Introduction

In Indonesia, discussions on memories of the Seroja Operation, a military act, and the government efforts to overcome its subsequent problems have not attracted much attention. This topic is sensitive due to the discussion of government responsibility for soldiers and their families after military operations, many of which are launched for the benefit of the state. However, the discussion is important because such operations have a direct effect on the fate of deployed soldiers and their families. Numerous soldiers are killed, or they return home with physical disabilities, and the government is required to issue policies related to their fate and families.

Operation Seroja was the code name of the largest joint military action of the New Order period, with the aim to exert control over Dili, East Timor (Singh, 1998, pp. xv–xvi). With the launch of this operation in December 1975, Indonesia’s physical involvement in the East Timor conflict began. The announced goal was to halt the Fretilin-led spread of communism and to maintain the political stability of Indonesia and, more broadly, of Southeast Asia. The New Order government, with its centralistic and militaristic tendencies, played an important role in the emergence of conflict (Hadi, 2007, p. 273). Operation Seroja had a tremendous effect on soldiers, civilians, and their families. On December 7, 1975, the operation began when the Indonesian military forces moved from the border area near Atambua into East Timor, although they were not able to enter Dili itself until 1976. As the Indonesian troops advanced, several battles and smaller skirmishes occurred and continued until the completion of Operation Seroja in 1978. Numerous deaths were incurred on both the Fretilin and Indonesian military sides. In addition, the death toll among civilians is also estimated to be high, with many casualties yet uncounted. The Indonesian Red Cross found at least four mass graves at Atleu and Same, each of which contained 40–60 bodies (Subroto, 1997, p. 208). Most of these victims were not armed soldiers but members and sympathizers of Fretilin, political opponents who were captured and killed.

With a better knowledge of the battlefield in several regions, Fretilin guerrillas were able to kill and injure Indonesian soldiers. Still, many soldiers returned home, though not all were in perfect physical health. With lost limbs to gunfire and explosions, the large number of wounded, disabled, and dead soldiers has given rise to social and economic problems because they lost their livelihoods, families lost their breadwinners, and military children lost the financial support needed for their education.

Given that Operation Seroja was an official mission ordered by President Soeharto, the subsequent problems experienced by the soldiers and their families could be considered the government’s responsibility. While the Republic of Indonesia declared the operation successful in bringing East Timor into the fold of the Unitary State as its 27th province, the treatment of veterans and their families did not reflect the government’s appreciation for the role of the soldiers in the mission.

This study of the effect of the Seroja Operation used a historical approach. The first stage involved a search for relevant sources. Interviews were carried out among residents of the Seroja Complex—the residential compound specifically built to house Operation Seroja families—which yielded 20 randomly selected informants, including 10 Operation Seroja veterans, 5 children of former Seroja soldiers, and 5 widows (warakawuri). The number of informants was considered to be representative of all residents of Seroja Complex for two reasons. First, many Seroja Complex residents have died or moved, and thus the number of residents has considerably diminished. Seroja Complex archives show that in 1982, the residents included 140 soldiers and 86 warakawuri, while in 2017, only 65 soldiers and 101 warakawuri remained (Seroja Complex archives, 2017). As soldiers died over the years, the number of warakawuri increased and remained in the Seroja Complex. The second reason is that the majority of Operation Seroja troops were loyal supporters of President Soeharto, evidenced by the fact that every interviewed Seroja soldier expressed support for the regime. The possible reason for this continued support of President Soeharto was that they received more welfare benefits from the New Order than from the post–New Order government. The reason is also related to East Timor’s separation from Indonesia after the fall of the New Order. In fact, most informants reacted positively to all New Order government aid programs. In addition, interviews were carried out using a general interview approach to understand their experiences and feelings. With the aim to enrich interview data, this study also collected primary archives such as photos, tables, and recordings from the National Library of Indonesia, Dharma Bhakti Social Foundation, Seroja Complex, and the DFM Radio recording (2007) archive. Subsequently, data were subject to qualitative analysis, and interpretation required connections and efforts to understand the spirit of the period under discussion.

The Impact of Operation Seroja on Families and Soldiers

Operation Seroja resulted in the loss of thousands of Indonesian Armed Forces (ABRI) soldiers in East Timor. Thousands more who survived came home with physical disabilities and psychological trauma. Table 1 shows the number of Operation Seroja soldiers who died from 1975 to 1978.

Table 1 Recapitulation of Seroja soldiers killed, 1975–1978
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Table 1 shows that the Soeharto government fielded all branches of the Armed Forces: Army, Navy, Air Force, Police, and other supporting volunteer elements. From 1975 to 1978, the records show that as high as 2209 combatants were killed in the battle in East Timor.

Subsequently, from 1978 to 1982, 140 people with disabilities from all units of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Police were recorded as residents in the Seroja Complex in Bekasi (Seroja Complex Archive, 2002). Between 1973 and 1977, 2538 children of Seroja soldiers became orphans and 830 women were widowed (Retnowati, 2007, p. 245).

To address these problems regarding Operation Seroja veterans and their families, the Soeharto government created various aid programs, including (1) construction of new housing and facilities (Kompas, 1980); (2) provision of benefits, compensation, and employment (Peraturan Pemerintah Republik Indonesia No. 36, 1968); (3) scholarships for children of former Seroja veterans (Koran Angkatan Bersenjata, 1979; Pratikno, personal communication, April 21, 2016); and (4) the Satyalancana Seroja award for Seroja veterans (Tohroni, personal communication, February 22, 2017).

The Soeharto government launched the programs for Operation Seroja veterans and families in line with Decree No. IV/MPR/1978 on the Guidelines of State Policy issued by the Indonesian People’s Assembly. Below is a 1978 quotation from GBHN, Part D, on the Direction and Policy of Development of Welfare obtained from Decree No. IV/MPR/1978, pp. 622:

  1. (a)

    Care of elderly people, poor, abandoned children, orphans, carried out in collaboration with communities and social institutions. In addition, more efforts are to be made to ensure that people with disabilities have access to employment opportunities that are appropriate to their capacity.

  2. (b)

    Support of disabled veterans is to be further improved to be in accordance with their duty (dharma) of devotion to the nation and state.

In other words, the social welfare of Republic of Indonesia soldiers, especially veterans, had captured government attention. In addition, the quotation also indicates the creation of social programs to help the lower classes through the assistance of social organizations. Thus, the Soeharto government did not implement veterans’ programs without clear written regulation. Several policies were not directly executed by the government, but by social organizations as ordered by President Soeharto. These organizations were the foundations established by President Soeharto himself to address social problems, namely, Dharma Bhakti Social Foundation (Dharmais), Trikora Foundation, and the Supersemar Foundation.

Although administered by foundations, part of the funds were provided by the government. From the net profit of state-owned banks, 2.5% were allocated to the three foundations. These amounts were directly controlled by Government Regulation No. 15, year 1976, and subsequently by the Decree of the Minister of Finance no. 333/KMK.011/1978, which further increased the allocation to 5%. The state-owned banks are instructed to deposit 50% of the 5% net income to the Supersemar, Dharmais, and the Trikora Foundations. Clearly, the existence of and actions by these foundations cannot be separated from the government. In addition, funds were also derived from other sources, such as President Soeharto himself, who donated part of his personal wealth as initial capital for these foundations. Different sources of funding include other social organizations and individual donors (Hadiyanto, 1995, pp. 9–10).

Memories of War from Those Who Returned Home

During the Operation Seroja, the deployed soldiers had no option to reject their assignment and were obliged to fight for their country regardless of the battle conditions. They were expected to be prepared to sacrifice their lives in defense of Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution (Notosusanto, 1985, p. 175). On taking up this onerous duty, the soldiers were carrying out orders issued by their superiors, knowing little about international politics and interventions. To them, this was entirely a duty and a manifestation of loyalty to the country. To quote Colonel (Ret) Ronny Muaya (personal communication, April 22, 2017),

For soldiers, orders from supervisors cannot be refused. They must be carried out; this includes carrying out war orders and I am proud that the army had the experience of war, because this is the duty of the state.

Although East Timor (now Timor Leste) eventually gained its independence, the military views Operation Seroja in a positive light. In addition to pride in what was perceived as an admittedly temporary success, that of integrating East Timor into the Republic of Indonesia, the military operation was also a measure of the capabilities of the Indonesian military. To the soldiers, despite all the casualties, the military operations in East Timor offered priceless combat experience.

One Operation Seroja warrior, Colonel Ronny Muaya, shared memories of his service in East Timor, as reported by CNN Indonesia on November 6, 2014:

The war was bad. Ronny was a member of the 502nd Kostrad Battalion assigned as company commander in Operation Seroja in Timor Leste, which was still called East Timor at that time.

It affected the psychology of a person seriously, especially when 30 people died in one incident. This battle, according to him, was hard-fought because Fretilin forces gave extraordinary resistance and they were armed with standard equipment used by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO, while Indonesian forces only used the M1 Garand semi-automatic firearm, which was an inherited infantry standard rifle from World War II.

“I was shot in the fighting and immediately lost consciousness. What was worse was that it was very difficult to evacuate”. After being shot, he did not remember what happened next on the battlefield. When he opened his eyes he was already in the hospital a week later. Even though he was seriously injured and lost his hand, he was grateful that he was still alive. Although he did not remember the incident after he was shot, Colonel Ronny often imagined an evacuation process that made him shudder because the terrain of the location of the battle was very difficult.

Post-war Social and Economic Problems for Soldiers and Their Families

For surviving widows and families, life became immeasurably harder, especially because the daily needs and education of minor children had to be met.

In a 2016 interview, Darifnidar, chair of Warakawuri Seroja (Seroja Widows), recalled that after her husband left to serve in East Timor, her financial situation changed dramatically. She had to support their six-year-old son by herself, where before her husband fulfilled all economic needs. The situation was even worse for widows who had no marketable skills. This problem was not limited to only families left to vie for themselves upon the death of their heads of household, but also those of disabled veterans. People with disabilities faced serious limitations in their capacity to carry out social roles and to function within the community.

Families left behind by their heads of households experienced a major loss. Agung Pratikno, the son of a Seroja soldier who served as the chairperson of the Indonesian Communication Forum of Sons and Daughters of Retired Officials (FKPPI) in 2016, said that when his father died in Operation Seroja, his mother made a living by making matches and selling them for additional income. The children suffered psychological trauma (Pratikno, personal communication, April 21, 2016). In addition, many warakawuri experienced severe stress because they felt that they had no future (Wijanarko, personal communication, April 8, 2017). Many of them gave up their children, whom they felt they cannot support, to the Seroja Orphanage (Wijanarko, personal communication, April 8, 2017).

Psychological problems are not only experienced by the families but also by former soldiers who returned with physical disabilities. The loss of one or several body parts does not only impair bodily function but also affects the psyche, and these veterans had abundant psychological problems.

Post-war Government Programs for the Rehabilitation of Soldiers and Their Families

The problems suffered by families of veterans and soldiers who had lost their lives were eventually noted by the New Order government (Meinarno, 2006, p. 2). As solution, the Soeharto government created various rehabilitation programs to fulfill its responsibilities to the former soldiers and their families in the aftermath of the Seroja Operation. These programs include the construction of new housing and facilities, provision of pension and employment benefits, provision of scholarships to the sons and daughters of former Seroja warriors (Pratikno, personal communication, April 21, 2016), and awarding of the Satyalancana Seroja military decoration.

The construction of new residential areas for veterans of Operation Seroja and their families was handled by the Dharma Bhakti Social Foundation, or Dharmais, which directly implemented the policies of President Soeharto.

The Dharmais Foundation was established by President Soeharto on August 8, 1975, with himself as the chairperson. The foundation engages in social activities and aims to improve public welfare by helping Indonesian citizen groups who face particular challenges, such as the orphans, physically and psychologically disabled people, elderly, and the homeless (Dharmais, 2017).

The Dharmais Foundation played a large role in the residential development, building four housing complexes for former Operation Seroja soldiers. Three of these are located in Bandung, Malang, and Solo, while the largest is in Bekasi (Meinarno, 2006, p. 2). The Office of the Center for Disability Rehabilitation (PUSREHABCAT) of the Department of Defense and Security was in charge of the housing built by the Dharmais Foundation in 1976 and 1977 (Seroja Complex Archive, 2002). A total of 467 small and medium-sized houses were built on a land area of 40,000 square meters (Seroja Complex Archive, 2002). Table 2 lists families and unions that received homes provided by the Soeharto government through the Dharmais Foundation from 1978 to 1982. The recipients are classified by unit and rank, and all former soldiers who received housing aid were disabled.

Table 2 List of disabled persons of ABRI Group II and Warakawuri former Operation Seroja that received assistance for housing complex of former Seroja, Bulakmacan Village of Bekasi Regency from the Dharmais Foundation, 1978–1982 (Phases I–IV)
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The government also provided retirement benefits and new jobs for former Seroja soldiers and warakawuri. During Operation Seroja, a soldier who could no longer perform his duties due to disability was discharged. Widows had to support families without their husbands. This scenario meant that the Soeharto government was responsible for the provision of retirement benefits, compensation, support for training in new skills, and employment for the family. The government itself directly implemented these programs, unlike the housing complexes that were built by the foundation.

Seroja veterans and widows received compensation in the form of death gratuities as an expression of condolence and appreciation from the Soeharto government. Compensation was given once during their transfer to the Seroja Complex in Bekasi. The amount varied depending on the soldier’s rank, class, and physical condition. For example, a widow, Salamah, received a compensation of 24 times the last pay received by her husband before his death in East Timor (Muaya, personal communication, April 22, 2017). In total, the average compensations received by widows in the Bintara group was Rp 54,000,000 in the period from 1977 to the 1980s. The range of compensation was as follows (Muaya, personal communication, April 22, 2017):

  1. 1.

    Death of soldier: 24 times the last income

  2. 2.

    Severe disability: 18 times the last income

  3. 3.

    Moderate disability: 12 times the last income

  4. 4.

    Light disability: 6 times the last income

In addition, the government also provided scholarships for children of Seroja veterans. Based on our sources, two of President Soeharto’s foundations, Supersemar and Trikora, provided scholarship funding for all the Seroja soldiers’ children from kindergarten to college.

In 1979, the Secretary of the Trikora Foundation, Col. (Ret.) H. Parwis Nasution, conveyed that they began providing scholarship assistance to Trikora, Dwikora, and Seroja daughters. The monthly scholarship fund amounts are:

  1. 1.

    Primary School- Rp 3000

  2. 2.

    First High School (SLP)- Rp 4000

  3. 3.

    Senior High School (SLA)- Rp 5000

  4. 4.

    Higher Education- Rp 6000 (Kompas, 1979)

The Satyalancana Seroja represents the government’s highest appreciation for soldiers in East Timor. For those who came home with disabilities, they received honor for their last missions (Muaya, personal communication, April 22, 2017). For warakawuri, the Satyalancana Seroja is an acknowledgment of their husbands’ contribution in the struggle to defend Indonesia (Pratikno, personal communication, April 21, 2016).

Reactions of Seroja Veterans and Their Families to Soeharto Government Aid Programs

Government assistance programs generate a wide range of responses from the residents of the Seroja Complex. Several people are satisfied, while others are not. However, almost all informants reacted positively to the Soeharto government aid at the time of this study. The possible reason for such positive feedback is linked to their negative response to the government following the Soeharto era. The majority of Seroja Bekasi Complex residents believe that they received better regard from the Soeharto government than the subsequent administration after the collapse of the New Order.

An example of the positive reactions given by the warakawuri is from Salimah, who is highly grateful for her current situation. She became a widow when her husband, a soldier, was killed on the battlefield in East Timor in 1975–1976. When she learned of the death of her husband, she quickly received the help she needed from the government, including assistance for her move from Purwokerto to Bekasi. She said that she did not spend one rupiah on the relocation, which was all borne and provided for by the government.

Similarly, Yulia Partini (personal communication, April 7, 2017), a warakawuri of a marine, was immediately approached by her husband’s unit and was offered a house in the Bekasi Seroja Complex. Yulia immediately accepted the assistance because she and her daughter were the only survivors (Table 3).

Table 3 Recapitulation of satisfaction interview results toward President Soeharto’s aid programs from sample of 20 residents of Seroja Complex
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Although many residents expressed satisfaction with the Soeharto government assistance, a few were not satisfied and believed that such aid was a fundamental obligation, a manifestation of responsibility to its troops. One such opinion came from a youth activist.

Henu is a political activist who serves in the current Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP) as a member of the House of Representatives (DPR). When his father died in East Timor, he lived apart from his family and developed his independence. As a student, he was an activist at the Institute of Teacher Training and Education (IKIP), Jakarta, and participated in the referendum supporting East Timor in 1999. He believed that the New Order government had been mistaken to incorporate East Timor into the Unitary Republic of Indonesia. This position led to confrontation with the police during the New Order period, sparking his resentment of the government. Thus, when asked about his satisfaction with the assistance program, he replied that he considered the aid as a government obligation. He also argued that the New Order government should have provided more assistance than what was given (Sunarko, personal communication, April 8, 2017).

Each resource person has beliefs based on past experience, such as those with the policies of different periods of governments, leading to different views and responses among residents of the Seroja Complex in Bekasi.

Conclusion

The policy of the New Order government in dealing with soldiers and their families who were victims of the Seroja Operation can be used as a policy model that can be replicated for the military casualties of other previous operations, including the Aceh-GAM conflict. Similarly, soldiers killed or wounded in the United Nations’ peacekeeping missions abroad also deserve the government’s attention, and the welfare of the veterans’ families is of particular concern. Supporting small businesses for family members who become the sole source of support for disabled soldiers is a worthy program. In addition to channeling the skills of the family members of the veterans, such programs can help create new jobs in the informal sector.

The findings of this chapter show that in spite of all the provided facilities, not all of the beneficiaries are satisfied with the program. Responses toward the program depend on the individual’s background and ideological position. The younger generation, with a more critical distance to the event, is prone to have a less favorable response. In other words, the compensation provided by the Soeharto government is not entirely sufficient to overcome the excesses of the Seroja Operation.

However, the change of government also brought changes to policy priorities. During the New Order, the security approach was considered as a priority to safeguard economic development. On the other hand, the dual function of the Armed Forces was subjected to vehement criticism toward the end of the New Order government when the extent of human rights violations came to light. This condition then created unfavorable public perceptions regarding the existence and role of the military and undermined the continuation of rehabilitation programs such as those provided to the veterans of the Seroja Operations and their families.