5.1 Introduction

In 1970, leaders of the Aboriginal community of Yirrkala in north-eastern Arnhem Land lodged the first of two objections with the Northern Territory Licensing Court to the granting of a licence for a new hotel on Aboriginal land (Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia House of Representatives Standing Committee on Aboriginal Affairs 1975). Their action is the first known instance of Aboriginal people in Australia invoking licensing laws to control the accessibility of alcohol (Brady 2004; Reid 1983: 24–27). The action occurred seven years after the community’s leaders had sent a bark petition to Canberra in an attempt to stop the federal government from excising a portion of their traditional land to make way for a new bauxite mine and township (Reid 1983). Neither the petition nor the licensing objections prevailed. The township of Nhulunbuy—20 km from Yirrkala—was built to service the mine, along with an alumina refinery and a new deep-water port.Footnote 1 Today, 50 years on, the refining of bauxite has ceased but the Walkabout Hotel still stands.

Since then, other Aboriginal communities and organisations have initiated local interventions aimed at preventing alcohol-related harms by curtailing access to alcohol, often with more success than the leaders of Yirrkala had in the 1970s. Such interventions focus on the ‘supply reduction’ component of alcohol and other drug harm minimisation policies, as outlined at the beginning of Chap. 3. In this chapter, we review evidence from local ‘supply reduction’ interventions. As we show, the approach can take different forms, but common to all of those reviewed here is a focus not on individual drinkers but on local populations—in some cases, the local Aboriginal population, in others, the entire local population, Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal.

In some Aboriginal communities, access to alcohol is managed not by population-based measures such as those discussed below, but by community-controlled licensed clubs or other outlets and/or by liquor permit systems under which approved individuals are permitted to import and consume liquor. These measures are examined separately in Chap. 7.

5.2 Local Restrictions: A Framework

In examining supply-based measures, it is useful to distinguish two dimensions, both of which influence outcomes: the measures themselves, and the sources of authority on which they rest. The former typically take one or more of five forms:

  • Price-based restrictions;

  • Restrictions on outlet trading conditions (over and above those applying to all outlets under the relevant jurisdiction’s licensing laws);

  • Restrictions on sales of particular beverages, such as cask wines;

  • Place-based restrictions;

  • Restrictions on sales to particular categories of people (again, over and above those applying to all outlets under the relevant jurisdiction’s licensing laws, such as minimum purchasing age).

The authority underpinning restrictions can take three forms:

  • voluntary: informal arrangements made by outlets at a local level, usually in consultation with community organisations;

  • negotiated-mandated: arrangements negotiated by stakeholders at a local level and given statutory recognition (e.g. as special conditions attached to a liquor outlet’s licence);

  • imposed: restrictions unilaterally imposed by governments or other higher-level authorities.

Table 5.1 Typology of restrictions on supply of alcohol, with examples
Full size table

Combinations of these two dimensions are summarised in Table 5.1. In reality, these measures are rarely found in pure form on their own but are normally packaged with other supply reduction measures, and sometimes also with demand reduction measures such as education campaigns and/or harm reduction measures.

5.3 The Foundations of Restriction-Based Approaches

As explained earlier (see Sect. 2.4 in Chap. 2), the strategy of preventing and managing alcohol problems by restricting supply, as well as reducing demand through early intervention and treatment, is based on a public health approach to alcohol policy that emerged under the auspices of the World Health Organization in the 1970s. As we showed in Chap. 2, in the 1980s the approach found favour among health professionals and others involved in the initial establishment of Aboriginal community-controlled health services.

In some areas, notably in remote Aboriginal communities in central Australia, the need for effective restrictions on availability also became a rallying cry among Aboriginal people, especially but not exclusively women (Brady 2019). In April 1993, for example, an estimated 300 Aboriginal women from central Australian communities converged on Alice Springs and marched to the office of the NT Licensing Commission to demand the revocation of licences of retailers believed to be selling alcohol to ‘grog runners’. At the time, with more than 70 outlets in a town of 26,000 people, Alice Springs was said to have the highest per capita number of outlets of any town in Australia (Northern Territory News 1993).

The context in which these and similar initiatives arose was shaped by three powerful factors. The first was an awareness, shared by many Aboriginal community residents and non-Aboriginal health and other service providers, of the terrible damage being wrought by excessive alcohol use by some drinkers. The second was the significance that many Aboriginal people attached to the ‘right to drink’ as a symbol of social and political equality—a view in turn derived from the many decades through which the same entitlement was denied to Aboriginal people (Brady 2004). The third—which was not always easy to reconcile with the second factor—was a deeply held desire on the part of many Aboriginal people to keep alcohol out of their communities.

In the NT, the introduction of a new Liquor Act in 1979, following on from the granting of limited self-government to the NT in 1978 after more than a century of rule from Adelaide or Canberra, gave legislative expression to these sentiments. On the one hand, it defined an entitlement to purchase and consume alcohol free of any race-based discrimination. At the same time, through the so-called restricted area provisions of the Act, it enabled communities to define their own regimes of restrictions or outright bans on importing and consuming alcohol, and to have these restrictions given the weight of NT law (Northern Territory of Australia 1979).

Take-up of the restricted areas provisions was rapid. Within four years, 50 communities—including most major communities—had become restricted areas (Northern Territory Racing Gaming and Liquor Commission 1988). It continued to grow, reaching 112 in 2010 (Northern Territory Licensing Commission 2010a).Footnote 2

While the restricted area provisions in the NT were the first and most widely used example in Australia, other jurisdictions also legislated to give Aboriginal communities control over alcohol. In Western Australia, the Aboriginal Communities Act, also introduced in 1979, enabled communities to create by-laws prohibiting or restricting alcohol and other substances (Western Australia 1979). Section 175 of the WA Liquor Control Act 1988 also enables the Minister, in consultation with local communities, to declare an area a ‘restricted area’ in which possession of alcohol is prohibited—a power first used in 2008 at the request of two Aboriginal communities (Western Australia 2022; Calladine 2009). In South Australia, amendments to the Aṉangu Pitjantjatjara Yankunytjatjara Land Rights Act 1981 introduced in 1987 empowered communities in the APY lands to restrict or prohibit alcohol (and other ‘regulated substances’) and gave police powers to enforce the provisions (South Australia 2017).Footnote 3

In the NT, independent reviews of the restricted area provisions of the Liquor Act showed that the provisions were by no means free of administrative and operational challenges, but nonetheless were associated with reductions in alcohol-related harms in communities and enjoyed widespread community support (d'Abbs 1989, 1990a, b; Legislative Assembly of the Northern Territory 1993; Reilly 1982). The restricted area provisions did not, however, curtail the activities of alcohol retailers, who remained free to compete for, and in some cases probably depended on, Aboriginal customers.

This was the nub of the issue that advocates of supply restrictions were determined to address. Without restrictions on suppliers over and above those universally applicable under the trading conditions of the Liquor Act, they insisted, efforts to reduce the harms that flowed from excessive drinking were doomed to fail. From the outset, however, proponents of restrictions encountered resistance, most predictably from drinkers and those who catered to them, but also from regulatory authorities, which were often reluctant to use their legal powers to promote public health, and from politicians, who showed little appetite for being seen to interfere with constituents’ ‘rights’ to drink or sell alcohol.

5.4 Restricting Alcohol Availability in Yalata, S.A.

One of the earliest instances where these issues were contested was in Yalata, a small community located on the far west coast of South Australia, close to the Eyre Highway that traverses the Nullabor Plain (Brady et al. 2003). Yalata was founded in 1952 as a Lutheran mission to house people from the Anangu Pitjantjatjara lands who had been displaced to make way for a testing site for British nuclear weapons at Maralinga. Following the repeal of laws prohibiting drinking by Aboriginal people in SA in 1965, mission authorities at Yalata sponsored the establishment of a beer canteen designed to foster a culture of moderate drinking (Brady et al. 2003). The canteen, which operated between 1969 and 1982, is examined further in Chap. 7 below. In 1975, a roadhouse at Nundroo, 47 km away from Yalata, was granted a liquor licence and began selling two litre glass flagons of fortified wine to customers from Yalata. Over the following years, levels of alcohol-related violence in the community climbed; deaths outstripped births and 30% of all deaths were alcohol-related (Brady et al. 2003).

In 1984, the community gained freehold title to its land following the introduction of land rights in South Australia by the State Government. Six years later, the Yalata council applied successfully to have Yalata declared ‘dry’ under the Aboriginal Lands Trust Act. Concurrent attempts to negotiate voluntary agreements with the licensee at Nundroo, however, were not successful. It was in this context that the events described by Brady et al. (2003) in Box 5.1 unfolded.

Box 5.1 A Crisis Precipitates Action

Extract from Brady et al. (2003: 67–69).

There was a multiple-fatality car accident on Good Friday 1991 that finally precipitated decisive action. Five Yalata people were killed on the Eyre Highway when their car, driven by an intoxicated 22-year-old man, pulled out of the Yalata roadhouse into the path of a semi-trailer. The community was traumatised by the accident, which happened in full view of anyone in the vicinity of the roadhouse. Two weeks later the council wrote to the Licensing Commissioner, asking him to visit and discuss the uncontrolled access to alcohol. The commissioner wrote to all licensed roadhouses, alerting them that he was considering an application to the Licensing Court for restrictions on take-away sales. In July he visited the community. They were ready for him.

A report had been commissioned through the local Yalata Maralinga Health Service to brief the commissioner on the mortality and morbidity associated with alcohol use (Brady 1991). When he arrived on 10 July, he was taken first to the Women’s Centre, where 20 women, all of the mature spokeswomen for the community and several who were council members, were gathered. They told him they were worried about their people, their children and their community. They told him that they had no old people left because of alcohol. They stated unequivocally that they wanted a prohibition on take-away sales to Yalata people, and that they wanted a ban on drinking at the bar in Nundroo as well. This meeting was followed by an enlarged council meeting at which the women’s suggestions were endorsed by the others present.

The meetings with the Liquor Commissioner marked the beginning of yet another round of complex interchanges and negotiations, which, it must be said, served to confuse and dismay community members. At the height of the negotiations about whether and how there were to be changed licence conditions, licensees began to circulate petitions objecting to these plans, inviting Yalata drinkers to sign up. In response to this, a Yalata woman dictated a letter that was circulated at the time, which read as follows:

Will the government take notice of those people signing names? Or are they going to listen to the people who have been arguing for that strong law for a long long time? And the bloke who’s sitting down with all the grogs [the licensee], he’s only trying to get the people: ‘you want to come and drink here, you sign your name here’ and he’ll argue for the people who sign it.

It’s for a lot of the kids, the tjitji tjuta. How many times you see tjitji [children] wandering around here, no mai [food], no camp, no tucker. In many areas peoples have strong laws. Why can’t Yalata stand up with those strong laws? Which bloke would stand up for Yalata and say we need kapi wiya [no grog].

The hotels all announced that they would oppose the suggested conditions. One hotel hosted a meeting with the surrounding farmers that reinforced the mistaken view that the take-away restrictions were going to affect local people not associated with Yalata. It was hoped that Yalata would be able to present its position to the Judge of the Licensing Court, which was that no take-away sales at all be available to residents of or visitors to Yalata. Instead, initially the Liquor Commissioner sought to negotiate a ‘compromise’ agreement with the hotels that they would sell only low-alcohol beer as both on- and off-sales for Yalata customers. Questioned by a local Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC) officer, some Yalata residents apparently acquiesced to the low-alcohol beer idea; this kind of beer had never previously been discussed in the community. The women’s group was unhappy with this proposed compromise. In the event, the proposal was declined by Judge Kelly of the Licensing Court on 13 September 1991, and the matter was further delayed.

Finally a hearing date was announced: 19 December 1991, eight months after the Easter deaths, and even then the matter was not simple. With the support of ATSIC, a large contingent of Yalata Council and community members drove the 1000 kms to Adelaide to attend and support their case at the court hearing. The licensees had hired lawyers to object to the proposed restrictions. Legal counsel for the community had been briefed to put the Yalata case, but South Australia is the only jurisdiction in Australia where parties do not have locus standi (the right of standing before the court); the community was supposed to rely on the Liquor Licensing Commissioner to speak on its behalf (Bourbon et al. 1999: 29).

There was some discussion before the Judge agreed to inform himself of the issues by agreeing to hear from lawyers. The court did not take any verbal evidence from community members. Judge Kelly finally announced his decision that no full-strength alcohol was to be sold for off-premises consumption to residents of, or travellers to or from, Yalata community and the Maralinga Lands by the licensees of Nundroo, Nullarbor and Penong. Light beer was excepted from this ruling. Commenting on the continued availability of low-alcohol beer, a council member observed that because of this, the ‘footsteps’ would still lead to the roadhouse: ‘Low alcohol beer is no good. It’s still drink, and it’s still Nundroo. They follow their step.’

Conclusion

The community had finally succeeded in imposing restrictions on the supply of alcohol in the region, after 16 years of struggle. Reflecting on the court hearing, Mabel Queama, a senior Oak Valley woman, observed in 2001:

Yes, we have been there [to the court case] for the drinking. To stop the alcoholic, Nundroo, Penong, Nullarbor. Too much fighting, murders, too many men and women drinking. Kids left behind, spend all the money on drinking. That was a long time ago [i.e. in 1991]; we have been at Oak Valley for a long time.

These restrictions remain in place today. Has the struggle been worthwhile for the community? A recent ten year follow-up study supported by Yalata Council and Yalata Health ServiceFootnote 4 provides evidence of improvements in the quality of life for the residents of Yalata, and a statistically significant decline in deaths from all causes, particularly in the 15–29 year age group. This was mainly due to a dramatic decline in alcohol-related motor vehicle accident deaths (Byrne et al. 2001). There is also now good evidence from a number of evaluated trials elsewhere in the country of the benefits of restrictions (d’Abbs et al. 1996; d’Abbs and Togni 2000; Gray 2000; Gray et al. 2000). Many long-term health and social problems remain in the community. Yvonne Edwards, a senior Yalata woman and one of those who drove to the court hearing in Adelaide in December 1991, said ten years later that ‘Everyone goes past Nundroo now, they go straight for Ceduna for the grog. Nullarbor, people don’t go there, people go straight past Penong.’ Colin Murka, a respected Yalata man and supporter of the restrictions, said in 2001 that ‘the legislation helped half-half—better than before, other people still drinking in their homes’.

5.5 The Struggle for Restrictions at Curtin Springs Roadhouse (CSR)

The following section draws on three main reports: a written submission by Pitjantjatjara Council Inc to the Northern Territory Legislative Assembly Sessional Committee on Use and Abuse of Alcohol by the Community (Pitjantjatjara Council Inc. 1990); a submission by the Ngaanyatjarra Pitjantjatjara Yankunytjatjara (NPY) Women’s Council to the Race Discrimination Commissioner (Kavanagh 1996) and an evaluation of liquor restrictions at Curtin Springs roadhouse (d'Abbs et al. 1999).

Another protracted struggle to restrict sales from a liquor outlet—one that was to have consequences beyond the immediate contestants—focused on the Curtin Springs Roadhouse (CSR), located on the Lasseter Highway linking Alice Springs with Uluru (Ayers Rock). Although situated in one of the remotest parts of Australia, CSR was readily accessible by three Aboriginal communities: Mutitjulu (100 km away, near Uluru), Imanpa (105 km away) and Amata (150 km away). It was also connected by road with several more distant communities.

Fig. 5.1
A photo of a rally of a large group of women.

Aboriginal women rallying on the Lasseter Highway in central Australia in July 1989 to demand an end to take-away alcohol sales to Aboriginal people from Curtin Springs roadhouse. (Photograph courtesy of NPY Women’s Council.)

Full size image

Traditionally, roadhouses in the NT have been subject to few restrictions on the hours during which they can serve fuel, liquor, food and other wares to the travelling public. In January 1988, the licensee of CSR reversed a long-standing policy under which he had voluntarily refrained from selling take-away liquor to Aboriginal people and began selling under what he described at the time as a ‘limit’ of no more than one carton of beer and one 4 L cask of wine per person per day (Kavanagh 1996). His reasons for doing so quickly became one of several matters of dispute. Pitjantjatjara Council, representing Aboriginal communities located in the Anangu Pitjantjatjara lands extending across parts of South Australia, Western Australia and the Northern Territory, claimed that CSR was bound by an informal agreement with local communities not to sell take-away alcohol to their residents (that is, a voluntary agreement in Table 5.1). Peter Severin, the licensee, denied the existence of any such agreement. Whatever the truth, the impact of the change was immediate and devastating, as Anangu from many communities converged on Curtin Springs to drink and take liquor back into their communities. Levels of alcohol-fuelled violence increased rapidly in communities that had previously opted to become ‘dry’ under the various state/territory-based laws referred to above.

In February 1988, the chairman of Amata community wrote to the CSR licensee asking him to reinstate restrictions on alcohol sales to Anangu, a request reiterated shortly afterwards by Pitjantjatjara Council. Both requests were declined. The licensee’s refusal precipitated a struggle that spanned almost ten years of negotiation and disputation involving the licensee, Pitjantjatjara Council, Ngaanyatjarra Pitjantjatjara Yankunytjatjara (NPY) Women’s Council, the NT Liquor Commission, NT Supreme Court and the Commonwealth Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (HREOC).

Following the licensee’s refusal to reimpose restrictions, Pitjantjatjara Council and NPY Women’s Council took their grievances to the NT Liquor Commission, requesting that, should the CSR licensee persist, his licence be suspended. The NTLC dismissed the complaints, accepting the licensee’s assurance that no informal agreement existed and ruling that the complaints were, therefore, groundless. By this time, another roadhouse located on the Lasseter Highway—the Erldunda Roadhouse—had also applied to the NTLC for a take-away licence in the face of objections from Pitjantjatjara Council. The NTLC subsequently conducted hearings in relation to CSR and the Erldunda application, during which 23 witnesses testified about increases in injury, violence, intoxication and child neglect with take-away alcohol purchased from CSR In a decision announced in May 1989, the NTLC dismissed all objections, renewed CSR’s licence with no restrictions and granted Erldunda an unrestricted licence.

The decision prompted an anguished response. In July 1989, over 300 women from all member communities of NPY marched down the Lasseter Highway to CSR (See Fig. 5.1) The NPY Chairwoman voiced their frustration:

The roadhouses are just too close to our communities. Since the Northern Territory Liquor Commission has allowed unrestricted amounts of alcohol to be available we are having lots of problems on our communities. We have been talking to the Northern Territory Government for almost 2 years now about these problems. We went to the Liquor Commission and a lot of people from our communities spoke out strong about these roadhouses. Why didn't the Government listen to all of our stories? We have been saying the same story again and again but they still won't listen. Now we are trying to fight this battle in the Northern Territory Supreme Court.

We are the women trying to be strong, trying to keep our families together, our communities together. But we can't be strong with all the grog coming in - it's just too much. We hear Mr PerronFootnote 5 talking about wanting to help Aboriginal women in Central Australia fight the grog problem. If he is really serious, why doesn't he do what we are asking him. STOP THE TAKE-AWAY LICENCES FROM CURTIN SPRINGS. How many more Aboriginal people have to die and get hurt before the Northern Territory Government will listen? (Kavanagh 1996: 3)

5.6 Alcohol Restrictions and Racial Discrimination

Around this time, the Council and NPY began to explore a different approach. One of the arguments used by licensees against restricting sales to Aboriginal people was that it would expose them to charges of racial discrimination. To test this assertion, in 1990, the Pitjantjatjara Council and NPY, together with several other Aboriginal organisations, asked the Commonwealth Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (HREOC) to examine the effects of alcohol on Aboriginal communities in the NT. Five years were to pass before the Race Discrimination Commissioner released HREOC’s report (Race Discrimination Commissioner 1995). In it, HREOC criticised the NT Government and NTLC in particular. For immediate practical purposes, however, the report’s most important outcome was a qualified endorsement of a legislative measure known as a ‘Special Measure’ for dealing with specifically Aboriginal alcohol-related harms. These are defined in Section 8(1) of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 as follows:

Special Measures taken for the sole purpose of securing adequate advancement of certain racial or ethnic groups or individuals requiring such protection as may be necessary in order to ensure such groups or individuals equal enjoyment or exercise of human rights and fundamental freedoms shall not be deemed racial discrimination, provided, however, that such measures do not, as a consequence, lead to the maintenance of separate rights for different racial groups and that they shall not be continued after the objectives for which they were taken have been achieved. (Cited in (Race Discrimination Commissioner 1995: 137)).

The Report stated that discriminatory restrictions requested by Aboriginal groups could qualify as ‘Special Measures’ under Section 8 (1) provided they satisfied three conditions:

  1. 1.

    they could be shown to lead to a reduction in alcohol-related harms in a community or communities, and to health, social and cultural benefits;

  2. 2.

    a community’s own advancement was the sole motivation behind restrictions and

  3. 3.

    the alcohol-related problems were sufficiently serious (Race Discrimination Commissioner 1995: 137–49).

Where these conditions were satisfied, HREOC would be prepared to issue a Special Measures Certificate (SMC) formally endorsing the measures.

As we show below, the interpretation as to what does or does not qualify as a ‘Special Measure’ under the Racial Discrimination Act appears to have changed since HREOC issued its report. The immediate effect of the report, however, was an application by NPY Women’s Council, lodged late in 1996, for a SMC under which CSR would not be permitted to sell any take-away alcohol to Anangu from member communities and only four cans of beer per person per day for drinking on the premises (Kavanagh 1996). At this point, CSR licensee Peter Severin ended his resistance. On 6 December 1996, he entered into an agreement with NPY to conduct two consecutive six-month trials of restrictions, commencing on 1 January 1997. Under the first set, no take-away sales were to be made to Anangu residents of 28 specified communities. Sales of liquor to Anangu for on-premises consumption were limited to between 1 and 4 pm only. The second set of restrictions, to operate from 1 July–31 December 1997, effectively reversed the emphasis of the first set. There were to be no sales to Anangu for on-premises consumption, while take-away sales were limited to six 375 ml cans of beer per person per day.

The new conditions were formally incorporated as an amendment to CSR’s liquor licence and endorsed in a SMC issued by the Commonwealth Race Discrimination Commissioner.Footnote 6 They were also the subject of an independent evaluation conducted by a team from the Menzies School of Health Research (d'Abbs et al. 1999). The evaluation found that sales of alcohol fell sharply (down by 79% on the previous year in the first six months, and by 59% during the second six months), with no evidence of a compensating increase in sales from the three other outlets in the region. Over the twelve month period, the value of meals sold by CSR increased by 25%. Alcohol-related contacts at Mutitjulu and Amata clinics fell by between 58 and 24% when compared with the preceding year. Examination of trends in selected offences (assaults, property damage, property theft, motor vehicle offences and unlawful entry of a building) recorded at Yulara and Kulgera police stations revealed similar declines compared with the preceding year. Over the same period, admissions to the Alice Springs sobering-up shelter from two communities affected by the restrictions at CSR increased, suggesting that some drinkers may have moved to Alice Springs following imposition of the trial restrictions (d'Abbs et al. 1999).

Qualitative data on people’s experiences of the restrictions were gathered through field trips to four communities and conducting interviews with drinkers, non-drinkers and other stakeholders. The reported experiences and opinions of Anangu are summarised in Box 5.2.

Box 5.2 Evaluation of Restrictions on Sales of Alcohol from Curtin Springs Roadhouse, NT, Anangu Perspectives

Edited extract from d’Abbs et al. (1999: 8).

The experiences and views of Anangu regarding alcohol in general, and the restrictions at CSR in particular, are complex, diverse and, often, a source of contention within communities. The evaluators do not claim to be able to represent all of these complexities and differences in the time available to conduct this evaluation. However, a number of points were made by Anangu men and women of various ages in the course of consultations.

...

Many drinkers—most of whom were young men—opposed the restrictions at CSR, claiming that as a result they had no alternative but to go to Alice Springs to drink, which involved longer journeys, more expenditure (and therefore more reductions in money available to the rest of the family) and greater danger. Some drinkers also held the CSR licensee, Peter Severin, in high regard, although others pointed out that Anangu had in the past had to pay considerably more for a carton of beer than non-Indigenous customers, and some complained of poor treatment by staff at CSR. Opponents of the restrictions also objected to what they regarded as their discriminatory nature; in the words of one man, the restrictions took people “back to the days of no black drinking”. It was also alleged that NPY, in negotiating the restrictions, had usurped more than its rightful powers, a reminder of the undertone of ‘gender politics’ that permeates much of the Indigenous discourse on controlling alcohol misuse.

Non-drinkers—who, in most Aboriginal communities constitute at least half of all adults—generally supported the restrictions. Communities were said to be more peaceful since the ban on serving Anangu at CSR, and women were not as scared because there was less violence. Some senior women spoke about the strain that they and others had experienced as a result of alcohol misuse, not only through physical harm but also because in many cases they had had the added responsibility of caring for their grandchildren. Since CSR stopped selling alcohol to Anangu, they added, these pressures had been reduced.

Senior men and women told of how, when alcohol had been available to Anangu at CSR, people from the community would drive there nearly every day and come back intoxicated and cause disruption in the community at night. Since the ban was introduced, they said that a few people were travelling into Alice Springs to buy alcohol, but this was not happening on a daily basis, and therefore the problems had lessened.

None of the supporters of the restrictions appeared to believe that the ban at CSR was, of itself, a total answer to the problems associated with alcohol misuse, particularly as CSR was not the only source of alcohol.

As the 12-month trial drew to a close, the licensee and NPY met again with a view to reaching an agreement for the longer term. On 2 December 1997, at a meeting at Ayers Rock Resort, Yulara, the parties agreed that henceforth no alcohol—either ‘sit down’ or take-away—would be sold to Anangu residents of communities covered by NPY Women’s Council, or to persons travelling to or through these communities (d'Abbs et al. 1999). Anangu present at the meeting undertook to encourage other Anangu to patronise CSR for purchases of food, fuel and other items. At the request of the licensee, the new agreement was endorsed by a revised HREOC Special Measures Certificate. The new special condition attached to the licence had no time-limit attached to it; it read:

Box 5.3 Curtin Springs, NT, Liquor Licence, Special Condition

Extract from d’Abbs et al. (1999: 14).

It is a condition of the Liquor Licence of these premises that there be a prohibition on the sale of liquor to Aboriginal residents of certain Lands and specific communities. This prohibition has been imposed at the request of the residents of:

  1. 1.

    The Pitjantjatjara Lands in South Australia;

  2. 2.

    The Ngaanyatjarra Lands in Western Australia; and

  3. 3.

    The Northern Territory communities of:

    1. (a)

      Docker River

    2. (b)

      Mutitjulu

    3. (c)

      Imanpa

    4. (d)

      Finke.

The prohibition is to combat alcohol-related harm and damage to Aboriginal culture.

  • Licensee—Curtin Springs Roadhouse

  • Ngaanyatjarra Pitjantjatjara Yankunytjatjara Women’s Council

  • Pitjantjatjara Council Inc.

  • Northern Territory Liquor Commission

Today, while some of the wording has changed, the same conditions form part of the CSR liquor licence (Northern Territory Government 2020). That the restrictions are seen as having continuing significance is shown by the NPY Women’s Council’s call in 2017 for similar restrictions to be imposed on other roadhouses in the area, especially at Kulgera (Zillman 2017). In January 2020, the NTLC imposed what it referred to as ‘the Curtin Springs special condition’ on Erldunda Desert Oaks Resort and the Kulgera Hotel (Northern Territory Liquor Commission 2019, 2020).

5.7 Restricting Alcohol Sales in Towns: ‘Thirsty Thursday’ in Tennant Creek

Both the CSR and Yalata campaigns were responses to problems faced by Aboriginal people living in remote communities. But much of the alcohol causing problems for Aboriginal people was consumed or at least purchased not in remote communities or nearby roadhouses but in towns, as participants in the April 1993 march by 300 Aboriginal women in Alice Springs, mentioned earlier (Sect. 5.5), were determined to point out. Over the years that followed, a number of measures aimed at reducing access to alcohol were trialled in Alice Springs and elsewhere (National Drug Research Institute 2007: 125–31) but the most prominent initiative and one that became a model for other towns was the trial of restrictions dubbed ‘thirsty Thursday’ in Tennant Creek, a town with a population of around 3,000 located a little over 500 km north of Alice Springs. At the time, 37% of Tennant Creek’s population were Aboriginal.Footnote 7

Tennant Creek was established in 1935, according to one possibly apocryphal story where a beer truck broke down, following the discovery of gold in the area (Brady 1988; Wright 2010). It is located on Warumungu land, its Warumungu name being Jurnkurakurr. By the mid-1980s, the town had entered a population decline caused by the closure of several mines and a meatworks. This left some 14 liquor outlets—including eight that sold take-away liquor—competing for a shrinking customer base (Wright 2010). In response, members of two Aboriginal organisations in the town—Julalikari Council that operated housing, employment and other services and Anyinginyi Congress Aboriginal Corporation that provided primary health services—became increasingly concerned with the part played by alcohol misuse in the poverty, marginalisation, violence and poor health being experienced by many Aboriginal people in the town.Footnote 8 Alcohol was also deeply implicated in racial tensions in the town, as non-Aboriginal residents chose from a variety of venues that afforded privacy, while Aboriginal drinkers had access to only one bar and faced restrictions on where they could drink (Brady 1988).

One resulting initiative was the formation of a community night patrol in collaboration with local police—a program described in more detail in Chap. 9. Another was a successful campaign to stop hotels from holding striptease shows in public bars (Boffa et al. 1994). The two Aboriginal organisations also formed a Beat the Grog Working Party (the name of which helped to inspire the title for this book) which adopted a strategic approach to alcohol problems. This included lobbying for restrictions on take-away sales on Thursdays, the day that most welfare payments were received. All of these efforts are described in detail in Alexis Wright’s book Grog War: Shifting the Blame: One Town's Fight Against Alcohol (Wright 2010).

Here, we focus on the restrictions themselves and their outcomes. On 12 July 1995, at the request of Julalikari Council, the NT Liquor Commission (NTLC) imposed restrictions on trading by selected liquor outlets in Tennant Creek, initially for a trial period of six months. Outlets affected were prohibited from selling either take-away liquor or liquor from ‘front bars’ on Thursdays.Footnote 9 On other days, take-away liquor sales were limited to between 12 noon and 9 pm; front bar sales could commence at 10 am, but only low alcohol ‘light’ beer could be sold before noon. Sales of wine were permitted only if accompanied by a substantial meal, and sales of 4 L casks of wine were banned (Liquor Commission NT 1995). The restrictions were applied to the two public hotels in Tennant Creek and to an independent take-away liquor store. They did not apply to the two licensed restaurants in the town, or to three private hotels, or to the four licensed clubs. None of these outlets had licenses entitling them to sell liquor to the general public. The clubs also undertook not to accept new members during the trial period other than newly arrived residents of Tennant Creek (d'Abbs et al. 1996).

The NTLC’s decision was highly controversial at the time, with hotels campaigning vociferously against them (Wright 2010). An independent evaluation conducted for the NTLC by a team from the Menzies School of Health Research (d'Abbs et al. 1996), however, found the restrictions to have been effective and to enjoy wide community support. The evaluation gathered quantitative data on health and welfare indicators, public order and liquor sales, and included a household face-to-face survey, using a probability sample from 273 households. These included both individual households and town camps. The survey was conducted towards the end of the six-month trial period (d'Abbs et al. 1996).

The effects were particularly striking during the first 13-week phase of stronger restrictions. For example, presentations at the Tennant Creek Hospital Emergency Department in which alcohol was coded as a feature fell by 34% compared with the same 13-week period in 1994, while presentations involving 'assault' fell by 21% (d'Abbs et al. 1996). Admissions to Tennant Creek Women’s Refuge also declined by 46% during the first 13-week period compared with the same period in 1994. Reductions were also recorded in criminal damage, unlawful entry and stealing and interfering with a motor vehicle.

Apparent impact on alcohol consumption was assessed by using quarterly ‘purchase into store’ figures supplied by liquor outlets in and around Tennant Creek to the NTLC for October–December 1995, compared with the same quarter in the previous year. Although the total amount of alcoholic beverages purchased by outlets in the town fell by only 2.7%, the impact in terms of the amount of pure alcohol purchased declined by 10.0%, largely because of a decline of 54% in purchases of cask wine.Footnote 10 As Table 5.2 shows, this change was partially offset by an increase in purchases by roadhouses within a few hours’ drive of Tennant Creek.Footnote 11 However, even with these included, the total amount of pure alcohol purchased fell by 7.6%.

Table 5.2 Changes in apparent consumption of pure alcohol, Tennant Creek, 1995
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The community survey found that 58% of those interviewed supported the trial measures, 21% opposed them and 16% supported some but not all of the measures. Asked what should be done in future to address alcohol problems in Tennant Creek, just over 50% favoured retaining or even strengthening the trial restrictions, compared with only 6% who advocated returning to pre-trial conditions (d'Abbs et al. 1996). Following the trial and another hearing, the NTLC announced that the restrictions imposed in the first 13-week trial period would be retained for the indefinite future.Footnote 12

Over the next ten years, the Tennant Creek restrictions were evaluated on two further occasions. The first was in 1998, following a request by Tennant Creek Town Council for the restrictions to be reviewed in light of allegations that their initial beneficial effects had worn off (Northern Territory Liquor Commission 1999). Critics claimed that the restrictions were being circumvented, and that other unintended effects had emerged, including adverse impact on tourism and other commercial activity (Gray et al. 1998). The 1998 evaluation was undertaken by a team from the National Drug Research Institute (NDRI) at the Perth-based Curtin University of Technology (Gray et al. 1998).

The second evaluation was even more constrained by time limits than the first had been, with only nine weeks made available. Within this time-window, the evaluators conducted a qualitative analysis of more than 100 written submissions to the NTLC and interviewed 39 key stakeholders. They reported finding a wide range of opinions, with a majority in favour of the restrictions, cautioning, however, that the opinions may not have been representative of the whole community (Gray et al. 1998). They also interviewed managers of 12 neighbouring pastoral stations, a majority of whom were in favour of the restrictions.

The evaluation included a community survey, similar in design to the earlier survey, with a sample of 271 individuals. Finally, the evaluators analysed available data on alcohol sales, health and welfare and public order. Box 5.4 contains an extract from the NDRI evaluation in which the authors report findings from the community survey.

Box 5.4 Community Opinions Regarding Alcohol Restrictions in Tennant Creek, NT

Edited extract from Gray et al (1998: 16–22).Footnote 13

As previously indicated, we conducted a survey of a randomly selected sample of the Tennant Creek population aged 18 years and over which was stratified for Aboriginality (thus ensuring that both non-Aboriginal and Aboriginal people were represented in proportion to their numbers in the total population). In the first section of the interview schedule we asked questions aimed at identifying the effects of the current restrictions on respondents personally and their perceptions of the effects of the restrictions upon the community as a whole.

Personal effects of the restrictions

Between four and 24% of respondents reported that they had been negatively affected by at least one of the restrictions. The restrictions reported as having the greatest adverse effects were the closure of hotel front bars on Thursdays (17%), the ban on the sales of wine in casks of greater than two litres (18%), and the closure of take-away outlets at hotels and liquor stores on Thursdays (24%). In contrast, between four and 12% of respondents reported that the restrictions had positive effects on them personally.

However, the majority of respondents reported that the restrictions had not affected them personally. Even if the responses to questions about the personal effects are interpreted conservatively—that is, assuming the actual percentage in the community is at the upper end of the 95% confidence intervals—less than 30% of the population has been adversely affected by any one restriction.

....

Effects of the restrictions on the community

When asked about the effects of the restrictions on the community as a whole, responses were mixed. 31% reported the restrictions had only negative effects, 16% that they had only positive effects, and 33% that they had had both negative and positive effects (with many reporting more than one such effect).

....

In answer to the question ‘Do you think the restrictions have had any bad effects on the community of Tennant Creek’, the most common response was that people had found ways of getting around them (see Table 5.3). In essence, this is not a negative effect per se, but people clearly recognize the fact that this is a factor which has served to limit the effectiveness of the restrictions. The second most widely cited negative effect of the restrictions was an unintended consequence of them. That is, the increase in broken glass in public places as a result of the ban on the sale of wine in casks of greater than two litres. Those who thought the restrictions had generally positive effects on the community sometimes cited these most common negative responses.

Table 5.3 Respondent perceptions of the negative effects of the restrictions on the community (n = 271)
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...

53% of the respondents identified positive effects of the restrictions on the community as a whole (Table 5.4). Among these positive effects were improvements in personal welfare, less drinking and/or public drinking and consequent reductions in disruptive behaviour, and an improvement in the general ambience of the town.

Table 5.4 Respondent perceptions of the positive effects of the restrictions on the community (n = 271)
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Implementation of the restrictions

As with the introduction of the trial restrictions, a significant percentage of respondents (38%) thought there had been insufficient consultation with the community over the introduction of the restrictions. These people included those who were both for and against the restrictions.

...

Attitudes to the current restrictions

Despite the perceptions of negative consequences of the restrictions and the perception that both licensees and some drinkers are circumventing them to varying degrees, there was considerable support for the existing restrictions (Table 5.5). Support ranged from 55% of respondents who wished the restriction on front bar trading on Thursdays to either remain the same (46%) or be strengthened (9%) to 86% who believed that the requirement that lounge bars make food available remain the same (75%) or be strengthened (11%).

As we would expect, the restrictions that had the least support were those that are the most onerous; that is, the closure of take-away outlets at hotels and liquor stores on Thursdays, the ban on the sale of wine in casks of greater than two litres, and the closure of hotel front bars on Thursdays. Respectively, 30 and 7%, 28 and 9%, and 35 and 4% thought these should be dropped or eased. It should be noted, however, that a small number of the respondents who took this position did so because the restrictions were not working, rather than because they were opposed to them in principle. Thus, 18% of those who thought the ban on sale of wine in casks of more than two litres should be dropped or eased, stated that their decision was based on the increase in broken bottles consequent upon the ban rather than whether it was effective in reducing alcohol consumption. Nevertheless, even if we take the conservative position and assume that the percentage in the total population is at the upper end of the 95% confidence interval, those who believe that the restriction with the least support—the closure of hotel front bars on Thursdays—should be dropped (41%) or eased (7%) make up slightly less than half of the population (48%). Importantly, although a large proportion of respondents identified some negative effects of the restrictions, overall the majority of the population (although in regard to some this might be small) is in favour of retaining or strengthening all the current restrictions.

Table 5.5 Respondent attitudes to the future of current restrictions (n = 271)
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In effect, the community survey added weight to observations made by residents of Tennant Creek in written submissions or interviews: some drinkers and some suppliers had found ways to circumvent the restrictions, and the restrictions themselves also had unintended consequences, notably an upsurge in purchases of wine in glass containers following the ban on sales of large casks of wine and an attendant increase in discarded and often broken bottles around the town. Despite these shortcomings, the restrictions continued to enjoy widespread support as they were regarded—by many Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal residents alike—as yielding a net benefit to the community.

The evaluators analysed trends in liquor purchases by Tennant Creek outlets over nearly four years, from the third quarter of 1994—12 months prior to commencement of the trial—to the second quarter of 1998. They estimated that per capita consumption of pure alcohol by persons in Tennant Creek aged 15 years and over fell from 25 L in the year prior to restrictions to 22 L in the following year and, in the following year, to 20 L. The report also examined figures for the NT as a whole over the same period, and showed that the decline in purchases in Tennant Creek could not be attributed to a Territory-wide trend (Gray et al. 1998).

Examination of alcohol-related admissions to Tennant Creek Hospital also showed a downward trend following introduction of the restrictions (Gray et al. 1998: 28). The authors were not able to obtain data to assess any possible economic effects of the restrictions on commercial activity in the town.

The evaluators concluded their report by recommending that the restrictions in place be retained and complemented by additional measures, including extending restrictions to other outlets in and around Tennant Creek. In response, the NTLC retained the restrictions, but declined to extend their scope. It also committed the Commission to yet another review of the restrictions to be conducted in November 2000 (Northern Territory Liquor Commission 1999).

The subsequent review was conducted by a team from Menzies School of Health Research, using similar methods to the two earlier evaluations (d'Abbs et al. 2000). It found that the decline in apparent per capita consumption of alcohol had flattened out at a level well below pre-restriction levels and also below the NT-wide level of consumption at that time. It also found that the impact of Thursday-specific restrictions had weakened, partly because some drinkers and licensees had become more adept at exploiting loopholes in the restrictions, and partly because, as of July 1999, Centrelink had altered their payment systems to allow recipients to nominate any weekday of their choice for receiving payments (d'Abbs et al. 2000). Despite the apparent weakening impact of the restrictions, the evaluation found that the majority of Tennant Creek residents wished to retain them, with some modifications, including the introduction of additional measures such as the stationing of a permanent licensing inspector in the town (rather than relying on local police with periodic visits from licensing inspectors), more alcohol education, stronger enforcement of laws, and greater attention to underage drinking and broken glass litter from discarded containers (d'Abbs et al. 2000). In response, the NTLC, after conducting another hearing and receiving further submissions, resolved to extend the ban on take-away sales on Thursday to all outlets in and close to Tennant Creek (Northern Territory Licensing Commission 2001).

The much-evaluated Tennant Creek restrictions remained in place for another five years. In October 2005, the NTLC undertook its own review and concluded that, while the restrictions continued to be associated with reduced levels of alcohol-related problems on Thursdays and Sundays, this was not true with respect to other days (Northern Territory Licensing Commission 2006). In the NTLC’s view, the restrictions were no longer contributing to reducing alcohol-related harm, and no longer enjoyed community support (although no data was presented to support either conclusion). The restrictions on Thursday take-away and front bar sales were revoked (Northern Territory Licensing Commission 2006). In their place, the NTLC introduced what it referred to as a ‘Liquor Supply Plan’ that retained bans on sales of 4 L wine casks, limited purchases of 2 L casks and prohibited take-away sales before 12 noon (Northern Territory Licensing Commission 2006).

5.8 Other Communities, Other Restrictions

In part because of the repeated evaluations, the Tennant Creek restrictions became the best documented and probably best known measures of their kind in Australia. But they were by no means the only examples. Two similar interventions—the introduction of purchase limits in the town of Elliott, NT, and restrictions on take-away sales from outlets in Fitzroy Crossing, WA, in 2007—have already been mentioned (see Sect. 3.2 in Chap. 3). Outcomes of other instances in Western Australia, South Australia, the Northern Territory and Queensland are described in a comprehensive review of evidence relating to restrictions on sale and supply of alcohol published in 2007 by the National Drug Research Institute (NDRI) (National Drug Research Institute 2007). ‘Restrictions’ were defined in the review more broadly than our usage in this chapter, to include not only limitations on physical availability of alcohol, but also price-based measures such as taxation, and measures targeting service to drinkers, such as responsible server training and changes to minimum drinking ages. As the authors noted, most Aboriginal community-based initiatives designed to reduce availability among Aboriginal drinkers combined restrictions on trading conditions with restrictions on sales of ‘high risk’ beverages such as cask wines (National Drug Research Institute 2007).Footnote 14

The NDRI review found that, in most cases, restrictions contributed to reductions in alcohol consumption, alcohol-related police incidents and alcohol-related presentations to health facilities. While displacement to other locations and/or other beverages often occurred, these effects only partially offset the reductions in consumption brought about the restrictions. The review, however, added two qualifying conclusions: firstly, restrictions on availability on their own could not overcome a community’s alcohol problems but required complementary measures to reduce demand and address causal factors such as inadequate opportunities in employment, housing, education and recreation. Secondly, in at least some cases, evidence suggested that the effectiveness of restrictions eroded over time, as both drinkers and suppliers found ways of circumventing them. These changes, however, generally weakened rather than cancelled out the beneficial effects of restrictions on supply (National Drug Research Institute 2007). On the basis of these findings, the NDRI review identified five ‘success factors’ which, they argued, shaped the outcomes of restrictions. These were:

  • The need for effective enforcement;

  • Attention to beverage substitution and drinker displacement to other localities;

  • Attention to the specific and changing needs of the target population;

  • Community control, support for and awareness of restrictions;

  • Evidence-based measures, situational suitability and evidence of outcomes (National Drug Research Institute 2007: 206–12).

We summarise their conclusions regarding each of these below.

Enforcement

Without adequate, sustained enforcement, the review argued, restrictions on availability of alcohol were unlikely to be effective. They noted that prime responsibility for enforcement on a day to day basis normally lay with police, with licensing inspectors sometimes also playing a role. They also noted that enforcement posed significant challenges in remote communities, where police resources were likely to be sparse or absent altogether. To be adequate, enforcement practices must create a genuine likelihood that breaches of restrictions would be detected and incur significant penalties (National Drug Research Institute 2007: 206–07).

Beverage substitution and displacement of drinkers

Substituting other alcoholic beverages (and/or other drugs) for restricted types of liquor, travelling to outlets outside restricted areas to purchase liquor, and ‘grog running’—that is, smuggling liquor into restricted areas and selling it at inflated prices—were all, as the review noted, well attested ways by which determined drinkers circumvented restrictions. As the review also noted, it was not only drinkers who resorted to such means. Liquor suppliers on occasion exploited loopholes in restrictions in order to undermine them. For example, in the town of Newman, WA, alcohol outlets began selling port wine in 1.5 L plastic bottles labelled ‘Ridgy Didge Wine’ in response to a local ban on sales of two litre casks of fortified wine (National Drug Research Institute 2007: 207).

The review suggested that efforts to circumvent restrictions were an inevitable by-product of local supply reduction initiatives, and that those overseeing implementation of restrictions should anticipate them. They also recommended, wherever possible, monitoring sales and/or purchases of liquor not only within areas affected by restrictions, but also in the surrounding region to detect both beverage substitution and shifts in purchasing locations. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the review pointed out that, in all of the cases where the impact of local restrictions had been examined in detail, circumventing of restrictions had the effect of offsetting some but not all of the reductions in alcohol consumption ensuing from restrictions. These practices, therefore, may be grounds for modifying restrictions or enhancing enforcement, but they are usually not in themselves legitimate grounds for abandoning them (National Drug Research Institute 2007: 207–09).

Meeting specific and changing needs of target populations

Restrictions, the review concluded, need to be tailored in the first instance to the needs of local settings and responsive to changes in these needs. These in turn could result from implementation of the restrictions themselves or from external changes such as changes in the economic or commercial environment (National Drug Research Institute 2007: 209–10).

Community control, support and awareness

One of the most common criticisms made by people affected by local restrictions, according to the NDRI review, was a perceived lack of consultation, representation and involvement. Regardless of how warranted these criticisms may be in particular instances, the report argued, restrictions that are externally imposed tend to be less effective than those backed by a high level of community control and involvement. In this context, they singled out for criticism the processes through which ‘alcohol management plans’—with in-built supply reductions—were imposed on Queensland Aboriginal communities from 2002 under the state government’s ‘Meeting Challenges, Making Choices’ program (Queensland Government 2002). This initiative is discussed further below.

The review argued that, as well as a high level of local community control, successful supply reduction programs required active support from agencies such as police and other government agencies. In the absence of such support, community-based efforts would struggle to be effective. Finally, the review stressed the importance of keeping people affected by restrictions fully informed both before and during the implementation of restrictions (National Drug Research Institute 2007: 210–11).

Evidence -based measures, situational suitability and evidence of outcomes

Faced with pressure to act in response to alcohol-related problems, but unfamiliar with the range of intervention options available and supporting evidence, community groups may be urged to adopt measures such as education campaigns or voluntary agreements, which are uncontentious and relatively simple, but which, according to available evidence, are usually ineffectual in reducing harms. The review argued that community-based measures should be based on both empirical evidence of effectiveness and a coherent theoretical base. On these grounds, the review concluded, restrictions on hours of trading by licensed outlets were well supported by evidence.

Whatever measures were selected, however, also needed to be suited to local conditions. As the review noted, there was little point in banning alcohol in a community if there were no police on hand to enforce the decision. Interventions needed to be tailored to limitations imposed by local contexts, and/or resources needed to be provided to overcome those limitations. The review also noted the importance of ongoing evaluations of interventions to provide feedback on whether or not they were having the desired effect (National Drug Research Institute 2007: 211–14). We return to this issue below.

5.9 More Recent Examples of Restrictions on Supply

5.9.1 Fitzroy Crossing and Halls Creek, WA

Since publication of the 2007 NDRI review, several other studies have examined the effects of restrictions on sales of high-risk alcoholic beverages in the Kimberley region of WA and elsewhere. One of these—the introduction of community-led restrictions on take-away sales from two liquor outlets in Fitzroy Crossing—is the subject of a separate case study in Chap. 6. In another, similar restrictions were introduced in 2009 by the WA Director of Liquor Licensing on sales from the hotel and liquor store at Halls Creek, also in the Kimberley. Both premises could sell only low strength beer (up to 2.7% alcohol) for take-away consumption, and the hotel could not sell liquor for on-premises consumption before 12 noon except to a lodger or in conjunction with a meal. An evaluation of the restrictions by University of Notre Dame examined indicators over three 12-month periods: pre-restrictions (June 2008–May 2009), the first 12 months following the restrictions and the second 12 months following restrictions (Western Australia Drug and Alcohol Office 2011). Among key findings were the following:

  • Alcohol-related assault offences fell from 243 incidents in the pre-restriction period to 156 and 86 incidents in post-restriction periods 1 and 2 respectively; total assaults followed a similar trend;

  • Police tasking in Halls Creek decreased from 2,058 tasks pre-restriction to 1,027 tasks in post-restriction period 2;

  • Alcohol-related presentations to the Halls Creek ED fell by 34% in post-restriction period 1 and a further 45% in post-restriction period 2;

  • In the first 12 months of the restrictions, admissions to the Halls Creek Sobering-up Centre decreased by 70%, from 1,084 pre-restrictions to 328; the decline continued in the second 12 month, although the data was incomplete.

5.9.2 Norseman, WA

In all of the examples discussed to this point, restrictions on supply have been imposed by state/territory licensing authorities at the request of Aboriginal community groups. In one other instance, restrictions came about through a voluntary agreement between a liquor outlet and Aboriginal residents of a small remote town and appear to have had sustained beneficial impact. The town of Norseman in WA, with a population of a little over 1,000 of whom 10% are Aboriginal, is served by just one hotel which also holds the only licence in the town to sell take-away liquor to the general public. In 2008, at the request of Aboriginal members of the community, and with the support of the state alcohol and other drug authority and other agencies, the outlet agreed to place daily limits on take-away purchases of beverages known to be favoured by Aboriginal drinkers, including 5 L cask wines, and to limit take-away sales to between 12 noon and 6 pm (Midford et al. 2017; Schinenu et al. 2010). An independent evaluation reported that, in the 12 months following introduction of the agreement, per capita consumption of alcohol in the town declined by 9.8% with accompanying falls in assaults, public drunkenness and alcohol-related hospital admissions (Schinenu et al. 2010). Qualitative data also indicated that health seeking behaviour and family activities had also increased. The restrictions, with some modifications, were subsequently retained. A follow-up evaluation, conducted after the restrictions had been in place for seven years, found that, while the decline in apparent per capita alcohol consumption was not sustained, mainly as a result of a subsequent increase in sales of spirits, levels of assaults, burglary, domestic violence and public drunkenness all remained below pre-restriction levels (Midford et al. 2017). Qualitatively, the evaluators reported that Aboriginal drinkers were commencing consumption later than was normal prior to the restrictions, and more likely to drink at home than in public. The evaluation found that these changes had contributed to an improvement in community relations and enjoyed broad support, although they cautioned that the shift to domestic drinking may also have added to difficulties experienced by children in getting enough food and sleep to be able to function well at school (Midford et al. 2017).

5.10 Alcohol Management Plans in Queensland

All the local alcohol restrictions considered above were initiated by communities or Aboriginal organisations, and therefore, belong in the ‘voluntary’ or ‘negotiated-mandated’ columns of Table 5.1. These can be compared with restrictions in the form of Alcohol Management Plans (AMPs) introduced into Aboriginal communities in Queensland from 2002 under the Queensland Government’s Meeting Challenges Making Choices (MCMC) policy (Queensland Government 2002). AMPs were the centrepiece of the government’s response to the Cape York Justice Report, an investigation commissioned by the Queensland Government at the request of Cape York Partnerships and Apunipima Health Council (Queensland Department of the Premier and Cabinet 2001; Smith et al. 2019). The report corroborated evidence from earlier studies that had revealed high levels of alcohol-related violence and associated community dysfunction in many communities (Queensland Department of the Premier and Cabinet 2001; Gladman et al. 1997; Martin 1998). It recommended, among other changes, that community councils be divested of responsibility for running licensed canteens and that access to alcohol in communities be curtailed.

Under MCMC, AMPs were supposed to include three components: new restrictions on alcohol availability, which in practice took the forms of ‘carriage limits’ specifying how much and what kinds of liquor residents were permitted to bring into communities; measures to reduce demand for alcohol, including treatment and rehabilitation programs and, in communities where local councils had hitherto operated licensed canteens, new governance arrangements under which licences would be taken away from community councils and vested in separate Community Canteen Management Boards. By these means, it was hoped that the existing dependence of councils on alcohol-generated revenue would end (Queensland Government (Department of the Premier and Cabinet) 2005). On paper, AMPs were also portrayed as incorporating a high degree of local community control, to be exercised through Community Justice Groups, which in turn would be given enhanced powers and responsibilities by the government (Queensland Government 2002).

In practice, as Clough and Bird (2015) have shown, the reductions in access to alcohol entailed in AMPs were widely perceived to be externally-generated impositions rather than expressions of community wishes (much less, community control). Many councils, not surprisingly, strongly opposed them. Nonetheless, over the next 3 ½ years, AMPs were formalised and approved in 19 Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities in Queensland. An internal evaluation conducted by the Queensland Government in 2005 concluded that AMPs had been only partially implemented, in that, while carriage limits had been introduced, proposed accompanying measures such as alternative management structures for canteens, and establishment of treatment and rehabilitation programs had not eventuated (Queensland Government (Department of the Premier and Cabinet) 2005). Even the restrictions on availability were said to have been implemented with such haste that there was little evidence of community ownership.

Nonetheless, the 2005 evaluation reported evidence of reduced assaults and more peaceful environments in several communities, although later government reports indicated that some of these benefits were short-lived (Queensland Government (Department of the Premier and Cabinet) 2005; Queensland Government 2008).

Clough and Bird (2015) have documented the evolution of AMPs in Queensland over the first 11 years, up to 2013. They depict a sequence of steadily expanding legislative restrictions, beginning with the carriage limits incorporated in the 19 community AMPs. Between 2005 and 2006, restrictions were extended to 148 liquor outlets located outside communities but within what were considered to be ‘catchment areas’ of communities, setting new conditions on selling liquor to residents of communities. Under a series of legislative amendments introduced from 2008, councils throughout Queensland were prohibited from holding a general liquor licence; it became an offence, punishable by substantial fines, to attempt to bring liquor into a restricted area; private residences became subject to carriage limits, and police became empowered to search without a warrant if they suspected a person was holding more than permitted amounts or types of liquor. By early 2009, canteen closures resulting from these legislative changes had made seven communities legally ‘dry’ (Clough and Bird 2015). Throughout this period, as Clough and Bird point out, virtually nothing was done to expand demand reduction measures. In the community of Pormpuraaw, located on the western side of Cape York Peninsula, a Shared Responsibility Agreement signed in 2006 by community, commonwealth and state governments promised funding for an alcohol rehabilitation facility, and a building was subsequently established at a reported cost of $10 million. The facility opened in September 2009, offering a 15-week therapeutic rehabilitation program for 2 families at a time. Nine months later, after 4 families had completed the program, funding ceased and the facility closed (Smith et al. 2019).

The restrictions have almost certainly led to reductions in alcohol-related violence. Margolis et al. examined Royal Flying Doctor Service retrievals for serious injuries in four communities between 1996 and 2010 (Margolis et al. 2008; Margolis et al. 2011). They found that, following introduction of restrictions in 2002–03, injury retrievals declined for two years, but then started to increase. However, with the introduction of further restrictions in 2008, injury rates again declined from 30 per 1,000 in 2008 to 14 per 1,000 in 2010.

Clough et al. (2017) studied residents’ perceptions and experiences relating to AMPs through a survey of 1,211 persons aged 18 years and over in ten remote Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities. On the basis of previously conducted semi-structured interviews, the researchers had identified seven ‘favourable’ impacts of AMPs, and seven ‘unfavourable’ impacts. These were used to construct survey questions. Responses are summarised in the Table reproduced in Box 5.5. As the table shows, on the ‘favourable’ side, a majority of respondents—though by no means an overwhelming one—saw AMPs as enhancing community and child safety (although the proportion who believed AMPs had reduced violence against women fell just short of a majority). On the ‘unfavourable’ side, clear majorities criticised AMPs for having ensnared people in fines and criminal convictions and led to an increase in smoking cannabis (gunjah) and binge drinking. They were also perceived as discriminatory. Smaller majorities also considered that the AMP had not reduced access to alcohol in the community or helped people reduce their drinking.

Box 5.5 Residents’ Perceptions and Experiences of Alcohol Management Plans in Queensland

From Clough et al. (2017)

Table 5.6 Proportions of participants agreeing with seven ‘favourable’ propositions and seven ‘unfavourable’ propositions about possible impacts of Alcohol Management Plans (AMPs) put to 1211 residents of 10 Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander (Indigenous) communities in a survey conducted in Queensland (Australia) in 2014–15
Full size table

The authors noted that the perceptions of reduced violence and improved community safety were corroborated by objective data. They also suggested, however, that the perceived failure to reduce alcohol consumption or curb binge drinking, the criminalisation and experienced discrimination resulting from AMPs and the continuing failure to address demand reduction measures, were all grounds for concern. Citing publicly available Queensland Government data, they noted that, as of 30 June 2014, a total of 6,961 individuals had been convicted of 15,511 charges for breaching sections of the Liquor Act restricting importation and possession of liquor in AMP communities. Over 100 persons had been incarcerated. Almost all of those convicted were Indigenous residents of AMP communities, leading the authors to the astonishing observation that up to 70% of adults in these communities may have accrued at least one conviction (Clough et al. 2017).

In light of the reductions in violence and improvements in safety, the authors recommended against rolling back restrictions, but suggested that the limits of what could feasibly be achieved through supply reduction may have been reached. Smith et al., in their study of the AMP at Pormpuraaw, reached a less charitable conclusion, arguing that governments have represented AMPs as exercises in community empowerment but, by under-resourcing programs associated with those AMPs, have in fact undermined communities’ capacity to deal with alcohol (Smith et al. 2019).

In recent years, alcohol management plans as instruments of alcohol policy have been deployed in two other contexts, both in the NT. The first consisted of several local initiatives in regional towns of the NT, where community groups developed local strategies to reduce alcohol-related problems under the auspices of the NT Department of Justice (Buckley et al. 2016; d'Abbs et al. 2010a, b; 2011; d'Abbs and Whitty 2016; Jilkminggan Community Aboriginal Corporation 2012; Katherine Region Action Group (KRAG) 2013; Success Works Pty Ltd nd; MacKeith et al. 2009; Northern Territory Department of Justice 2008; Senior et al. 2009). Although all of these plans contained some sort of restrictions on the supply of alcohol, such restrictions were not central to the plans, and in some cases pre-existed them. They are not, therefore, included in this chapter.

The second category of AMPs originated under legislation introduced by the Commonwealth Government in 2012 to supersede the 2007 NT Emergency Response (‘the Intervention’). Called the Stronger Futures in the Northern Territory Act, the new law designated community AMPs as expressions of alcohol control policy in Aboriginal communities (Australian Government 2012, 2013; Minister for Families Community Services and Indigenous Affairs 2013). These AMPs were intended to be tailored to the needs and wishes of individual communities, but in order to gain recognition required formal approval from the Commonwealth Minister for Aboriginal Affairs. For reasons that lie beyond this analysis, this proved to be a major stumbling block. A 2016 review by the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights concluded that the process of developing and approving AMPs was not functioning effectively (Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights 2016, Para 3.53). It noted that, as of October 2015, only one AMP had received ministerial approval, while another seven, all approved by their communities, had been rejected by the Minister. Although not formally amended, the AMP policy has since been quietly abandoned and replaced by other measures. For a useful overview of AMPs as policy instruments, see Smith et al. (2013).

5.11 Special Measures Revisited

Ironically, one by-product of the controversy generated by the Queensland AMPs has been a re-interpretation of Special Measures under the Racial Discrimination Act (RDA) which, as we showed earlier (in Sect. 5.5) had been instrumental in enabling Aboriginal communities in Central Australia to negotiate restrictions with a roadhouse licensee.

On 31 May 2008, Joan Maloney, an Aboriginal resident of the Queensland community of Palm Island with no prior criminal record, was apprehended carrying one bottle of Bourbon and one bottle of rum in contravention of the Palm Island AMP, which permitted residents to possess only one carton of light or mid-strength beer. She was fined $150 and forfeited the liquor (High Court of Australia 2013). Subsequent appeals to the Queensland District Court and Supreme Court failed, but she was granted leave to appeal to the High Court of Australia.

Palm Island’s AMP had been unilaterally imposed on the community by the Queensland Government in 2006, following the failure of groups in the community to agree on the kind of restrictions that should be imposed. In appealing against her conviction, the appellant argued that the AMP discriminated against community residents on the basis of their Aboriginality, since 97% of the population of the Island was Aboriginal, and since it deprived these people of entitlements available to other Australians. In dismissing her appeal, successive courts—including the High Court—conceded that the AMP measures were discriminatory but ruled that they did not contravene the Race Discrimination Act as they qualified as a Special Measure under Section 8 (1) of the Act. The counterargument—namely, that the AMP did not qualify as a Special Measure because it was not based on consultation with the parties affected and did not have their consent—was dismissed by the High Court on the ground that consultation was not a requirement of a Special Measure (High Court of Australia 2013).

This marks a significant shift from the position taken by the Race Discrimination Commissioner in her 1995 Alcohol Report. In addressing the question of whether and under what conditions alcohol restrictions qualified as a Special Measure, the Commissioner stated: ‘The wishes of the community to whom the restriction applies, and that community’s concept of their own advancement, is [sic] the motivating force behind the restrictions’ (Race Discrimination Commissioner 1995: 146). Elsewhere the Commissioner stated ‘Alcohol restrictions imposed upon Aboriginal groups as a result of government policies which are incompatible with the policy of the community will not be Special Measures’ (Race Discrimination Commissioner 1995: 141).

At the time of Maloney’s appeal, approximately 10% of Palm Island’s population had been convicted under the same provisions as Maloney and were awaiting the outcome of her appeal. As Gear (2014–2015) pointed out, as a result of the High Court’s decision, a substantial proportion of the island’s Aboriginal population now had a criminal conviction for behaviour that would not be illegal in mainstream Australia. She argued that as a result of the Court’s interpretation, the Special Measures provision of the RDA now had very different implications from those intended when the RDA was drawn up.

5.12 Evaluating Outcomes

One of the ‘success factors’ identified in the 2007 NDRI review of restrictions on supply, and listed above in Sect. 5.8, was the use of evaluation to demonstrate outcomes. In concluding this chapter, we reproduce in Box 5.6 an extract from the review offering some useful pointers for evaluating restrictions on supply.

Box 5.6 Evaluating Implementation and Outcomes of Restrictions

From National Drug Research Institute (2007: 220–22).

There are many ways to conduct an evaluation but foremost, the approach taken should be tailored to address the questions that have been posed (e.g. have the restrictions on trading hours reduced levels of alcohol consumption and harms among hotel patrons? has the increased police enforcement of minimum purchase age legislation reduced alcohol consumption and harms among young people?).

Well-designed evaluations typically include a core set of characteristics: a complementary collection of reliable, relevant and objective data to ‘measure’ outcomes (e.g. wholesale alcohol purchases, police reported assaults; local resident survey); a comparison of measures taken ‘before’ and ‘after’ the implementation of the intervention; inclusion of a ‘control’ town or area not subject to the intervention with which to compare to and help rule out alternative explanations; and the identification and consideration of other characteristics or interventions which might also be responsible for apparent outcomes (e.g. economic recession, mining boom).

The application of objective and reliable evidence in an evaluation is crucial; undue reliance on personal opinion, conjecture and anecdote and other biased observations may create false impressions, ultimately leading to erroneous and at worst, harmful decision making. Table 5.7 provides details of measures or ‘indicators’ which have been used to objectively evaluate restrictions in the past. These indicators should be considered in the first instance but may be supported by additional measures sensitive to characteristics of the specific populations involved.

Table 5.7 Indicators of alcohol consumption and related harms for use in evaluation*
Full size table

Logically, in order to mount a reliable evaluation based on reliable information, data collection procedures should be in place before the restrictions are implemented. When this is not the case, analysts are sometimes fortunate enough to have access to a collection of high-quality indicators that cover the population of interest. However, more often than not, evaluations must be designed to fit within data limitations. In many cases, the objective data necessary to answer the questions raised by stake holders, communities and policy makers about restrictions cannot be retrospectively collected. This results in considerable knowledge gaps and a tendency to fall-back on subjective information—thus highlighting one of the practical virtues of adopting a forward-looking pro-active policy approach rather than a reactive one.

Different indicators of alcohol-related harms will not necessarily respond to restrictions in a uniform manner. Hospital admissions provide a good example of this variability. Typically, alcohol-attributable hospital admissions for injuries or ‘acute conditions’ are likely to respond more immediately to changes in the availability of alcohol within a population than are disease-based or ‘chronic’ alcohol-attributable conditions. This is because acute alcohol-attributable conditions such as violent assault injury, falls, road crash injury, tend to occur as a short-term outcome of episodic binge drinking or intoxication. By comparison, the progression of chronic disease (e.g. alcohol liver cirrhosis) is typically slower, often requiring the accumulation of many years of problem drinking to appear and a proportionate amount of time to positively respond to reduced consumption.

Outcomes from particular evaluations are rarely so marked and consistent that there remains no question as to cause and effect. Yet, a collection of reliable and valid indicators, expertly applied and interpreted, can considerably increase the degree of certainty about conclusions reached. The standard scientific approach to determining the efficacy of an intervention is to apply tests of statistical significance which estimate the likelihood that the findings are due to chance. Despite the reliance on objective mathematical parameters, there is always room for error. The possibility that a statistically significant finding is due to chance can be markedly reduced when the result is interpreted in concert with other indicators. However, the absence of statistically measurable change does not guarantee that change has not actually occurred. The inability to demonstrate an effect of a particular restriction may well be due to: lack of sensitivity of the measure employed; failure to include a valid measure of the behaviour of interest; too few observations; the presence of other factors which counter or confound the expected effect, and unaccounted for changes to standard reporting practices. Thus, in any determination provision should be made for the possibility that actual change may have been ‘missed’ by the evaluation. Perhaps more importantly however, is that in practice, it may be sufficient to demonstrate that restrictions have been effective at reducing consumption and or harms ‘on the balance of probabilities’. What constitutes statistical ‘significance’ from a scientific perspective (e.g. 95% confidence) is far greater than that required to be demonstrated in a legal sense for instance, where a probability greater than 50% may be enough to merit attribution. The following are some key points for decision makers to keep in mind when gauging expectations:

  • Even modest changes in measurable outcomes, can in reality, bring welcome relief to communities beset with the burden of alcohol-related problems;

  • Evidence of short-term improvement may be preferable to no improvement at all;

  • Evidence of short-term change is typically easier to show than long-term change;

  • Evidence of ongoing change should be the ultimate goal;

  • To produce evidence of ongoing change enduring but flexible evaluation strategies are necessary;

  • Piece-meal changes may be easier to implement than comprehensive strategies but are less likely to result in optimal and ongoing change;

  • Restrictions that are politically attractive, met with little resistance and relatively easy to implement are not necessarily effective;

  • Restrictions may require multiple transformations and adjustments to reach their optimal potential and should be monitored over time;

  • A goal should be to sustain the impact of restrictions; and,

  • Wherever possible it is preferable to err on the side of minimising—not continuing—harm.

5.13 Conclusion

As numerous studies have shown, tailored restrictions on local alcohol availability can reduce consumption and associated alcohol-related harms (Gray and Wilkes 2011; Saggers and Gray 1998; Gray 2000; National Drug Research Institute 2007). Restrictions on hours and conditions of trade are particularly well supported by evidence of effectiveness. While restrictions will inevitably incur opposition, the evidence also suggests that, where there is a high degree of community involvement, they enjoy sustained community support. In themselves, however, restrictions do not constitute a solution to high levels of alcohol-related harm, but also require investment in measures to reduce demand, including early intervention, treatment and rehabilitation, as well as measures addressing the underlying drivers of alcohol misuse, such as lack of opportunities for a safe and productive life. A key word here is ‘investment’; unlike regulatory changes, intervention and treatment programs cost money. A recurring theme in studies of local restrictions is the failure of authorities to provide resources for complementary demand-reduction measures (Hudson 2011).

The impact of restrictive measures is also liable to fade over time, making it necessary to monitor them and adapt them as necessary to changing circumstances. Local restrictions can also generate unintended and sometimes adverse consequences, including ‘sly grogging’ and displacement to other drinking venues and/or other substances, such as cannabis. As we have seen, while these responses offset the gains from restrictions, they rarely negate them.

Evidence suggests that—in the categories set out above in Table 5.1—‘negotiated/mandated’ restrictions are the most robust, combining as they do ‘grass roots’ engagement with the enforcement power of the state. Voluntary agreements can be unilaterally abandoned, as may have been the case in Curtin Springs, and imposed restrictions—as many Queensland AMPs appear to be—generate high levels of opposition. Negotiated/mandated restrictions, however, require a supportive licensing authority—which, as we have seen, is not always present.

Notwithstanding the evidence of effectiveness, local restrictions on access to alcohol also come with limitations. As Calladine (2009) notes, restrictions on access to alcohol by Aboriginal people, or on Aboriginal lands, or even in places occupied largely by Aboriginal people, have three key features:

  1. 1.

    They are inherently discriminatory, in that the same restrictions do not normally apply to non-Aboriginal people;

  2. 2.

    They have historical antecedents in earlier policies that prohibited Aboriginal people from possessing or drinking alcohol and

  3. 3.

    They do not address the underlying reasons why Aboriginal people drink in the first place (Calladine 2009).

Restrictions can, however, provide a ‘breathing space’ that allows the community to attend to other issues, as the Fitzroy Crossing example discussed in the following chapter demonstrates.

Despite the evidence of effectiveness (or perhaps, so far as some liquor industry interests go, because of such evidence), local restrictions are usually controversial. Typically, opponents will complain that the ‘rights’ of the moderate majority are being curtailed because of a small minority of alcohol abusers, whose needs—the argument sometimes continues—could be better addressed through targeted restrictions and/or treatment. A related argument is that heavy or dependent drinkers will somehow get around the restrictions anyway, making the impositions on everyone else pointless. Again, the evidence suggests that while some drinkers will indeed do whatever it takes to keep drinking, at a community level tailored restrictions yield a net benefit.