suffer considerable damage. We might have to withdraw the minesweepers if the situation grew dire. I don’t want to risk the lives of my men when we have no clear national support.

And yet, if you think about it, the JMSDF exists for the country, not for its own sake. Even if it suffers damage as an organization, it can’t be helped. With the preceding line of thought, Sakuma convinced himself.

When Sakuma was serving as president of the JMSDF Command and Staff College in Ichigaya in 1987, former CMS Teiji Nakamura once paid him an informal visit. Haltingly, Nakamura told Sakuma about the speech former IJN Admiral Katsunoshin Yamanashi had given after the war at the JMSDF Command and Staff College: “The JMSDF doesn’t have many ships or aircraft. Its equipment and facilities are very poor. But it has people. … The Japanese navy grew to the size it was wholly because those who came before us struggled so hard despite facing hardships no different from yours today, or even bigger ones, from the founding in the Meiji era, to the [First] Sino-Japanese War and the Russo-Japanese War, and through the era of arms limitation [after WWI].” Nakamura confided that, whenever things had not gone as planned during his service in the JMSDF, he had taken courage by recalling the admiral’s speech that day. With that, Nakamura took his leave.

Nakamura had apparently visited the JMSDF Command and Staff College just to tell that story, to personally encourage his juniors through Sakuma and entrust them with the future of the JMSDF, in which things still rarely went as planned. At least, that was Sakuma’s impression. He says that when the minesweepers were sent to the Persian Gulf, he often recalled Nakamura’s remarks from that day.

The Commander of the Minesweeping Force

Perhaps the most crucial decision CMS Sakuma made regarding the dispatch of minesweepers was the choice of commander of the Minesweeping Force. He chose Captain Taosa Ochiai, who had just arrived at his new post, commander of Mine Warfare Force 1, on March 20; until the day before, he had served as director of the JSDF Provincial Liaison Office in Nagasaki, where he recruited new JSDF personnel. Ochiai was the son of Rear Admiral Minoru Ōta.Footnote 4

Like his father, whom local citizens were exceptionally fond of despite the strong anti-military sentiment prevailing in postwar Okinawa, Captain Ochiai was known for being a commanding officer who showed compassion toward his subordinates. Despite his rank, he would sometimes volunteer to load supplies on the ship alongside young sailors when he had time, marking him as unconventional: in the JMSDF, following the IJN tradition, there is a stark distinction between officers and enlisted men. When he was serving in the Regional Liaison Office in Okinawa as a lieutenant, locals adored him, saying, “So you’re the son of Vice Admiral Ōta.” He alternately served in minesweeping and recruiting JSDF personnel. He was not an elite type who would participate in policymaking in the central headquarters. Only Captain Ochiai can be entrusted to maintain morale and command the minesweeping force, which may be dispatched for an extended period, Sakuma judged.

However, Ochiai laughs the selection away with his natural sense of humor. “Pin-chan is great.” Affectionately calling Sakuma by a nickname that comes from mah-jongg,Footnote 5 he talks in a characteristically friendly tone. “He chose someone who doesn’t understand he is an expendable scapegoat, making him the commander of the minesweeping force.” Seeing who their commander was, Ochiai continued with a grin, the crew “must have done their best, thinking, ‘We can’t rely on this guy. I don’t know what would happen if I had to depend on the commander. I have to protect my own life.’” Joking aside, if an incident arose, Ochiai would respond perfectly, and if necessary, he would take responsibility with good grace. Sakuma chose me because he trusted me. I need to meet his expectations. Knowing that was the actual reason why Sakuma chose him and feeling thankful for it, Ochiai expresses himself with wry humor. In any case, Ochiai accepted the post of commander with a promise that he would “call Pin-chan if something happened.”

Having received the order in Tokyo to lead the special mission, Ochiai began organizing the force to be sent to the Persian Gulf. JMSDF personnel are used to going overseas. Around five teams go overseas annually for missions, including the RIMPAC exercise, overseas training cruises, and Antarctic exploration cooperation with the icebreaker JS Shirase. Within the JMSDF, in fact, only the minesweeping force had little familiarity with overseas operations. Only 28% of the JMSDF officers and sailors of the dispatch force had prior overseas experience. In the present day, this is probably a rather low figure. And yet the minesweeping crews would become the first JMSDF unit to travel 7000 nautical miles (13,000 kilometers) on an actual mission. Captain Ochiai was worried.

“Generally speaking, those posted in the minesweeping force are not JMSDF elites. Many officers are also from the bottom of the heap. When you’re assigned to the minesweeping force, people ask if you’ve done something wrong, you know,” Ochiai says. A few of the officers in the dispatch force were Internal Officer Candidates who had joined the JMSDF upon graduation from high school, had worked as petty officers for a few years, and had applied to and attended the JMSDF Officer Candidate School in Etajima, in contrast to the elites who had graduated from the Defense Academy and civilian universities.

The dispatch force was organized in an extremely short interval before its departure, roughly a month after Captain Ochiai had assumed command of Mine Warfare Force 1 on March 20, and exactly 10 days after the order to study the specifics had been issued on April 16. Six vessels were dispatched in total: the minesweeper tender JS Hayase; the minesweepers JS Hikoshima, JS Yurishima, JS Awashima, and JS Sakushima; and the underway replenishment ship JS Tokiwa. A total of 511 crew were aboard, including 50 headquarters personnel.

The typical fulfillment rate of various JMSDF forces is somewhere between 75% and 90%. Similarly, only around three-quarters of a minesweeper’s complement of 45 is usually filled. While organizing the dispatch force for the Persian Gulf operation, Sakuma promised Ochiai that at least the complement would be filled 100%. Forcible transfers from nationwide forces filled the deficiency. It was not something done in ordinary times, but it was made possible by special order of the CMS. What a powerful man the chief of maritime staff is! Captain Ochiai thought.

One crewmember even hurried to Yokosuka from Hokkaido as soon as his appointment was announced on April 18; his vessel departed Yokosuka just after his arrival. While Ochiai asked for capable crewmembers, some units did not send their finest personnel. Their ages varied greatly, from those who would reach their 19th birthday during the dispatch to those over 50 who were nearing retirement. Not all of these JMSDF officers and sailors were hand-picked.

Crewmembers were not forced to go to the Persian Gulf: they could leave the ship if they did not want to go. Sakuma and Ochiai were expecting that around 25% of the entire crew would refuse to go. They were surprised to find that only five people backed out when the mission was announced, and even those five were actually willing but unable to go because of various circumstances, such as a doctor’s prohibition or a parent’s illness. There were even crewmembers who took part although their own or their daughter’s weddings had been scheduled during the traditional long May holiday when they would be away. The fiancée of a JMSDF official who went to the Persian Gulf was herself a JMSDF official, a WAVES (Woman Accepted for Volunteer Emergency Service);Footnote 6 she postponed her wedding for half a year to wait for his return. The mother of Lieutenant Akihiro Watanabe, who played an active role as an explosive ordnance disposal diver, happened to pass away on the day of her son’s departure. However, his father kept the news from him so he would not be upset. And the father, who traveled to Singapore to tell him of his mother’s death, did not ask him to return home, nor did the son say he wished to.

The crewmembers were calm as usual. Captain Ochiai quipped that “They probably didn’t know how important it was.” But that was not the sole reason. Certainly, we feel uneasy going far away. You never know what environment awaits you. But the mission we’ve been given is minesweeping, our area of expertise. We’ve been training to dispose of live mines off Iwo Jima every year. The place might be different, but the procedure is the same. Disposing of mines is terrifying regardless of the number of times you do it, but it’s not something unfamiliar. You just have to coolly carry out your duty. The crew was full of quiet confidence.

Ahead of their departure, CMS Sakuma visited each of the six vessels to be dispatched and talked to the crew on each vessel for an hour. “Never mind your rank. Just tell me frankly what’s on your mind.” Encouraged, petty officers, notebooks in hand, threw a series of sharp questions at the supreme officer of the JMSDF. A staff member reprimanded them, asking, “Aren’t you willing to go?” They continued their questions with tears of frustration in their eyes: “That’s not why we’re asking questions. We just want to know more about the area, to do our job well.” Sakuma was relieved to hear the crew speak their minds. Had they been silent, he would have worried. He could only send them off, believing they could do the job. He felt it was his role to lighten their burden as much as possible.

Departure

Thus, in a very limited time, the force was organized, the crew chosen, equipment and supplies prepared, and local information gathered. The MSO, as well as other the units involved, including the Supply Demand Control Command,Footnote 7 had needed to work night and day for the final few days. The official decision that JMSDF minesweepers would be dispatched to sweep mines in the Persian Gulf was made at an extraordinary cabinet meeting and in the Security CouncilFootnote 8 on April 24. Preparations were finally complete 2 days later: supplies were being loaded right up to departure and there was no chance to grant the crew any leave. On April 26, the flagship JS Hayase and the minesweeper JS Yurishima left Kure, while the minesweepers JS Awashima, JS Sakushima and the underway replenishment ship JS Tokiwa departed Yokosuka, and the minesweeper JS Hikoshima sailed from Sasebo. Civilian protest boats attempted to approach the three vessels at Yokosuka to prevent them from leaving, but they were blocked by MSA patrol boats.

In his address to the commanders and commanding officers of various ranks, sent to them in a sealed envelope to be opened after leaving port, CMS Sakuma stated:

Looking back, the environment surrounding the JSDF has been extremely unforgiving ever since the establishment of the JMSDF in 1954. Our predecessors endured these hardships, inherited good naval traditions, tried to adapt to the new era, and worked hard to build up the JMSDF of today. We must never forget the noble sweat, tears, and even blood that they shed.

The spirit of Admiral Yamanashi’s lecture that Nakamura conveyed to Sakuma seems to be deeply reflected in this address. Coincidentally, the day of departure, April 26, was the 39th anniversary of the establishment of the Coastal Safety Force, the predecessor of the JMSDF.

On April 28, 2 days after departing separately from Yokosuka, Kure, and Sasebo, the six vessels of the dispatch force rendezvoused in Kasari Bay at Amami Ōshima, Kagoshima, and held their first study meeting. Here, Captain Ochiai addressed the whole crew. First, let’s bring our hearts together in making navigation safe. Second, let’s not have any accidents. This is not a war; this is a peacetime operation, so act on the principle of safety first. When in doubt, choose a safer way. Let’s go to see the cherry blossoms together in Kure next year. Don’t rush to achieve results. Ochiai pledged himself to bring all 511 crew safely home.

The dispatch force, heading south along the Nansei Islands, received an aerial send-off from a formation of JMSDF P-3C antisubmarine patrol aircraft and JASDF C-130 transport aircraft. At sea, the ships’ crews responded by waving their caps, in keeping with JMSDF customs inherited from the IJN. The six vessels left Japanese waters in a single column, with JS Hayase in the lead, headed straight toward the Persian Gulf (Fig. 9.1).

Fig. 9.1
A photo of a line of J M S D F minesweeping force headed toward the Persian Gulf.

The JMSDF minesweeping force proceeds in a single column, September 2014. (Photo credit: JMSDF)

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Cooperation Among Navies

After leaving Japan, the minesweeping force called at several ports en route: the US Navy’s Subic Bay Naval Base in the Philippines; Singapore; Penang, Malaysia; Colombo, Sri Lanka; and Karachi, Pakistan. In the Strait of Malacca, the crew of a Japanese dredger cheered, waving small Japanese national flags, which moved the minesweeper crews.

Fortunately, the dispatch force encountered no cyclones on its journey; it passed through the Strait of Hormuz and entered the Persian Gulf on the morning of May 26. The following day, it arrived at Port Rashid in Dubai, the United Arab Emirates, which was used as a supply base by the minesweeping forces of various countries. Straight away, Captain Ochiai visited Rear Admiral Raynor A. K. Taylor, commander, US Navy Middle East Force, aboard his flagship, USS La Salle. He then attended the coordination meeting of the commanders from various countries onboard the German Navy’s tender FGS Donau.

Ochiai was feeling bad when he arrived in Dubai. The Japanese force had arrived in the region a month after the German Navy, the last to send minesweepers before the JMSDF. He was worried that the other navies might criticize him for arriving too late. Indeed, 800 of the 1200 mines laid had already been disposed of.

However, all the various navies gave the JMSDF latecomers a warm welcome. The first 800 mines had been laid in areas that were relatively easy to sweep. The remaining mines were laid in difficult areas, and everyone was grateful for any support in getting rid of them. Although he arrived in Dubai feeling uncomfortable, the atmosphere was welcoming, as if to say, “Here comes the ninth guy. Let’s get to work right away. We’ll give you our full cooperation.”

Minesweepers are built of wood so that they do not trigger magnetic mines, but they become magnetized after a long voyage due to the influence of the Earth’s magnetic field. It would be dangerous to start minesweeping without addressing this first. When the Japanese force arrived at Dubai, the Royal Navy lent them their mobile degaussing facility straight away. Although degaussing usually takes more than a day per vessel, the JMSDF force spent only half a day degaussing four vessels, much to the surprise of the other countries’ naval personnel.

According to Ochiai, the most important thing in minesweeping is information about the mines: what kinds of mines have been laid and where. With this information, the work of minesweeping is as good as 70% completed. For that reason, information about mines is top secret in every country. Unfortunately, the JMSDF minesweeping force had no information of its own about the mines laid in the Persian Gulf, so they had to rely on the other navies, especially the US Navy. Since the initiation of the use of force against Iraq in January, however, the US Navy had stopped providing the JMSDF with this kind of information. They circulated the details to countries that took part in the multinational operations, but they did not share it with the Japanese who were unwilling to fight. It was a matter of course.

Once the dispatch of minesweepers to the Persian Gulf had been decided, the JMSDF had desperately been requesting this information from the US Navy, but nothing had been sent even by the time Ochiai’s force arrived in its last port of call, Karachi. Ochiai was concerned that the US Navy would not share the information after all. When he paid a courtesy call on Rear Admiral Taylor in Dubai, however, the commander matter-of-factly handed him a stack of documents, saying, “This must be the information you want.” In these documents was necessary data such as the number and location of mines, methods of disposal, and the presence of floating mines, all organized in charts. On calm reflection, there was no reason for the information to be concealed when the navies were going to be minesweeping together. The US Navy simply treated the JMSDF as an ally cooperating against a common threat. Nonetheless, the information was shared because the US Navy trusted the JMSDF minesweeping force. Ochiai was delighted.

Besides providing information, the US Navy offered both material and nonmaterial support. They took the trouble to give up the best section of the pier to the JMSDF minesweepers, provided missing equipment, and allowed the JMSDF minesweeping force to buy beer for its crewmembers at the US Navy’s NEX (navy exchange). And the US Navy was not the only one that displayed generosity. The Royal Navy let the JMSDF use their degaussing facility; the Dutch Navy carefully taught the JMSDF its method of mine disposal; and the German navy loaned the JMSDF a plastic model of MANTA, a highly effective Italian mine that is hard to dispose of. In return, the Japanese force opened the helicopter deck of the flagship JS Hayase to helicopters of other navies and refueled them. It felt like everyone was working on the same mission, regardless of nationality or flag color.

The Dispatch Force’s Crew

The four Japanese minesweepers and the tender JS Hayase departed Dubai on May 31, 4 days after the minesweeping force had arrived. They were destined for the waters off Kuwaiti ports, waters that had been left untouched and placed under the Japanese force’s charge. After supplies had been loaded, JS Tokiwa also departed and headed for the area on June 2. Thereafter, the Tokiwa, alone, made 11 round trips between Dubai and the minesweeping area, bringing food, water, and mail from crewmembers’ families to the minesweeping force. At the anchorage, the crew of the Tokiwa tried to assist the minesweeping crews, laundering their workwear, providing them hot baths and freshly baked bread, and entertaining them with barbeques on the deck. The minesweeping crews called the Tokiwa “Ofukuro (dear mother)” and waited longingly for the next supply run.

The minesweeping operation began on June 5. Minesweeping in these waters was not technically challenging, but the crew was nervous as this was their first task. Ochiai addressed the crew, informing them that the number of mines they would dispose of was not the issue. It would even be acceptable not to dispose of any mines, he said, as long as safe navigation could be guaranteed.

The waters of the Persian Gulf were a tough environment for conducting minesweeping operations. During the day, the temperature reached 43 °C (109 °F). In this heat, the crew had to wear helmets and life jackets and stay on deck in case they struck a mine. They also had to wear air-tight goggles and masks to prevent dust and soot blown off the coast from blowing into their eyes and mouths. The humidity at night was over 90%. Flies and mosquitos also plagued them.

Under these difficult conditions, the crew worked on a schedule of five consecutive working days followed by a day off. In the morning, they woke up at 4:30 a.m., left the anchorage soon after sunrise (just after 5:00 a.m.), and started minesweeping around 7:00 a.m. They returned to the anchorage around 7:00 p.m. as the sun was setting, then deployed an anti-mine net against floating mines, and carried out maintenance and inspection of equipment. They went to bed at 11:00 p.m.

Every night, when the minesweepers came back, Captain Ochiai boarded each vessel and inspected the meal leftovers. He also checked the faces of young crewmembers. When they were tired, there were more leftovers, especially of fatty food. After consulting the doctor who accompanied the force to look after the health of the crewmembers, he changed the schedule to four consecutive working days followed by a day of rest. As the US and German Navies had taken a day off after three consecutive working days, the schedule kept by the Japanese force was still the hardest.

And yet the crews continued working without complaint. In particular, the chief petty officers (CPOs) worked diligently, leading by example. A minesweeper is naturally small in scale; the crew is like a family without much distinction by rank. So, they look up to their senior CPO as a father figure. In the minesweeping operation, the CPOs volunteered for mine lookout duty at the bow, for example. If a ship navigating the danger zone hits a mine, the lookout will be blown away first. The CPOs, who were approaching their 40s and 50s, took on the dangerous duty, saying, “The young crewmembers haven’t enjoyed their lives to the fullest. We have lived long enough.” CPOs also played an active part aboard the minesweeper tender JS Hayase and the underway replenishment ship JS Tokiwa. The young crew performed their duties while learning a great deal from the examples set by their senior colleagues.

It was not just the CPOs they looked up to. Everyone followed Captain Ochiai’s example as they worked. When Sakuma talked to the young crew during his field visit, they said, “It’s hard work, but we do it because OyajiFootnote 9 [Ochiai] says, ‘Let’s do it.’” Ochiai himself made his career as a JMSDF officer under the influence of his senior colleagues. He still remembers Teiji Nakamura, then commander of Escort Division 32, yelling at him when he was an ensign, serving as assistant operations officer of the destroyer JS Kitakami on the bridge alongside the commanding officer. Naturally, he was scared and drew back. It was alright, however, because Nakamura’s severe reprimand was not done in selfish anger. While in port, Nakamura would wear a shabby raincoat when he returned to the official residence after a day’s work, so Ochiai and others affectionately called him “Teiji Columbo.”Footnote 10 When Ochiai’s service on the Kitakami came to an end, Nakamura called to him and rewarded him by saying, “Hey, would you like to go on an overseas training cruise?” One of the trainee officers Ochiai instructed during that voyage was the future Admiral Kōsei Fujita, the current CMS.Footnote 11 Ochiai recollects that everyone grew by learning from the example set by their senior colleagues.

The crews were exemplary even when they were not working. Normally, when sailors of any given unit carry out duties at sea or ashore for a certain length of time, about 5% of them violate service regulations and rules. Whenever sailors are involved in an incident, such as trouble with a drunk crewmember or a traffic offense, the commander has to deal with the issue. However, the force dispatched to the Persian Gulf did not cause a single problem during the 188 days from the time they left Japan until they returned home. “These people were not the cream of Japanese society,” Ochiai says. “If anything, they were the less able of their generation. And yet, they caused no problems and carried out their work properly. On our return, I told the CMS that the JMSDF’s training is doing something right.”

The dispatch force’s crew had a good reputation for behaving well at ports of call in Dubai and Bahrain. Unlike sailors of certain other navies who often caused incidents, including violent ones, the JMSDF personnel were polite, never drunk and disorderly, and taxi drivers liked giving them rides. City markets welcomed them as well. Commanders of other navies frequently asked Captain Ochiai, “Why aren’t there any troubles with the Japanese minesweeping crews? Are there really no problems? How do you teach them to behave so well?” They were worried and nervous whenever they called at ports, thinking their crews might do something bad. Ochiai answered that he had not taught his crews anything out of the ordinary; still, he must have been pleased at heart. Most of the crewmembers were very ordinary young people, but he says they seemed to understand without being told that they were traveling abroad representing Japan.

Regarding the crew, Captain Ochiai was the most concerned about their families left at home. If their families did not feel reassured, the crew themselves would feel ill at ease while working. So, when he left Japan, he asked CMS Sakuma to look after the families well. He personally wrote to the families of all 511 crewmembers. Every day, he wrote to the parents of the unmarried crewmembers and to the wives of those who were married. He received replies from almost 80% of the families who received his letters. Among them, one said, “I didn’t even know my son had been dispatched to the Persian Gulf until I read your letter. Please kindly take care of him.” Ochiai thinks the parents and wives on the home front of this day and age were admirable. They all waited, quietly praying that their sons and husbands would carry out their duties well and return home safely.

Ochiai also advised the crewmembers: “Write to your family. If your hearts aren’t as one with your family, you’ll never be able to work steadily on a tough job for a long period. So, you must write to them.” Young crewmembers seemed to be making collect calls from the ports of call, however, probably feeling that writing letters was too much trouble. Ochiai came to realize that letter writing was a relic of his own generation. At the suggestion of Captain Kōichi Furushō, the chief of the MSO’s Public Affairs Section, a newspaper, Taosa Times, featuring reports on aspects of the crews’ daily life, was published and distributed to families. The crewmembers’ families were also invited to attend informal gatherings at the naval bases in Kure, Sasebo, and Yokosuka.

Operation Gulf Dawn

The minesweeping operation commenced on June 5; for some time thereafter, the Japanese disposed of no mines. They carried out their operation using a safe and reliable method called “strip minesweeping,” dividing the water into strips of 100 yards (about 90 meters) and processing them one by one, like cutting a piece of paper into rectangular shapes. After finishing a group of ten, they moved to a different section. Tokyo appeared to be quite frustrated by the slow progress: “Why are there no results yet?” Someone overheard an officer in charge at the MSO and Captain Ochiai shouting at each other over the telephone. For Ochiai, the crew’s safety was the top priority, regardless of whatever Tokyo expected. To ensure safety, he did not rush. In the afternoon of June 12, MSO’s Public Affairs Section Chief Furushō led members of the defense press club to the operational theater aboard JS Tokiwa; “You came a week too early,” Ochiai told Furushō. At a press conference the following day, Captain Ochiai revealed that the minesweeping operation had been named Operation Gulf Dawn, in the hopes that peace in the Persian Gulf would begin again with this operation. Ochiai might have been thinking that the operation would also mark a new dawn for the JMSDF.

After confirming the locations of mines in 70% of the area by June 17, the crews commenced the actual disposal. On the morning of June 19, the minesweeper JS Hikoshima dropped a depth charge designed to destroy mines and then everyone held their breath and waited. Lieutenant Commander Hiroyuki Niino, the commanding officer of JS Hikoshima, was on edge. Should the first disposal fail, it will have a serious effect on the crew’s morale. After a countdown, at exactly 10:01 a.m. as scheduled—“one zero zero one” in the JMSDF style—the sounds of two underwater explosions could be heard and the sea surface bubbled. Slowly, a column of water rose, reaching a height of 50 meters. Success! A great cheer went up from the crew.

Another mine was disposed of that afternoon, and then another the following day, this one by divers for the first time. Three mines in total had been destroyed; by July 1, a total of 16 mines had been removed. The dispatch force temporarily entered the Port of Mina Salman in Manama, the capital of Bahrain, on July 4. After a month of working continuously, the minesweeping force crew took its first weeklong rest. The operation resumed on July 14, and another mine was disposed of, bringing the total up to 17. Every time a mine was destroyed, the crew celebrated in the evening with lots of beer. As another mine was destroyed, they drank again. They ended up consuming a 6-month supply of beer by the end of July. Half suspecting the crewmembers might be limiting mine disposal to one a day so they could enjoy their evening beer, Captain Ochiai sent a telegram to Tokyo urgently requesting more beer nonetheless. That was when the US Navy let the JMSDF Minesweeping Force buy all the canned beer at the American NEX. Even that was not enough, so Ochiai asked the Dutch and German navies to supply some as well.

Joint Minesweeping Operation with the US Navy

The Japanese minesweepers completed operations in the designated area on July 20 and returned to Port Rashid in Dubai. It so happened that, on that same day, the navies from the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Belgium, and the Netherlands headed home after minesweeping the Kuwaiti ports, because the UN resolution to “remove mines in international waters” had been achieved. Still, one troublesome area remained left to sweep, an area with rapid currents and an intricate network of pipelines. Only the US Navy and JMSDF minesweepers remained in the region, so it was natural for them to work together. The remaining area extended across the Iraq-Iran border and the permission of both governments was required to conduct minesweeping operations there. The US Navy could not operate openly: the United States had no diplomatic relations with Iran and could not seek Tehran’s permission. That meant that the JMSDF dispatch force took charge of the most challenging section with assistance from the US Navy.

Iraq granted Japan permission to operate in this innermost part of the Persian Gulf on July 25; the Minesweeping Force left Port Rashid the following day to head for the area. The water in that area is only about 10 meters deep for it is very close to the mouth of the Shatt al-Arab (River of the Arabs) formed by the confluence of the Euphrates and the Tigris. The tidal current is also extremely fast. Moreover, any rupture of the oil pipelines running across the sea floor there would pollute the sea. It was the worst area for minesweeping. The Iraqis had sought to prevent the multinational forces from landing there by laying numerous mines, including the highly effective Italian MANTA bottom mines.

The staff of the US Navy Mine Countermeasures Group, including its commander, Captain Leslie W. Hewett, forcefully debated the question of how best to conduct minesweeping operations with the staff of Ochiai’s force, at times shouting at each other. The JMSDF and the US Navy used different procedures. Where and when would divers be sent in? When were mines to be detonated? With crewmembers’ lives depending on the answer to each question, the arguments were serious and heated. Coordinating their operations with a passion that came “only short of an actual exchange of blows,” they developed a deep sense of mutual trust by the time the minesweeping was done.

The dispatch force commenced the minesweeping operation on July 28. According to Lieutenant Akihiro Watanabe, the chief explosive ordnance disposal diver on the minesweeper JS Sakushima, the water was too shallow to tow the minesweeping equipment. The mines were detected by sonar, and then disposed of by divers working in almost zero visibility, the fast current lifting sand from the seabed to muddy the water. The divers could not even see their own hands. They crawled on the seabed, held themselves steady by sticking their knives in the sand, and felt around for mines. Because it was judged to be too dangerous when the tidal current was flowing fast, the minesweeping operation was carried out hurriedly when the current slowed. Yet visibility was still bad: the divers only had a narrow field of view through their goggles. A diver’s head or leg could have easily touched a mine’s antenna (fuse) unwittingly. Once, Watanabe accidentally bumped a mine with his knife, making a sound. Although an acoustic mine cannot be triggered by a single sound, he felt himself cowering, thinking he would die if he made another. In the end, the divers removed 29 of the 34 mines that the JMSDF removed from the Persian Gulf.

The claim that the JMSDF has the highest level of minesweeping capabilities in the world is only half true, according to Ochiai. Undoubtedly, the skills of divers like Watanabe are the best in the world. The US and European navies, however, possess unmanned underwater search vehicles that can be used to search for underwater mines through a monitor on the surface, maneuvering the vehicle with a control lever like a joystick. There is no need to risk divers’ lives. Ochiai’s stomach was in knots every time the divers entered the water, and he waited for them to surface 9 minutes later as specified by regulations.

In addition, the other countries’ minesweeping forces were capable of processing all the data from GPS, radar, and sonar by computer. Mines that were located were automatically plotted on a chart. The JMSDF at the time had no computerized minesweepers, so charting depended on craftsmanship. Of the nine navies of the coalition that took part in the minesweeping operation, only Saudi Arabia’s minesweeping equipment was more outdated than the JMSDF’s. The shabby vessels and equipment of the JMSDF required constant maintenance, and the Japanese crews used every trick in the book to keep them running. During the entire operation, the dispatch force’s maintenance crew repaired as many as 315 breakdowns and defects, keeping the operational readiness rate at 100%. It was almost a miracle.

After returning to Japan, Ochiai strongly advocated for modernizing the minesweeping force, but it has not been implemented as he had hoped. It is not as though Japan lacks the technology. But, given the limited defense budget, funding runs out before it can be appropriated to the minesweeping force. Whereas the displacement of the US Navy’s minesweeping tender USS Tripoli was 25,000 tons, JS Hayase was only 2000 tons. Ochiai proposed building a new 35,000-ton minesweeping tender, however, the new ship was only 5600 tons.

The crewmembers did their best with their limited vessels and equipment in the challenging environment. They finished minesweeping in the difficult waters on August 19. They disposed of 17 mines in this troublesome area, bringing the total number of mines Japan removed in the Persian Gulf up to 34. During the operation, one minesweeper had been detached to engage in expanding the navigational routes off Kuwait. After paying a goodwill visit to an Iranian Naval base, the ship resumed its mission and engaged in minesweeping of the anchorage; then the final minesweeping operation was carried out on the navigational route to Khafji, Saudi Arabia.

A “steel beach” party was held with US sailors on September 11 to celebrate the completion of the operation. Held on the minesweeper tender’s deck, the crews could socialize together, enjoying themselves without letting language differences get in the way. After everyone had a considerable amount to drink, a call came from Tokyo, informing them that the Iranian government had finally approved minesweeping in Iranian waters. The JMSDF is to dispatch two vessels, and the US Navy is also to dispatch two. Begin preparations immediately. The crews sobered up at once and soon left the anchorage, arriving in the area at 6 o’clock the following morning. Another call came from Tokyo, however, ordering the cancellation and termination of the operation: the Iranian president said the minesweeping could not be allowed after all. The tension lifted from Ochiai’s shoulders at once. “It’s over. There’s no need to risk the lives of my subordinates anymore,” he thought to himself. The mission of the dispatch force was fully accomplished. The operational readiness rate was 100%, and there were no casualties. It was a triumphant outcome.

Ties with the US Navy

The cooperation between the Japanese and US forces in the Persian Gulf was rooted in the mutual trust between the JMSDF and the US Navy. Without the friendship that had developed over the years, it would have been inconceivable to share intelligence on mines with the JMSDF, which was not part of the multinational operations. During the period leading up to the Gulf War, Vice Admiral Henry H. Mauz, Jr., commander of the Seventh Fleet, was commanding US Naval forces in the Persian Gulf when he had been relieved as previously scheduled;Footnote 12 on his way home, he stopped at Yokosuka and Atsugi to explain the situation to the crews’ families. In a courtesy call with Sakuma, the admiral expressed his true feelings: “Although 19 navies are taking part [in the multinational operations], only four can be relied on when it reaches the point where shots are fired. I thought, how reassuring it would have been, if the JMSDF vessels had been there.”

Once Japan made its decision to dispatch JMSDF minesweepers to the Persian Gulf, Admiral Robert J. Kelly, CINCPACFLT, sent a message to the forces under his command, ordering them to give full assistance to the JMSDF operation. The US Navy not only provided information on the mines, but also prepared detailed weather maps while the minesweepers were heading to the Persian Gulf. The US Navy’s support was very reassuring to the JMSDF.

Admiral Kelly’s father was a young Navy pilot who died fighting at Rabaul during the Pacific War. His mother, made a young widow, had raised her son by herself. The son became a fine naval officer. Yet, years after the war had ended, his mother still regarded the Japanese as the hateful enemy who had taken her husband from her. She hammered this into her son. When Kelly, as the commanding officer of the carrier USS Enterprise, arrived at Sasebo for the first time in 1983, he still considered the Japanese as the hateful enemy who had killed his father; he had not forgiven them in the least.

And yet, after meeting Japanese people himself and learning about Japan, his feelings changed. He made many valuable friends, and Japan became his favorite country. His mother, however, could not understand her son’s change of heart. How could you become friends with those who killed your father? They argued over it many times. Many years passed, and the disagreement continued.

One day, the admiral had a chance to return to Washington, D.C. and spend a day with his aged mother who was living in the suburbs. The admiral showed her the Grand Cordon of the Order of the Rising Sun that he had been awarded, and they talked for hours.

She listened to my story for the first time and began to understand. Before my eyes, my mother started to open her heart. We both wept. She finally forgave the Japanese. My mother even called a local paper and asked them to print an article about her son receiving a medal. Already over eighty, my mother is not well. However, when she departs this life, she can go to her eternal rest peacefully, leaving behind the hate she’s been holding on to.

The paragraph above is part of Admiral Kelly’s speech at the Seventh Fleet’s change of command ceremony in Japan when he was nearing his own retirement, 3 years after Japanese minesweepers were sent to the Persian Gulf. Since the time of Admiral Arleigh Burke, the officers and sailors of the Japanese and US navies who fought bitterly in the war, as well as the younger generations that came after, have fully cooperated despite holding differing opinions. Sakuma strongly feels that the respect and mutual trust born of the interactions between JMSDF and US Navy personnel enabled the bilateral cooperation during the dispatch of Japanese minesweepers to the Persian Gulf.

The Minesweepers Return Home

The dispatched minesweeping force left Port Rashid, Dubai and headed home to Japan on September 23, calling at Muscat, Oman; Colombo, Sri Lanka; Singapore; and then Subic Bay Naval Base in the Philippines. To avoid Typhoon Ruth then bearing down on the Philippines, the Minesweeping Force made a hasty departure from Subic Bay, reaching Japanese waters on October 24. It received a warm welcome from JMSDF P-3C antisubmarine patrol aircraft and JASDF F-4EJ fighter jets from Naha Air Base, flying in formation. As the ships approached the main island of Okinawa, two minesweepers from JMSDF Sub Area Activity Okinawa met them at sea, celebrating their return with a sign that read “Welcome Back” and traveling alongside them.

The six vessels of the dispatch force entered the Seto Inland Sea from the Hyūga-nada Sea and arrived at the anchorage off Ōkurokamishima Island in Hiroshima Bay on October 28. They anchored there to take a one-day rest; Captain Ochiai ordered the crews to “do nothing other than breathe.” Once the minesweepers entered port, the crews would be caught up in the welcome-home ceremony. They were exhausted and needed a proper rest. The JMSDF veterans waiting ashore wondered why the ships did not immediately enter port once they reached it; Ochiai still believes that the one-day rest was essential.

On October 29, Admiral Makoto Sakuma, chairman, Joint Staff Council (as of July 1); Admiral Fumio Okabe, the new CMS; Rear Admiral Jesse J. Hernandez, commander, US Naval Forces Japan; and Commander in Chief of the Self-Defense Fleet Tatsuji Itō boarded JS Hayase by helicopter to hold a meeting. The dispatched force finally entered the port of Kure on the morning of October 30. Around 20 boats at sea, shouting protests through loudspeakers, were prevented from approaching the minesweeping force by MSA patrol boats, which came between them and the six returning ships.

The entire port was in a welcoming mood. On the side of the ferry connecting Kure and Etajima hung a banner that read, “Thank you for your service.” On the portside of the minesweeper JS Awashima, a banner reading “HOME AT LAST” in English was attached along the rail. The crews’ families, waving flags on the pier, welcomed the ships home. The crewmembers of each ship were glad to find their families among the crowd. When the flagship JS Hayase moored alongside F Berth, Captain Ochiai briefly spoke to Chief Staff Officer Hidehisa Miyashita, standing next to him: “Thank you for your good work.”

Prime Minister Kaifu, who had not sent the dispatch force off, attended the welcome-home ceremony at the pier. There was scant applause when he appeared. In sharp contrast, the attendees reacted enthusiastically when Captain Ochiai appeared on the minesweeping tender JS Hayase. Among those welcoming Ochiai at the pier was, of course, Admiral Sakuma.

At that instant, Ochiai and Sakuma must have felt many conflicting emotions in their hearts: frustration surrounding the difficulties preceding the dispatch of minesweepers to the Persian Gulf; satisfaction of having carried out the mission successfully and without mishap and having brought back all 511 crew safely; and pride in each crewmember who had grown tougher as a JMSDF official through the experience in the Persian Gulf. Beyond that, Captain Ochiai might have remembered his father who had died in Okinawa, the history of the JMSDF minesweeping force that had continued minesweeping along the coast of Japan despite many casualties, and his recruitment and training of young recruits at the Provincial Liaison Office. And for his part, Chairman Sakuma might have recollected townspeople calling him a “tax parasite” when he entered the Defense Academy as a cadet of the first class (Class of 1957); his less-than-exemplary times as a student (he was the first to be reprimanded for drinking in the academy); and the resentment he felt as a young officer toward his superiors, former officers in the IJN who were always referring to the “Navy” as though the IJN was a true navy while the JMSDF was not.

That evening, the crewmembers and their families attended a welcome-home party hosted by Defense Agency Director General Ikeda. The following day, a ceremony was held at 9:00 a.m. to disband the force. After CMS Okabe and Commander in Chief of the Self-Defense Fleet Itō had addressed the crowd, Captain Ochiai gave the final speech. First, he read the messages of thanks from Rear Admiral Taylor, commander, US Navy Middle East Force, and Captain Hewett, commander of the US Navy Mine Countermeasures Group, who had “carried out the operation together [with the JMSDF dispatch force crew] with their arms around each other’s shoulders.” The messages were attached to an Iraqi contact mine given as a gift in commemoration. Captain Hewett wrote, “This mine laid by the Iraqi forces is presented to my dear Captain Ochiai and his officers and sailors, who gallantly engaged in the minesweeping operation in close cooperation with the US Navy’s Mine Countermeasure Group.”

Captain Ochiai then spoke to the crew about three points.

The first thing I want to talk about is gratitude. The mission of this dispatch force was made possible not only through the crews’ efforts, but also due to the support of many others, especially your families who held down the fort. We must never forget our gratitude toward them.

The second is about pride. For the last six months, you have quietly carried out the dangerous operation of mine disposal under difficult environmental conditions, including high temperatures and high humidity, dust and soot. You accomplished the mission to secure safe passage for our ships and contributed internationally. It is really splendid, and I’m very proud of that. However, pride is something you should keep in your hearts, and not something to hang from the “tip of your nose,” to show off to others or boast about. As soon as you show off or boast about it, that pride is no longer true pride, and it turns into arrogance. I want you to keep pride in your heart as spiritual nourishment to refine yourself and use it as a tool to encourage yourself when you are experiencing hard times.

The third is about practice. You were able to accomplish this mission because you demonstrated perfectly the skills you had been honing until now. Skill is not something you can learn in a day. Unless you continue to constantly hone your skills, you can’t prove your mettle when it counts. It is imperative we start again today, working hard together, polishing our skills, and training for tomorrow’s missions.

Then Captain Ochiai concluded his address: “The Persian Gulf Dispatch Force is hereby disbanded. I wish you a safe voyage to Yokosuka and Sasebo; please give my kind regards to your families.”

And so, the first actual mission force assembled by the JMSDF since its founding was disbanded, and the crew resumed their training, in preparation for new missions.