A Letter from Admiral Burke

There was one person whom James Auer wanted to see before he headed to Japan in July 1970 to study the history of the JMSDF’s formation: Arleigh Burke. The significance of the role that Admiral Burke had played in the founding of the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) became more evident the more Auer reviewed the literature. Deciding that he needed to interview Burke, Auer got in touch with the former CNO. Ten years since retiring from the Navy, Burke kept a busy schedule as an outside director of an oil company as well as the director of Georgetown University’s Center for Strategic and International Studies. Unfortunately, Burke was on a business trip when Auer visited Washington, D.C., so Auer was not able to see him before he left. He therefore wrote Burke a letter soon after arriving in Japan to ask again for an in-person interview in 6 months’ time, when he would be back in the United States. With his letter, he enclosed a list of questions that he had composed.

Auer was a young (under 30), active lieutenant commander at that time. Even if only for research, he had written a letter to an admiral, a man who had served as the country’s top naval officer. And yet it was not all that unusual, which might give an indication of the Navy’s organizational openness.

Before much time had passed, Burke sent his reply by return mail. He would gladly see Auer when Auer was back in Washington. He provided simple yet sufficient answers to Auer’s questions; in addition, he remarked, “The following is what you should have asked me,” then included a new set of questions as well as his answers. In the East and the West, regardless of rank, naval officers are equally diligent. Many scrupulously reply to letters without procrastinating. Burke concluded his letter with a few cryptic lines: “In the early 1950s, I had a fascinating conversation with Mr. Takeo Ōkubo, the MSA’s first director general. I recommend that you ask him about it directly. I hope your research produces good results.”

The conversation with Ōkubo that Burke referenced related to the US Navy’s request for Japan to dispatch minesweepers during the Korean War. The US Navy’s minesweeping capability in the Western Pacific was extremely limited at the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950, according to Auer’s The Postwar Rearmament of Japanese Maritime Forces, 1945–71, which assembled his research findings. After the end of the Pacific War, CNO Chester W. Nimitz had abolished the minesweeping forces of the Pacific Fleet by 1947, and minesweeping was relegated to a collateral duty of the logistics and destroyer forces. As a result, there were only ten US Navy minesweepers in the Western Pacific, three of which were laid up in caretaker status. In August 1950 Vice Admiral C. Turner Joy, commander, US Naval Forces, Far East (NAVFE), asked CNO Forrest P. Sherman, who was visiting the combat theater at the time, about the possibility of increasing the minesweeping forces, but Sherman replied that there could be no increase because of other priorities.

Burke, a rear admiral at the time, arrived in Tokyo to be the deputy chief of staff under Vice Admiral Joy, per CNO Sherman’s direct request. His duty was to provide advice from Washington’s perspective on the amphibious landing at Incheon on the west coast of the Korean Peninsula. The landing was masterminded by General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, commander in chief of the United Nations Command. Burke was also tasked with reporting the war situation to Washington. Following the success of the operation carried out on September 15, he was then ordered by Vice Admiral Joy to plan a similar landing at Wonsan on the peninsula’s east coast. This was part of the UN forces’ penetration into North Korea, aiming to unleash a pincer attack on Pyongyang from the east and the west. The severe lack of minesweeping capability soon made itself evident. As many as a few thousand mines had been laid, with the assistance of Soviet experts, off the east coast of North Korea, which made it impossible to push through with the landing unless they were dealt with. Burke suggested the operation was impossible, yet MacArthur did not relent. The landing was scheduled for October 20; time was running out. For Burke, there was only one solution: to dispatch the minesweepers that had belonged to the IJN.

The Postwar IJN Minesweeping Forces

With Japan’s defeat in August 1945, the IJN ceased to exist. Naval personnel were disarmed and any remaining vessels, including the battleship HIJMS Nagato, were disposed of accordingly. On December 1, the Ministry of the Navy was abolished and renamed the Second Demobilization Ministry,Footnote 1 with its primary mission being to assist in the repatriation of Japanese armed forces personnel from overseas. However, part of the IJN forces—the IJN minesweepers—continued their wartime mission almost uninterrupted.

At the war’s end, about 11,000 influence minesFootnote 2 laid by the US Navy and another 55,000 defensive mines laid by the IJN remained scattered around the coastal waters of Japan. The mines posed an extreme danger as economic activities resumed. Indeed, several private vessels sank after striking mines, resulting in many casualties. For example, on August 22, 1945, just after Japan surrendered, the Ukishima Maru sank after hitting a mine near Karasujima, Maizuru; the ship had been transporting those returning to the Korean Peninsula from Ōminato to Maizuru, and over 524 people drowned. On October 7, Kansai Kisen Kaisha’s Muroto Maru, the first vessel to use the Seto Inland Sea-Kyushu route after its reopening, hit a mine immediately after departing the port of Osaka and sank, resulting in 336 dead and missing; there were only 25 survivors. On January 28, 1948, while navigating near Kuroshima on its way to the port of Ushimado in the Seto Inland Sea, Kansai Kisen Kaisha’s Joō Maru struck a mine and sank in 15 minutes, resulting in 193 lives lost. The total number of victims lost to vessels hitting mines in the postwar era as of 1953 was as many as 1294 dead and missing and 402 wounded.

US forces had ordered the IJN minesweeping forces to continue dealing with the mines. In a meeting between the Japanese and US military staffs held in Manila following Tokyo’s acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration, the Japanese were directed, as part of the end-of-war process, to remove all mines hampering access of entry to the Japanese main islands before the arrival of Allied occupation forces. Upon arrival off Yokosuka in September, US naval authorities reprimanded the Japanese officers for failing to complete the removal of all mines, as they had been directed. Yet, it was almost impossible for them to remove tens of thousands of mines in such a short period of time. The US military seemed to be overly optimistic about the minesweeping operations in Japanese coastal waters, Auer says. In December 1945 the IJN minesweeping forces commanded by Captain Kyūzō Tamura were transferred to the newly established Second Demobilization Ministry and continued the minesweeping operation. The vessels and crew were the same used in the IJN days. The NAVFE headquarters opposed attempts by the Government Section of the General Headquarters (GHQ), the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) to purge the former IJN officers commanding the minesweeping forces, and so active IJN forces remained in place, unaffected by the change in affiliation. This is why Auer claims the IJN did not actually cease to exist. Around this time, the strength of the minesweeping forces was 391 vessels and over 19,100 personnel.

The minesweeping forces passed through several sets of hands: from the Second Demobilization Bureau of the Demobilization Agency to the Second Demobilization Bureau of the Prime Minister’s Office, then to the Department of Minesweeping Vessels in the Marine Transport General BureauFootnote 3 of the Ministry of Transport. With each move, the forces were progressively reduced until they were taken over as a whole by the MSA, which was established in 1948. Their overall strength then was 51 vessels and 1500 minesweeping personnel. The minesweeping operation was transferred again in November 1952 to the National Safety Agency’s Safety Security Force (a reorganization of the Coastal Safety Force, established in April), and then finally to the minesweeping forces of the JMSDF. Despite the rapid and frequent organizational changes, the mission and principal commanders remained almost the same for 9 years. The commanders included Ryōhei Ōga, the future chief of maritime staff (CMS), and Sadao Senoo, who translated and published Auer’s doctoral dissertation as Yomigaeru nihon kaigun. Even after Japan’s defeat, their mission remained; they continued to struggle with the mines despite many lives being lost.

The JMSDF minesweepers conducted the last minesweeping operation to eliminate obstacles on sea routes in 1985. During the minesweeping operations between 1945 and 1952, as many as 77 crewmembers lost their lives due to accidents. In 1952, a memorial honoring those who lost their lives during the minesweeping operations was erected at Konpira Shrine in Kotohira, Shikoku. A memorial service has since been held annually at the shrine, whose patron deity is dedicated to navigational safety.

Dispatching Japanese Minesweepers

Burke had his eye on this valuable force. The number of vessels and crew far surpassed the US Navy’s own minesweeping forces. Although the Japanese vessels were all old, its personnel were highly skilled, as they had been minesweeping continuously, even after the war. So, Burke called MSA Director General Takeo Ōkubo on October 2, 1950, to ask that he come as soon as possible to the NAVFE headquarters, which was located in the Bank of Tokyo’s former head office building. When Ōkubo arrived, Burke invited him into his office and requested, in a straightforward manner, the dispatch of the MSA’s minesweepers. Burke emphasized the danger of the sophisticated Soviet mines laid by North Korea, but he made clear that, as the UN forces had encountered difficulties, they were left with no other option but to ask for the assistance of the Japanese minesweeping forces. “The Japanese minesweeping forces are excellent, and I have huge confidence in their ability,” he added.

Naturally, Ōkubo was taken aback and hesitated to accept the request. Japan is not at war with North Korea; in fact, Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution prohibits Japan from participating in a war. The MSA is not an armed force. Its vessels cannot be dispatched directly into the combat zone to engage in minesweeping. Burke argued that minesweeping would not be a hostile act. Yet Ōkubo did not accede to the request, insisting that it was beyond his authority to make a decision on the matter. Only Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida could do that. So, the two men got into a car and headed for the prime minister’s official residence.

As expected, Yoshida was not willing to give an affirmative answer. Yoshida asked Burke if General of the Army MacArthur had granted consent for the matter. “That’s why I’m here,” said Burke. No matter how much Yoshida might resist the request, Japan was, after all, occupied by the US military. If MacArthur had approved it, there was no alternative. In the end, Yoshida acquiesced, and a decision was made to dispatch the MSA’s minesweeping forces to Korean waters. Needless to say, this matter was kept strictly confidential.

And now 20 years later, in the fall of 1970, Auer had received Burke’s letter with the mysterious recommendation to contact Ōkubo; Auer did so immediately and secured an appointment. Ōkubo had become a member of the House of Representatives for the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). On learning the purpose of the meeting, he invited Auer to dinner at a French restaurant in the Imperial Hotel. He gladly did so because Auer had contacted him upon the recommendation of Mr. Burke, to whom Ōkubo had felt indebted for years. Auer was accompanied by Ichirō Masuoka, who was a House of Representatives staff member, and Shunji Taoka of the Asahi Shimbun, who served as interpreter. Auer had been introduced to the politically connected Masuoka through the naval attaché at the US embassy in Tokyo, and Masuoka had set up the meeting with Ōkubo. Taoka, a young journalist interested in security issues, had become friends with Auer through the introduction of Yoshio Murakami,Footnote 4 who was studying at The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy where Auer was pursuing his doctorate.

Auer arrived at the hotel at the appointed time, whereupon Ōkubo handed him a book titled Gekirō nijūnen (20 years on the raging waves) chronicling the MSA’s history and remarked, “This book covers everything you would want to know. You can read it later. So, let’s just enjoy a meal together.” He did not seem so keen on having a serious conversation about the circumstances of the formation of the JMSDF.

But Ōkubo’s attitude changed when Auer revealed that, “Admiral Burke said he had an interesting conversation with you in 1950 and he urged me to ask you about it.” Ōkubo confided, “I’ve never told anyone about it. That’s the only thing that isn’t mentioned in this book—Mr. Taoka, please consider this off the record.” He then began to recount his conversations with Burke and Prime Minister Yoshida regarding the dispatch of minesweepers.

Auer temporarily returned to the United States for Christmas that year, and he met Burke in person for the first time. Burke invited the young lieutenant commander to his house in Bethesda, on the outskirts of Washington, D.C., to give an interview. As Auer told him about his conversation with Ōkubo, he looked amused and grinned while he listened. “Did you actually have MacArthur’s approval beforehand?” Auer asked him; Burke told Auer to “fuzz it over,” or obscure the details a little. In fact, he had not obtained MacArthur’s approval beforehand. Auer respected Burke’s wishes and left that fact out of his book, The Postwar Rearmament of Japanese Maritime Forces, 1945–71. However, more than 30 years have passed since Auer had interviewed Burke, who died in 1996. It is no longer a problem for Auer to talk about it now. It was an extraordinary measure of the Occupation era, especially under the unique circumstances of the Korean War. Time and time again, history is marked by such momentary leaps.

Ōkubo himself—the very person who had the conversation with Burke—wrote about it in his own book Uminari no hibi: Kakusareta sengoshi no dansō (The days of the roaring of the sea: A hidden aspect of postwar history).Footnote 5 The details recounted in Ōkubo’s book differ somewhat from what Auer had heard from Burke. After listening to Burke’s request, Ōkubo immediately met with Prime Minister Yoshida at his official residence on his own to explain the situation and seek instructions. In contrast, according to the biography of Burke written by E. B. Potter,Footnote 6 whose draft Burke himself had read through, it was only Burke who took a car to see Yoshida at his official residence, soon after the meeting with Ōkubo. The difference could be simply due to the uncertain memories of the persons concerned. But now that they have both passed on, there is no way of knowing for sure.

“There’s no other way,” Yoshida was said to have muttered, according to another recounting of Ōkubo’s reported by Yōichi Funabashi of the Asahi Shimbun. “But I fear it might be criticized in the Diet if it is interpreted as leading to the overseas dispatch of troops. Please keep it confidential,” he instructed Ōkubo.Footnote 7 However, Uminari no hibi does not mention this. Yoshida, having listened to Ōkubo’s briefing, allowed him to comply with Rear Admiral Burke’s request, reasoning “It is the Japanese government’s policy to cooperate with the UN forces.” Ōkubo took a broad interpretation of Directive No. 2 issued by the Office of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers on September 3, immediately after the end of the war, which states: “The Japanese Imperial General Headquarters will ensure that all minesweeping vessels immediately carry out prescribed measures of disarmament, fuel as necessary, and remain available for minesweeping service. Submarine mines in Japanese and Korean waters will be swept as directed by designated Naval Representatives of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.” He also relied on the fact that MacArthur’s order was absolute during the Occupation, in justifying his acceding to the request.

Moreover, upon accepting the request, Ōkubo asked the GHQ to direct the Japanese government in writing. “Although it was urgent, I thought the members of the minesweeping forces would be surprised by my sudden order, and I needed to justify the dispatch of the minesweeping forces,” he wrote. As a result, Vice Admiral Joy, commander, NAVFE, issued a directive to Minister of Transport Takeshi Yamazaki on October 4 that read, “The Japanese Government is hereby directed to assemble 20 minesweepers, one guinea pig [ship,]Footnote 8 and four other Japanese Maritime Safety vessels in Moji as soon as practicable. These vessels will be prepared for such minesweeping operations as will be designated in future directives.”

Two days earlier, Ōkubo had held an urgent executive meeting at the MSA and issued an order saying, “As it has been decided that we’ll conduct minesweeping in Korean waters according to the US directive … gather vessels at Moji as soon as possible.” Twenty-five vessels and their crews assembled from bases in Kure, Shimonoseki, Osaka, Otaru, Nagoya, and Niigata. The Special Minesweeping Force,Footnote 9 comprising four minesweeping units, was formed; its supreme commander was the former IJN captain Kyūzō Tamura, the director general of the Fairway Safety Office of the MSA.

Minesweepers Assembled at Shimonoseki

On October 6, 1950, the newly formed Special Minesweeping Force assembled at Karato Pier in Shimonoseki. That evening, Ōkubo summoned Supreme Commander Tamura, unit commanders, and commanding officers to the saloon of the flagship JMS Yūchidori to explain the circumstances of dispatching the minesweeping forces to Korean waters and the intention of the Japanese government. Then, he concluded by emphasizing the importance of their mission and encouraging them to do their best: “To regain Japan’s independence, we must overcome this challenge and win international trust. There will be no one waving the Japanese flag on Karato Pier at your departure. But I believe the history of Japan will definitely value your services highly.”

Despite Ōkubo’s encouragement, the assembled minesweeper personnel’s reaction was mixed. For example, whether to take part or not was left up to an individual’s judgment, according to Sadao Senoo, one of the personnel. You don’t have to go if you don’t want to. Hearing this, a few of the crew did leave the vessels. One teary-eyed wife came to the pier to plead with her husband not to go.

On a side note, it was after he became acquainted with Auer that Senoo spoke about his experiences on the minesweepers dispatched during the Korean War for the first time. Soon after graduating from the Naval Academy in March 1945 (74th class), Senoo had witnessed the defeat of Japan. He joined HIJMS Katsuragi as a deck officer, making three roundtrips to Rabaul on the carrier that became a repatriation ship. He was then assigned to the minesweeping forces, continuing to take part in Kure-based minesweeping operations along the coast even after being transferred to the MSA. It was while serving in this post that he was summoned to Karato Pier in Shimonoseki and heard the explanation about the dispatch to Korean waters. He continued to serve after returning from Korea, first in the Safety Security Force, then the JMSDF, working hard to carry out his duties at sea until he retired.

Ultimately, most of the crew agreed to take part in the dispatch after hearing Ōkubo’s explanation. Participants received a huge reward. On top of a monthly salary that was between 6000 and 8000 yen, they received an additional danger allowance of 30 yen per hour—double the money for minesweeping service at home. It was further doubled north of the 38th parallel. Moreover, danger allowance at home was typically paid according to the actual hours worked; for this service, it was paid for a full 24 hours a day from the time of their departure from Shimonoseki until their return. Also, a surprise bonus of 5000 yen was paid on top.Footnote 10 For his month of service in the Incheon-Haeju area, Senoo received 70,000 yen in total. Only 5 years after the war, Japan was still a poor country, and such a huge reward must have been attractive. Yet, the crew had received no explanation about the specifics of compensation at the time of departure. More importantly, most of the crewmembers were IJN veterans, many of whom had struggled through life-and-death situations. We’ll be alright, so let’s go! they thought. On Senoo’s vessel, 25 members responded to the call and agreed to participate in the operation. Senoo was the commanding officer of the submarine chaser MS14. This vessel ended up striking a mine and sank off Wonsan, leaving one dead. Senoo narrowly escaped this fate: before the departure, he had been reassigned to MS04 and dispatched to the Incheon-Haeju area, not the Wonsan area.

“I couldn’t make sense of the mission, to take part in minesweeping during combat in foreign waters,” KōjiFootnote 11 Shiga wrote in his memoir, which is included in Uminari no hibi. Shiga, the commanding officer of MS07 that was also dispatched to the Incheon-Haeju area, noted that his mind was beset with questions about the mission, such as the extent of risks, the protection and rescue in an emergency, and the freedom of action for safety. He could not, he said, “convince myself that it was worth asking the crewmembers who had wives, children, parents, brothers, and sisters to accompany me.”

However, an earlier departing submarine chaser had to return to port due to generator trouble. Shiga was getting a haircut in a nearby barbershop when a subordinate notified him of the decision to dispatch MS07 instead. Immediately making up his mind, Shiga said, “I’ll return at once. Prepare the ship to get underway.” He noted in his memoir: “Why did I make up my mind to go then, despite being quite against the idea? Why did the crew, who wholeheartedly supported me in opposing the idea of being dispatched to foreign waters, make perfect, obedient preparations to depart and wait for the commanding officer’s return? I still cannot fathom it.”

MS14 Sunk by a Mine

Thus, Supreme Commander Tamura aboard the flagship JMS Yūchidori—along with five minesweepers and three patrol ships of the Second Minesweeping Unit led by Commander Shōgo NoseFootnote 12—departed Shimonoseki as the first group at 4 a.m. on October 8 and arrived off Wonsan on October 10. Neither Tamura nor Nose knew at the time of departure that they would be conducting minesweeping operations off Wonsan, according to Ryōhei Ōga, commander of the Fourth Minesweeping Unit in the second group, which headed for the Incheon-Haeju area a little later. They learned of their destination when they rendezvoused with a US Navy ocean tugboat and were handed the plan of operation. Their vessels were forced to drift at night, under radio silence and nighttime blackout, unable to drop anchor due to the danger posed by mines and the deep sea.

The minesweeping operation commenced on October 11. Operating day and night despite the six-knot current and rough sea, the crew’s fatigue reached its limit. An incident occurred on October 17: MS14, ordered to clear the landing harbor in Yonghung Bay off the port of Wonsan in conjunction with the US minesweepers, struck a mine and sank instantly at 3:21 p.m. Most of the crew were thrown into the sea. Although minesweeping was suspended at once to rescue the crew, the casualties numbered one dead and 18 injured. The 21-year-old steward, Sakatarō Nakatani, was killed (Fig. 4.1).

Fig. 4.1
A photo of the explosion of mine field in the sea.

South Korean minesweeper hits a mine off Wonsan, October 1950. (Official US Navy Photograph, 80-G-423625)

Full size image

Due to the risk of hitting mines, all crewmembers were required to go up to the deck during minesweeping operations. On this occasion, too, the commanding officer had called out, “Everyone stand by in the safety compartment.” Nakatani, however, had apparently gone down alone to the rice and wheat storage in the ship’s hold to prepare dinner, and was unable to get out. His body was never found. His funeral was held in Kure on October 27. As Supreme Commander Tamura read his message of condolence, everyone mourned the death of a fellow sailor who had been with them conducting minesweeping since the end of the war. The US Navy did send four million yen in condolence money, but because the operation was conducted in strict secrecy, Nakatani’s death was not publicly honored for 30 years.

The sinking of MS14 left the minesweeping force unsettled. Just 5 days earlier, the crew had witnessed USS Pirate and USS Pledge sink instantly after the US minesweepers struck mines, resulting in 12 dead and 92 injured. This time, a fellow ship followed that fate and sank right in front of their eyes.

The commanding officers, gathered aboard the flagship JMS Yūchidori, insisted on suspending the minesweeping. Using deep-draft minesweepers to conduct minesweeping is dangerous. Let’s do preliminary minesweeping with small shallow-draft vessels first, followed by full-scale minesweeping. Supreme Commander Tamura and Commander Nose suggested this method at the discussion, then later proposed it to the US forces. The US forces, however, impatient with the delay in launching the amphibious operation because the minesweeping was still incomplete, ordered them to conduct minesweeping as planned. According to Ōkubo’s Uminari no hibi, again attempting on October 18 to negotiate their request to conduct preliminary minesweeping, the higher-ups in the US military chain of command gave them an order: “Weigh anchor in 15 minutes and return home. Or start minesweeping in 15 minutes.”

Supreme Commander Tamura and Commander Nose were anguished as they contemplated the current position of Japan, the duty of public servants, and the risk of hitting mines. Some members wanted to continue the operation, but the collective opinion of Nose’s unit was that they should withdraw and return home. In the end, three minesweepers rapidly weighed anchor and left the waters off Wonsan, heading for Shimonoseki, with Commander Nose being overcome by his subordinates’ will. Supreme Commander Tamura, mindful of the consequences of such an arbitrary action, issued an order to Commander Nose to “return home.”

There seems to have been considerable confusion on the Japanese side as to what the US forces ordered them to do. They seem to have felt that the order given by the Americans was quite overbearing. Yōichi Hirama, a former professor of the National Defense Academy, himself a former JMSDF Rear Admiral, wrote in a book titled Nihon no sōkai (The Japanese minesweeping), that the US forces took an uncompromising attitude, saying, “If you don’t get back and resume minesweeping in 15 minutes, we will fire.” However, he also mentions that the US records state, “due primarily to language difficulties and consequent misunderstanding, three of the remaining JMS [vessels] left the area [Wonsan] and returned to Japan,” and suggests that the Japanese might have misheard “hire” for “fire.” He could be right. But instead, they might have understood the Americans’ statement, “we will fire you [unless you start minesweeping]” as meaning that “we will fire on you.” This is only my educated guess, however, with no concrete evidence.

In any case, there is no doubt that Nose’s unit leaving the front line was the most significant crisis throughout the entire period of the Japanese minesweeping force’s deployment in Korean waters. The US Navy was adamant that those responsible must be punished.

Under these circumstances, Ōkubo replaced Commander Nose with Kō Ishitobi, commander of the Third Minesweeping Unit, and ordered three replacement minesweepers to be sent. Then he heard about the situation directly from Supreme Commander Tamura, who had returned to Tokyo. On October 24, Ōkubo, as the MSA’s director general, once more issued Tamura an order stating that the minesweepers were expected to “continue the minesweeping operations without delay in Korean waters following instructions given by the local US forces.” He instructed Tamura to convey his message, without omission, to the Special Minesweeping Force: “There is an agreement between the Japanese government and the GHQ that the members will receive the maximum salary.”

After managing the unrest among the frontline units this way, Ōkubo went with Tamura to the prime minister’s official residence on October 31 to ask whether, according to the government’s highest policy, the minesweeping should be continued. Chief Cabinet Secretary Katsuo Okazaki, the future minister for foreign affairs, received them and conveyed the Prime Minister’s intention: “Prime Minister Yoshida thinks that the Japanese government must cooperate fully with the UN forces and thereby conclude a peace treaty that is advantageous to us. He understands that there are considerable troubles associated with the minesweeping operations in Korean waters under adverse winter weather conditions, especially with small, old vessels. We hope that you will conduct the minesweeping operations to the best of your ability and fulfill the US Navy’s requests.”

After the meeting, Ōkubo called on Vice Admiral Joy, commander, NAVFE, again taking Tamura with him. He apologized for the three minesweepers’ returning home and promised to punish those responsible. Vice Admiral Joy responded with a much gentler attitude than he had taken immediately after the incident: “I’m glad that the Japanese minesweeping force is working very hard. The accident was unfortunate, and I ask for your cooperation to prevent another such incident in the future. Supreme Commander Tamura, in particular, is doing very well. Please convey to the minesweeping force, through Mr. Tamura, that the US Navy is grateful.” The punishment was settled with Commander Nose alone bearing full responsibility and being removed from his position.

“Well Done”

Vice Admiral Joy’s favorable attitude toward Ōkubo was probably related to the fact that Ishitobi’s and other minesweeping units deployed off Wonsan in place of Nose’s unit accomplished their mission excellently. The minelaying off Wonsan was much more extensive than Rear Admiral Burke had feared. The presence of sophisticated magnetic mines was confirmed for the first time on October 18, the day after MS14 had hit a mine. “The US Navy has lost command of the sea in Korean waters,” assessed Rear Admiral Allan E. Smith, commander of the US minesweeping forces, in one of the most dramatic telegraphs he sent to the CNO. The US Navy on its own did not have the capability to remove the roughly 3000 mines hidden underwater. The amphibious operation would have been impossible if the Japanese minesweepers had ended their operation. It was not surprising, then, that the US Navy asked a big favor of the Japanese minesweeping force.

Freshly arrived in the area, Ishitobi’s unit met the US Navy’s expectations well. On October 26, 6 days after Ishitobi’s unit resumed the minesweeping operation, UN forces successfully landed on Wonsan using a route where safety was now guaranteed. Ishitobi’s unit continued minesweeping in the area until November 26, for 38 days in total, removing five mines. In addition, 15 mines were removed off Incheon and Haeju by the First Minesweeping Unit led by Commander Kimio Yamagami; two off ChinnampoFootnote 13 by the Second Minesweeping Unit led by Commander Jikyō Ishino; and three off Kunsan by the Fourth Minesweeping Unit led by Tōshi Hagiwara. Along with the three initially removed by Nose’s unit, 28 mines were removed in total.

According to Auer’s The Postwar Rearmament of Japanese Maritime Forces, 1945–71, between October 2 and December 12, 46 Japanese minesweepers, one large guinea pig ship, and 1200 former naval personnel were employed in operations off the Korean ports of Wonsan, Kunsan, Incheon, Haeju, and Chinnampo, sweeping 327 kilometers of channels and anchorages extending 607 square miles. No areas swept by Japanese ships ever had to be reswept, unlike the case of other, less experienced UN minesweeping units. Japan had no more casualties after the MS14 incident; the only other accident occurred on October 27, when MS30 grounded and sank off Kunsan.

“Well done,” read the message Vice Admiral Joy sent on December 7 through Ōkubo, praising the achievements of the Japanese Special Minesweeping Force. A member of Vice Admiral Joy’s staff explained that “well done” was the highest praise within the US Navy. On December 9, Ōkubo stood once again on Karato Pier in Shimonoseki, addressing the personnel of the minesweeping force. He thanked them for their effort. “For Japan to become an honorable member of the international community in the future, we cannot obtain that status by sitting on our hands. … We must obtain it ourselves, by our own labor and sweat.” And so, the Japanese minesweeping force’s operation in Korean waters, an activity that spanned over 2 months, was completed.

The Legacy of the Japanese Minesweeping Force

There are a variety of evaluations of the mission and accomplishments of the Japanese minesweeping force that was dispatched to Korean waters in the fall of 1950. Initially, the Japanese government tried to hide the very fact for a long time. This was probably because justifying this overseas minesweeping operation was problematic under the interpretation, at the time, of Article 9 of the Constitution; even if the operation was conducted in support of the UN forces, it was not for self-defense, and was therefore not possible to justify.

The first reports of the matter appeared in the Tokyo Shimbun on October 9, the day after the minesweepers left Shimonoseki. The Asahi Shimbun followed with a report, citing foreign dispatches, on the sailor who had died carrying out his duties. There was no reaction from the opposition parties to the news, however, possibly due to the influence of the Occupation forces at the time. Four years later, in January 1954, when the Sankei Shimbun ran a detailed story on the circumstances of the dispatch of minesweepers, the lawmakers from the Japan Socialist Party and the Japanese Communist Party began criticizing the operation in the Diet. Yet the prime minister feigned ignorance, saying “A minesweeper is said to have sunk, but I have no record of that incident at the moment.” At the March 27 meeting of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, in a discussion of the minesweeping operations during the landing operation at Wonsan, Diet Member Shichirō Hozumi asked, “If you interpreted the Constitution as allowing these activities, please clarify the criteria for your interpretation.” Takezō Shimoda, the director general of the Treaties Bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, answered as follows:

Legally speaking, there were two things happening, each of a different nature. First, as it was US ships that conducted the minesweeping, the service was provided according to procurement … by the United States, and a Japanese individual died while providing the service when a US ship sank. In this case, as the service was provided based on a personal and free contract, there would be no issue as a state.

Second, the GHQ demanded minesweeping service not from individuals, but from the Maritime Safety Agency as an institution of the Japanese government, which was under the command of the Occupation forces. This certainly could have been an issue if Japan had not been under occupation. Japan did not actually have the right to raise it as a breach of international law, however, because the nineteenth article of the Peace Treaty states that Japan could not pursue liability for actions done under the directives of the Allied forces during and after the war.

Japan as a state had no business with the matter if each member of the minesweeping force provided service to the US forces as individuals. Even if the operation were executed based on the GHQ’s order to the MSA as a state institution, nobody could bring legal action against the US government and sue for damages because Japan had renounced the right to do so in the Peace Treaty. This was the gist of his answer.

For the minesweeping crew, this negative interpretation would have been difficult to accept. “[With such a negative interpretation,] my brother’s death would mean nothing. What did my brother die for?” wondered Tōichi Nakatani, the elder brother of Sakatarō Nakatani who died onboard MS14, in an article “Shōgen: Chōsen sensō ni sansenshita nihonjin (Testimonies: The Japanese who fought in the Korean War),” featured in the July 1976 issue of Ushio (The tide) magazine. Citing this, Yōichi Funabashi finds a link between Sakatarō Nakatani’s “death in action after the war” and Vice Admiral Joy’s “Well done,” a link whose vague meaning Funabashi sees as symbolic of the uncertainty of the postwar Japan-US alliance.

A somewhat more positive perspective on the minesweeping off Wonsan had been posited about 2 years prior to Director General Shimoda’s aforementioned interpellation. During the December 4, 1952 Committee on the Budget of the House of Representatives, Diet Member Yasuhiro Nakasone, admitting that the minesweeping off Wonsan conducted under the occupation might have been different in nature, asked:

In the future, in the name of cooperation with the United Nations, the vessels of the Coastal Safety Force or the MSA could be pressed to do similar things, such as minesweeping and escorting at sea. … If Japan would cooperate with the United Nations at sea, where can you put a limit to cooperation?

Minister of Foreign Affairs Okazaki replied as follows:

To say the least, there is no question that we would not be involved in the battle itself. Therefore, we would like to cooperate from our perspective in peaceful missions, providing services in the rear—such as meeting special procurement demands for ammunition and other supplies; allowing the use of port facilities; as well as providing transport and other services—ordinary activities that would not mean involvement in the so-called battles, as much as practicable.

How can Japan cooperate with the UN or US forces when they act? What should Japan do in the future? There was already at that time a discussion of the same issues that are in the current discussion on the Guidelines for Japan-US Defense Cooperation, or the New Guidelines. Diet Member Nakasone continued his line of questioning and expressed his concern about Japan being dragged into war in the name of UN cooperation. But the government expressly declared that it would do what it could within the limits of the Constitution. It was consistent with the idea that Ōkubo stated at Karato Pier in Shimonoseki, that the Japanese had to win an honorable international status “ourselves, by our own labor and sweat.”

For almost 40 years thereafter, the dispute over Article 9 of the Constitution became preoccupied with a futile discussion over Japan’s right to self-defense; a long time passed before Japan again dispatched minesweepers to foreign waters, making a small contribution to international security. And yet, the dispute continues today over what is, or should be, the limit, under Article 9, of cooperation with other countries to contribute to international security. Foreign Minister Okazaki stated Japan should “cooperate as much as practicable,” but that begs yet another series of new questions, which are beyond the scope of this book.

A Thread Connecting the IJN and the JMSDF

The US Navy valued the Japanese minesweeping force’s contribution highly. For armed forces personnel, there are only two types of people: friends or enemies. Friends and allies who can be trusted in times of emergency are irreplaceable. Despite the initial discord, the US naval officers and sailors discovered a reliable ally in the Japanese minesweepers with whom they conducted minesweeping operations in waters around Wonsan and other areas. They were colleagues who overcame dangerous challenges and worked hard together.

According to Michinaga Ōnishi, the executive officer of MS14 that struck a mine, the US Navy auxiliary tugboat’s crewmembers, whose strong arms rescued the Japanese sailors who had spent half an hour in the water, were very kind. They gave up their beds so the rescued Japanese sailors could rest. In the evening, they cooked curry with rice, a favorite dish for the Japanese. The curry (made with poorly cooked foreign rice) was not so tasty, but the goodwill was certainly appreciated.

In addition, Commander Ishino, who was deployed off Chinnampo, was especially impressed by Commander S. M. Archer, a calm and collected Southerner in command of the US naval forces. Commander Archer never once in 4 weeks spoke in a stern tone of voice despite being on a battlefield; he “worked diligently and was always gentle.” Moreover, the US forces’ attitude was totally different before and after the operation, according to Ryōhei Ōga, the last to return from Haeju. Ōga was given a hero’s welcome upon his return to Sasebo. The “Interim Evaluation Reports,” lessons of the Korean War compiled by the US Pacific Fleet Command, state that “Japan’s minesweepers, having obtained the permission of the Allied Forces to participate, contributed greatly to the tactical success.”

The Japanese minesweeping force had not only interacted with the US Navy. An older person, seemingly a Korean sailor, once spoke to Commander Ishino inconspicuously at the side of a Korean minesweeper. Although there were some who felt animosity toward prewar Japan, he said, “in my ship, most are grateful to you for your cooperation at this time of crisis in Korea.” Commander Shiga of MS07, who was engaged in minesweeping in the Incheon-Haeju area, was placed under the command of the Royal Navy’s frigate HMS Whitesand Bay. Initially, the British supervision was strict and felt like forced labor rather than like working together. It also felt as if they were watching closely. As the operation went on, however, the Japanese crew started chatting with the British crew about families and girlfriends, and the relationship improved as they came to understand each other better. British naval officers began to treat the Japanese as equals and sometimes even used respectful language.

Rear Admiral Burke, who had planned the operation in the first place, expressed trust and gratitude toward the Japanese minesweeping force most fervently. On December 15, 1950, after the procedure to disband the Special Minesweeping Force, Ōkubo visited Burke at the NAVFE headquarters. Burke welcomed Ōkubo with “joy expressed in his big eyes and large body” and said, “The MSA’s achievements on this occasion have been highly valued, and in my personal opinion, they’ve strengthened the momentum to conclude a peace treaty with Japan.” He also suggested that Ōkubo go to America to discuss with the US government and the Pentagon the idea of strengthening the MSA.

Following this advice, Ōkubo visited Washington, D.C. in January 1951. Burke had notified Ōkubo with a grin, “I’ve already ordered my aide-de-camp in Washington to look after you.” It turned out that the aide-de-camp he was referring to was, in fact, his wife, Bobbie. She looked after Ōkubo in many ways during his stay; she even petitioned high-ranking US officers to enhance the capabilities of the MSA.

The goodwill Burke showed toward Ōkubo and the MSA would have been unlikely without the actions of the Japanese minesweepers. The former IJN officers who comprised the minesweeping forces had left Burke with a strong impression of their capabilities and sense of responsibility; Burke must have been convinced that Japan’s maritime forces would be an asset for the United States in the future. I believe that, behind Burke’s extraordinary efforts to strengthen the MSA and, beyond that, to establish the Coastal Safety Force the following year, there was a sort of realization that the postwar Japanese maritime forces were dependable. The Japanese minesweeper crew who took part in the minesweeping in Korean waters carried out their duties well, despite the challenges their dispatch posed given their unclear status under the Occupation. They laid the essential foundation of the postwar relationship between the Japanese and US navies, the thread connecting the IJN to the JMSDF.