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Globalization Shocks and Foreign Military Intervention

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Shocks and Political Change

Part of the book series: Evidence-Based Approaches to Peace and Conflict Studies ((EBAPCS,volume 11))

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Abstract

Given the impact that rapid shifts in globalization can have for societies and the relevance that the topic holds today, it seems wise to continue to investigate the various ways that shifts in globalization patterns impact intrastate and interstate dynamics. This chapter examines the relationship between such precipitous changes, termed globalization shocks, and the propensity to use interstate military force. In this regard, it is evident that globalization shocks weaken governments and mobilize dissent. A well-worn argument in the interstate conflict literature claims that governments that face significant domestic challenges may turn to the international arena to bolster their domestic political standing. Such struggling governments may use interstate military force both to divert elite and popular attention from domestic problems and to rally the population around their leadership (Fordham in Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics, 2017). Given such possible diversionary incentives, it seems reasonable to expect that globalization shocks may at times be associated with the use of interstate military force. Substantial globalization shocks may not only increase the probability that intrastate force is used, but they may increase as well the probability that interstate force is employed. To test this presumption, the chapter builds on a notable empirical study that finds a positive relationship between globalization shocks and civil conflict (Nieman in International Interactions 37:263–292, 2011). The chapter’s results suggest that globalization shocks are related to an increased probability of initiating foreign military intervention, but only for well-established democracies that are highly enmeshed in the global community. Advanced western democracies have a propensity to launch supportive military interventions when they experience globalization shocks, but not hostile military interventions. A similar relationship between shock and intervention is not found for other states. Although more research is needed on the subject, these results suggest that OECD Chief Economist Boone’s concerns about the potential ramifications of rapid deglobalization may be well founded. Stark increases or decreases in globalization levels may not only have wide-ranging domestic consequences, but they may also affect interstate relations.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    D. Rodrik, Harvard University, quoted in Wong and Swanson (2022).

  2. 2.

    Cited in Wong and Swanson (2022).

  3. 3.

    Elbadawi and Hegre (2008) find no relationship when looking at economic globalization and economic shocks alone.

  4. 4.

    Annual globalization rankings produced by the KOF Swiss Institute at ETH Zurich provide considerable support for this demarcation. The top ranks of the index are largely populated by advanced Western democracies, with some variation. Of course, this proxy represents a first cut at understanding the globalization shock-interstate military force relationship. It would be valuable to analyze different, more nuanced measures in the future.

  5. 5.

    Also, Bussmann and Schneider (2007) find that globalization is weakly linked to domestic instability and Karakaya (2018) finds that globalization is related to nonviolent but not violent domestic protest.

  6. 6.

    Variable 09, “Direction of Intervention,” provides this information in IMI. When a state initiated both a supportive and a hostile intervention in the same year, it is coded for each type of intervention.

  7. 7.

    Since some countries initiated two or more interventions in a single year, I also estimate negative binomial estimates of count dependent variables of different intervention types. Results remain consistent.

  8. 8.

    The IMI definition of multinational intervention is consistent with Regan’s (2002: 102). Missions taken in concert by multiple actors are considered unilateral so long as individual national militaries retain strategic and operational autonomy.

  9. 9.

    Updates to the KOF index can be found at: https://kof.ethz.ch/en/forecasts-and-indicators/indicators/kof-globalisation-index.html.

  10. 10.

    Minorites at Risk Project (2009). The countries included in the MAR Western democracies categorization are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany (West and unified), Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States.

  11. 11.

    Computed using the mchange command in Stata.

  12. 12.

    As a robustness check, Model 6 was estimated with Firth’s penalized likelihood regression which accounts for rare events with dichotomous dependent variables. Globalization shock remained positive and significant at the .01 level.

  13. 13.

    Ninety percent confidence intervals are used in Figs. 1 and 2 because the expected direction of the impact of globalization shock is known.

  14. 14.

    The US initiated the most interventions in our sample, 55. The next most frequent intervener was France, with 40 total interventions.

  15. 15.

    Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, Director General of the World Trade Organization, argued in 2022 that “re-globalization - deeper, more diversified international markets remain our best bet for supply resilience.” Quoted in Wong and Swanson (2022).

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Pickering, J. (2023). Globalization Shocks and Foreign Military Intervention. In: Thompson, W.R., Volgy, T.J. (eds) Shocks and Political Change. Evidence-Based Approaches to Peace and Conflict Studies, vol 11. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-1498-2_11

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