Resilient Governance of Urban Redevelopment

Abstract

This chapter aims to explain why there are diverse features associated with the different phrases. The purpose of changes in governance modes is closely related to governmental target with economic growth. Structural elements include institutional, cultural and economic ones which are external and internal challenges; changed governance modes are responses against these challenges. This chapter aim to make a clear connection between changes in the developmental environment of Guangzhou and authoritarian regime in this city. Various aspects of the developmental environment have changed in the last 25 years, and the modes of governance have also changed; however, the logic underlying the connection between these two parts has never been changed. Every mode of governance has been transformed to adapt a changed environment to maximise economic growth. This is resilient governance of urban redevelopment in Guangzhou.

4.1 Changes Impacted on Urban Redevelopment in Guangzhou

Governance modes have been quite different between three phases; mayors are the key actor to determine and announce governmental strategies in every phase. Besides, other forces, such as political, economic and social changes, are also important to influence governance modes.

4.1.1 Political Changes

Structural changes have formed both constraints and resources for individuals to pursue their own interests; these constraints and resources influence behavioural patterns of governance in redeveloping Guangzhou. These changes include three categories: political factors, social and cultural elements and economic reasons. The political dimension includes crucial changes in the land administrative system, urban policy, urban planning sectors and adjustment of Guangzhou’s territory.

• (1) Changes in Land Administrative System

Land administrative agencies have responsibility to control land use, land transactions, conversion and planning issues in both urban and rural areas. Their influence on urban redevelopment is concerned with two aspects, land transactions of urban land and conversions from rural agricultural land to urban construction land.

Such transactions involve the transfer of land use rights from the local state to land users. Before 1988, land transactions were free of charge because land transaction fees were constitutionally forbidden. In April 1988, the National People's Congress approved a change in constitution to permit transaction fees, and the Land Administrative Law was modified to adopt the constitutional change. In 1990, the State Council pronounced rules to run the land transaction process with land leasing fees. In 1992, Guangzhou set up the Land Development Centre to organise land expropriation, conversions and transactions.

In land transactions, negotiation was more popular than open auctions in the 1990s. For example, in 1994 and 1996, there were 9,7405 and 10,3921 land transactions in Chinese cities, and only 12.86 and 11.51% of them were through open auctions (Zhang 2006). The use of negotiation to settle the price of land transactions means no public participation or real competition; this often leads to cheaper prices for land leasing and more profits for developers.

The Guangzhou case is part of this story; negotiation is the main method to transfer land use rights from the local state to developers. Negotiated land transactions brought about more incentives for developers to be engaged in redevelopment activities. This method also resulted in less regulation in construction because open auction often works with planning conditions. This is one of the reasons to appear the free market mode in the Primitive Market Phase (1990–1998).

On the 30th May 2001, the State Council in the Notice about Enhancing Management in State owned Land announced that every land transaction must be though open auction when there are more than two potential buyers for commercial land. Updated policy with similar rules was published in April 2003 and March 2004 by the National Land and Resources Management Ministry. After the deadline of 31st August 2004 it was no longer possible for negotiation to be used for transactions of commercial land. Therefore the 31st August, 2004 has been called ‘doomsday for developers’.

Following this, land transactions became the most important resource for fiscal income in Chinese cities because land leasing fees are much higher in auctions than in negotiation (He and Wu 2005; Zhang 2006). Land leasing became a profitable business in downtown. This might be another reason for local authorities to invite developers to come back to urban redevelopment to form a de facto networking style governance in the Multiple Players Phase (2006–2015).

At the same time, conversion from agricultural land to construction land is also profitable for the local state. The local state holds a monopoly to transform collective-owned low-value agricultural land into state owned high-value construction land by expropriation with relatively low compensation, and then sell the transformed construction land to developers. However, the regulation of such conversion by the land management system became more and more strict.

From 1996 the central state started to limit the amount of land expropriation and conversion by the local state. In 1997, the central state even commanded that no expropriation could take place for the next whole year. However, local states still had methods to expropriate and convert in spite of national regulation. On the 30th July 2003, the National Council required local states to reveal their unapproved land expropriation and conversion.

In 2004 the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee announced the Number One Document about strict protection of agricultural land. In 2008, the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee approved the Decision about Some Important Problems about Supporting Reforms in Rural Areas; which claimed that the strictest protection in the world would be applied to agricultural land. Under this regulation, after 2003 the local state in Guangzhou had more difficulties in making profits from land conversion in suburban areas.

Therefore, they have paid more attention to redeveloping urban areas in the third phases of governance than in the second one, the Pure Government Phase (1998–2006). The Guangzhou Municipal Government encourages capital investment in the governmental land leasing market in terms of open auction transactions, in the Multiple Players Phase (2006–2015).

• (2) Changes as Expanding Territory After 1990

In 2000, the territory of Guangzhou had expanded from 1,443.6 to 3,718.5 km². In 2005 another round of expansion had increased this number to 4,914.72 km². In 2014, the central government approved the increase of Guangzhou’s territory to 7,434.4 km². The first expansion in 2000 brought about more opportunities for developing new projects in the new territory to update existing industry, because there are fewer properties in suburban areas and therefore less compensation as an obstacle to development; most of the new territory being agricultural land.

Conversion from agricultural land to construction land is problematic because of strict regulation by the central state after 2003. However, before that time, it was relatively easy to convert agricultural land. Between 2000 and 2005, expansion of urban space reduced pressure to develop old urban areas (Tan 2013). Therefore, in the Pure Government Phase (1998–2006), the local state refused private capital investors to enter the field of redevelopment in downtown areas because it was less difficult to establish new projects in the new suburban territory to update the urban economy (Fig. 4.1).

Fig. 4.1

Source author’s construct, 2023. Notes ‘1’ indicates territory before 2000; ‘2’ indicates expanded areas in 2000; ‘3’ indicates increased urban space in 2005; ‘4’ indicates new territory of Guangzhou in 2014

Expansion of territory from 1990.

• (3) Changes in Urban Policy from the Central State

Urban policy has influenced the scale and speed of spatial development of cities. Guangzhou is the third largest city in China, and its spatial expansion has been strictly controlled before 2000 due to two institutional factors. Firstly, the Socialist Five-year Plans of China, as the comprehensive planning mechanism to organise the planning economy, have a strong influence on urban issues. The sixth (1981–1985) and seventh (1986–1990) Five-year Plans announced that the sizes of large cities should be controlled, medium cities should have reasonable development and small cities need to be positively developed.

This policy has been changed in the eighth Five-year Plan (1991–1995) with the directive that sizes of large cities should be ‘strictly’ controlled. Secondly, the City Planning Law of the People’s Republic of China has been in force from April 1990 to January 2008. This law also emphasised that sizes of large metropolis should be strictly controlled. These two institutional arrangements mean that Guangzhou as a large city had very limited opportunities to obtain new construction land; this municipality could mainly focus on redeveloping constructed land. Such institutional constraints could explain why in the Primitive Market Phase (1990–1998) urban redevelopment in downtown areas was highly active.

Such control over large cities has been released in the statement in the ninth Five-year Plan in 1996 and repeated in the City and Countryside Planning Law of the People’s Republic of China in 2007. Therefore, suburban development in the next 2 phases has more advantages than in the first phase (1990–1998); redevelopment in downtown has fewer driving forces and pressures. Forbidding of developers to join urban redevelopment projects in city centre in the second phase (1998–2006) became more possible.

When the central state aimed to control the big cities, Guangzhou has difficulties to increase its construction land.

(Yuan, scholar and planner, interview, 01/2014).

• (4) Changes in Urban Planning System

The urban planning system works in a political environment; therefore, it often needs to adopt political considerations. In 2000, the territory of Guangzhou was significantly expanded. In response to this new situation of development, the local authority in Guangzhou input a new type of planning, the strategic development planning, in Guangzhou. This plan includes four parts of spatial strategy, developing to the South (南拓), optimising the North (北优), advancing to the East (东进) and combining to the West (西联).

The development to the South was the most important one because this strategy aimed to transfer Guangzhou from a domestic riverbank city to an international port city (Wu and Zhang 2007). Many mega projects, such as New University Town, Biology Island and Nansha High-tech Industrial Park had been built in the south part of Guangzhou to support this ‘developing to the South’ strategy; this is the spatial focus of the city in this phase; therefore, urban redevelopment in downtown areas has less importance in this period.

This changed spatial front line of economic growth might lead to the formation of the Pure Government Phase (1998–2006) because of the changed spatial focus of development. However, in 2006, Mayor Guangning Zhang announced that ‘adjusting the city centre’ (中调) is also critical to developing Guangzhou in a revised version of strategic development planning. It means that it is still important to redevelop the downtown area in a whole landscape of economic growth. This is the landmark of the appearance of the Multiple Players Phase (2006–2015). After that, the capital and administrative resources were distributed into declining central urban areas again. The Enning Street project had been set up for this reason (Figs. 4.2 and 4.3).

Fig. 4.2

Source author’s drawing based on Yuan (2015), Accessed at: 30/06/2017. Notes 北优 Optimising the North; 南拓 Developing the South; 东进 Advancing to the East; 西联 Combining to the West

Spatial strategy of Guangzhou in 2000.

Fig. 4.3

Source author’s drawing based on Chinese Society for Urban Studies (2010), Accessed at: 30/06/2017. Notes adjusting the city centre (中调) as a new strategy has been added into spatial strategy

Spatial strategy of Guangzhou in 2006.

4.1.2 Social Changes

• (1) Changed Legitimacy of Governance

There was a decline in the legitimacy of governmental behaviour after 1990. Liu (scholar, interview, 2013) claims that these residences more respected to the government than later phases. The residents trusted the real estate companies involved in this project because they were affiliated with the district government and acted as governmental agents. Therefore, in the Primitive Market Phase (1990–1998), cooperation between the state and communities was positive; conflicts mainly occurred between developers and residents.

In the third phase (2006–2015), people in the Enning Road project were skeptical of the motivation and behaviour of the government. They did not believe the purpose of this project was to improve the public good; instead, they thought the district government aimed to produce fiscal income for their own interests. Because of this change in the legitimacy of the state there were more conflicts and problems rather than coordination between government and residents. Therefore, developers become more important in the recent phase to overcome the increased distance between residents and government.

In the Multiple Players Phase (2006–2015), legitimacy has declined and awareness of property rights has increased among individuals in communities; top-down style mobilisation of properties from individuals in redevelopment projects has become more difficult. Therefore, a de facto networking style governance becomes more necessary to organise cooperation in a less legitimated environment for the local state.

• (2) Changed Ideas About Historical Preservation Among Citizens

In the 1990s the population in Guangzhou have less awareness about historical preservation. In the Liwan Square Project, residents were protecting economic interests, not historical issues. In the Multiple Players Phase (2006–2015), citizens, especially the young generation, have more and more awareness about historical preservation. It is a cultural demand rather than an economic consideration.

In response to such awareness mass media delivered information about the value of historical preservation. In municipal governance the local state has to positively respond to these changes in popular ideas of urban history because of strong influence from the mass media. Traditional cultural issues are supported not just by citizens, but also by the communist party and the government because history education is part of patriotism and national identity. Therefore the voices of historical preservation from the communities cannot be ignored by the local state; the interests of conserving historical buildings and areas should be included in redevelopment projects. This is also another reason to from a semi-network governance mode in this phase.

People want to get some cultural identity at the municipal level. Some young intellectuals produced some pressure to the government in the issues (of historical preservation); however, the owners of demolished properties have fewer concerns about this.

(Yuan, scholar and planner, interview, 01/2014).

Because I am a local resident in Guangzhou, I have been anxious about my cultural identity when I watched news about the Enning Street project from 2008. You have a sense that the Asian Games had changed the whole landscape of Guangzhou; it was not like our memories any more. So I felt I need to pay attention to this problem and joined the Enning Focus Group.

(Doris, member of semi-NGO, interview, 12/2013).

• (3) Changed Role of Mass Media

The mass media in Guangzhou is the pioneer in terms of marketisation reform in China’s mass media. Market-oriented mass media have to adjust their reports and articles to satisfy the requirements of society. After the population have changed their opinions about the legitimacy of the state and importance of historical preservation, the mass media needed to reflect such changes. Also, because Guangzhou is the capital of Guangdong Province the provincial government and municipal government have different interests in the mass media.

This is a semi check-in-balance between different levels of government; therefore, there is more freedom in Guangzhou for mass media to criticise the local state in comparison with other Chinese cities, such as Shanghai. Some mass media, such as the New Express Daily, are very active in the field of urban redevelopment. They often support the expression of community interests in redevelopment projects. These articles in the mass media are not direct challenges against the communist regime and are more tolerated compared with political protests. These functions of mass media in Guangzhou contribute to the formulation of network-style governance in the Multiple Players Phase (2006–2015), because mass media have the increased power of communities in front of the market and the state.

Guangzhou is the capital of Guangdong; the provincial government need mass media to supervise activities of the municipal government. These media have more freedom to investigate and report. Another reason is fierce competition among media; journalists have incentives to do influential reports.

(Yuan, scholar and planner, interview, 01/2014).

After 2008, I have noticed that mass media has a strong influence in historical preservation issues. The television reports could produce hot topics on historical issues to the population; after that, the newspapers continue to deeply investigate stories in cultural and historical protection. Mass media makes everybody know what has happened in the field of urban redevelopment.

(Doris, member of semi-NGO, interview, 12/2013).

4.1.3 Economic Changes

• (1) Limited Amount of Construction Land and Increased Capital in Urban Redevelopment

At the beginning of the 1990s, capital was more important in the field of urban redevelopment than in other phases because of the scarcity of capital at that stage. This is one of the factors to explain the formulation of the Primitive Market Phase (1990–1998) where powerful market forces established and operated projects in the interaction between groups from communities and government.

In the next two decades, due to both the development of the economy and expansion of urban construction areas, there is more and more capital in the market with fewer and fewer amounts of available land for construction in urban areas. Construction land as a resource for development and redevelopment becomes relatively scarce compared with capital (see increased amount of capital in Table 4.1). Therefore, land value in urban space has increased significantly.

Table 4.1 Increased capital in fixed assets in Guangzhou

This increase brings about more incentives for urban redevelopment because land needs to realise its potential value. The ‘three old’ redevelopment policy, which is launched in the last two phases is based on this changed relative scarcity between capital and land suitable for construction. Economic prosperity is more dependent on redeveloping constructed land than converting agricultural land in terms of building office, commercial department and service industry because conversion from agricultural land to construction land has more and more strict controls.

For the government, economic growth is based on available construction land; for developers, pursuit of profits and scarcity of construction land directed their interests back to urban redevelopment. This is another reason to explain the return of private capital to downtown areas in the Multiple Players Phase (2006–2015). It is also the main reason to build up the ‘three old redevelopment’ agenda both in Guangdong Province and Guangzhou Municipality since 2009; this agenda is an important driving force to formulate a network-style governance in the last two phases.

Guangdong province only has 10 square kilometres increased new construction land under national land management regulation; however, the requirement for economic growth in Guangdong is for at least 40 square kilometres of new construction land. Where could we get such land? Urban redevelopment.

(Deng, senior officer, interview, 12/2013).

4.2 Resilient Governance as Responses to Changes

This chapter provides explanations about the changed mode of governance in different phases. They are related to changing developmental environments. The purpose of such adaptation is to maximise economic growth under political, economic and social constraints.

In the Primitive Market Phase (1990–1998), the economic dimension, outside scale and individual aspect might be more influential than others. In this phase, political and social dimensions of this city were almost the same ones as before; they were supportive to urban growth and redevelopment. The economic difficulty, especially the scarcity of capital is the only bottleneck to urban redevelopment. To overcome this bottleneck the Mayor Li had to mobilise market force to stimulate redevelopment. The Mayor is the direct reason to develop a semi-market mode of governance. And the investment of redevelopment was mainly from outside of Guangzhou; therefore, the outside scale is more important in this phase.

In the Pure Government Phase (1998–2006), the political dimension, outside aspect might be more influential than others. In this phase, the state had much more capacities to mobilise capital in urban development; the scarcity of capital has declined. The communities had not been awaken in this period; therefore, political dimension was the most crucial in this phase to support the dominance of the local state in this phase. Mayor Lin was a powerful leader in this phase to control the governance urban redevelopment. Outside factors, such as the changed urban policy about spatial expansion, and the changes of territory in 2000 were supported his preference in governance; these factors were mainly provided by the central state.

In the Multiple Players (2006–2015), the social dimension, inside scale and structural aspect might be more influential than others. The social dimension is the most important because of the rising of communities; this rising is displayed by the active of mass media, the population’s awareness of historical conservation and empowerment of communities. Such social power is mainly based on local resources rather than on outside scale forces; therefore, inside scale is more important in this period. The mayors have been less influential in this phase under the background of the rising of social forces compared with in former 2 phases. The structural changes in social interaction between the state, market and communities is more crucial than individuals, even the Mayors.

From discussion about changes in developmental environments and governance modes, it seems that governance modes can adopt changing political, economic and social environments. The spatial focus of development and relationship between the state, market and communities are reproduced incessantly in such an adoption process; different focuses of space and state-market-communities relationships are influential in governance activities.

The Primitive Market Phase (1990–1998) is focused on developing central areas of Guangzhou; development of the capital holds the dominant role in this stage. Therefore urban redevelopment is active, in which the most powerful elements are market order and market actors.

In the Pure Government Phase (1998–2006), development has been shifted from central Guangzhou to marginal areas; the government has the leading role in redevelopment. Activities in central areas are less important; public funding is not focusing on redevelopment; fewer energy appear in this field because it is controlled by the state; the hierarchical order is the mainstream order in this phase.

In the Multiple Players Phase (2006–2015), urban development pays attention to both central areas and the outskirts or outer parts of Guangzhou; communities is rising up to compete with state and market forces. The awareness of rights in the masses and the development of mass media have increased the incentives and capacities of communities to express their preferences and interests; these factors have empowered communities in negotiation in redevelopment; a more balanced power structure has developed in these two phases; network-style governance has become more important to support cooperation in urban redevelopment.

Therefore, the governance mode changed along with changes in the spatial focus of development and relationships between the state, market and communities; they interact with each other in a broad meaning of governance. Furthermore, what is the reason for these changes? The answer might be very obvious, the rationale for this adaptation is to maximise economic growth under political, economic and social constraints.

The logic of Guangzhou’s authoritarian regime has been discussed in Chap. 2; however, this chapter provides more detail on urban redevelopment and its environment. Market-style governance is helpful to support economic growth in the Primitive Market Phase (1990–1998) in terms of mobilising scarce capital into redevelopment while central Guangzhou is the developmental focus; communities has less power to limit influence from market actors.

A hierarchical style of governance is necessary in a state-dominant redevelopment phase when the state focuses on suburban development and relies less on urban areas for growth; market forces have not been mobilised in this phase therefore less resources are active; hierarchical order is the most convenient mode in such an environment.

In the Multiple Players (2006–2015), economic growth is mobilised both in central and marginal areas of Guangzhou with resources from state, market and communities; the rising of communities has empowered communities; the dominance of state or market has been challenged; to mobilise more resources from various sources in an environment with more constraints requires a network-style governance to achieve growth.

4.3 Authoritarian Characteristics as the Basis for Resilient Governance

An resilient governance mode in urban redevelopment, which is pursuing maximising economic growth through adapt to changes in its developmental environment, has been displayed in 25 years as three distinct phases of governance. The reasons behind this resilient governance is the autonomy of Guangzhou to adjust its policy and actions, and its authoritarian political system to mobilise actors from the market and society, and ignoring resistance against these changes in governance.

4.3.1 Autonomies of Guangzhou Municipality

Guangzhou has more autonomy in economic activities which might lead to significant changes in governance modes in urban redevelopment when the political leaders could make their own decisions to adopt a changed environment. Guangzhou is the capital of Guangdong Province, which is the pioneer of reform after 1978 because of its geographical position far away from the central state and close to Hong Kong, the window of Western technology and institutions. Also, the leader of Guangdong Province after 1978 was Mr. Zhongyi Ren, who aimed to increase independence of Guangdong in terms of the de facto federal system between the central state and Guangdong. His requirements to build a federal system had been refused by Xiaoping Deng; however, the autonomy of Guangdong had increased in terms of decision-making in economic fields (Zheng 2013), as the capital of Guangdong, Guangzhou has relative autonomy to decide its economic issues.

This autonomy was enhanced after the decentralisation reform in 1992, the Tax Sharing System (Wu 2002). Legally, in the hierarchy of Chinese cities, Guangzhou is categorised as a large city. Cities in this category have more autonomy to impose their own laws and rules in terms of urban development, urban management and environmental protection (Chen 2014).

This relative autonomy of Guangzhou does not just lead to independent decision-making and changeable policy in governing redevelopment, but also results in specific governance modes. For example, in the 1990s, large numbers of state-sponsored enterprises, which are not all state owned, but strongly supported by agencies of the state, had built by departments of the central and local state, children of national leaders, and armies. They were located in Guangzhou and have strong connections with the municipal government.

These enterprises received resources and privileges from the local state, and in exchange, the Guangzhou government received support from the central state to enhance its autonomy. These state-sponsored enterprises, such as the Pearl River Real Estate Investment Enterprise which was built by the former mayor of Guangzhou, had more autonomy in the market, therefore, the Primitive Market Phase (1990–1996) has acted as a micro foundation to support a free market governance mode.

After 1998, because of problems of corruption in such state-sponsored enterprises, Mr. Rongji Zhu, the Prime Minister of the central state, came to Guangdong to regulate these enterprises. His activities enforcing regulation in Guangzhou might have influenced Mayor Shuseng Lin’s decision to refuse developers to enter urban redevelopment in the Pure Governmental Phase (1996–2003) (Zheng 2013).

4.3.2 Mayors’ Preference to Influence Urban Redevelopment Governance

Mayors, as the most influential municipal leaders in the field of urban redevelopment, have the capacity to change governance modes by their preferences. The most important features of mayors’ influence in governance are flexibility and significant changes of governance modes. The diverse ages of mayors, their political experience and personalities could lead to totally different modes of governing activities.

The one party state without serious election and the dominance of the mayor in governance can explain the strong influence of mayors’ preferences in governance. Furthermore, these leaders have another important significant tendency in their totally different styles in comparison with former leaders. Therefore, the Guangzhou case has two characteristics of governance.

Firstly, there are significant changes between different phases with different leaders who have the same political partisanship. The mode of governance has changed from a market mode, to a hierarchical mode, and to the mode has more networking features when the mayors have changed.

Secondly, there are strong influences of mayors’ personal preference over governance modes; these influential factors include ages, political experience and personalities. These factors are significantly formed by institutional arrangements in administrative hierarchy and the mayors’ personal track in this institution.

• (1) Mayor’s Age and Governance Modes

There are rules about ages and promotion in the political hierarchy in Chinese government. On the 18th August 1980, Mr. Xiao Ping Deng, the leader of China, announced that leaders in China’s communist regime need to be younger, more knowledgeable and professional. This requirement has been repeated several times after this announcement. The mayor of Guangzhou is located at the sub-provincial level in this hierarchy; to arrive at the provincial level, mayors often need to be promoted once or twice.

Mr. Ziliu Li became mayor of Guangzhou in 1990 at the age of 58. There is a’59-years-old’ phenomenon in Chinese government. This means that officers who are at the age of 59 have more incentives to become corrupt because 60-years-old is the usual retirement time for ordinary officers; they prefer to grasp more economic interests when political promotion is impossible (Zhang 2009). Mayor Li’s age at which he became the mayor meant that he had fewer opportunities to be promoted: this leads to more interest in economic issues rather than political considerations from a general perspective. These economic interests may lead to a less regulated style of governance in the Primitive Enterprise Phase, which could lead to more economic returns for Mr. Li.

Mr. Shusen Lin achieved the position of mayor of Guangzhou in 1996, at the age of 50. Mayor Lin had more political ambitions because he was still young to hold the position of mayor of Guangzhou. Construction in suburban areas has fewer obstacles because these areas are occupied by fewer people and a lower density of properties needs to be removed with attendant compensation issues. Therefore, in comparison with central urban areas, suburban areas have more space for mega projects and there is less resistance against such projects to support political ambitions. Redevelopment in the city centre had less priority in the governmental agenda; a pure government mode had less political risks in a less important field.

In the phase of Mr. Guangning Zhang, Mr. Jianhua Chen, as the Mayor in later periods, they have less influence compared with former Mayors.

• (2) Mayor’s Political Experiences, Personalities and Governance Modes(1) Mayor’s Age and Governance Modes

Mr. Ziliu Li was appointed as the Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party Jiangmen Municipality Committee, the highest political position in Jiangmen Municipality in 1983. He has worked in Jiangmen from 1983 to 1990. After that, he was appointed as the mayor of Guangzhou Municipality. He preferred to apply his experience of relatively small cities, such as Jiangmen and Dongguan, which have more free market features in comparison with other cities. Before his phase of governance, Guangzhou had more communist characteristics and less market features because it is the capital of Guangdong and has more ideological responsibilities. After his coming to power, less control and more autonomy became the principles of Guangzhou in a Primitive Market Phase.

You know, personal background and experience are crucial for local leaders to make decisions. Mr. Li is another example. Firstly, he has come from the position of leader in a small city, and has less knowledge to run the urban economy in the early stage of a marketing economy; therefore, he aimed to transfer the policy of small cities, such as Jiangmen, into Guangzhou with totally different scales. Secondly, he preferred to learn from Dongguan, another city much smaller than Guangzhou, which is famous for its less regulated and primitive market economy. After all, he thought Guangzhou should learn from these small cities, to improve efficiency.

(Ye, senior officer, interview, 12/2013).

Ziliu Li is accepted as a master in economic growth, with all the methods and support he could find; while at this phase there were less financial resources to develop. He preferred to release freedom to individuals in the market with their energy, resources and abilities. For him, the free market mode is the choice to mobilise resources to redevelop Guangzhou in such a capital-rare environment.

Mr. Li is a master in economic growth. He could combine every possible element to support one priority, economic growth. At the same time, he has less methods and tools to do so compared with leaders in later phases.

(Yuan, scholar and planner, interview, 01/2014).

Mr. Shusen Lin became the Deputy Secretary General of the provincial government in 1992, and later, Provincial Commission Director. The latter duty is the core department for economic growth at a macro level. His experience in these two positions helped his later efforts as a mayor. At the provincial level of government, there are more duties to balance interests between different cities, regions and sectors. Therefore, he had more comprehensive and structural considerations about urban development.

Mr. Lin preferred to be treated as an expert in the field of urban development. He wrote a book about urban development and redevelopment in 2013; and he became the honour professor in urban and regional planning department of Sun-Yat Sen University in 2014. Other mayors of Guangzhou after 1990 did not exhibit similar skills and activities. His experience in comprehensive development, and as an urban planner contributed to the formation of the Pure Governmental Phase in his period as mayor. He insisted on upholding the principle of protecting historical buildings and blocks in this phase of governance. To achieve this purpose, a pure government mode is necessary.

The logic inside municipal government had been expanded into market and communities. In this phase, redevelopment projects are chosen by the government from political considerations; the majority of funding in redevelopment were from public resources; redevelopment projects aimed to produce public goods for some specific groups, which led to less opposition and conflicts; the numbers and scale of redevelopment were very limited because of the limitation of public funding in this phase.

His [Mr Lin’s] understanding of the metropolis is close to that of urban planners. Yes, he had the consideration as a politician; however, he very much preferred to be treated as a qualified expert about urban issues.

(Ye, senior officer, interview, 12/2013).

In the phase of Mr. Guangning Zhang, Mr. Jianhua Chen, they have fewer personal references compared with former Mayors.

4.3.3 Institutional Capacities to Support Resilient Governance

This resilient governance of urban redevelopment appears for several reasons which are related to characteristics of the authoritarian regime. First of all, the local authorities have control of most of the crucial resources (He and Warren 2011), such as power in administrative approvals, setting up the orientations of urban planning and public funding to selectively support some projects, to change governance patterns. This concentration of resources on the one hand has reduced the cost of authorities to make decisions and formulate consensus; on the other hand, the concentration has strengthened the power of a few rulers to implement their decisions.

Secondly, the CCP has developed the whole system to response to external changes. These adaptive capacities include two aspects, the institutional capacities and personal abilities of the local leaders. The institutional one is related to the organised mobilisation as a Maoist heritage (Heilmann and Perry 2011). This mobilising system is operated by local leaders which are selected through the promotion system. This system is called a meritocracy mechanism by Nathan (2003). Elites are selected with related capacities in such a mechanism to control their position to operate the governance system and its changes.

Thirdly, there are fewer resistances against the tendency to change governance modes. There is no opposite party, no strong civil society and no powerful anti-growth coalition (Lai 2010), though in the Enning Road Redevelopment there is some evidence of such coalitions. The local state does not have strong obstacles against the realisation of its proposals; changing governance modes might be one of its agendas. At the same, weak barriers to change governance modes might be connected to the fragile ideology in contemporary Chinese society and CCP. Even Breslin (2011) has described China as a de-ideological society. No communist or democratic ideology can resist the tendency to change its governance modes.

The Chinese authoritarian regime has strong capacities to change its governance modes. However, why should this regime wish to do so? It is because of its dependency on economic growth to strengthen social and political stability. CCP employs economic growth and increased living standards of people to encourage political support from the population without representative rights. It is a pro-growth authoritarian governance (Lai 2010). This feature has been analysed in Chap. 2; growth is the core issue for the government in Guangzhou and other Chinese cities. This chapter has explained the reasons for changes in governance modes; keeping growth in changed environments is the reason for such changes.

After all, the Guangzhou government and other Chinese urban government have not gained their political power by fair and open elections. This means they have less legitimate power. Instead of winning support by legitimacy, they aim to increase support from society by their performance in the economic field. An authoritarian regime experiences more pressure to pursue performance. This pressure in the local state has been supported by institutional arrangements between the central and local state. The central state has provided principles and incentives to the local state; local levels have autonomies to realise the target provided by the central authority, the achievement of growth (Zheng 2013).