Introduction

Interest in Indonesia on the part of the Soviet Union can be traced back to Joseph Stalin’s government (1924–1953), in particular, to his last decade of leadership (1945–1953). After Indonesia’s proclamation of independence in August 1945, the struggle received a positive response from the Soviet Union. Stalin’s government supported Indonesia’s fight for freedom from the Netherlands, which wanted to regain its control after the Japanese occupation. When the Netherlands finally recognized the Republic of United States of Indonesia (RUSI) in December 1949, the Soviet Union formally recognized Indonesian sovereignty and established diplomatic relations. The first two decades played an important role in Indonesia’s formation as an independent state and in uniting its territories, particularly as what was known as West Irian at the time.

Research on diplomatic relations between Indonesia and the Soviet Union, especially in the post-independence period, has made significant progress since the declassification of Soviet archives. Several studies using the new data have been written by Efimova (2003, 2015), Efimova and McVey (2011), Bezik (2004), and Vartanyan (2015). The present chapter employs these new archival resources along with UN Security Council archives and attempts to reconstruct, first, the significant support given by the Soviet Union in the Stalin era despite the lack of official diplomatic relations and, second, the personal relationship between Khrushchev and Sukarno that broke through the rigid boundaries of diplomatic protocol and helped to reinforce mutually beneficial relations between Indonesia and the USSR.

This study is anchored in the context of Soviet foreign policy, which can be understood as Russia’s geopolitical strategy in the Far Eastern regions, particularly in Southeast Asia. The Soviet Union’s diplomatic support for Indonesia in the early years of the formation of the United Nations contributed to political differences between the members of the Allied forces, and, it may be argued, became the starting point of the Cold War. The differences between Soviet and British perspectives on Indonesia marked the beginning of the rift in the relations between the two countries, leading to increased and more open hostilities during the Cold War. While Soviet support provided a stepping stone for Indonesia to become an independent country, as relations between the Soviet Union and the West deteriorated, the decision on Indonesia served as a triggering factor that divided the erstwhile Allied forces into two major power blocs.

It is hoped that the approach of this study, which focuses on individuals as agents that influenced their countries’ policies, offers a contribution to the field of international relations. We argue that international relations as an academic discipline should pay closer attention to the human factor in the analysis of bilateral and multilateral relations. Culturally, Soviet–Indonesian relations did not only prompt political and economic cooperation but also formed collective memories manifested in various artifacts and monuments, symbols that are retained within the collective memories of both nations.

Stalin and Diplomatic Support for Indonesia

Although in the Soviet Union the public was late to receive news of Indonesian independence, the rise of the new state of Indonesia in the Nusantara archipelago attracted attention, especially when a fierce battle broke out in Java between the newly formed Indonesian government troops and British troops. On October 13, 1945, the Soviet newspaper Izvestiya published an account of the Indonesian situation, relayed from the Soviet information agency TASS based in New Delhi (Solmov, 2009, pp. 92–93).

The Soviet Union was concerned that the new nation was experiencing diplomatic difficulties in the international arena, as Indonesia struggled to prove its independent existence. The United Nations, especially the UN Security Council, an international organization founded by the Allied countries of the Second World War, discussed Indonesia in at least five sessions during its first meetings in 1946. The head of the Soviet Ukrainian delegation, D.Z. Manuilsky (1883–1959), proposed what it defined as the Indonesian question, thereby changing the previous perception that viewed the conflict as a Dutch domestic matter. Based on Manuilsky’s letter, the UN Security Council in its 12th, 13th, 14th, 16th, and 17th sessions (February 7–12, 1946) settled the discussion agenda by relating the Indonesian people’s fate. The presence of the Indonesian delegation was made possible by the diplomatic support of both the Soviet Ukraine and the Soviet Union. Consequently, Indonesia was recognized as an independent subject worthy of debate. D.Z. Manuilsky’s proposal to the UN Security Council thus played a crucial role in the Indonesian struggle to gain recognition of and support for its sovereignty.

In the Security Council’s 17th session on February 12, 1946, Manuilsky stated that a military conflict involving British troops had occurred; the Indonesian people deemed that the British had used non-proportional military force and Japanese troops in confronting Indonesian partisans. The British declared that they were doing part of their task to secure the region after the Japanese occupation. Manuilsky accused the British not only of abusing their authority in Indonesia but also of violating the Allied forces’ mandate. The Soviet Union, also a member of the Allied forces, declared that the British troops were not carrying out duties in Indonesia, and that, in fact, Britain had violated the Allied forces’ agreement on the Far East region (UNSC S-13/1946).

The Soviet Ukrainian delegation’s statement not only demonstrated Soviet solidarity with the Indonesian people’s struggle, but also explicitly supported Indonesia’s diplomatic position. The position of the Soviet Ukraine delegation cannot be separated from the Soviet Union’s foreign policy strategy of, first, supporting the anti-colonial struggle and, second, weakening the hegemony of capitalism. This position implemented the Soviet decision, approved by Stalin with regard to the Indonesian question, which was mentioned in a service note (sluzhebnaya zapiska) of Soviet Foreign Affairs Minister Vyacheslav Molotov to Stalin on December 5, 1945:

Тов. Сталину

У меня возник вопрос, не следует ли настаивать, чтобы в повестку дня совещания трех был включен вопрос о событиях в Индонезии. В этом случае можно бы предложить, чтобы была дана информация и объяснения о событиях в Индонезии и чтобы три министра обменялись в формальном порядке мнениями по этому вопросу, у меня в виду необходимость прекращения кровополития и вмешательства иностранных (британских) войск и разрешение спорных вопросов в Индонезии мирными и демократическими средствами.

[Trans.]

Dear Comrade Stalin,

I have a question. Don’t you think we had better demand that the situation in Indonesia become a discussion agenda in a meeting of the Three [Allied Forces]? On that opportunity, it can be suggested to provide information and an explanation about the situation so that the three ministers [of foreign affairs] exchange thoughts about the issue. In my opinion, the bloodshed and intervention of foreign (British) troops needs to be stopped, and we need to solve the problem in Indonesia in a peaceful and democratic way. (AVP RF. No. F 0430 op. 2. p. 4. d.1.l.34)

From this note, it seems that Stalin had paid attention to Indonesia at least since December 1945. Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov advised him that the Soviets needed to request that the Indonesian question be discussed in the meeting among the three Allied nations (Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union) and demand an explanation of the current situation. The Indonesia question, involving British troops in armed conflict in Indonesia, had become a tipping point in differences between Britain and the United States on one side and the Soviet Union on the other. This note makes explicit the rejection by the Soviet Union of foreign and bloody intervention in Indonesia and the request to end that intervention.

The Soviet proposal based on Molotov’s suggestions was raised only in the 13th Security Council session in February 1946. Through Manuilsky, one of his comrades in the Soviet Ukrainian delegation, Molotov’s suggestions were aired. In his January 21, 1946, letter to the chairman of the UN Security Council, N. J. O. Makin, Manuilsky requested the discussion of the current and developing situation in Indonesia.

Western capitalist countries were against support from the Soviet Union and its allies to strengthen Indonesia’s political position. Consequently, several resolutions proposed by the Soviet Union were eventually either rejected or replaced by ‟softer” alternatives which benefited the Netherlands. Such alternatives served not only to protect the West and Dutch economic interests in Indonesia (for instance, Dutch plantations and American mines) but also to secure the United Kingdom’s reputation after its failure in securing peace in Indonesia during the transition period. This became especially evident in 1946, when the United Nations Security Council issued only two decisions related to Indonesia after the United Kingdom vetoed a proposed resolution which would have disobliged the West.

To control and supervise the implementation of UN resolutions and decisions on Indonesian-related questions, the UN Security Council formed ad hoc institutions, for instance, the Consular Commission and Committee for Good Offices. However, since the Soviet Union did not have diplomatic representation in Indonesia, it could not provide maximum political support. The Soviet Union could not join that committee to make concrete decisions. For example, upon forming the Committee for Good Offices (also known as Komisi Tiga Negara, the commission of three countries), it was agreed that three countries would address the Indonesian question; these three countries were Australia, Belgium, and the United States. The Soviets believed those three countries were more likely to represent colonial interests rather than the interests of the Indonesian people. For this reason, the Soviet Union was pessimistic about the committee’s possible achievements. Based on these circumstances, Stalin’s government promoted efforts to open diplomatic relations between Indonesia and the Soviet Union.

Efforts to Establish Diplomatic Relations During the Stalin Era

The absence of a Soviet diplomatic mission in Indonesia made it difficult for the Soviet Union to offer diplomatic support to Indonesia in Security Council debates; lack of Soviet representation on the Consular Committee, which consisted of representatives in Jakarta, was especially problematic. Without any representative, the Soviet Union could not become directly involved in the peaceful settlement of the Indonesian question. This situation encouraged the Soviet Union to support Indonesian efforts to establish diplomatic relations between the two countries. On January 28, 1948, the Charge d’Affaires of the Soviet Embassy in Czechoslovakia received a letter from the Special Envoy of the Government of the Republic of Indonesia, Soeripno, suggesting the establishment of diplomatic relations between Indonesia and the Soviet Union. The letter mentioned that the Republic of Indonesia wanted to open diplomatic representation on a consular level and requested an exchange of consuls from each country. Soeripno’s request on behalf of the Indonesian government received a positive Soviet response. On May 22, 1948, in a meeting in Prague, the Soviet ambassador for Czechoslovakia, Shilin, handed a letter to Soeripno, agreeing to establish diplomatic relations.

By a Letter of Assignment signed on December 25, 1947, by President Sukarno and Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Tamzil, Soeripno became Special Envoy to Prague for the Indonesian Government. At the time, Soeripno was head of the Information Bureau of the Republic of Indonesia based in Prague, Czechoslovakia, assigned to Eastern European regions and the Soviet Union. As such, President Sukarno had assigned him to ensure diplomatic cooperation with Eastern European countries and the Soviet Union (Solmov, 2009, p. 265).

Soeripno’s suggestion to the Soviet representative in Prague was approved by the highest Soviet leader, Joseph Stalin. In his letter addressed to Stalin, Soviet Foreign Affairs Minister Vyacheslav Molotov had explained the Indonesian government’s desire to open diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union through Special Envoy Soeripno. Soviet Ambassador M.A. Shilin’s letter of May 22, 1948, shows Stalin’s approval. However, this idea received a harsh reaction from inside Indonesia, where various parties questioned Soeripno’s authority to create diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. This rejection meant a discontinuation of diplomatic negotiations and was linked to the protest issued by the Dutch in conjunction with the Renville Agreement, signed January 17, 1948, which, according to the Netherlands, did not allow the Republic of Indonesia to form new contacts or relations with other countries. Another factor that delayed diplomatic relations was the Madiun Rebellion in 1948, in which the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) was involved and Soeripno, along with other PKI leaders, was executed. Soeripno had returned to Indonesia with Musso, a PKI leader who had lived for a long time in the Soviet Union. The Madiun Rebellion in September 1948 and the execution of PKI leaders including Musso and Soeripno defeated efforts from both sides to open formal diplomatic relations.

In fact, it was only after the Netherlands recognized the sovereignty of the United States of Indonesia (RUSI) in the Agreement of the Round Table Conference of December 1949 that diplomatic relations could be opened. The Soviet Union recognized Indonesian sovereignty by sending a letter from Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrey Vyshinsky to Indonesian Minister of Foreign Affairs Mohammad Hatta on February 3, 1950 (AVP RF F.071 Op. 6. D. 3. p. 3. L. 6). Three months after Soviet recognition on May 3, 1950, the Indonesian government sent a Missi (delegation) to Moscow. Through Minister of Foreign Affairs Vyshinsky, the Soviet government supported Indonesia’s desire to become a member of the United Nations. The 1950 delegation’s purpose was to receive acknowledgment and support from the Soviet Union as a permanent member of the UN Security Council and to make plans to place diplomatic representatives in both countries (See ANRI KPM No. 2338).

The opening of diplomatic representation between Moscow and Jakarta was delayed until 1954, about four years after the Soviet Union recognized Indonesian sovereignty. The obstacles had to do with Indonesian internal problems; caution and disparity of views about the necessity of opening a diplomatic mission with the Soviet Union were factors that delayed opening representative offices in both countries. However, while political dynamics continued in the domestic sector and in international politics, under the leadership of Indonesian Minister of Foreign Affairs Moekarto Notowidigdo (in the Wilopo Cabinet), the Indonesian government continued efforts to open a diplomatic mission in the Soviet Union. Geopolitical considerations, development of international politics, and economic considerations were reasons to open an embassy in Moscow immediately.

Soviet Foreign Policy and the Role of the Khrushchev–Sukarno Relationship

After Stalin’s death, the Soviet Union’s new leadership brought about drastic changes in foreign policy. The new leader, Nikita Khrushchev, paid attention to Third World countries as potential partners in a new world order, a consequence of the peaceful coexistence principle launched by the Soviet Union. Peaceful coexistence was not Nikita Khrushchev’s idea. Lenin first introduced it, but Khrushchev emphasized a new and different perspective. With Khrushchev’s rise, efforts to open a diplomatic mission between Indonesia and the Soviet Union gained momentum and became a milestone in bilateral relations.

In foreign affairs, Khrushchev inherited from Stalin complicated effects of Cold War escalation and unfriendly relations with Western countries. Rooted in “Socialism in One Country,” Stalin’s foreign policies treated capitalist countries as opponents. The Soviet Union’s relations with politically neutral countries in Eastern Europe (such as Yugoslavia) worsened. Stalin’s disapproval of the 1951 San Francisco Treaty of Peace led to unclarity in the relationship with Japan in the aftermath of the Second World War. In his critique of Stalin, Khrushchev argued that Stalin’s policies eliminated the Soviet Union’s opportunity to decide the fate of Japan after the Second World War, similar to the problem with Germany. Geopolitically, such policies disadvantaged the Soviet Union’s position in the international arena. Stalin’s attention was focused mostly on the rivalry with the West, so other substantial problems were ignored.

Khrushchev believed that socialism could live in every type of society and that, therefore, peaceful coexistence was the ideal type of relation between countries that espoused different social systems. Based on this view, he introduced radical changes to Soviet foreign policy. In the first years of his governance, he paid visits to a number of Western European countries, such as the United Kingdom and France, and even visited the United States. He went to Yugoslavia and normalized diplomatic relations between the two countries.

The important changes made in Soviet foreign policy had to do with Khrushchev’s conclusions about world threats and how to deal with them. In the XX Congress of CPSU, among other things, he said that in the absence of a new fatal and inevitable war, it is possible to build socialism in various ways, including the peaceful way; it is possible to have a peaceful coexistence between countries with different social systems and politics (Kovalev, 1984, p. 48).

Points 2 and 3 state important matters, which were then implemented in Soviet foreign policy. The second point countered Stalin’s misinterpretation that socialism could only be built through violence. According to Khrushchev, through peaceful means, people could rise to build a socialized society. As for the third point, the Khrushchev government believed it possible to have mutual respect and to live side by side in peace (mirnoye sosushyestvovaniye) with countries that have different social systems and politics. His idea meant not fighting against social systems and politics considered correct by other countries. At the same time, Khrushchev added that peaceful coexistence is a special form of class struggle that avoids military and violent means.

This policy came from Khrushchev’s efforts to avoid a dangerous frontal war in light of the development of nuclear weapons. Although the struggle against capitalist and imperialist countries continued, Khrushchev attempted to avoid direct conflict with Western Bloc countries that were convinced the world was divided into two powers firmly separated by their ideological principles.

Although at the beginning of his leadership, Khrushchev optimistically attempted to build better relations with Western countries, including America and Britain, his hopes failed because the West was already deeply trapped in its “old” perception of Stalinist Russia. According to Kovalev (1984), the Soviet Union’s foreign policy under him had specific objectives: (1) to guarantee, with other socialist countries, conditions of international relations for the development of socialism and communism; (2) to strengthen the unity and solidarity of socialist countries, their friendship and brotherhood; (3) to support freedom of movement and independence and to materialize multidimensional cooperation with young, developing countries; (4) to maintain principles of peaceful coexistence with different social systems; to oppose the power of aggressive imperialism; to keep humanity from the threat of a new war (Kovalev, 1984, pp. 48–50). This fourth point stressed the importance of peaceful coexistence with different social systems and was meant not only for capitalist countries but also for countries without similar social systems or those based on socialist understanding. Within this framework, Khrushchev paid much attention to Third World countries. He saw the potential of new countries (Asian, African, and Latin American) as partners in his fight against capitalism. At this point, he met Sukarno, who was then known as an initiator of solidarity among Asian and African countries. The success of the Afro-Asian Conference in Bandung raised Sukarno’s reputation in Khrushchev’s eyes.

Khrushchev’s role as leader is central to understanding the Soviet attitude and position on the Soviet–Indonesian relationship. Specifically, this role was based on the personal relationship, beginning in 1956, between him and President Sukarno. A formal relation developed rapidly, along with bilateral relations between their countries. Sukarno’s four visits to Moscow and his intense meetings with Khrushchev created a certain chemistry between the two leaders. Because the Soviet political system holds the axiom that the leader is able to do anything and make any decision, bilateral relations and powerful support for Indonesia were very much determined by the positive relations between the leaders. In general, Khrushchev saw Sukarno as a leader with a keen intellect and as a hard worker who had dedicated his life to the independence and greatness of his nation. Khrushchev appreciated and honored Sukarno. The latter’s skill in speaking and his breadth of knowledge were very impressive to many Russians, including Khrushchev. In his memoirs, Khrushchev wrote:

President Sukarno first came to visit us [that is, in August–September 1956]. We welcomed him with the honors that were his due. He impressed us as an educated man and above all an intelligent man. After all, education and intelligence do not always go together. I have met many educated people who were not very intelligent, and the other way around, people who had not received systematic education but on the other hand had brilliant minds. In Sukarno’s case he had both education and intelligence. We established good relations with him right away. We liked him. (Khrushchev, 1999, p. 785)

In his conversation with Sukarno on a train trip from Moscow to St. Petersburg, Khrushchev frankly stated that Sukarno was luckier than he, who had graduated only from a worker faculty; therefore, he confessed he had to catch up by reading a lot in his spare time. He read so he could be equal in conversations with other leaders. Igor Kashmadze quoted Khrushchev in his memoirs:

You, Mr. President, […] got a bright university education. I never even had any education during my exile, and instead of having education at an elite university, I only finished Rabfak (faculty of worker). In the meantime, I had to interact with highly educated people like you. This is why I try to catch up by reading a lot, especially every night. (Kashmadze, 2009, p. 8)

Personal closeness, in turn, encouraged rapid diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and Indonesia during Khrushchev’s leadership. The figure, personality, and diplomatic style of the first Indonesian president was memorable, so much so that Khrushchev sought friendship (druzhba), both personally and as head of state. Sukarno’s positive image was the opposite of Khrushchev’s perceptions of other leaders, such as Mao Zedong:

[…] in our private meetings, Mao gave character sketches of the other members of the CCP Central Committee Politburo. His way of characterizing his comrades put me on guard. He spoke of most of them in gloomy terms; I would even say he besmirched them. He painted everything in black colors. I cannot recall now, word for word, what he said about Liu Shaoqi, but he had very bad things to say about Liu, citing certain facts as proof. He also gave a negative characterization of Zhou Enlai […] Mao had just as bad characterizations of all the others except for Deng Xiaoping, who at that time was already general secretary of the CCP Central Committee. Mao pointed at him and said: “See that little fellow over there?” Mao and I were having a conversation during a reception, sitting apart from the others. “He’s a very wise man, sees far into the future.” (Khrushchev, 1999, p. 791)

Khrushchev described Mao Zedong as a leader who did not respect or listen to other people and was always suspicious of people around him, especially those he did not like. Khrushchev equated Mao’s personality with Stalin’s. In Khrushchev’s point of view, Stalin was always suspicious, attributed negative characteristics to people around him, and saw people close to him as his enemies. Khrushchev’s perception of Mao later became a factor that encouraged the breakup of the harmonious relations between the Soviet Union and China.

As his friend, Khrushchev knew that Sukarno had a weakness that should have been avoidable by a great person like Sukarno:

[…] he was completely unrestrained in his attitude toward women. That was a notable weakness of his. I am not revealing any secrets here. The newspapers of those times were studded with accounts of his amorous adventures. We condemned that aspect of his behavior, but it is not easy to fight successfully against human weaknesses. We could not understand how an intelligent man, holding such an important post, could allow himself to engage in such escapades in his personal life. This discredited him in international circles as well as in his own country. (Kashmadze, 2009, p. 8)

Nevertheless, as a friend, Khrushchev understood and thought it difficult to change one’s behavior, although he did regret that such weakness could discredit Sukarno and his country.

Khrushchev was an open leader; he spoke frankly, humorously, and at the same time firmly. Sometimes he mixed serious sayings and jokes. On one occasion, Khrushchev received Nasution, who was visiting Moscow to buy weaponry during the liberation of what was known as West Irian at the time. As Nasution presented the request for military assistance, Khrushchev said that President Sukarno was a “plunderer” (for the number of weapons requested). The relationship between Sukarno and Khrushchev must have been close if he could comfortably make such a statement.

Another incident that showed Khrushchev’s attitude and character was the appointment of the Soviet Ambassador, Nikolai Aleksandrovich Mikhailov, to Indonesia (1960–1965), as reported by Igor Kashmadze:

It can be said that Mikhailov became an ambassador by coincidence. In February 1960, he accompanied Khrushchev on a state visit to Indonesia. When he landed in Jakarta, our ambassador Boris Volkov did not meet him [Khrushchev] at the airport […] soon he [Volkov] was sent home to the Union [Soviet] with one of the planes that accompanied Khrushchev. Knowing from Khrushchev about Volkov’s “problem,” Sukarno asked whom would be sent to Jakarta as the new ambassador […] ‟Please choose [Khrushchev replied] one of the ministers that accompany me: you may choose the Minister of Culture, Mikhailov, or the Head of State Television and Radio, Kaftanov.” (Kashmadze, 2009, pp. 4–5)

Khrushchev actually gave Sukarno the choice of ambassador to Indonesia. In the end, Sukarno chose Soviet Minister of Culture Mikhailov, who had accompanied Khrushchev on the visit to Jakarta. This showed two facets of Khrushchev’s character. First, he was a hard leader and did not compromise; he could easily fire someone who was not performing his duties well. On the other hand, he gave Sukarno, a person he trusted, the discretion to choose the Soviet ambassador to Indonesia. This was a unique case in the diplomatic world. It would not have happened without trust (doverie) and friendship (druzhba) between the two leaders.

The Soviets, under Khrushchev’s leadership, gave both political and military support to the Indonesian struggle in reclaiming what was known as West Irian at the time. The political support was given to assist Indonesia to gain international opinion vis-à-vis the Netherlands’ provocative actions, which could trigger regional tension. For example, on February 9, 1962, the government of the Soviet Union launched its official statement (ofitsialnoye zayavleniye) about the Soviet’s position on the what was known as West Irian at the time dispute. In the statement published in the daily newspaper Pravda on the same day, the Soviet government stated:

The Soviet government firmly stands on the policy to rescue peace and to strengthen national independence for all states and nations. It cannot help but pay attention to the dangerous situation as a result of the impact of aggressive actions by the Netherlands toward the Republic of Indonesia. By long continuing to refuse the peaceful solution of the what was known as West Irian at the time issue, the government of the Netherlands now stands directly on the path of military provocation. (Pravda, February 9, 1962, as quoted by Solmov, 2009)

In this statement, the Soviet government emphasized the Netherlands’ aggressive actions toward Indonesia. The Soviets believed that the Netherlands had been guilty of military provocation, which endangered world peace and security, and that their efforts delayed the peaceful solution of the what was known as West Irian at the time dispute. The Soviet attitude confirmed alignment with Indonesia and secured in public opinion the fact that the Netherlands had exercised aggressive action.

On an earlier state visit to Indonesia in February 1960, Nikita Khrushchev in a speech in Bali quoted by the daily newspaper Warta Sovjet (June 23, 1962) stated: “The Soviet people consider that [Indonesian] claim to reunite what was known as West Irian at the time to the motherland of Indonesia is a fair and legal claim. You have our sympathy completely.” The degree of support declared in the statement above shows the significant increase in support amid the escalation of conflict between the Republic of Indonesia and the Netherlands. In a subsequent official statement on February 9, 1962, the Soviet Union even brought up the issue of the attack by the Netherlands on an Indonesian patrol ship in the Sea of Arafuru (January 15, 1962) as an aggressive step by the Netherlands that was supported by Western powers to protect their colonial system and resist the national independence movement.

A Pravda report of February 9, 1962, quoted by Solmov, 2009, states:

Lately in the what was known as West Irian at the time region, the military of the Netherlands had been mobilized on a large scale. One of the hardest actions was pirate-like on an Indonesian patrol ship by Dutch ships on the open sea. By taking such steps toward an independent Republic of Indonesia, the Dutch tried to prolong their colonial power over what was known as West Irian at the time to make that Indonesian region a front post of the military block of aggressive Western countries in their efforts to resist the national independence movement of nations in Southeast Asia. (Pravda, February 9, 1962, as quoted by Solmov, 2009)

This action by the Netherlands was construed as an effort to expand its colonial power and to ignore Indonesian sovereignty. The Soviets believed that this Dutch maneuver did not stand alone and was part of the Western Bloc strategy to reintroduce imperialism against the spirit of the freedom of nations that was on the rise in Southeast Asia. The Netherlands was suspected of wanting to make Indonesia the front post (forpost) for the military bloc of the Western countries.

The Soviet government indicated that the attitude of the Dutch and other colonialists was supported by the military powers of the Western Bloc, that is, NATO and SEATO. For the Soviet Union, the what was known as West Irian at the time issue was closely related to the support from the Western countries in their efforts to destroy the independence movement. The Soviets linked this matter to the statement of the United States’ 7th Fleet command, which was ready to support the Netherlands in case of combat. This was mentioned in the following quote:

What is the reason for the Dutch, which until this moment have ignored the UN resolution about the eradication of colonialism which had direct connection with what was known as West Irian at the time? This matter can be explained by the fact that behind them, including behind the Portuguese and other colonialists, there are aggressive powers such as NATO and SEATO, which run politics of the demolition of the national independence movement of nations. In this connection, the US 7th fleet command had stated that in case of combat between Indonesia and the Netherlands, the US Navy will take action. (Pravda, February 9, 1962, as quoted by Solmov, 2009)

Besides that, the Soviet government also believed that with this action the Dutch had violated the UN Declaration on the right of independence of nations. The Dutch action, furthermore, had violated the national sovereignty and the unity of a country, which were regulated in the UN charter. The Soviet government used the term “rude violation” (gruboye protivorechie) to indicate a serious diplomatic statement, ignoring the polite terminology commonly used in diplomatic language.

The harsh criticism of the Dutch action is a manifestation of the Soviet political support that was given at the right time. Only two weeks after the Arafuru Sea incident, the Soviet government declared in an official statement (on February 9, 1962) their support of the Indonesian position. The open statement by the Soviet government had a huge impact at a time when the various diplomatic steps taken by Indonesia on its own in the international arena had not produced significant results. This Soviet move strengthened the international opinion that the Dutch were in the wrong position in their attempts to defend this position by any means necessary.

Conclusion

In establishing Soviet–Indonesian diplomatic relations, the years 1945–1964 are a critical period that naturally divides into two parts: 1945–1953 under Joseph Stalin’s leadership, and 1953–1964 under Nikita Khrushchev. The 1945–1949 period was marked by Soviet efforts to support Indonesia’s struggle to gain international recognition of sovereignty through the Soviet Union’s role as one of the decision makers in the UN Security Council.

Stalin’s approval of Foreign Minister Molotov’s proposition that the Indonesia question should become the main agenda of discussions between foreign ministers of the Allied countries actually signaled the quarrel between the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom, in which the former accused the latter of abusing its power in Indonesia. At the same time, the problem of Indonesia was widely discussed among Russian intellectuals.

During Khrushchev’s leadership, diplomatic relations progressed. When Indonesia initiated the Asia-Africa Conference in 1955, the Khrushchev government perceived Indonesia as an important partner for the Soviet Union’s policy of peaceful coexistence. The mutual interests of both countries were strengthened by the leadership and personal friendship between Nikita Khrushchev and Sukarno.

Personal contact between Sukarno and Khrushchev became a pillar for bilateral relations. Private diplomatic messages between them apparently developed harmony between the two countries. In the Stalin era, no direct contact occurred between Stalin and Sukarno, and certainly not the friendship enjoyed by Khrushchev. Contact during Stalin’s era took place only at the level of minister of foreign affairs and diplomats who met in UN Security Council debates.

Based on the spirit of druzhba (friendship) and doverie (trust), Khrushchev and Sukarno’s personal connection was a very important foundation which sustained the bilateral diplomatic relations between the two countries. Thanks to the power of trust between the two leaders, the two countries quickly reached agreements on many important decisions without the obstruction of complicated bureaucracy. Because of this relationship, Indonesia gained the Soviet Union’s full political and military support in reclaiming West Papua. After the fall of the Khrushchev government in 1964, Indonesia certainly did not receive the same amount of support in its confrontation with Malaysia in later political developments. In Soviet political culture, the leadership factor played an important role in policy-making, including in diplomacy and foreign policy.

The personal relationship between the two leaders significantly impacted all levels in the Soviet hierarchy. This enabled Khrushchev to make quick decisions and cut through existing bureaucratic procedures. Nevertheless, just as leadership is vulnerable to change, so are personal relationships among leaders. Khrushchev’s government had been the main pillar which sustained diplomatic relations between Indonesia and the Soviet Union, but its sudden fall in October 1964 was the counterpoint in the relation between the two countries. Subsequently, the period between October 1964 and September 1965 was a transition period in which diplomatic relations between the two countries deteriorated.