How JMSDF Officers and Sailors View the US Navy and the Alliance

When I completed the Japanese version of this book in 2000, I wrote the following in the final chapter (Chap. 10 of this book):

The current middle-ranked officers will mostly be retired in 20 years’ time. Those who retire … will be succeeded by the younger generation currently undergoing training at sea and in the sky. The new officers who will depart from Etajima on a long-distance training cruise in March 2001 are 23 or 24 years old. When the Gulf War broke out, they had just started junior high school. Even the memory of the Gulf War is just history for these young [Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force] JMSDF personnel. Still, they will be in the position to maintain and strengthen the JMSDF and the Japan-US alliance 20 to 30 years from now.

More than 20 years have already passed since then, and it turned out just like I wrote. The youths of the Class of 2000Footnote 1 who set off on a long-distance training cruise as ensigns after graduating from Officer Candidate School in Etajima in March 2001 are already in their mid-40s. They work as mid-grade officers in various fields throughout the service. The early ones have made captain already, and serve in leadership positions, such as commanding officers of warships, escort flotilla staff, or section chiefs at the Maritime Staff Office (MSO) or the Joint Staff Office. They are in the same positions today that JMSDF officers who were my age or slightly younger were appointed to around 2000.

Over the past 20 years, the generation of the Class of 2000, including officers and enlisted from several years on either side of it, have lived through the War on Terrorism, North Korean threats, counter-piracy measures in the Gulf of Aden, the Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami, rising tensions with the Chinese navy over the Nansei Islands, and the intensifying confrontation between the United States and China. They have experienced a greater diversity and complexity of joint activities, not just with the US Navy, but with the navies of Australia, Canada, India, Singapore, Great Britain, France, and even Germany.

How do these mid-level officers and enlisted personnel currently on active duty in the JMSDF view today’s JMSDF-US Navy relationship? How do they feel about the future of the bilateral alliance? Are there any elements that make them uneasy?

The Interviewees: Joining the Maritime Self-Defense Force

Fortunately, I was able to interview several JMSDF personnel and hear their thoughts thanks to the efforts of Captain Ryōko Azuma, chief of the MSO’s Public Affairs Section, and others. They included five officers (Classes of 1996–2000), and a chief petty officer (CPO) and a petty officer third class who work in the same field. These men and women had different reasons for joining the JMSDF. (The ranks and positions of the interviewees are as of the time of their interviews; a few of them have been promoted and have moved on to new positions of responsibility as of the time of publication.)

Captain Shūsuke Kitaguchi (Class of 1996) is currently chief of liaison section, Administration Division, Administration Department, MSO. He joined because of a strong childhood interest in the IJN and a dream of one day commanding a JMSDF destroyer. He had worked at a private company in Kyoto for a while after graduating from a Kansai area university. But, unable to give up on his dream, he studied hard, sat for the JMSDF officer candidate exam, and passed.

Captain Kazushi Yokota (Class of 1997) is currently the director of the Plans and Programs Division, Operations and Plans Department, MSO; he is from Tokyo. So, ever since high school, Yokota wanted to find a job where he could serve his country. I happened to learn about a medical officer treating wounded soldiers in a cave on Iwo Jima in 1945 in the last phase of the battle. The army doctor persuaded the soldiers to live and return home instead of dying in a final assault. It made me consider becoming a naval doctor, to make my contribution in the field of medicine. But after twice failing the entrance examination for the National Defense Medical College, I went instead to the National Defense Academy, which I passed. For a time, he thought about joining the JASDF. However, he came across portraits of Admirals Nimitz and Burke at the US Navy Officers Club in Yokosuka, not too far from the Academy where he was studying. He learned how they had fought against the IJN in the war. He also read a translation of the US Naval Institute’s Naval Leadership, a textbook for midshipmen. He thus felt that there was a healthy skepticism and rational scientific thinking in the US Navy, a way of thinking that is somewhat different from Japan’s. He wondered if perhaps that was a reason for the IJN’s defeat. And so he decided to join the JMSDF, to serve the country, and never let Japan repeat that mistake again.

Captain Toshihiko Shiraishi (Class of 2000) is currently chief of the Aircraft Section, Aircraft Division, Logistics Department, MSO; he is from Hirado City, Nagasaki Prefecture. His father was a fisherman, so Shiraishi loved the sea. He went to Sasebo North High School and was quite familiar with the JMSDF and the US Navy. After entering the National Defense Academy, he naturally chose the JMSDF. Similarly, Captain Takuo Kobayashi (Class of 2000) is chief of the Plans and Policy Section, Plans and Programs Division, Operations and Plans Department, MSO and Yokota’s subordinate; he is from Yokosuka. His father served as chief engineer on commercial and fishing vessels, and Kobayashi, too, was familiar with the JMSDF, US Navy, and National Defense Academy (NDA). After graduating from junior high school, he was educated as a JMSDF student at Etajima (a system to train enlisted personnel, abolished in 2011, where a student simultaneously followed the high school curriculum to obtain a diploma). After completing his studies, he entered the National Defense Academy and chose the JMSDF. Developing an interest for the sea appears to be a result of growing up near it.

Some people, in contrast, join the JMSDF without knowing much about it. Captain Junko Kawashima (Class of 1997) is currently liaison officer, Operations Support Division and Administration Division, MSO, assigned to US Naval Forces Japan; she is from Saitama Prefecture. After graduating from Dokkyo University, an institution near her home that emphasizes international education, she wanted a job related to foreign countries, so she applied to two or three foreign-affiliated trading companies. However, an SDF recruiter told her that if she wanted to do international work, the JMSDF was definitely the way to go. Thinking that this advice made sense, she took the officer candidate examination, and joined the JMSDF without knowing almost anything about it.

Chief Petty Officer Makoto Takitō, currently the system chief of the destroyer JS Maya, also said that he knew nothing about the JMSDF when he enlisted in 1991. He passed the recruitment exam, which he took only because a close friend from high school suggested they take it together. He said he had not planned to serve long, thinking he would leave the service after a few years. Petty Officer Third Class Masato Alexander Yasuda, currently an instructor at the Surface Warfare Center, had a similar story when he enlisted in 2015. He took the exams for the fire and police departments in addition to the JMSDF, but he joined the JMSDF because it was the first to confirm that he had passed. Neither man had particularly strong feelings for the JMSDF at the time of enlistment. There are always some people like that among JMSDF applicants.

Encounter with America and Beyond

Regardless of why they joined the JMSDF, once they did, they ended up working with the US Navy. Many of them have varying degrees of routine contact with US Navy personnel, which is natural given that the United States is Japan’s sole ally and that JMSDF-US Navy ties are particularly close. What impressions and assessments have they formed through personal experience with the US Navy and of the United States, more generally?

Listening to their stories, I came to realize that the diversity of JMSDF personnel has made great strides compared to 20 years ago. The number of people who, before joining the JMSDF, lived and/or studied abroad, especially in the United States, seems to be steadily rising.

The one who kicked off this trend, so to speak, is Captain Keizo Kitagawa (Class of 1993); though he was not a subject of these interviews, I have known him personally for years. In fact, he is the only graduate of the US Naval Academy in Annapolis in the history of the JMSDF (the eighth Japanese to graduate; the one prior to Captain Kitagawa graduated in 1900). Originally from Ube City, Yamaguchi Prefecture, Kitagawa did a homestay in the United States as a high school exchange student. At his US high school, he came across a brochure for the Naval Academy, famous for offering a quality education comparable to that of top-level civilian American universities. Young Kitagawa, with his innate ability for taking action, inquired at the Academy, and was told that he would be allowed to take the exam. He applied, and based on his examination scores, received notification of his acceptance. He moved to Annapolis in the summer of 1989, entered the Academy, and worked exceedingly hard to keep up with his studies and training in English. He completed the 4-year course, making many friends.

A big question arose just before graduation: who would pay for his tuition? This unprecedented case apparently reached the notice of relevant officials in the US Navy and the JMSDF, as well as the officials in charge of national security policy at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. What a waste to force a young Japanese graduate of a US service academy to find employment in the private sector. If he was to join the JMSDF, they judged, surely he will contribute to deepening the Japan-US alliance. Thus, a bilateral solution was devised: upon graduating from Annapolis, he would be treated as though he had graduated from Japan’s National Defense Academy, proceed to JMSDF Officer Candidate School, and become an officer of the JMSDF.

Deeply influenced by his education at Annapolis and building on his experiences as a JMSDF officer, Captain Kitagawa had developed a strong ongoing interest in the differences in naval officer training in Japan and the United States pre-World War II, and in the best way to train JMSDF officers today. Long interested in academia, Kitagawa later obtained a master’s degree from the National Defense Academy and a doctorate from Keio University. His doctoral thesis was on the topic of intellectual innovation in military organizations, specifically the relationship between theory and practice in naval education. (Incidentally, I served as one of the assistant examiners of his thesis.) Until December 2022, he served as the first director of the Naval Strategy Office, Operations and Plans Department, MSO, offering his thinking and advice on the proper balance between theoretical knowledge and practical art in the JMSDF to the chief of maritime staff (CMS) and other JMSDF leadership.

Captain Shūsuke Kitaguchi grew up mainly in Great Neck, Long Island, a suburb of New York City from the second grade of elementary school to the tenth grade of high school because his father, a Japanese trading company employee, had been transferred to the United States. He had a carefree childhood, studying with Americans in public schools. The locals were very kind, and he still misses them, he told me. Yet, he also had some experiences to realize that not all of American society is just freedom and tolerance.

The increase in the number of personnel with one non-Japanese parent heightens the perception of the diversity within the JMSDF. Petty Officer Third Class Yasuda’s father had been in charge of carrier-based aircraft maintenance aboard the aircraft carriers homeported at US Fleet Activities Yokosuka in the 1990s and early 2000s. He met a Japanese woman from Yokosuka, they got married, and Yasuda was born. When my father retired, he returned to Los Angeles, so my mother and I moved to the United States to join him. After we lived in America for a while, my father got a new job in Guam, so that’s where I graduated from high school. However, I have a strong sense of being Japanese: I was born in Yokosuka, grew up surrounded by my mother and her family and relatives, and I studied at a Japanese public school. I could have joined the US Navy if I had wanted, since my father is a US citizen. But I joined the JMSDF without hesitation. It made me happy that, when I told my father about enlisting, he told me that when he worked on the aircraft carrier, he often worked with the JMSDF, watched what they did, and respected them. “You will now join the JMSDF I respect,” he told me; “I respect your decision.”

Apart from his height and exotic features, Petty Officer Third Class Yasuda is every bit the old-fashioned sort of Japanese young man, extremely well-mannered and unusually reserved. The number of personnel with one non-Japanese parent, like him, will likely grow. Anyone with Japanese citizenship who meets certain qualification requirements should be very welcome, but JMSDF personnel are national civil servants who often come into contact with classified information. This is not a problem if the father is a citizen of the United States, an ally, but the decision is made more difficult, it seems, depending on the nationality of the parent. Several years ago, a top student at the National Defense Academy with a parent who was a Chinese national was not permitted to join any of the three SDF service branches, an outcome his classmates protested. The decision may be handled on a case-by-case basis, as the issues involved are complex and full of nuances.

In the United States, a foreign national can gain citizenship by serving in the military for a few years. Many young foreigners, swearing allegiance to the United States, acquire the pride and attitude of an American in the military, and then, upon leaving the service, go on to become good American citizens. Ordinary citizens respect and treat these former foreigners who served the country in the military as true Americans. The military was among the first government institutions to abolish discrimination against blacks. In Japan, where the birthrate is declining, is it still too difficult to adopt a similar system utilizing the SDF as a place to foster good Japanese citizens?

Drawn to America, Repelled by America

Other personnel had no direct personal experience with America before joining the JMSDF; their prior views ranged from fascination or simple awareness to dislike of that country. Captain Yokota attended a junior high school affiliated with Ochanomizu UniversityFootnote 2 that had a class for returnee students, many of whom had grown up abroad. Since they spoke in English, I was exposed to the world of English for the first time. I worked hard to study English, writing down the lines from Top Gun, Back to the Future, and other movies I was obsessed with at the time; challenging myself by reading books in the original English; and getting hold of an English-English dictionary to push myself further. It appears that Captain Yokota’s view of America before he joined the JMSDF was a combination of admiration for contemporary America and knowledge that the US and Japanese Navies had fought in the Pacific War.

Captain Kobayashi, meanwhile, as a second-year junior high school student, had the opportunity to visit the aircraft carrier USS Independence at US Fleet Activities Yokosuka, where he was treated kindly. I thought Americans were cheerful people. The movie Top Gun made me want to be a pilot. However, I was shocked to read the farewell note of a kamikaze pilot on my first visit to the Museum of Naval History when I was a JMSDF student at Etajima. The pilot, just 17 when he wrote his note, crashed into an American ship and lost his life. I remember thinking that I was 2 years younger than he was. That could have been me.

In spite of the self-sacrifice of the pilot and deaths of innumerable others, in the end Japan lost the war to the United States. I didn’t feel any hatred, just an overwhelming sense of chagrin. I wanted to do it over and beat America. The feelings I had were complicated. They have not disappeared completely, even now. After that, I began to visit the museum by myself two or three times a month, and to think about the war. Kobayashi advanced to the National Defense Academy where he joined the rugby club. At an international conference with students from foreign military academies, he befriended Joe, a member of the American football team at West Point, the US Army’s military academy. While horsing around, he tackled Joe on the snow, knocking him down. Kobayashi felt a weight lift from him.

It is fascinating that, although their feelings toward America differed, both Captains Yokota and Kobayashi, born nearly 30 years after Japan’s war with the United States, had been thinking about that war when they joined the JMSDF.

Female Personnel Seek to Globalize the Workplace

Any consideration of diversifying the JMSDF must include the increase in the number of female personnel and the expansion of their scope of activity. The SDF’s recruitment of women began surprisingly long ago. The National Safety Force, the JGSDF’s predecessor, began hiring female nurses in 1952; the JGSDF began employing college-educated female officers in 1968. The JMSDF and JASDF started hiring female officers in 1974. The number of female recruits, however, was small and the types of jobs open to them remained limited for a long time.

The Japan Defense Agency declared in 1993 that all SDF occupations would be opened to female personnel, yet for a long time afterward, women were not assigned as destroyer, submarine or aircraft crewmembers, for instance, owing to maternity protection, the potential for close combat, difficulty in ensuring privacy between men and women, economic efficiency, and other excuses. Newly commissioned female ensigns finally embarked on an overseas training cruise for the first time in 1995, after women’s quarters with locks were installed on the training ship JS Kashima; the first assignment of female personnel to destroyers began in 2008. Before 1995, female JMSDF officers had no experience working at sea. There have been two female rear admirals to date, Hikaru Saeki in 2001 and Natsue Kondo in 2016, but neither of them has been on sea duty: Admiral Saeki was a medical officer, and Admiral Kondo is from the pre-training cruise generation whose main occupations were accounting and supply.

Around the year 2000, a female officer assigned to the MSO’s Education Division, a classmate of former CMS Tomohisa Takei, provided me with assistance several times when I did some work for the JMSDF. She was popular among her colleagues and classmates who often sought her help. She married a more senior JMSDF officer. Nevertheless, she once told me that, looking back, she had been sad that, though a JMSDF officer, she was not able to serve on a naval vessel because she had not been able to go on that overseas training cruise.

Captain Kawashima, interested in international work, joined the JMSDF just as the SDF began cautiously expanding the categories of work open to female SDF personnel. It was difficult for women to be selected for overseas assignments, such as international operations or foreign details. Even though there were other women like me who wished to be sent overseas, it was not permitted for a long time. No matter how hard we worked at English and how eager we were to do such work, being a woman was an obstacle for some job categories and placements—it was a painful experience. The male personnel likely were unaware of that. Yet, believing that these occupations would open up some day, I didn’t give up, continuing to express my wishes, and I was accepted in the end. Over the past few years, she has served as the commanding officer of the training ship JS Setoyuki in Kure; as an advisor to the Special Representative of the NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) Secretary General at NATO headquarters in Brussels, Belgium; as a liaison officer in Bahrain; and currently as a liaison officer to the US Navy in Japan. She acknowledges that she is much more fortunate than the previous generation of female SDF officers, who could not do her jobs because they were not allowed aboard ships. Nevertheless, she feels that it took far too long.

Incidentally, Captain Miho Ōtani, a Class of 1996 classmate of Captain Kitaguchi and 1 year senior to Captain Kawashima, was in the first class of female cadets at the National Defense Academy, the first woman to serve as the executive officer and commanding officer of a destroyer, and the first female commanding officer of an Aegis destroyer, JS Myōkō. Also Class of 1996, Captain Ryōko Azuma, currently chief of the public affairs section who made these interviews possible, was the first female training ship captain and the first woman to serve as the commander, Escort Division. Captain Kawashima, as a female officer, is following in the footsteps of Captains Ōtani and Azuma.

September 11 Terrorist Attacks

Soon after becoming officers, these men and women experienced the 9/11 incident in 2001, which forced a new awareness of the US Navy. Captains Kobayashi and Shiraishi (Class of 2000) just happened to return to Harumi, one of the passenger ship terminals in Tokyo, from their overseas training cruise on September 10. That day, Kobayashi disembarked from the training ship JS Kashima and moved to Sasebo to take up his first posting on the destroyer JS Kurama. On the night of September 11, he was watching TV as he ate ramen and drank beer at a restaurant in Sasebo. Suddenly, there was a commotion among the customers watching the television, which showed a video of jet airliners crashing into a New York skyscraper; Kobayashi had no idea what had happened. But, when he called a superior on the Kurama, he was told that he did not have to return to base. He never imagined that what he saw was a terrorist attack, nor did he consider the implications for the JMSDF.

Kobayashi moved to Etajima, as originally scheduled, to take the introductory training course for junior surface officers at the First Service School. While he was at school, it was decided that JS Kurama, a component of Escort Flotilla Two, would be dispatched to the Indian Ocean on November 9 together with the destroyer JS Kirisame and replenishment ship JS Hamana. Kobayashi was headed to the Indian Ocean for his first real mission.

After 9/11, the US government requested the Japanese government to participate in the Global War on Terror in Afghanistan. In response, the Koizumi cabinet decided to dispatch destroyers and a replenishment ship to the Indian Ocean under a new Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law. After the law was enacted, JS Kurama and the other two vessels were dispatched, nominally to survey and research.

The sailors soon to be on their first deployment to the Indian Ocean were so tense that many wrote out their wills. Kobayashi, too, was worried he might die. He had just been bid an emotional farewell by an old woman who had looked after him on the weekends.Footnote 3 “Why you?” she had cried; just 20 years old at war’s end, she well remembered how young naval officers went off to fight, never to return. Because his overseas training cruise had gone to the Indian Ocean and the Middle East, Kobayashi had not experienced a port call at a US Navy base, and so this deployment would be his first time seeing US naval operations.

Coincidentally, Kawashima was an assistant ASWFootnote 4 officer on JS Kashima, the flagship of the Training Squadron for the Class of 2000; it had been her first visit to the Middle East. She learned of the 9/11 incident at sea, as her ship was heading to its home port in Kure after having dropped off Shiraishi, Kobayashi, and the other newly commissioned officers at Harumi. It came as quite a shock, though the news did not provide much detail at the time. I wondered what the United States was going to do. I remember feeling disappointed when I heard that there would be no more training cruises to the Middle East because of this incident.

Twenty years later, in 2021, she was appointed as the liaison officer to the US Navy’s Fifth Fleet in Bahrain, as Kitaguchi’s successor. She learned about America’s decision to withdraw troops from Afghanistan from President Biden’s statement. Bahrain became the site of operations for the withdrawal from Afghanistan. From US Navy briefings, she could get a sense of the progress of preparations for withdrawal and the tensions mounting by the day. After the fall of Kabul, she was very impressed with the decisiveness of the United States, the strong will to act and the logistical capability of US forces to achieve their goals, and the leadership of the US Navy’s commanding officers. Reflecting on the past 20 years, she told the commander of the Fifth Fleet of her involvement with the war in Afghanistan, at the start when President Bush declared the war on terrorism right after 9/11, and at the end in the Middle East. He told me that for me to understand the start and end of a serious mission was valuable for the US military.

Bonds Between Japanese and US Navy Experts

Increased internationalization of the JMSDF notwithstanding, the majority of personnel first come into contact with the United States and its people after joining the JMSDF, as they conduct exercises, patrols, operations, resupply, and information exchanges with the naval forces of their sole ally. They visit America, the first foreign country for many of them, through training trips to the United States and joint exercises at sea, for instance a helicopter pilot’s landing on the flight deck of a US Navy ship. Alternatively, the JMSDF bases in Yokosuka, Atsugi, Iwakuni, Sasebo, and Okinawa share various facilities with the adjacent US Navy bases. For example, submarines at Yokosuka base are always moored at a pier in one corner of the US naval base. Similar arrangements are only just beginning with the JGSDF and JASDF, but the JMSDF has been like that since its inception.

CPO Takitō had no particular hopes for his assignments when he enlisted in the JMSDF. Asked what I wanted to do after enlisting, I only replied that, since I had joined the JMSDF, I wanted to be a crew member on a naval vessel. First of all, I knew next to nothing about the JMSDF. I never dreamed that I’d be working with people in the US Navy in the future.

And so, after completing basic training, I was told I was assigned to fire control because I had an aptitude (in the JMSDF, each job category is called the technical specialty required to perform the duties in that category). You can be sure, I had no idea what fire control was. Since then, CPO Takitō has spent his nearly 30-year career in the JMSDF focusing unremittingly on missile fire control systems for Aegis ships. He feels great contentment with how it turned out: improving his knowledge and skills in this technical field gives him a great sense of purpose and identity in his life.

The role of a fire controlman, when firing artillery or missiles mounted on a destroyer, is to calculate the position and movement of the target, fire the shell or missile, track the ordnance with radar to verify correct flight trajectory, and hit the target. Simultaneously, he must radar track the enemy’s incoming ordnance and relay that information to the ship’s captain and other officers. In the IJN, fire control staff used a rangefinder to measure the distance to the enemy vessel, calculated the sailing speed and direction for both ships, and reported that to the gunners, who fired the guns. Nowadays, the radar determines the target’s location, and a computer calculates the correct rate and angle of fire instantaneously. The technology improves year by year. The SPY radar that the Aegis missile interception system uses possesses groundbreaking capabilities for target detection and calculation of projectile speed and angle. Thus, the Aegis system using SPY radar is a top-secret technology of the US Navy, which is why the JMSDF was given the radar system as a black box at first, without any information how it was put together.

The JMSDF commissioned its first Aegis-equipped warship, JS Kongo, in 1993, 2 years after CPO Takitō enlisted; it subsequently deployed a series of Aegis destroyers to each escort flotilla. To operate Aegis ships effectively, the JMSDF had an urgent task to train fire control personnel who could understand and master the workings of the Aegis system, a completely new system for the JMSDF. CPO Takitō was selected as one of those candidates. The most enthusiastic of students, he devoted himself to mastering SPY radar technology, setting himself on the path to becoming the JMSDF’s SPY radar specialist responsible for operating and maintaining the radar, installing new operating system software and application updates. In his seventh year after enlisting, he was selected and ordered to study at the US Navy’s SPY radar school in New Jersey for 1 year. He crossed the Pacific with his wife and 3-year-old son—it was their first time in America.

Takitō returned twice more for further study at the US Navy’s school, but it appears that he feels particularly nostalgic about his first experience in America. My wife also enjoyed her first time living in America. However, we had a lot of trouble with English in our daily life. Though I had attended an English school before leaving, it didn’t do me much good right away. I’d go to a restaurant and not know what or how to order. The Americans at the school were kind and looked after us.

Since the classes at school were conducted in English, I struggled to follow along. But, hungry for new knowledge about SPY radars, I studied hard. The instructors were kind. I wondered why they were so caring and spent time with me. It took so much time to pose a question in English, then more time to understand the response. They answered my questions no matter how much time it took. There were times I’d suddenly realize that it was 9 or 10 o’clock at night. I thanked the instructor, who told me, “Don’t worry about it. I am here for you.” “So that is what the student-teacher relationship is like in America,” I marveled. I met this instructor again 15 years later, when I came to study for the second time.

There was a lot to learn, but after returning from studying abroad and gaining more experience, I no longer felt my understanding of the SPY radar was any less than that of my US Navy counterparts. Whenever the JMSDF builds a new Aegis destroyer, one of the US Navy SPY radar specialists comes to give advice. Although we work together, there have been times we adamantly disagreed with each other. One time, it was so emotionally charged, it almost got out of hand, and I barely stopped myself from punching him. After arguing over who was right, we decided to give it a try to find out. When it turned out Takitō was right, the Navy specialist came to respect the Japanese CPO.

This man recently came to Yokosuka again. JS Maya, one of the newest Aegis destroyers, is about to go to Hawaii for testing. I suddenly received an email from him saying that he’d seen my name in the crew list of the Maya, so he got himself assigned to oversee the testing. We’ll be working together for the first time in 20 years. He retired from the Navy but still works on SPY radar as a civilian contractor. I am so happy to see him again after such a long time; I missed him. We respect each other. Soon we’ll board Maya and depart Yokosuka for Hawaii. There are several other US Navy specialists that I’ve known for about 10 years. CPO Takitō has been sent to the United States to participate in bilateral training and exercises on an Aegis destroyer eight times.

Because of this relationship, we both know that everything will go well when the Japanese and US navies conduct joint exercises at sea, with Aegis ships from both sides taking part: he is watching the Aegis on the US side and he knows that I’m watching on the Japanese side. There is thus an unwavering sense of trust and camaraderie between SPY radar specialists, which I find rewarding to think is part of the strong bond between our two Navies.

Enhancing JSDF Interoperability with US Forces

The encounters that JMSDF personnel have with the US Navy vary. Captain Yokota, after having visited America for the first time on his overseas training cruise, crossed the Pacific with units from the JGSDF and JASDF to train for several months at Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton in California for the 2013 joint exercises, Operation Dawn Blitz 13.2. This was the first of such trainings following the 2011 publication of the new and revised National Defense Program Guidelines, enabling the SDF to train and acquire island recapture and amphibious warfare capabilities. Learning how the Marines fight by taking part in live-fire exercises was a completely new experience for Yokota. He realized what it was like for a military to fight.

This training was, in fact, the first full-scale joint training that assumed the JMSDF and JGSDF units would cross the sea and fight together. Since its inception, the JMSDF has shared various experiences and lessons learned with the US Navy, but it has conducted training and exercises only infrequently with the JGSDF and JASDF. Conducting joint operations, therefore, has been relatively uncommon. The three SDF service branches differ in the history of their founding, their assigned duties, and their institutional cultures and conventions that have been handed down; they have completely separate command structures. Consequently, it was rather difficult to operate together.

After two laws regarding the structure and responsibilities of the SDFFootnote 5 were revised on the basis of long debates and changes in the situation, it resulted in the establishment in 2006 of the Joint Staff Office, to replace the Joint Staff Council, and the creation of the position of Chief of the Joint Staff, instead of the Chairman of the Joint Council. The Joint Staff Council lacked independent command authority. In contrast, the chief of staff, Joint Staff, is given ultimate command of the three SDF service branches and, assisted by staff members of the Joint Staff Office, actually operates the ground, maritime, and air forces. For the SDF, this was a major transformation, one very much needed to respond to diverse security threats jointly with the US military.

Achievement of this major transformation has made island recapture operations possible: in the event that a foreign country attacks and occupies islands in the Nansei Islands region that is Japanese territory, Japanese ground, maritime, and air forces will act jointly to recapture them.

In concrete terms, the purpose of this operation is for JGSDF combat units to land on and recapture an island occupied by an enemy country. The landing forces will be transported by JMSDF helicopter-carrying destroyers from their bases on the mainland to the waters of the occupied island. JASDF fighters and attack aircraft will support the landing of JGSDF units from the air. And the JGSDF troops will make an amphibious landing on the island.

The problem, however, was that even though it had the duty and capability to deal with an enemy landing on Japanese territory, the JSDF, which has followed an exclusively defense-oriented policy due to constitutional restrictions, lacked the strategy, know-how, and experience necessary to execute landing operations on islands under enemy control. The JMSDF never envisioned conducting such operations since its establishment. The JGSDF-JMSDF joint force with Captain Yokota went to the United States to learn island-recapture know-how from the US Marine Corps.

Japan simultaneously carried out joint ground, maritime, and air operations with the US military forces after the Great East Japan Earthquake of March 11, 2011. Then, too, Captain Yokota worked with JGSDF, JASDF, and US military personnel at the bilateral coordination center located at JGSDF Northeastern Army Headquarters in Sendai. A bilateral joint operation command center, established at Yokota Air Base, set the overall direction for carrying out relief activities as well as decided the areas of operation and division of roles and duties between the JSDF and the US military. At the bilateral coordination center in Sendai, the three SDF service branches and US forces allotted personnel, secured logistics, and gave detailed instructions and coordination for the specific relief activities for each unit to carry out jointly. Captain Yokota served as the JMSDF representative there. Though not a war, it was for both the JSDF and US military their first large-scale joint mission and operation.

The US military’s relief operation, where the mightiest military in the world employed its powers fully, held a groundbreaking significance because it proved that the Japan-US alliance functioned effectively in an emergency situation. The friendship and trust of the Japanese people towards their US ally increased markedly.

The JMSDF has learned much from the US Navy and has improved its capabilities since its founding. The JMSDF may be the first of the three SDF service branches to have achieved actual joint operations (except for joint command), a goal it had aimed for with the US Navy.

In conjunction with the development since the 2000s of the JSDF’s own joint operations, the conducting of training, exercises, and missions jointly with the US military is no longer the sole purview of the JMSDF. The “friendship across the seas” between Japan and the United States is now a “friendship on the ground” and “friendship in the skies,” too.

The Job of Liaison Officer

The JMSDF and US Navy have led the other service branches in all forms of cooperation and joint activities, from communications between the JMSDF CMS and the US Navy CNO on down to interactions between enlisted sailors, in the course of joint training, exercises, surveillance, replenishment of fuel supplies, and other routine activities. Contacts occur through the course of carrying out these duties, hence interaction with the US Navy, itself, is not the mission. Although friendship and trust may frequently be generated as JMSDF personnel work together with their US counterparts on difficult tasks, it is altogether distinct from the institution-to-institution communication and exchange of information between the JMSDF and US Navy. The JMSDF has a job category that specializes in that.

The primary duty of liaison officers, such as Captains Kitaguchi and Kawashima, is to facilitate communication and information sharing between the JMSDF and the US Navy. The two navies must maintain close communication on a daily basis, especially between the commanding officers responsible for mission execution, so that they can share strategies, define clear objectives, and carry out joint operations to achieve them. The position of liaison officer was established for that purpose.

By no means are liaison officers a new institution. Stationed at US Fleet Activities Yokosuka, the headquarters of US Naval Forces Japan, during the Cold War of the 1970s and 1980s, they coordinated tasks and conveyed information obtained there to the Maritime Staff Office in Roppongi. As described in Chap. 7, Commander James Auer had been a staff member for the commander, US Naval Forces Japan, who, along with his staff, comprised the counterpart for the CMS and his staff. In that capacity, Auer coordinated and communicated various policy matters with the top levels of the JMSDF, either through JMSDF liaison officers or by traveling to Tokyo himself. There was no direct line of communication between the JMSDF and US Seventh Fleet or Pacific Fleet Command.

As JMSDF-US Navy relations have grown deeper and the JMSDF’s activities have become more global, so too have JMSDF liaison officers seen their number and postings, as well as their duties and roles, expand dramatically. For example, Commander Hayashi was the lone JMSDF liaison officer at US Pacific Fleet Headquarters at the time of the Ehime Maru incident; he alone was busy with communications between the MSO and Hawaii and with the JMSDF’s on-site response to families of the crew of the sunken training ship, and to the media covering the incident. Today, in contrast, the JSDF routinely dispatches seven or eight liaison officers from all three service branches to the Indo-Pacific Command and the Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor. There are many visitors from Tokyo on business, and JMSDF vessels call at Pearl Harbor constantly. This direct communication channel between the three JSDF service branches and the US Indo-Pacific Command may be taken to symbolize the changing times. Currently, the JMSDF also dispatches liaison officers to USS Blue Ridge and to the office of the CNO at the Pentagon; in return, the US Navy has liaison officers placed at the MSO and the Self-Defense Fleet to facilitate communications with the JMSDF.

Captain Kitaguchi is fluent in English, having spent his childhood studying alongside Americans at local New York public schools. Naturally, he has often been given responsibility for negotiations and coordination in English since he joined the JMSDF. His first placement was aboard JS Kirishima, and he participated in RIMPAC 98.Footnote 6 He was dispatched overseas many times, including a visit to PetropavlovskFootnote 7 in Russia on board JS Hiei as its assistant engineer. He first served as a liaison officer early (as a lieutenant), assigned to the US Third Fleet in San Diego; he also served as a liaison officer for the US Fifth Fleet in Bahrain.

I had a lot of experience living in the United States and I have worked with US Navy personnel many times since my first deployment. People are approachable, maybe because I am approachable to them. Perhaps that was why I could speak freely and directly, regardless of class or rank, and I felt it was a better environment to work in.

People in San Diego rush home around 3:00 pm on Fridays. US sailors, once aboard ship steaming out of port on a mission, often work in fairly demanding environments. The ensuing land assignments allow them to relax and prepare for the next duty on the frontline. It’s a pretty good balance—something the JMSDF does not have, I realized.

Of course, as a liaison officer, Captain Kitaguchi has frequently seen harsh aspects of the US Navy. In two separate incidents in 2017, Seventh Fleet vessels collided with civilian ships resulting in several fatalities. The string of scandals involving the Seven Fleet became a hot topic for discussion in Japan, too, because of the possible implications for effectiveness of the Japan-US alliance. US Navy leadership took the situation so seriously that they abruptly relieved Vice Admiral Joseph Aucoin of his command. It came as quite a shock to everyone in the Seventh Fleet, from the sailors and officers up to the commander himself.

While serving at JMSDF Self-Defense Fleet headquarters, Captain Kitaguchi at the time had been assigned to work on the USS Blue Ridge as the JMSDF’s second ever liaison officer to the Seventh Fleet. Then came Aucoin’s sudden dismissal. He was shocked, his staff was shocked, his family and those around him were left in a state of shock. Likewise, the JMSDF was surprised. It seems everyone at the MSO was at a loss as to how to deal with this situation; such a sudden dismissal would be unlikely to occur in Japan.

In fact, Vice Admiral Aucoin was supposed to leave Japan that fall, so a grand farewell party hosted by the JMSDF had already been scheduled, and he was to be awarded a decoration by the Government of Japan. With all of that now out of the picture, the CMS wanted to pay a visit at least, so he instructed Kitaguchi to make him an appointment with Aucoin. The vice admiral’s office, somewhat perplexed, agreed to the visit. The CMS visited the vice admiral at his hilltop residence within US Fleet Activities Yokosuka to express his gratitude for all of Aucoin’s contributions. The vice admiral received him politely.

Kitaguchi felt it was, in a sense, one of the US Navy’s strongpoints that Vice Admiral Aucoin was held responsible for the series of incidents and was relieved of command, for it showed America’s strict top-down chain of command as well as the leader’s taking responsibility when push comes to shove. It seems that there was not much precedent even in the US Navy to dismiss him when he was about to leave Japan. But given the gravity of the situation, the US Navy’s top brass took bold action. No one could assume that he would be treated leniently for his negligent job performance. The higher the rank, the stricter it is. Everyone worried that US Navy morale was declining, but perhaps discipline has improved as a result of this punishment. Kitaguchi thinks so. This story reminded me of something former CMS Kazuomi Uchida told me when I interviewed him for this book. Recalling that the IJN had promoted a certain admiral just after he had made a major blunder in a campaign against the United States, Uchida told me, “The IJN and the JMSDF are both too lenient; neither had such a thing as mandatory punishment. And so, the same mistakes were repeated.” Or something like that; my memory is somewhat hazy. Is this a characteristic of Japanese organizations, not just its navy?

Kitaguchi felt that, as in this dismissal case, there are times aboard a US Navy vessel when you did not know what the commander would do until the very end, even at sea. It is unpredictable. For one thing, the commander has latitude to make decisions at his discretion, entrusted with a broad range of options to take. Consequently, these actions will vary from one commander or captain to the next. The Seventh Fleet Command believes it needs to be apprised of only the necessary information, leaving it to subordinates to carry out the mission. In fact, the total unpredictability is frightening for the enemy.

A gourmet dinner of steak and lobster is served on occasion aboard US Navy vessels out at sea for 6 months at a time to places like the Western Pacific, the Indian Ocean, or the Middle East. All-you-can-eat ice cream for dessert. The crew isn’t always happy when that happens. Even as they eat, they wonder what’s the catch—their enjoyment is tempered by worry. When JMSDF vessels are dispatched overseas, the return date is decided from the beginning and rarely altered; in the US Navy, the return home is often postponed suddenly near the end of a long voyage. The day after the steak dinner, the captain makes an announcement from the bridge, informing the crew that, as expected, the return home has been postponed. This is perhaps another sign of the unpredictability of the US Navy’s actions. The sailors grumble but carry out their duties as before. Here, too, lies the strength of the US Navy.

Captain Kawashima has followed a career path similar to that of Kitaguchi, one class senior to her. As mentioned above, she joined the JMSDF wanting to do international work but was initially disappointed to find that the assignments she wanted were closed to women. Later, she had opportunities to learn about navies in America and around the world, taking part in overseas training cruises, which now allowed women aboard, a total of five times, as a crewmember and as a member of the command staff. She was stationed abroad twice, at NATO Headquarters in Brussels and at US Fifth Fleet in Bahrain, and now serves as a liaison officer at the headquarters of US Naval Forces Japan.

As a female JMSDF officer with a wealth of international experience, she has been interested in how foreign navies treat their female personnel ever since her first training cruise; the more she learned, the more she compared those cases to the JMSDF. In her view, there are countries where women work just the same as men, and there are others that are slightly behind. Whereas some countries demand the same abilities and results from female as from male staff, other navies expect and utilize them in fields such as health or information/communications. The US Navy is no exception. There was a time when discrimination and sexual harassment against women were prominent in the US Navy, such as the Tailhook scandal of the early 1990s. Now, however, there are many women working in every kind of position; there are female fighter pilots, commanding officers of ships, and commanders of flotillas. It is nothing unusual, and they do not get treated any differently from the men.

Actually, there are not that many female officers, and few at the rank of captain, at US Fleet Activities Yokosuka, where I currently work as a liaison officer. I’m not sure why that is. But women in the US military are not denied opportunities or choices, nor are they given special consideration because of their gender. It is a comfortable workplace, Kawashima feels, because she can work naturally without being too conscious of gender. Ironically, it is the Japanese staff working in the US military that seem to feel uncomfortable with my being a liaison officer; I have heard them asking if the current liaison officer is a woman.

I worked with US Navy officers at NATO headquarters in Brussels and again in Bahrain. I thought that the US military officers at NATO headquarters were friendly and worked hard. This is perhaps partly because the United States plays the central role in NATO, both in terms of budget and military power. Aware of Russia’s presence, the United States considers the security of Europe as its own security. It seems that America has the will and thinking to pull the other members along. I got the impression that US Navy personnel, in general, are always thinking about what they should do to engage with the world. Scandals plagued the Seventh Fleet for a while, but that can happen in any navy. The US Navy remains strong and has not changed; it is not in decline. Kawashima believes so.

JMSDF Official as Diplomat

Captain Shiraishi, meanwhile, had little connection with Americans before joining the JMSDF and felt that they were a blunt people. After I joined, however, I came to think that the people in the US Navy I have met through work are the same as us. From June 2015 to June 2018, he worked as an assistant defense attaché at the Embassy of Japan in the United States. Officials from various ministries and agencies are dispatched to work at embassies around the world; this includes uniformed SDF personnel, too. Once such an assignment is decided, each official is detailed to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and receives basic training as a diplomat at the Foreign Affairs Training Institute in Sagami Ono, Kanagawa before posting.

The majority of defense attachés are posted to embassies in three types of countries: those important to Japan’s national security (such as the United States, Australia, the United Kingdom, and South Korea), those whose military information is essential (such as China and Russia), and those that are geopolitically important (Israel, Turkey, India, and Indonesia). A total of six SDF personnel—one attaché and one assistant from the JMSDF, JGSDF, and JASDF—make up the defense section at the Embassy of Japan in Washington, D.C., which has probably the most embassy staff in the world, reflecting the importance of Japan-US relations. In addition, the Ministry of Defense sends public servants from its own Internal Bureau staff to the embassy’s political affairs section, to be responsible for security-related policy matters and working alongside section members from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Officials detailed from their ministries and agencies are assigned to various sections—general affairs, political affairs, finance, economics, Congressional affairs, cultural and public affairs, science and technology, and so on—where they share office space with foreign ministry officials. The embassy is like a mini Kasumigaseki,Footnote 8 and in my experience as a cultural and public affairs officer for the Japanese embassy in the United States, there is no more convenient place to get information from each ministry’s experts. If the detailed embassy staff does not have the information, they will contact their ministry immediately to ask for it.

For Shiraishi, it was his first experience working in such an environment, assisting the head of the defense section, a rear admiral dispatched from the JMSDF. Although I have many contacts in the US military and other armed forces around the world, I have learned a great deal by looking at the Japan-US alliance from a non-military perspective, becoming acquainted through daily interactions with experts in non-military fields. Also, it was very good to be seconded to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and work at the embassy as foreign ministry staff, as I was able to use the Ministry’s diplomatic buttons and levers. I was able to achieve what I could not have had I been simply a JMSDF or JSDF representative.

Through their many years of diplomatic experience with America, both Ambassadors Sasae and Sugiyama, whom Shiraishi served under, had a good understanding of the importance of the military in the United States as well as the importance of the SDF-US military relationship. He briefed Ambassador Sasae on a regular basis, which was appreciated. One of the tasks of the defense attaché is to attend, together with the ambassador, not only military events, but also national anniversaries and holidays in which the military is an integral part.Footnote 9 For the ambassador as well, it would be more formal, as well as polite, as an expression of sympathy from the people of Japan to attend these anniversaries with a defense attaché.

The US Navy also took good care of Japan’s defense attachés. Shortly after Shiraishi arrived at the embassy, the Navy invited the defense attachés to commemorate the Battle of Midway. He felt they had the broad-mindedness to include former enemies into their group.

In 2017–2018, when North Korea’s missile tests were front-page news in the United States, Shiraishi grew worried that US Naval Academy graduates would not want to be stationed in Japan. This was not the case. It was his impression that those graduates with ability and drive wanted to serve in Japan. For Japan, it is very important that the best and brightest young US Navy officers come: through their experiences in Japan, they will understand the importance of the Japan-US alliance. For that reason, the ambassador hosted a reception to send off the group of Annapolis graduates who had been assigned to Japan. It was not something the SDF could do by itself.

Not all US Navy personnel have a keen interest in Japan. JMSDF personnel often say: in Washington D.C., there are mainly Atlantic Sailors, concerned with the Atlantic Ocean, and Pacific Sailors, who focus on the Pacific Ocean. It was Shiraishi’s impression that the notion of Japan as an ally had yet to sink in for the Atlantic Sailor. Those who have been stationed in Japan are very friendly to JMSDF personnel, greeting them anywhere, even at the Pentagon. They talked about their experiences in Japan and seemed to miss the country a lot. For example, Rear Admiral Charles W. Rock, who had served as commander, US Fleet Activities Sasebo, was commandant, Naval District Washington, when Shirashi was at the embassy. He would invite JMSDF personnel coming from Japan as well as their families to his home, providing comfort and assistance. Apparently, he was repaying the good will and kindness he received from the people of the JMSDF during his time at Sasebo.

US military personnel who have been stationed in Japan are actually the largest pro-Japan group of Americans. This is true for the Army, Air Force, as well as the Navy and Marines. Though not based on objective survey data, a fairly high percentage of them, irrespective of rank, return home with a fondness for Japan and relate their experiences there to their friends and colleagues. This phenomenon is notable compared to other countries where the US military is stationed, a US Navy friend of mine once told me. And more importantly, they can be found all around America. Many of them, even after separating from the military, continue to cherish their memories of Japan and, for instance, join the local Japan-America Society to become actively engaged in private-sector exchanges between Japan and the United States. Quite a few military personnel spent several years in Japan when their parents were sent to a military base there.

Yet, there had never been an alumni association for active duty or retired military personnel who had been stationed in Japan. In the early 2000s, someone proposed that the embassy might offer assistance of some kind for those military personnel who had been stationed in Japan, to organize and run such an alumni association. But there were concerns that, unless it were done very carefully, for a foreign government to organize another country’s nationals could very well ignite a political backlash. It took a while to materialize, but finally in 2015 the Japan-United States Military Program (JUMP)Footnote 10 was launched for active duty and former military personnel who had been stationed in Japan, providing a space for voluntary gatherings, and sometimes assisting them with “homecomings” to Japan. At the embassy, the defense section is in charge of the JUMP program, which remains quite active. Shiraishi’s duties at the embassy included assisting the head of the defense section, a rear admiral, to lead JUMP activities, and coordinating with other relevant parties.

English Proficiency of the JMSDF

Language, of course, is necessary for communication between the JMSDF and the US Navy to have such close ties. They could use either Japanese or English. From the outset, a modern navy has been associated with English: the British Royal Navy set the prototype in the nineteenth century, which the US Navy developed further from the end of the nineteenth through to the twentieth century. Today most of the world’s navies are modeled after these two navies, with English as the common language. So, naturally the JMSDF uses English to communicate with the US and other foreign navies.

Today’s JMSDF is one of the world’s most capable maritime forces. Consequently, its leaders at the flag officer (rear admiral and above) level must use every opportunity to engage their foreign counterparts, and be able to speak precisely, concisely, and persuasively about how the JMSDF and Japan views its national security. They must demonstrate their whole character and personality through their humor and culture, not just their area of expertise.

Do the JMSDF’s top leaders really have that level of English proficiency? So far as I am aware, there have been only one or two admirals with that level of competency until quite recently; it was a rare ability even looking at the entire JMSDF. I have often wondered if this is acceptable for a global navy. Compared to the US Navy, where most admirals earn master’s degrees or doctorates while on active service, there are relatively few active-duty executive officers among the JMSDF leadership who have reached that level with sufficient language ability and broad international experience.

However, some officers believe that the JMSDF’s language skills have made rapid progress over the last decade or so. With his ability to speak English, Kitaguchi has been asked by his superior officers to help with liaison duties with the US Navy, regardless of his actual assignment. There was a time when many captains and admirals could not communicate nuances and subtleties with the US Navy without Kitaguchi’s involvement. But it is different now. When I was present as the head of the Maritime Staff’s liaison team, I have often admired how high-ranking JMSDF officials communicated in English so naturally and confidently when speaking with their respective US Navy counterparts in informal discussions and in VTCs (video-teleconferences), without relying on an interpreter. The English proficiency and intercultural communication skills of many JMSDF senior officers today are extremely high.

Also, in April 2022, when the training ship JS Kashima, and its accompanying ship JS Shimakaze, called at Yokosuka before departing on a long-distance training cruise, the commander of the Training Squadron had invited several naval attachés working at the Tokyo embassies of the countries where the two vessels were scheduled to visit to come aboard to lecture the new graduates of the Officer Candidate School. As Kitaguchi observed, many of these newly commissioned officers asked questions in English quite naturally. It has changed considerably from when we were at their stage. Some were so fluent that they seemed to have grown up abroad, and been educated in English, as I had been. The number of such young officers is on the rise. Moreover, when Kitaguchi was a new officer, whenever he stood before the senior and dignified captain of his first assignment, JS Kirishima, he was so nervous that he could only say “yes, sir” and “no, sir.” In contrast, today’s young people can have a natural conversation with the captain. They look very promising. Kitaguchi believes that the JMSDF is definitely better than it used to be, in this respect.

Yasuda also feels that the English skills of the JMSDF members around him are improving. A native speaker of both English and Japanese, he used to have to help explain the details of English conversations to his colleagues. At first, he was pleased to do it. But, I no longer think I’m special. Language is important, but a depth of specialized knowledge is more important and necessary. If you don’t master that, it doesn’t matter how good your English is. That’s what I came to realize.

In addition, I am a fire control officer, a SPY radar specialist, on an Aegis destroyer. On my ship , there are many petty officers who can speak English well and work comfortably in English because they are sent frequently to the United States for training and so must communicate with US Navy SPY radar specialists. Perhaps this is because an Aegis crew operates in a somewhat unique environment. General purpose destroyer crews do not require much English to carry out their duties, so I’m sometimes surprised by how few officers or enlisted can communicate in English without difficulty.

One of the JMSDF’s leading SPY radar specialists, Takitō, whom Yasuda respects as god-like, has personally experienced things similar to what Yasuda has described. I couldn’t speak English at all when I first went to study in America; I wasn’t good at shopping or ordering at restaurants in English. Yet, I concentrated on studying in my classes at school, taught in English, and gained further experience when I came home as the person in charge of SPY radar aboard an Aegis destroyer. Before I knew it, I no longer felt inferior to my US Navy counterparts in understanding SPY radar. I’m still not fluent in everyday conversation, but when it comes to SPY radars, I can understand everything a US Navy specialist has to say. I can also tell my counterpart exactly what I want to say. Accurate communication even without being able to speak the language. Strange, but I believe it.

I imagine that, as he struggled to learn about the SPY radar in English, Takitō achieved a high degree of understanding so that, before long, he probably ceased thinking about what language he was speaking. That is just my amateur opinion, however. Continuing to use English as a means of communication, his understanding of technical terms and how to use them in his area of expertise far surpassed his general English proficiency. That is what it seems like to me. I myself have had the experience of completely forgetting that I was speaking in English while engaging in difficult negotiations as a lawyer or engaging in discussions as a scholar at an American university or law school. A certain level of English proficiency is required, but English is only a means to gain the professional understanding necessary to accomplish work.

Remembering the Past at the Naval War College

As the SDF’s international mission has expanded over the past 20 years, so too have the needs and opportunities increased markedly for the SDF to conduct joint exercises, counter-piracy operations, peacekeeping operations, and large-scale disaster relief operations together with the US and other foreign militaries. International activities will likely increase further in the future. Each SDF service branch needs not just the SDF officers who can perform their duties in such missions; it also needs personnel who can command military personnel from other countries and who can carry out their missions jointly with them. Admiral Hiroshi Itō, the current commandant of the JMSDF Headquarters Kure District, was appointed in 2015 as the commander of the multinational naval task force conducting counter-piracy operations in the waters of the Gulf of Aden (CTF 151). Since then, four officers have been appointed as commanders from the JMSDF. This happened because, although SDF personnel cannot command the armed forces of other countries under the interpretation of Article 9 of Japan’s Constitution, anti-piracy operations are not combat operations under international law. The know-how that SDF officers gained from commanding foreign military personnel may still be useful for when conditions for exercising the right to collective self-defense are further eased. Commandant Itō’s achievement was a watershed event, for both the JMSDF and the SDF as a whole.

In preparation for further expansion of international missions in the future, each SDF service branch is sending promising mid-ranking officers to study at military educational institutions and other graduate schools in Japan and abroad in order to develop the personnel to follow Commandant Itō’s precedent. The JMSDF is no exception; it has long been more enthusiastic than other SDF service branches about sending its executive officers to study abroad. In particular, it is customary that each year one person is selected from among the top JMSDF mid-ranking officers to study at the United States Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island. Several of those who studied there became chiefs of maritime staff, including Admirals Uchida and Nakamura, who are described in detail in this book.

The Naval War College is an advanced research and educational institution where the US Navy, which boasts a history of over 200 years, continuously accumulates knowledge, develops theories, and imparts knowledge to future naval leaders. But the US Navy’s journey was far from smooth until the College’s founding in 1884. The United States established a permanent navy in 1794 when Congress passed the Naval Act, based on its experience during the American Revolutionary War when confronting the British Royal Navy in its alliance with France. As Britain had completely seized control of the Atlantic Ocean after Napoleon’s defeat, any threat from the Atlantic Ocean had been eliminated, leaving the US Navy little work to do throughout the nineteenth century, except for during the Civil War. It remained very small, its ranks were full of sailors from the old school, and lacked discipline due to frequent drinking and brawling.

There was no organized educational system for officer training in the early days of the US Navy. The only way to train a full-fledged officer was to put a 15-year-old boy aboard a ship to have him learn by doing through an apprenticeship. This way of thinking, in line with the traditions of the Royal Navy, was overwhelmingly dominant, and there was strong opposition to the establishment of a school for officer training. It was in 1845 that the Naval Academy was established, overcoming the opposition, on the coast in Annapolis, the capital of Maryland. (By way of contrast, the Military Academy was established at West Point on the Hudson River in New York State in 1802, making it 43 years older than Navy’s Annapolis.)

The US Navy entered a period of stagnation again after the Civil War, in which the Union Navy blockades of Southern ports had contributed greatly to the North’s victory. The United States moved forward on industrializing the domestic economy and was largely indifferent to the Navy’s existence. The US Navy grew even smaller in scale, its equipment was lacking and outdated, and its sailors underqualified and low in morale. Alarmed by this situation, a group of US Navy officers led by Steven Luce appealed to top naval leaders and to Congress to reform the US Navy. And thus, the Naval War College was founded as an institution of higher education to promote the professionalization of naval personnel, research the art and science of war, and develop future executive officers and staff capable of thinking logically.

The significance of the Naval War College went unrecognized at first, even within the Navy. But before long, outstanding scholars and educators appeared from among those Luce had educated, men who would influence the very nature of the US Navy. Alfred Thayer Mahan is the epitome, providing Theodore Roosevelt with the theoretical framework for his push to construct a modern navy. Moreover, some of the officers who had acquired strategic and tactical theories at the Naval War College returned to teach what they had learned during the US participation in World War I. This, in turn, produced officers like Nimitz, Halsey, and Burke, who eventually fought the Pacific War against the Imperial Japanese Navy and won a spectacular victory.

A major cause of the IJN’s total defeat by the US Navy in the Pacific War, according to Admiral Sadayoshi Nakayama, the first president of the JMSDF Command and Staff College (who would later serve as JMSDF’s fourth chief of staff), and other IJN officers who contributed to the establishment of the JMSDF, was that the IJN traditionally overemphasized spirituality and lacked theoretical thinking of war as a science. To address this point, the postwar JMSDF decided to replace the old Imperial Naval War College with the Maritime Command and Staff College, as well as to send students to the US Naval War College shortly after the JMSDF was established. Former IJN officers, who had fought numerous ferocious battles in the Pacific, sought instruction from their erstwhile enemy, and US Navy veterans of those same sea battles willingly consented to their requests.

Kobayashi relates that, as a JMSDF officer and as a Japanese born in the 1980s, a major turning point in his own understanding of Japan-US naval relations was his study in the Naval Command College course. Before going, Kobayashi apparently did not know the history of how it came to be that senior JMSDF officers study at the US Naval War College. Many JMSDF leaders, including Admirals Uchida and Nakamura, have studied there alongside naval officers from more than 20 countries around the world. When the program started, memories of the war were still fresh. Yet, Admiral Nakayama, who set up the study abroad program with the help of CNO Arleigh Burke, and the Naval War College officials accepting the students, all understood that cooperation between the postwar Japanese and US naval forces was vital to keeping the peace. And now I am here studying as part of that stream of history, Kobayashi felt keenly.

As mentioned above, Kobayashi had somewhat mixed feelings about the loss of the Pacific War and the death of many Japanese. As he studied at the Naval War College in New England’s four beautiful seasons, he came to truly understand how important and precious are the close Japan-US naval relations, forged by overcoming the war, and the significance of his being allowed to study there.

Incidentally, there are active-duty or retired naval personnel and civilian employees who were stationed in Japan among the current Naval War College (NWC) faculty and staff, who are nostalgic about their interactions with JMSDF and their experiences in Japan. A few years ago, these Navy people with ties to Japan, in coordination with other retired naval personnel living in Rhode Island who had been stationed in Japan, on their own initiative established the Japan-America Navy Friendship Association (JANAFA)Footnote 11 of Newport; it hosts the cherry blossom festival and various other events at the Naval War College together with the JMSDF liaison officer and students dispatched to the College.

Looking back, Japan began its war against the United States with the Imperial Navy Air Corps’ attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. In the ensuing four and a half years, countless sailors from both navies lost their lives in fierce sea battles, creating a wellspring of deep mutual animosity. The current relationship between the JMSDF and the US Navy has overcome the trauma of Pearl Harbor, where it all began. Kobayashi, who came to truly understand this through his NWC studies, wished to put down his thoughts in a form that he could share with the people he met before he left the Naval War College. Kobayashi proposed a joint 79th Pearl Harbor Commemoration Ceremony, which was accepted by the NWC president and staff and was implemented. Assisting JANAFA-Newport were volunteers from among NWC researchers, faculty, and staff, and the Japan-America Society of Newport sponsored the event. The Japanese side made its preparations with the assistance of JMSDF Liaison Officer Captain Yuki Bitō. As for Kobayashi, he felt like he had completed another homework assignment by successfully holding this event. Even after his return home, Kobayashi hears that they will continue to hold an annual event jointly commemorating Pearl Harbor, and that Japan and the United States together marked the 80th anniversary in 2021 and the 81st in 2022.

Think, Communicate, Do! At the Naval War College

Division Director Yokota studied at the US Naval War College a few years before Kobayashi did. And just like Kobayashi, Yokota also was greatly stimulated and influenced by his experiences there.

Starting the year Yokota arrived at the College, foreign students who came to study there were allowed to enroll in the Naval Command CollegeFootnote 12 with US and other foreign students, provided they passed a selection examination. So, I chose this course and studied very seriously in my own way, but I was greatly shocked by the instructor’s words. “You are in my class, but you do not participate in my class,” he scolded me. Speak up. If you are Japanese, introduce your Japanese perspective and contribute to the class. Along with my shock, I realized that just remembering what I had been taught is not good enough, that I must always express my thoughts in words. There is a difference between having one’s own opinions, thinking, and participating in class and attending class just to sit there silently. This very clear way of thinking left me with a very strong impression.

In US schools generally, not just in the navy, education is provided to foster the ability to think for yourself and to communicate your thoughts to others. It is important to have your own opinion, and if you are wrong, it is okay. I also learned this from the education my daughters, who I took to study abroad, received in elementary school in the United States. People learn multiplication tables in America, but once they understand the explanation, they do not need to use it for calculations. They use a calculator for that. What humans have to do is look at the results of the calculations and think for themselves, not make the calculations.

Expanding on what I learned at the Naval War College , the important thing is to think of methods to solve problems. This is task analysis. We extract lessons for policy, strategy, and leadership from a detailed analysis of military history, politics, economics (including corporate management, etc.) and general history. We also extract lessons from diversity, rationality, critical thinking, justice and liberty, rights and duties, which we apply to the current environment and in the end summarize diverse opinions. This is what it is all about, I think.

One of the things I learned at the Naval War College is the concept of a “better peace.” A “best peace,” one that is satisfactory on all points to all parties to the conflict, allies and enemies alike, does not exist. By calmly analyzing the goals of one’s own country and the goals of other countries, and striking a seesaw-like balance, we come to an agreement on a comprehensive basis. Reaching agreement is better than not agreeing. I was taught that it was necessary, in order to protect the peace, to reach an agreement after making such a decision. It is essential that, for the bilateral alliance to function, Japan and the United States should achieve a better peace, calmly, and from a broader perspective, on the basis of such thinking.

Yokota believes that the better peace concept is nothing but an application of the logical, rational, and comprehensive problem-solving methods emphasized at the Naval War College. As mentioned earlier, as a National Defense Academy cadet, he came to believe this US Navy way of thinking may have helped the US victory over Japan. I recalled having these thoughts as well as my determination to serve and contribute so that this would never happen to the JMSDF again. At the time, I only had the vaguest sense, being an NDA student, of what this meant. But as it happened, I went to study at the US Naval War College 20 years later, where building on my own experience I gained even deeper understanding of the US Navy’s problem-solving methods and the importance of rational and scientific thinking.

The JMSDF as Seen by a US Navy Officer

I, the author, have not visited the United States in recent years owing to the COVID-19 epidemic. And so, I interviewed only members of the JMSDF to supplement this revised English edition. What I have written so far is how these JMSDF members view relations with the United States, our ally, and its navy; I hardly touched on how US Navy personnel view Japan and the JMSDF. Fortunately, however, I had the opportunity to speak separately with Captain James “Jim” Hartman, a US Navy liaison officer serving as a bridge between Japan and the United States, who frequently visits the Maritime Staff Office. (Captain Hartman’s interview reflects his personal views and not the official policy or position of the US Navy, the department of defense, or the US government.)

He is a graduate of Harvard University. While a student, Hartman completed the Navy’s ROTC training program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) down the Charles River from the Harvard campus. (In protest against the Vietnam War, Harvard University did not allow such military-related courses until relatively recently.) He aspired to be a military pilot, partly influenced by his father, a former Air Force pilot. He joined the Navy and became a shipboard helicopter pilot. His first deployment was to US Naval Air Facility Atsugi. He fell in love with Japan and subsequently served five times in Japan or as a pilot on Yokosuka-based naval vessels.

Captain Hartman is the second US Navy liaison officer assigned to the MSO. He plays a vital role as a fountain of wisdom in maintaining smooth relations between the two navies, keeping in close daily contact with JMSDF staff under CMS Sakai, exchanging information, and occasionally conveying messages from the US Navy’s top brass to the MSO and vice versa. Over the years, Captain Hartman has deepened his working relationship with the JMSDF and gained many trusted friends among his JMSDF colleagues. He admires the organization and understands the JMSDF perhaps better than anyone else in the US Navy. I cannot think of anyone more suited to the “ambassadorial” job of liaison officer from the US Navy to the JMSDF. He is not without some criticism of the JMSDF, however.

I believe that the JMSDF excels in many ways. Relations between our two navies are close and we need each other. Nevertheless, disparities do exist between them, and the JMSDF faces many problems and issues to tackle. Misunderstandings and lack of understanding also exist on the part of the US Navy. That is why, at every opportunity, I candidly speak my thoughts to CMS Sakai and his staff.

For instance, the JMSDF is presently struggling to meet its quota, so as a recruitment strategy it emphasizes improvements in benefits, the acquisition of specialized skills that are useful in the private sector, and the ability to stay in the local area where one’s parents live. Hartman finds this trend may miss the point of service in the JMSDF.

Many US Navy personnel—the officers, warrant officers, sailors, and captains I know, and myself included—joined the Navy because they wanted adventure, they wanted to see the world, they wanted to go to foreign lands. Rarely do you find someone who, after joining the Navy, wants to work in the town where he or she was born and raised. How could sailors possibly do their job if they lacked such a positive, outgoing attitude? The US Marine Corps is skilled at recruiting: instead of hiding the fact that the Marine Corps is the toughest military service, they succeed by selling it, emphasizing pride, honor, worthiness, adventure. Young people enlist in the Marine Corps for the challenge and adventure. Perhaps this is not possible in Japan, where young people are becoming more introverted. Some say that America has turned inward, but I believe that our young people’s adventurous spirit and strong curiosity have not been lost. Is it not possible for the Self-Defense Forces to inspire young people to take on new challenges in Japan as well?

He also thinks that the JMSDF could make more use of the innovation and energy of young people. When the US Navy trains pilots, for example, they appoint pilots in their 20s with fresh aerial combat experience as instructors, who then fly with and teach their juniors the lessons and skills that they acquired in actual combat. Just as the movie Top Gun portrayed it. Juniors are trained in this way and hone their skills through their own efforts and ingenuity. Moreover, the young instructor pilots in their 20s also create the tactics the Navy uses. In the JMSDF, however, instructors who are far more senior than students give lectures and write papers. The captain questions the practical use of such approaches.

Hartman also considers the relationship between the US Navy and JMSDF in terms of capability. The American side tends to ask the JMSDF to further strengthen its roles, missions, and capabilities. Among the topics being discussed are calls to place F35Bs on Izumo-class vessels and for stronger capabilities to respond in a timely manner to enemy attacks. Japan is trying to increase its defense budget significantly and striving to improve the SDF’s capabilities dramatically. Political rationales may lay behind the debates in both Japan and America. I would not call it unnecessary; I think the direction is correct.

However, even if each Izumo-class ship is equipped with 10 F-35Bs, the contribution to the alliance strike capability, for example, the supplement to a US Navy aircraft carrier’s capability, may not be sufficient to significantly alter how we fight. But meanwhile, the JMSDF has advanced capabilities in other areas, capabilities that the US Navy may not possess to the same degree, and the provision of those capabilities can and does complement the overall capabilities of the US Navy quite well. For example, the JMSDF’s mine countermeasure capabilities are high, and it has as many as 22 high-performance minesweepers and larger mine warfare vessels. There had been 26 ships until a few years ago, but that number has decreased by 4.

In contrast, the US Navy’s minesweeping capability is extremely limited, with only four ships in the region. Captain Hartman believes that the US Navy needs and appreciates the JMSDF’s supplementing US Navy mine countermeasure capabilities in the region, perhaps even more than if Japan were to build a full-fledged aircraft carrier. I hope that the JMSDF will retain and continue to provide these capabilities which complement those of the US Navy. In that sense, it would be problematic for the overall mine countermeasures capability of Japan and the United States if construction of helicopter-carrying destroyers led to a further reduction in the number of JMSDF minesweepers. The same holds true for such capabilities as anti-submarine warfare (ASW) and aerial intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities (ISR).Footnote 13

The Future of Japan-US Navy Relations

What do the mid-ranking JMSDF officers whom I interviewed think about the future of Japan-US Navy relations and of the alliance? While each responded from a personal perspective, overall, they felt that current close-knit relationship would likely continue and grow stronger for quite some time to come. Yet, for that to happen, both sides must make efforts to overcome the existing problems and challenges through cooperation. If I were to consolidate their views, this seems to be what they believe. Our countries cannot afford to let our guard down: the quantity and quality of external threats to address will change, as will the political, economic, and technological factors within each country. While the trust, respect, and the friendships among individual service members that have been built up between our two countries over the years are important assets for maintaining close ties between our navies, we should not take them for granted, relying on them too readily.

For the United States, its alliance with Japan is irreplaceable, Captain Shiraishi underscored. For a country which confronts China, North Korea, and Russia in East Asia, there is no more valuable ally than Japan located so close to all three. It is only natural for the US Navy to have bases in Japan and work with the JMSDF to deal with these threats; there is no reason to change this. That being the case, the close JMSDF-US Navy relationship will likely continue for many years to come.

Captain Shiraishi also points out that the common bonds uniting Japan and the United States have, over the 77 years since the war ended, become firmly established, and will continue going forward. To give a familiar example, the US Navy and JMSDF both have the same basic attitude of valuing fellow sailors. They cherish each other as allied navy sailors and as companions. Such common ethics or values underpin the bilateral alliance and the Japan-US Navy relationship, he believes.

CPO Takitō, too, remarked on the ethics and values common to the two navies, as Captain Shiraishi had raised. The US Navy holds the JMSDF in high esteem. They admire how our maintenance is always spotless and our aircraft and ships are always like new. They also appreciate our sailors’ manners and praise them for being polite and punctual. This is not because the US Navy lacks these elements, I think, but rather because we share the same sensibility for improving techniques and prizing manners. That is why we respect each other. Takitō speaks from his own experience.

Shiraishi, meanwhile, notes that we cannot predict what will happen, when, or where in today’s world. He worries that, should the unexpected happen, the very closeness of the Japan-US navies, which may lull us into automatically assuming that it cannot be otherwise, may be a vulnerability. To ensure that does not happen, the navies need constant people-to-people communication, exchange, and discussion of ideas. Without such meetings, friendship cannot be nurtured, and it atrophies.

The Japanese people, it is said, do not think for themselves about national security, preferring to leave that to the Japan-US alliance and the JSDF. Shiraishi’s own view on that is a bit different. I think that such criticism is evidence that the joint JSDF-US military deterrence is working effectively against foreign threats. As SDF members, we are carrying out our duty to defend the country, and as such, we are highly regarded by the public in the sense that we are doing our jobs properly. Conversely, the major topics going forward are what should we do when deterrence is no longer effective? And how can we maintain the deterrence? Still, Shiraishi believes that the basic idea remains unchanging: to work together with the United States.

Captain Kobayashi, too, thinks the close bilateral naval relationship will continue for the foreseeable future. Whether this relationship will function then as does now is hard to say. We face problems on a different level than what we have dealt with so far, such as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the growing possibility of China’s invasion of Taiwan. Whatever the future may hold, the US Navy needs South Korea, the Philippines, and especially Japan, all situated on the front lines in the region. Japan will remain America’s most important partner. The JMSDF and US Navy built the close relationship they enjoy today after having fought each other in the war and survived the chaos of the early postwar period. There is a saying: “After it rains, the earth hardens (adversity builds character)”—indeed, after the great storm of war, the bilateral alliance became possible for the first time and the ground, the foundation for the new alliance, has been hardened by the acts of both nations’ citizens, including, of course, the service members of the JSDF and US forces. However, how will those generations who are unaware of that process maintain these connections? The challenge, he believes, is how to nurture new friendships.

To make the Japan-US alliance even more unshakable, Kobayashi believes that the bilateral relationship should be boldly institutionalized and a system to effectively manage the alliance should be put in place. Japan and the United States enjoy a “good chemistry.” The United States leads but does not order or force Japan to do whatever it says. Both allies must take good care of this harmony. America is still a country rooted in liberty and democracy, and so I believe that both sides can maintain this harmony with each other.

Kobayashi earned a master’s degree from the School of Government, Kyoto University studying under Professors Hiroshi Nakanishi and Satoshi Machidori. He recalls that in his frequent discussions, Professor Machidori emphasized the importance of institutions in the governing structure that underlies the American Constitution. Kobayashi thinks it might be the same with the alliance. If some sort of situation were to arise, what must be done and by whom should be determined automatically. (Currently, it is not automatic, and allies might not know what they are supposed to do and how they can work together.) Our shared values, like liberty and democracy, and our shared experiences are important; people-to-people connections are important, too, of course. But the conditions and requirements of our response to contingencies should be institutionalized so that the alliance functions more effectively. Doing so would greatly increase transparency and certainty in the alliance and enhance its deterrence.

The point is that both people and institutions are needed. There is much that can be done now, even without amending the Japanese Constitution, which would entail much political cost. What is needed is firm political leadership, enactment of statutes, and the high abilities of the JSDF. Ultimately, I think that it is a matter of deciding whether to do it or not.

Toward an Alliance Sharing Honor

Working constantly on the ideal form that the Japan-US alliance should take is the duty of Captain Yokota, director of the Operations and Plans Division, MSO. He also spoke eloquently about the future of the alliance.

At the time of the Great East Japan Earthquake, Yokota worked with US Navy personnel at the Sendai Coordination Center to save the lives of several victims, but not everything went smoothly. He witnessed the cultural differences between the JMSDF and the US Navy/Marine Corps; there were also disagreements. US Navy commanders, rather than give detailed instructions, leave the particulars to frontline officers: it is up to these frontline officers to decide how to deliver relief supplies when assisting victims. It is a very rational and practical way of thinking. In the JMSDF, the senior officer tends to decide even the smallest details; he is not used to or good at delegating decision-making authority.

However, despite our differences of opinion and our different ways of carrying out our missions, working together for the same purpose created mutual understanding and trust, which grew into friendship. The name, Operation Tomodachi, I think captures that nicely. It became a true alliance because we recognized each other’s culture. I believe this is important for the future of the Japan-US alliance.

There is one thing that Yokota has witnessed that worries him about the Japan-US Navy relationship. Whereas US Navy officers will sometimes severely reprimand and then provide guidance to US and Australian naval staff, they do not do that to JMSDF staff and treat them as guests. It is important for the Japanese staff to have their opinions challenged, to earnestly defend them while persuasively contesting others’ views until one side is convinced and a better outcome for all is reached; this is something they must be able to do, if not now, then in the future, he believes. It may be an issue of language. Nevertheless, it is not just a matter of asserting one’s own opinion, but also of finding areas of agreement, of building a relationship of give-and-take, which he feels is important.

Yokota was taught at the US Naval War College that there are three main reasons for nations to form alliances: fear, national interest, and honor. For example, postwar Japan concluded an alliance with the United States out of fear that, having just lost the war, it was powerless and could not survive on its own. In contrast, the United States formed an alliance with its erstwhile enemy, Japan, out of the necessity to preserve its national interests—the defense of the United States and the security of East Asia, by dealing with the Soviet and Communist Chinese threats in East Asia—and to that end, it was best to secure US military bases in Japan.

If alliances are based on fear and national interest alone, however, the underlying situation can change; indeed, much has changed in the 70 years postwar. In particular, it is possible that the United States, a superpower, may form an alliance with a nation with completely different values in order to ensure its own security. During World War II , the United States [and Britain] formed the Grand Alliance with the communist Soviet Union, which brought the Allies victory over their common foe, Nazi Germany. They allied with the dictator, Josef Stalin. We must not forget this fact.

In order to maintain the bilateral alliance as an effective system for the security of both countries, it must be the best option for both Japan and the United States. Japan must continue to make unremitting efforts to maintain and strengthen the effectiveness of the alliance, its credibility as an ally, and the sharing of basic values, so as to convince the United States that, in the final calculation, an alliance with Japan is indispensable and that it has no option but to maintain the alliance with Japan. The JMSDF and the US Navy both take pride in constituting the underpinning of the Japan-US alliance . The story is probably the same with the JGSDF and JASDF . And so, I would like to aim for a Japan-US alliance based not on fear and not just on national interests, but one also based on honor between the two countries, and in particular, among the five service branches of the US armed forces and the three SDF service branches.

What is honor? One of the things Yokota felt while studying at the Naval War College was the respect that the American people, regardless of party affiliation, have for the military and its personnel. When military personnel board a civil aircraft as a passenger, they are given priority boarding, and if seats are available, they will be upgraded to first class. The general public takes it for granted. It is because, regardless of political affiliation, they have a feeling of gratitude toward the military personnel.

On vacation with my family, we were at the gate waiting to board the airplane, when I happened to hear an announcement that the body of a US soldier had arrived. When the coffin was carried off the plane and to the gate, the civilians present stood up, one after another, to express their condolences. Many (presumably veterans) saluted. In America, which has a diversity of values and where different values are conspicuously in conflict, men and women join the military without hesitating to give their lives for their country, and as soldiers, they serve their country, risk their lives fighting, and sometimes make the ultimate sacrifice. A strong respect for their service unites the nation.

Yokota was aboard the Haruna when the government ordered the JMSDF to carry out a maritime security operationFootnote 14 during the suspicious ship incident off the coast of the Noto Peninsula. I was selected as a member of the boarding team to search the suspicious vessel and if necessary, use force. I was prepared to die. For the first time, I understood the readiness of American soldiers in times of emergency; I empathized with them. It is his most significant experience as a JMSDF officer. A US Naval War College classmate of Yokota’s died soon after graduating: his friend who attended class with him just a few weeks before lost his life in combat—a reality all too familiar for military personnel.

That is the very reason why it has become customary in the United States to honor the soldiers who risk their lives in service to their country on Memorial Day (a national holiday that began after the Civil War to mourn soldiers who died on the battlefield), through “Thank you for your service” campaigns, displaying flags and posters here and there expressing thanks to those defending the homeland, and similarly hoisting POW (prisoner of war)/MIA (missing in action) flags and praying for the safe return of soldiers lost on the battlefield or captured by the enemy (initiated by the families of POW/MIA soldiers during the Vietnam War ). This is what honor means.

We could cite many factors as strengths of the Japan-US alliance—interoperability, mutual complementarity, and the sharing of technology and information—but these are only tools and methods. What is indispensable are the intangible factors shared between our two peoples as well as between JSDF and US military personnel: spirituality, ethics, values, and pride. The people’s feelings toward their military personnel differs greatly in Japan and in the United States, and it is unlikely to change much in the future. However, I would like for the alliance to be one that shares honor while holding common values between the SDF and US military personnel who share the same mission. This is what Yokota believes.

Yokota also believes that there are various things that the JMSDF must do, practical things as well as attitude, to strengthen and develop the bilateral alliance and naval relationship. Again, the JMSDF must form a relationship with the US Navy rooted in honor, rather than in a fear-based alliance, and this relationship must be the foundation of the Japan-US alliance. It must evolve into a true friendship starting from a practical place, rather than simply from a mere sense of security that we are “friends.”

We must go beyond the buzzword of the 1980s, interoperability (the ability to operate jointly with weapons, equipment, communications, and various standards and procedures) and embrace interchangeability (a comprehensive ability to carry out missions on behalf of the US Navy when the necessity arises). In other words, if the US Navy were unable to defend a certain area because it was mobilized to deal with other threats, the JMSDF would be capable of stepping in to fulfill that same role. That capability will be necessary. And it may entail sacrifice.

We must make sure the means does not become the end. If it does, realizing the true purpose becomes impossible. Perfecting the means alone, without clarifying the purpose for doing so, means nothing and merely invites the question, “So what?” or “What’s next?”

There is a need for the JSDF to be closer to the people, and for the people to have a sense of the work of defense in Japanese society. I don’t think that the Japanese people will ever adopt the sort of honor and respect the US public has for their troops without putting effort into a full-fledged public relations campaign that would have the Japanese public understand and personally experience the common values shared by Japan and the United States, as well as the importance of a free and open Indo-Pacific region. They are both concepts worth protecting.

There are growing concerns that the conspicuous divide among the American public will spill over into US national security policies and its policy for the alliance. Yokota, however, thinks that any such impact is limited, and that the US military’s power is fundamentally unchanged. First of all, the perception of core national security staff in Japan and the United States remains largely unchanged. In particular, he thinks that, at least for the time being, both countries will continue to work together to deal with the China threat, trying to realize and maintain a “better peace” There is no fundamental change in bilateral naval relations, which will continue to improve for some time.

On the other hand, it seems to Yokota that how the US military and the general public perceive change is somewhat different. America has maintained a set of common values even as it values diversity of religion, culture, and ideas. Recently in America, however, it feels as though the larger framework has disappeared (or has grown thin) and excessive individualism is taking over. The general public is much more inward-looking than it once was. I honestly do not know if it will affect the US -Japan alliance in the future.

Differences in Culture, Ways of Thinking; Yet Japanese and US Navies Remain Allies

I also asked Captain Hartman his thoughts on the future of the bilateral alliance and relations between the two navies. He highlighted the need to remember that a sailor’s understanding of the JMSDF varies depending on factors such as his or her proximity to Japan and depth of experience of working together with the JMSDF. (Similarly, Captain Shiraishi believes that US Navy leaders with an Atlantic Sailor background must gain a deeper awareness of the JMSDF and understand its importance to the entire US Navy, to make further advances qualitatively and quantitatively in the naval relationship.)

Hartman feels that Yokota’s statement that US commanding officers treat JMSDF staff like guests is less an attitude and rather an indication that some US Navy leaders’ understanding of the Japanese is not that high. A US Navy commander unknowledgeable about Japan hesitates to yell at JMSDF staff, probably from a belief that Japanese are very polite and well-mannered people. It’s a good observation, but I do not think it necessarily means there is a lack of trust in the bilateral naval relationship. Yokota may be concerned that the Japan-US alliance will not fully function unless both sides interact without such discretion or restraint. It merits further consideration.

Similarly, Captain Hartman thinks this aspect shines through in visiting US Navy commanding officers’ praise of JMSDF maintenance and tidiness, the phenomenon that CPO Takitō noted. The fastidiousness of JMSDF personnel—their ships and aircraft fixtures are polished to a sheen, all rope is neatly wound and stowed like works of art, and everything is in order—impresses these US Navy officers, who sometimes see equipment and tools cluttering the decks of their own vessels.

Captain Hartman thinks that, if that’s the case, it should serve as a stimulus for the US Navy. Good housekeeping is fundamental to all navies. To perfectly carry out equipment maintenance, cleaning, and organizing—tasks that are easy to neglect when out at sea and there is much work that must get done—Captain Hartman thinks this testifies to the JMSDF’s latent and spare capabilities and therefore indicates the high level of JMSDF’s overall abilities as a navy.

Yet, Captain Hartman thinks these US Navy commanders often do not understand the JMSDF very well and tend to comment only on what they see when they visit. The JMSDF must also have strengths and weaknesses in less easily observable areas. Failing to appreciate this point, and just settling for a superficial understanding will mean that future efforts to strengthen and deepen Japan-US naval relations will not be accompanied by substance, or so I fear.

In fact, this point applies to both sides of the Japan-US Navy relationship, it seems to me. A few years ago, a retired admiral (an old acquaintance of mine) told me, “US Navy enlisted personnel do not usually appear as polished as JMSDF enlisted, their order not as orderly and it makes you wonder if everything is really alright. But once they’re in a fight, they are incredibly strong.” Reconsidering his point, I sense that the habitually disorganized appearance of US Navy personnel is somehow connected to their ability to prove their mettle on the battlefield when the unpredictable happens. Might this be a result of the combat experience the US Navy has accumulated by constantly operating “battle-ready” ever since World War II. Conversely, no matter how perfectly organized or how outstandingly rehearsed a force may be, it is no guarantee that it can demonstrate an ability to fight in actual combat. This may well be the big question hanging over the JMSDF, which has never actually fought since its founding.

The point ties directly to Captain Hartman’s final thought regarding the future of Japan-US naval relations, that there is one fundamental difference between the JMSDF and the US Navy. It’s hard to say it directly to my friends and colleagues in the JMSDF, but the Japanese and US Navies have never fought together. Allied navies are supposed to fight alongside each other, acknowledging the possibility that sailors may lose their lives for their comrades if it came down to it. The IJN, which had fought the US Navy so fiercely in naval battles of (at least initially) equal strength, was remade after the war as the JMSDF, which has been actively working in partnership with the US Navy to maintain peace and stability in Japan and now in the Indo-Pacific region. The fact that we have never fought together, however, leaves a spot of uncertainty in the alliance.

The same holds true, in fact, for the navies of other countries, Hartman noted. A friend of mine who had been in the Royal Navy mentioned at a recent gathering that militaries that are not prepared to shed blood together could not be true allies.

I myself heard the assertion that an alliance with a country one has never fought alongside cannot be a true ally at a conference of experts on the Japan-US alliance held in Washington in the mid-1990s. One of the attendees, former Army Captain Michael Powell,Footnote 15 raised his hand to inquire if the Japan-US alliance was an alliance in the true sense of the word. Just in the period after World War II, Australian, New Zealand, Canadian, and South Korean soldiers fought and died alongside US soldiers in the Korean War, Vietnam War, and the 1991 Gulf War. Even Germany, which like Japan was a US enemy in World War II, fought in Afghanistan, as a member of NATO with other European nations. Japan’s Self-Defense Forces and the US military lack this experience.

It was a superb alliance, countered Auer, scholar of the JMSDF’s creation and Powell’s onetime boss at the Pentagon. He ticked off points supporting his argument, asking rhetorically: During the height of the Cold War in the 1980s, didn’t the JMSDF and the US Navy work hard together to prevent Soviet nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines from advancing into the Pacific from Vladivostok? Immediately after the Gulf War, didn’t Japan dispatch minesweepers to the Persian Gulf to clear mines laid by Iraq in cooperation with foreign navies to great success? Mr. Powell was not persuaded, however.

The Japanese people have been truly fortunate that Japan in the postwar has never engaged in actual combat, whether alone or jointly. After their country’s utter defeat in the war against the United States, they wished never to go to war again, a situation that Article 9 of the Constitution made impossible. But, notwithstanding their “no war” pledge, would they not fight if Japan was to be invaded? Would the state not protect its citizens? The SDF was created to prepare for such a contingency, and the bilateral alliance was formed with the condition that the SDF would fight alongside the US military only in the defense of Japan. More than 70 years later, however, the international situation in which the Japan-US alliance finds itself has changed dramatically, and so, too, has the role expected of Japan as an ally. Like it or not, the day is coming when Japan will fight jointly with the United States, albeit on a limited basis, in areas other than the defense of Japan. Japan and the United States must one day become allies sharing glory and honor—Captain Yokota’s statement may be the same as Captain Hartman’s final point. This, of course, is a matter for the Japanese people to decide, not the JSDF.

Aiming for Ever Better Japan-US Alliance and Navy Relations

I heard the JMSDF officers and petty officers (and US Navy Captain Hartman) speak about the present state of the Japan-US alliance and its future. Since joining, they each have developed such a depth of experience and long ties to the US Navy (JMSDF, in Captain Hartman’s case) that I cannot say for sure that their thoughts and opinions are representative of the average sailor’s.

Clearly, each of them thinks deeply and can analyze flexibly, rationally, and logically, whether one agrees with what they say or not. They agree on the overall direction yet have diverse opinions, which they are capable of expressing eloquently and freely. These JMSDF personnel are heirs to the naval legacy and traditions bequeathed by their predecessors, former IJN officers who founded the JMSDF. Amid major changes in the international situation and under various constraints, they will remain always at the ready to do their utmost to fulfill the duties entrusted to them by the people of Japan: to maintain the peace and security of Japan. To that end, as they grapple with various problems and challenges, they devote their energies working through the Japan-US alliance and deepening the bonds between the Japanese and US Navies to achieve the better peace Yokota referred to (Fig. 12.1).

Fig. 12.1
A photo of the Commander of the U S Pacific Fleet and the Chief of Staff, J M S D F shaking hands with each other.

Commander of the US Pacific Fleet pays a courtesy call on the Chief of Staff, JMSDF. (Photo credit: JMSDF)

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