The Cold War in Asia After 1953

Abstract

This chapter overviews the Cold War in Asia after 1953, covering important events in East, Southeast, and South Asia. This piece will focus on the intersections between the two major aspects of the Cold War in this region: the triangular relations among the United States, the Soviet Union, and China, on the one hand, and local and regional conflicts stemming from the decolonization process, on the other hand. 

In the first decade of the post-war period, Asia was exposed to and impacted by two major historical currents: The Cold War and decolonization. Going through such events as the Chinese Revolution and the Korean War, Asia was divided into two military camps. In the meantime, political forces in ex-colonies, such as Korea, China, Indochina, India, and Pakistan, declared independence and sought measures for state formation, nation-building, and economic modernization. In some cases, they fought bloody civil wars with each other and/or wars against colonial rulers.

The Cold War was a geopolitical and ideological struggle between the United States (US) and the Soviet Union (USSR) on a global scale. The Cold War and decolonization not only coincided, but also closely intertwined. From their security and ideological concerns, the superpowers repeatedly and fiercely intervened in the so-called Third World and left significant political, economic, and social marks there (Westad 2005). Yet, the influence did not flow in one direction: The development of regional and local conflicts stemming from the process of decolonization often informed the course of the Cold War. In the words of Robert McMahon (2003, p. 36), “[d]ecolonization and the Cold War were fated to become inextricably linked, each shaping and being shaped by the other, in Asia and elsewhere.”

Nevertheless, we could not fully understand the dynamics of the Cold War in Asia without examining the role of another communist power: China. Indeed, since the early 1950s, the development and transformation of the triangular relations among the US, the USSR, and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) became the focal point of the Cold War in Asia.¹

Drawing on these insights, this chapter provides an overview of the Cold War in Asia after 1953, covering important events in East, Southeast, and South Asia. The primary focus will be on the intersections between the two major aspects of the Cold War in this region: Triangular relations among the US, the USSR, and China, on the one hand, and local and regional conflicts, especially those in Indochina and South Asia that stemmed from the decolonization process, on the other hand.

This chapter kicks off with the story of post-war Sino-Soviet relations up to the end of the 1960s, followed by sections that deal with such events as: The three wars in Indochina, the Sino-US rapprochement and its regional impacts, the wars between India and Pakistan, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Sino-Soviet normalization, and the political settlement of the Cambodian Civil War.

1 The Sino-Soviet Split

1.1 The Golden Years of Sino-Soviet Relations

After Soviet dictator Iosif Stalin died in early March 1953, his successors began to pursue a policy of “peaceful coexistence” with the West. Stalin’s tyranny and misbehaviors, they believed, had not only damaged the legitimacy of socialist regimes, but also undermined Soviet national security (Mastny 2010a). Stalin’s death opened the way for closer Sino-Soviet relations. Mao Zedong, the Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), believed that China should become the leader of the socialist camp in the long run. However, he had to focus on restoring his country, which had been destructed by the Korean War. In mid-1953, the Chinese government started the “First Five-Year Plan” aiming at rapid industrialization and collectivization of agriculture based on the Soviet model. Chinese leaders were keen on learning from the Soviet experience. In addition, political, economic, and military support from the communist “big brother” was essential for the reconstruction and development of the war-ravaged country (Chen and Yang 1998, p. 258).

In Moscow, Nikita S. Khrushchev, then emerging as a top leader among Stalin’s successors, saw “unlimited opportunity” in Sino-Soviet relations. Soviet alliance with the “most populous” country, he believed, “would propel Communism to global victory” (Westad 2017, p. 237). Indeed, Khrushchev chose Beijing as the destination for his first foreign travel in the autumn of 1954. During the visit, the Soviets offered a substantial amount of loans and technical assistance for the First Five-Year Plan. Moreover, in October 1957, the Soviets promised to provide a model atomic bomb and relevant data by 1959 (Lüthi 2008, p. 74). The mid- and late 1950s witnessed the “golden years of the Sino-Soviet alliance” (Westad 2011, pp. 35–62).

1.2 The End of the Alliance

In 1956, a series of events shook the communist world. At the Twentieth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party in February 1956, Khrushchev delivered the famous “secret speech” advocating the policy of “peaceful coexistence” and blamed Stalin for abuse of power and policy mismanagement. Khrushchev’s speech seriously undermined the legitimacy of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe and, consequently, led to anti-Soviet riots in Poland and Hungary in October 1956.

Along with the development of Chinese domestic politics, these events had a significant impact on Mao. The success of agricultural collectivization and other economic schemes after 1953 convinced him that the socialist transformation of China could be accelerated in its own way, not in direct accordance with the Soviet model. Moreover, Mao’s views on Stalin differed from that of Khrushchev; the CCP leader believed that Stalin significantly contributed to the Soviet Union and the socialist world despite his misconduct. In addition, the Polish and Hungarian riots strengthened Mao’s skepticism about the “de-Stalinization” of the USSR (Chen and Yang 1998, pp. 268–69).

Mao’s determination to pursue his own vision, e.g., continuous revolution, led to the deterioration of the Sino-Soviet alliance in 1958. Early in this year, Mao started a policy of the “Great Leap Forward,” an ambitious plan to accelerate transformation of China into a socialist country. By the end of the year, however, its failure became apparent; it triggered a disastrous famine. Moreover, Mao’s foreign policy disturbed Sino-Soviet relations. In the first half of 1958, the Soviet Union made two proposals for closer military cooperation: The construction of radio-wave communication systems for the Soviet Navy in China and the establishment of a joint submarine flotilla. Yet, Mao thought the Soviet proposals would threaten “Chinese sovereignty and integrity” (Chen and Yang 1998, pp. 268–69). The second Taiwan Strait Crisis in late August further soured relations. Since 1954, the United States had committed itself to the defense of the Republic of China (ROC), i.e., Taiwan, based on the US-ROC Mutual Defense Treaty.² While firmly supporting Beijing in public, in private Moscow feared that the Chinese shelling against Quemoy and the Jinmen Islands would provoke Washington.³

By 1960, the Sino-Soviet alliance virtually collapsed. The experience of the Second Taiwan Crisis made the Soviets worry about China going nuclear. In June 1959, Khrushchev informed Mao of his decision to withdraw the nuclear assistance program, which in turn drove China toward its own nuclear program. Two months later, China and India clashed at their border. The Soviets remained neutral, and China felt betrayed, believing that their Soviet ally chose to side with India (Chen and Yang 1998, p. 273).

There was an “ambiguous truce” between Moscow and Beijing from early 1961 to mid-1962. In this period, moderate leaders like Deng Xiaoping took the lead in Chinese decision-making while Mao was marginalized for the failure of his Great Leap Forward. Despite continuing public disputes over ideology, the “rollback of the Great Leap Forward and the need for food aid,” which the Soviet Union offered in 1961, “led to some relaxation in Sino-Soviet relations” (Lüthi 2008, p. 194).

The “truce” did not last long. Mao re-emerged in the CCP by the summer of 1962 and resumed his quest for continuing revolution. For Mao, Khrushchev’s decision to back down in the final phase of the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962 proved that the Soviets were “revisionists” and reinforced the correctness of his own ideology. Unsurprisingly, the Sino-Soviet party talks of July 1963, which were to reconcile ideological differences, reached nowhere.

1.3 Collision Course

In October 1964, China successfully exploded its first atomic bomb. In the same month, Khrushchev was ousted by his colleagues. The new collective leadership in Moscow, headed by Leonid Brezhnev, tried to rectify relations with Beijing. For his part, Mao decided to send a delegation headed by Premier Zhou Enlai to the Sino-Soviet meeting in early November. Yet, “[e]ven before the start of the meeting in Moscow, both sides occupied irreconcilable positions” (Lüthi 2008, p. 291). Naturally, again, the Sino-Soviet meeting reached nowhere.

Along with ideological differences, security concerns loomed large in Mao’s Soviet perception. After the Cuban Crisis, the US and the USSR pursued a détente, which culminated in the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) of August 1963. The Chinese recognized the LTBT as a joint venture between superpowers to prevent China and West Germany from acquiring nuclear weapons. Moreover, the Soviets began to increase levels of force along the Sino-Soviet border and attempted to make Outer Mongolia a member of the Warsaw Pact. These Soviet actions resulted in Mao’s fear of Soviet attack against Xinjiang, Manchuria, and Inner Mongolia. Furthermore, by 1965, when the US increased its commitment in Vietnam, “Mao was probably as much concerned with the Soviet threats in the north as with the American threat in the south” (Radchenko 2010, p. 364).

For their part, in 1966, Soviet leaders increasingly worried about the Cultural Revolution, the radicalization of politics and society in China. Inspired by Mao’s radical thoughts, groups of students formed the Red Guards and held mass rallies across the country. The Red Guards encircled the Soviet Embassy in Beijing to condemn Soviet “revisionism.” In addition, Moscow was concerned about China’s military buildup in the border area. Moscow countered by stationing troops in Mongolia according to the Soviet-Mongolian alliance treaty of 1966 and building up forces in the Far East. By so doing, Brezhnev hoped to deter the Chinese from attacking the Soviets (Radchenko 2009, pp. 174–90).

The Soviet deterrence strategy backfired. The Chinese reacted with “a show of force to dissuade the opponent from hostile action.” In early March 1969, the Chinese military ambushed the Soviet border troops around Zhenbao (Damansikii in Russian) Island on the Ussuri (Wusuli) River. Within six months, another military clash occurred in Xinjiang. Ominously, Moscow hinted at a nuclear strike against China in both incidents. On September 11, Soviet premier Alexei Kosygin met his Chinese counterpart Zhou Enlai at the Beijing Airport. They reassured each other that they had no intention to start war and agreed to resume negotiation over border issues. Nevertheless, Mao still suspected that Moscow would take advantage of the border talks to deflect Beijing’s attention to the Soviets’ first strike. Though the Soviets never attacked, strong concern over a war with the Soviets drove Beijing to rapprochement with the Americans, who were then suffering from a bitter war in Vietnam (Radchenko 2010, pp. 367–8).

2 Wars in Indochina, 1954–1969

2.1 Geneva Conference and Its Aftermath

The United States began its commitment to Vietnam in early 1950, when it decided to support French war efforts in Indochina.⁴ The beginning of American involvement in Vietnam coincided with diplomatic recognition of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) by the Soviet Union and newly established Communist China in January 1950. Beijing soon started providing military assistance with the Viet Minh, the leading organization of Vietnamese anti-colonial struggle against France. The US countered this move through diplomatic recognition of the State of Vietnam, the French-backed regime in the south. According to Logevall (2010, p. 286), it was a watershed moment. “Henceforth, the First Indochina War was simultaneously a colonial conflict and a Cold War confrontation.”

Despite American support to France, the Viet Minh maintained the upper hand militarily throughout the war. Indeed, when ceasefire talks began on May 8, 1954 in Geneva, the Viet Minh controlled three quarters of the country. Yet, in July, Ho Chi Minh, the leader of the Viet Minh and the premier of the DRV, decided to accept the Geneva accords, which secured nation-wide elections to be held within two years but only half of the country for the DRV. In Geneva, the American delegation headed by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles threatened military intervention unless the US’s terms were accepted. Even the DRV’s allies, the USSR and China, wanted a ceasefire and pushed DRV leaders to acquiesce. While anxious about the “prevalence of fatigue and war weariness” among the Vietnamese, Ho’s “greatest concern” was the prospect of US intervention. “[F]inalizing a settlement represented the only way to avoid US intervention and protect the long-term interest of the Vietnamese Revolution,” believed Ho (Asselin 2018, pp. 73–74).

Ho and his comrades were confident that they would win the national elections scheduled in 1956 and reunify the country. In July 1955, however, Ngo Dinh Diem, the leader of South Vietnam, refused to hold the elections, with the blessing of the Americans. Washington was determined to prop up Diem, seeing South Vietnam as a cornerstone for its containment policy in Southeast Asia. In April 1954, President Dwight D. Eisenhower emphasized the importance of South Vietnam with his famous domino theory: If South Vietnam fell into the hands of communists, other countries would quickly follow suit in the region. With such an ominous prospect in mind, in September 1954, the Eisenhower administration signed the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty (the Manila Treaty) which led to the establishment of the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO). In addition, Washington started pouring massive military aid into South Vietnam.

In the late 1950s, it was already apparent that Diem had failed to consolidate his domestic political base. His oppressive and despotic rule, often favorable to the Catholic population, alienated the majority of South Vietnamese society, who were peasants and Buddhists. Towards the end of 1950s, Viet Minh members that stayed in the South increased their pressure on Hanoi to restart liberation efforts.

In the beginning, the leaders of the Vietnamese Worker’s Party (VWP) in the north were cautious and pursued the liberation of the south only through non-military measures. Although they did not abandon the policy of reunification, they first and foremost had to consolidate their new country while avoiding provocative measures against the Americans. With strong pressure from their comrades in the south, however, the Hanoi leadership gradually changed their strategy. Early in 1959, the Central Committee of the VWP decided to restart their armed struggle and support anti-governmental activities in the south. The decision included the opening of the famous “Ho Chi Minh Trail,” a hundred-mile-long route from the south to the north through Laos that supplied materials and manpower. In December 1960, a number of anti-Diem groups formed the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NLF). Waging guerrilla warfare and garnering wider support from the South Vietnamese, the communist led NLF soon became the central force in the southerners’ battle for liberation and reunification (Asselin 2018, pp. 81–104; Furuta 1996, pp. 17–18). The Indochina War then entered its second phase.

2.2 Kennedy and the Second Indochina War

In January 1961, John F. Kennedy, the new American president, inherited the conflict in Indochina from his predecessor. At that moment, Laos, not Vietnam, was the immediate concern for the new administration. In contrast to his predecessor, Kennedy saw little American security interest in Laos. Thus, JFK decided to pursue a negotiated settlement on Laos. In July 1962, the International Agreement on the Neutrality of Laos was signed (Logevall 2001, pp. 40–41).

While the Laos crisis was successfully defused, the situation in South Vietnam was deteriorating. Anti-Diem protests expanded and intensified. Protesting against religious oppression by Catholic Diem, Buddhist monks burned themselves in the street. Diem’s tyranny, corruption, and nepotism alienated South Vietnamese and helped the NLF increase its force and popularity in the south. American officials found that the US backed South Vietnamese Army lacked the ability to wage a counter-insurgency against the NLF.

Yet, in Vietnam, JFK had no intention of negotiating. He was afraid that by opting for a diplomatic solution in Laos “he had opened himself up to charges of being ‘soft on communism’ from his domestic opponents” (Logevall 2010, p. 293). Strategic concerns also loomed. For Kennedy, Vietnam was a touchstone of “the credibility of America’s commitment” which was essential “to convince adversaries and allies alike of American firmness, determination, and dependability.” From mid-1962 onwards, the US began to see China, which pursued radical foreign policy under Mao’s tutelage,⁵ as a more serious threat than the USSR. In this context, Vietnam became a keystone for containing Beijing. Yet, JFK was faced with a dilemma. “[H]e did not want to expand the American military commitment,” which he believed would easily slip into a quagmire, “but he feared a continued military and political deterioration in South Vietnam” (Logevall 2001, pp. 43–6).

Kennedy ended up taking a middle course and increased financial assistance to Diem’s government while sending US military advisers to train and help the South Vietnamese Army. The number of American military advisers gradually increased and, by the end of 1963, reached around 16,000. Kennedy’s cautious approach, however, did not work well. Indeed, JFK allowed a group from the South Vietnamese military to proceed forward with a coup against Diem, hoping new leadership would restore political stability. Diem was ousted in November 1963. Nevertheless, the turmoil in the south continued.

2.3 Americanization and Its Consequence

With the assassination of JFK, Lyndon B. Johnson took over the Vietnamese problem in November 1963. LBJ maintained Kennedy’s policy in view of the November 1964 presidential elections. However, an important event happened, which furthered American involvement in Vietnam. In August, the president was informed that two American destroyers were attacked in the Gulf of Tonkin. Though lacking conclusive evidence, Johnson decided to retaliate by launching air strikes against North Vietnam. In addition, at Johnson’s request, Congress decided to authorize the president to “take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression” of Southeast Asia (United States Congress 1964).

In February 1965, after his landslide victory in the presidential elections, LBJ decided to escalate the US war effort. In the wake of a communist attack against an American air base (the Pleiku incident), he decided to start continuous bombing of North Vietnam. In July, Johnson authorized an increase in the number of American ground forces in Vietnam. By the end of 1965, the US sent more than 180,000 ground forces. The war in Vietnam was now fully Americanized, and the US military presence reached its peak of 536,100 in 1968.

The more the American war efforts increased, the greater the Soviet and Chinese military and  economic assistance to the DRV became. Here loomed large the ongoing Sino-Soviet split.⁶ The two communist giants competed with each other to support the DRV: “[T]hus growing US pressure on North Vietnam merely stimulated that rivalry to Hanoi’s advantage” (Haslam 2011, p. 222). Still, neither Moscow nor Beijing wanted a direct conflict with Washington. Indeed, in 1965, China tried to send signals to the US that it had no intention of sending troops as long as the American army did not invade China. (Hershberg and Chen 2006).

Assistance from the Soviets and Chinese partly explains the reason why the North Vietnamese could continue their fight against the Americans. To achieve an upper hand in the guerrilla warfare waged by the Vietnamese, the US exerted enormous fire power and the most advanced technologies, e.g., carpet bombing, napalm, armed helicopters, and crop defoliants. However, alienated by such cruel American tactics, many Vietnamese not only supported the communists but also volunteered to fight in the war.

In the meantime, skepticism about the American war effort grew. Anti-war movements pervaded not only in the United States but also around the world. Against this background, the DRV and NLF launched an extensive attack in the south during the Tet lunar new year in late January 1968. Although the Tet offensive failed to achieve all its military goals, it made clear that the United States could not win the war. In his TV address on March 31, President Johnson announced a partial halt of bombing against the DRV and called for armistice talks. He also stated that he would not run for president in the upcoming election. Increasingly, it came to be believed that American power and international role were in decline. Finding a way out of the quagmire of Vietnam and restoring US influence became important tasks for Johnson’s successor.

3 Asia in the Era of Détente and Post-Vietnam

3.1 Superpower Détente and Sino-American Rapprochement

When President Richard Nixon took office in January 1969, the United States faced a wide range of problems. The US failure to succeed in the guerilla warfare waged in Vietnam had seriously discredited American prestige. The war also imposed heavy financial and human costs on the Americans, although the Vietnamese suffered from a much larger number of war casualties. Even in military terms, American power appeared to be declining. By the end of 1960s, the Soviet Union had caught up with the United States in terms of strategic nuclear power.

Such international difficulties urged Nixon and Henry A. Kissinger, Nixon’s special assistant for national security affairs, to reorient the American grand strategy towards “détente.” The basic goal of détente was the same as their predecessors’ strategies to contain the Soviet Union. Interestingly, a Sino-American rapprochement constituted an integral part of détente. The Sino-Soviet split, they believed, had brought about a propitious moment to “play the Chinese and Soviets off each other.” In addition, with the strategy of détente, Nixon and Kissinger hoped to induce the Soviets and Chinese to help the Americans get out of Vietnam (Hanhimäki 2013, pp. 39–40).

For its part, China had strong motivation to improve its relations with the US. Towards the end of 1960s, China increasingly felt threatened. American involvement in Vietnam was a major threat for China in the south. In the West, it was faced with India, an enemy since the border conflict of 1959. Yet, the “worst threat” was now in the north: “[A] former ally—the Soviet Union.” Encircled, Beijing decided to shift its strategy to seek a way out (Chen 2001, pp. 240–241). For Beijing, rapprochement with Washington was a strategic countermove against Moscow.⁷

With these thoughts in mind, from mid-1969, the Americans and Chinese exchanged a series of secret messages through Pakistan and Romania.⁸ These attempts led to Kissinger’s secret trip to China in July 1971, followed by Nixon’s official visit in February 1972. In Beijing, Nixon met Mao and Zhou.⁹ Their central concern was the status of Taiwan. While the US had committed itself to the defense of Taiwan since 1954, “No PRC leader could retreat from Beijing’s basic position that there was only one China, that Taiwan was a part of China, and that the People’s Republic was the only legal government of China” (Accinelli 2005, pp. 9–10).

After lengthy discussions, China and the US worked out terms acceptable to both. In the final communique announced on February 28 in Shanghai, the Chinese “reaffirmed” its position: “[T]he PRC is the sole legal government of China”; “Taiwan is a province of China”; and “the liberation of Taiwan is China’s internal affair.” For their part, the Americans stated: “The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States Government does not challenge that position” (United States Department of State 1972).

The Americans and Chinese respectively obtained what they had wanted. Sino-American rapprochement boosted the PRC’s prestige in the world. In 1971 and 1972, thirty-three countries extended diplomatic recognition to China, breaking their diplomatic ties with Taiwan. Since then, the PRC has enjoyed the upper hand in their competition with Taiwan. Indeed, in September 1972, Japan agreed to normalize its relations with China, while abandoning its official diplomatic ties with Taiwan.¹⁰ The Sino-American rapprochement also prodded the Soviets into turning to détente with the Americans. In May 1972, three months after Nixon’s trip to China, the president visited Moscow and signed such important agreements as the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty, the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, and the Basic Principles of US-Soviet Relations. The “triangular” strategy worked vis-à-vis the Soviets. But this was not case for the Vietnamese. Why? To answer this question, we need to examine the Sino-North Vietnamese relations of this period.

3.2 The Sino-Vietnamese Split and the Paris Peace Accords

While relations among long-standing enemies drastically shifted towards détente, relations between China and the DRV—old allies since the early 1950s—kept deteriorating. Until the end of 1968, China was the most significant supporter for the DRV’s war effort while Hanoi also received military and financial assistance from Moscow. Well aware of the ongoing Sino-Soviet split, Hanoi leadership tried to postpone the moment when they would have to choose one side as long as possible.

The 1968 Tet Offensive marked a turning point in the Hanoi-Beijing relationship. Beijing had worried that a major operation as such would increase Hanoi’s dependence on Soviet weapons and, in turn, expand Moscow’s influence on Hanoi. Worse for China, DRV leaders decided to participate in the Paris peace talks with the Americans to seek a way out of the military impasse. Unsurprisingly, Beijing strongly opposed the US-DRV talks that Moscow endorsed. As a result, after 1969, the Soviet replaced China as the biggest supplier of aid. Hanoi’s tilt towards Moscow scared Beijing as, by then, the Soviets had become the most dangerous enemy for the Chinese.

Naturally, China sought to break the impasse by improving relations with the US while they simultaneously kept fighting with Moscow and Hanoi. The Chinese and North Vietnamese involved themselves in a “struggle for mastery in Indochina” (Nguyen 2006, p. 15): They tried to extend their influence over Cambodia and Laos in order to secure their regional allies. As we will see, the Sino-Vietnamese political battle over Indochina paved the way for the Third Indochina War. In terms of relations with the Americans, both the Soviets and Chinese pursued their strategic goals to the detriment of the Vietnamese. Indeed, upon Washington’s request, Moscow and Beijing made constant efforts to persuade Hanoi to restrain its military actions and sign a ceasefire agreement in vain; Hanoi was determined not to repeat their mistakes at Geneva in 1954 (Nguyen 2006, pp. 12–32).

In the meantime, the Nixon administration pursued the policy of “Vietnamization” by strengthening the South Vietnamese military so that the Americans could withdraw their forces. Nixon gradually pulled American forces from Vietnam, from 543,000 in the spring of 1969 to 60,000 in the fall of 1972, while increasing military pressure on Hanoi through bombing. By so doing, the president hoped to squeeze out a better deal at the Paris talks. He also sent troops to Cambodia in 1970 and to Laos in 1971 in order to destroy the Vietnamese footholds. Hanoi, however, did not yield to the American pressure.

3.3 Third Indochina War

On January 27, 1973, the Paris Peace Accords were signed. The North and South Vietnamese countries agreed on ceasefire while the Americans withdrew their troops from Vietnam. It did not take long before the battle between the two Vietnamese regimes resumed. By early 1975, the DRV assumed the dominant position on the battleground, and Vietnam was reunified in April 1976. The DRV was renamed as the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV). Meanwhile, communists seized control in neighboring countries. In December 1975, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic was established under the leadership of the Pathet Lao. The Kingdom of Cambodia, which had been under the rule of Prince Norodom Sihanouk since 1953, had plunged into a civil war in 1970. The bloody conflict ended with the victory of the Khmer Rouge led by Pol Pot, a radical Maoist and aggressive nativist leader. In April 1976, Pol Pot declared the creation of the Democratic Kampuchea (Kiernan 2006, pp. 187–206).

Yet, neither the Paris accords nor the communist victory brought peace to Indochina. Towards the end of the 1970s, the Third Indochina War, a series of military conflicts among China, the DRV, and Democratic Kampuchea, erupted. All the belligerent countries espoused Marxism, but their ideological affinity did not prevent them from fighting with each other, as the leaders of each power were “influenced by nationalist sentiments as much as by communist ideologies” (Best et al. 2014, p. 326). After the conclusion of the Paris accords, China was increasingly concerned about the Moscow-backed DRV becoming a dominant regional power. Perhaps, the Chinese fear of the Soviet-Vietnamese coalition was overshadowed by the long-standing history of Sino-Vietnamese animosity dating back to the second century BC (Matsuoka 2001, pp. 117–118). Accordingly, Beijing increased its support for the Khmer Rouge, hoping the anti-Vietnamese Pol Pot’s regime to be a counterbalance against Hanoi (Nguyen 2006, p. 26). In 1977 and 1978, there were frequent border clashes between the Vietnamese and Kampucheans.

The anti-Vietnamese coalition of China and Kampuchea pushed Vietnam further towards the Soviet Union. In November 1978, Moscow and Hanoi signed the treaty of friendship and cooperation, which provided the Soviets with a naval base in the strategically important Cam Ranh Bay. In December, the Vietnamese army crossed the Kampuchean border and replaced the Pol Pot regime with the People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK), a pro-Vietnamese government led by Heng Samrin. The Vietnamese army remained there until 1989. The Vietnamese, however, failed to capture Pol Pot and his subordinates who continued armed struggles against the PRK.

Convinced that Moscow had pulled strings behind the scenes to counter China, in February 1979, China invaded Vietnam to “teach a lesson” to Hanoi. The Vietnamese army, however, effectively resisted and forced the Chinese military to retreat.

In resisting Vietnam and the PRK, China and the ASEAN countries worked together on both military and diplomatic fronts. They shared security concerns vis-à-vis Vietnam. Militarily, China and such ASEAN countries as Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia supported non-communist rebellions in Cambodia against the PRK. China also kept providing Pol Pot’s group with military equipment. In parallel, ASEAN took a series of actions in the United Nations to isolate Vietnam. In June 1982, China and ASEAN helped to establish the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK), a government in exile consisting of three anti-Vietnamese political groups: The royalist FUNCINPEC led by Sihanouk, the communist Khmer Rouge, and the antiroyalist and anticommunist Khmer People’s National Liberation Front (KPNLF) (Scott 1996, pp. 85–91; Tanaka 1992, p. 194).

As we will see in Sect. 9.5 of this chapter, in the late 1970s, the United States, like China, was increasingly concerned about the reemerging Soviet threat, which pushed Washington and Beijing to form a quasi-alliance. Accordingly, in Indochina, the Americans “began to counter what was perceived as Soviet expansionism through its client, Vietnam” (Scott 1996, pp. 84–85). And the US government under Presidents Jimmy Carter and, from 1981, Ronald Reagan would support China and ASEAN’s move against Vietnam in Cambodia (Scott 1996, pp. 84–104). The aforesaid story demonstrates the dynamic interactions inherent to Sino-US-Soviet triangular relations and the regional conflicts in East and Southeast Asia in the 1970s. We can observe similar developments in South Asia.

4 South Asia in the Cold War

4.1 India-Pakistan Relations in the Early Cold War

India and Pakistan attained their independence in August 1947. From the beginning, the two countries disagreed over the ownership of Kashmir and clashed as early as October 1947.¹¹ In addition, the two countries took different stands on the Cold War.

The new Indian leaders, prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru and his Congress Party, saw themselves as “nonaligned, anticolonial and socialist.” As a political leader of an underdeveloped country, Nehru was attracted by the Soviet economic model of centralized planning. Nevertheless, he strongly opposed the Cold War. For him, it was the European centered international system deflecting “attention” from “the real problems” of the world: “[U]nderdevelopment, hunger, and colonial oppression.” And the Cold War threatened the possibility of nuclear catastrophe. “Third World solidarity, national sovereignty, and freedom of action was essential,” believed Nehru (Westad 2017, pp. 423–424). Indeed, India played a leading role in organizing the Asian-African Conference held in Bandung, Indonesia, in 1955, and the Non-Aligned Movement, in order to resist the Cold War system.

In contrast, Pakistan leaned toward the United States. While acting as a member of the Non-Aligned Movement, the Muslim leadership in Karachi hoped to derive from the US not only economic and military assistance, but also a security commitment against India. For this purpose, they tried to portray their country as a cornerstone of American containment policy in South Asia. In 1954, the two countries signed a mutual defense assistance agreement. Pakistan also became members of SEATO in 1954 and of the Baghdad Pact in 1955.

In the early phase of the Cold War, the Soviet Union had little interest in involving itself in the Third World. Stalin’s death, however, changed Moscow’s course. The new Soviet leaders, especially Khrushchev, found increasing opportunities to expand Soviet influence among newly independent countries including India. Moscow, they believed, could take advantages of strong anti-colonial/Western feelings and desires for economic modernization among Third World countries (Gaiduk 2015).

4.2 The Sino-Soviet Split and the Cold War in South Asia

In the mid-1950s, security concerns over American-backed Pakistan, together with its sympathy towards the Soviet economic model, pushed New Delhi towards Moscow. The Soviets could not miss the chance. In February 1955, India became the first non-communist Asian country that concluded an economic assistance agreement with the USSR. Two months later, Nehru made an official visit to Moscow. Alarmed, Washington started providing India with massive economic aid in the late 1950s, while maintaining its military commitment to Pakistan. In so doing, US officials hoped to “cultivate friendly, productive relations with both countries” in order to contain the expansion of Soviet influence in the region (McMahon 1994, p. 333). In South Asia, local rivalry between India and Pakistan intermingled with the US-Soviet conflict.

International politics on the Indian Subcontinent were further complicated by the emerging Sino-Soviet split. As we have seen, the Sino-Indian border conflict of 1959 disclosed a rift between Moscow and Beijing.¹² During the second Sino-Indian border incident in October 1962, which coincided with the Cuban Missile Crisis, Moscow sided with Beijing. The Soviets wanted to secure Chinese support for their actions in the Caribbean. Not surprisingly, Moscow’s dismissive stance drove New Delhi towards Washington. Kennedy took this opportunity to cultivate friendly relations with India. Upon Nehru’s request, the US provided India with military equipment. JFK’s policy, however, backlashed. US assistance could not prevent India’s defeat, and it only angered its Pakistani ally.

The 1962 Sino-Indian war changed the international dynamics in South Asia. On the one hand, the incident made Moscow and New Delhi closer as they began to see Beijing as their “common enemy” (Mastny 2010b, pp. 62–63). On the other hand, feeling betrayed by the US, Pakistan tilted toward China. The Sino-Soviet split and the post-Cuba superpower détente overshadowed this process: The US and the Soviet Union was now seeking détente, while their respective relations with China deteriorated.

It was against this complicated background that Pakistani General Mohammed Ayub Khan started a series of military moves against Kashmir in August 1965. Indian Prime minister Lal Bahadur Shastri, the successor of Nehru who had passed away in May 1964, immediately responded. This alarmed the Americans. If China intervened in the Indo-Pakistani War, the regional conflict in South Asia might escalate into a global war. In addition, Beijing’s move could have wider repercussions for US interests by undermining the “faith” of US Middle Eastern allies “in American commitments,” pushing Pakistan further toward China, and driving India to go nuclear (McMahon 1994, pp. 328–330). Naturally, Washington attempted to ensure an armistice through the United Nations. Such American attitudes, however, alienated both India and Pakistan. In contrast, the Soviets succeeded in mediating a ceasefire. In January 1966, Shastri and Ayub went to Tashkent in Soviet Uzbekistan and agreed to declare an armistice (Perkovich 2000, p. 110; Kalinovsky 2014, p. 182).

4.3 South Asia in the Era of Détente

After the 1965 Indo-Pakistani War, the Johnson administration decreased its commitment to the Indian subcontinent. With the inauguration of President Nixon, however, the United States again changed its South Asia policy. Nixon entered the White House with strong pro-Pakistani and anti-Indian sentiments, which had been formed during his 1958 visit to the region as vice president. Nixon’s South Asia policy also reflected his new strategy of détente. Throughout 1969 and 1970, Nixon tried to inform Beijing of his readiness to normalize Sino-American relations through Agha Mohammed Yahya Kahn, the president of Pakistan who had replaced Ayub in March 1969. In early December 1970, Nixon received what he had longed for: Zhou Enlai’s message welcoming Nixon’s special envoy to Beijing (McMahon 2008, pp. 251–256).

Nixon’s effort coincided with a serious political development in Pakistan. In East Pakistan, the Awami League Party, which had demanded full autonomy for Bengalis, won a major victory in the national elections. Next spring, Yahya’s government in West Pakistan decided to use force to crack down on the independence movement in East Pakistan. Many Bengalis were killed. Nixon, however, remained silent. His priority was to maintain good relations with Yahya, a key figure for Sino-US rapprochement (McMahon 2008, p. 259). Indeed, in July 1971, Kissinger made a secret trip to Beijing by way of Pakistan and successfully arranged Nixon’s visit to China early in the next year.

The emerging coalition of the US, China, and Pakistan inflamed the security concerns of the Soviet Union and India. Indeed, early in August, New Delhi and Moscow signed a friendship treaty. The treaty convinced Indira Gandhi, Nehru’s daughter and then the Indian prime minister, that her government was now well prepared to use force in order to solve the problem of East Pakistan. Although Moscow hoped to avoid another Indo-Pakistani war, New Delhi did not care about Soviet opposition. When Pakistan declared war against India in early December, Gandhi did not miss the opportunity to “dispose of India’s principal adversary by splitting it in two parts” (Mastny 2010b, pp. 68–69). In two weeks, India won a quick victory, and a new independent Bangladesh was established in East Pakistan.

4.4 Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan

The quick end of the 1971 Indo-Pakistani War did not stabilize the political situation in South Asia. In May 1974, India conducted a “peaceful” nuclear test, codenamed “Smiling Buddha.” It is widely believed that Gandhi made this decision because of security concerns about Pakistan. Recent studies, however, persuasively argue that pressure from the Indian defense and scientific establishment along with domestic political concerns were more important for Gandhi than the Pakistani threat (Perkovich 2000; Chap. 7; Mastny 2010b, p. 72). Pakistan countered India by accelerating its own nuclear project. The nuclear arms race in South Asia was set in motion.

In Pakistan, army general Muhammad Zia ul Haq seized power in the coup d’état of July 1977. As a pious Muslim leader, Haq intended to transform his country into an Islamic state based on Shariah. At the same time, neighboring Afghanistan experienced a major political change. In April 1978, the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) came to power. The new government intended to transform a rural country into a modern socialist state and hoped to receive aid from the Soviet Union. Moscow was not involved in the PDPA’s seizure of power and, initially, was cautious to help the new regime. Yet, “[t]he growing instability on the southern frontiers only increased a temptation to turn Afghanistan into a stable satellite under Soviet tutelage.” In December 1978, the two countries signed a friendship treaty (Zubok 2009, pp. 259–260).

Early in 1979, the situation in Afghanistan began to deteriorate. The PDPA’s radical socialist-oriented policy alienated a broader range of Afghan people, and they soon committed themselves to the Islamist rebellion called mujahedin. Initially, the Soviets were cautious to send troops to the country. The assassination of Afghan Prime Minister Nur Mohammad Taraki by his deputy Hafizullah Amin in September 1979 became the turning point for Moscow. Taraki was Brezhnev’s favorite. Moreover, the KGB Soviet intelligence agency informed Moscow from Kabul that “Amin was playing a double game and meeting secretly with the Americans” (Zubok 2009, pp. 260–262).

From the mid-1970s, US-Soviet relations kept deteriorating on many fronts, including strategic arms control negotiations, the Third World, and human rights, among other issues. Against this background, Soviet leaders made a critical decision to “eliminate Amin and ‘save’ Afghanistan” (Zubok 2009, p. 262). In late December 1979, the Soviet army crossed the Afghan border. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, despite its defensive motive, marked the end of the superpower détente and the beginning of the so-called New Cold War (Njølstad 2010, pp. 135–155; Hanhimäki 2013, pp. 77–154).

5 From the “New Cold War” to the End of the Cold War in Asia

5.1 The Making and Unmaking of the Anti-Soviet Coalition

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan intensified Sino-Soviet confrontations. Deng Xiaoping, who had consolidated authority within the CCP after the deaths of Zhou Enlai and Mao Zedong in 1976, criticized the Soviet move as “an important step toward pursuing worldwide hegemony” (Chen 2019, p. 17). As suggested in Sect. 9.3, faced with a Soviet-Vietnamese alliance, Beijing increasingly recognized Washington and Tokyo as strategic partners in the late 1970s. In addition, there loomed a large economic consideration. Pursuing the policy later known as “reform and opening-up,” Chinese leadership desired that their country enter the global market by expanding political and economic ties with capitalist powers in the Asia–Pacific: the US, Japan, and the ASEAN countries. With these calculations in mind, China began to decrease its aid to revolutionary and communist forces in Southeast Asia and, eventually, cut it off in the early 1980s. In August 1978, Beijing also signed the Treaty of Peace and Friendship with Tokyo.

Deng expected the Sino-Japanese treaty to be a stepping stone to Sino-American normalization. For its part, the US wanted a closer relationship with China to resist global Soviet threats. Again, the greatest stumbling block was the Taiwan issue. For normalization, China demanded that the US “must break off diplomatic relations with Taiwan, must withdraw its troops from Taiwan, and must abolish its mutual defense treaty with Taiwan.” Beijing also insisted that Washington should not continue its arms sale to Taipei. In addition, China continued to assert that “the liberation of Taiwan was an internal Chinese affair, and other countries had no right to intervene.” Washington was ready to break off its official relations with Taipei (Gong 2005, p. 134, pp. 138–139). The US, however, intended to continue selling weapons to Taiwan. They also hoped to “terminate,” not abolish, the US-ROC Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954 with one-year notice to Taipei. Moreover, the Americans hoped to “get the Chinese to renounce the use of force against Taiwan,” a position Beijing would never take (Foot 2005, p. 110).

Neither side, however, wanted to miss out on this opportunity. In the end, the US and China “decided to postpone settlement of their differences” on the sale of arms. As to the liberation of Taiwan, they formed a compromise by agreeing that each party unilaterally declare its own position (Gong 2005, p. 144). On December 15, 1978, the US and China issued a joint communique declaring that the two countries would normalize their relations on January 1, 1979. They also agreed that the US-ROC Mutual Defense Treaty would be terminated at the end of 1979. In March 1979, however, the United States Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act. With this Act, Congress demonstrated its willingness to maintain the US’s defense commitment to Taiwan after the US-ROC treaty expired (Sahashi 2015, pp. 199–201).

In any case, an anti-Soviet coalition among the US, China, and Japan was formed by the end of the 1970s, though it did not last long. After President Reagan took office in January 1981, the issue of arms sales to Taiwan flared up again. By August 1982, Washington and Beijing managed to put the blaze under control by issuing a joint communique on this matter (Tucker 2009, pp. 134–147). However, the renewed debate on arms sales made Chinese leaders reconsider their strategy. Indeed, by mid-July 1982, Deng decided to abandon the policy of anti-Soviet alignment with the US and Japan. The Chinese leader also sought to improve relations with the Soviets, provided Moscow remove what Beijing called the “three obstacles” to Sino-Soviet normalization: (1) the withdrawal of Soviet military force in the Chinese-Soviet and the Chinese-Mongolian border areas, (2) the withdrawal of Soviet troops in Afghanistan, and (3) the withdrawal of the Vietnamese military from Cambodia (Masuo 2010, pp. 161–181). In September 1982, “Beijing declared that Chinese foreign policy would accord the principle of ‘independence and self-determination’ and thus would attempt to maintain neutrality between both superpowers” (Chen 2019, p. 18). Yet, it would take another six years for the two ex-allies to normalize relations.

5.2 Gorbachev and the Difficult Path to Sino-Soviet Normalization

Moscow had already called for a dialogue with Beijing. In a speech given at Tashkent, Uzbekistan in March 1982, Brezhnev announced that the Soviets hoped to improve Sino-Soviet relations. The Soviet move was “an attempt to play the China card against the United States” as Moscow hoped to break off the encirclement by the US, China, and Japan (Lüthi 2020, pp. 535–536). China agreed to have secret talks, though the resumed dialogue soon hit a snag. Soviet leaders certainly wanted to improve relations with their Chinese counterparts. However, for them, agreeing to the “three obstacles” was tantamount to making “one-sided concessions.” Moscow “wanted to engage Beijing for normalization, but not on China’s terms” (Zubok 2017, p. 125).

The Sino-Soviet talks continued to stall even after Mikhail Gorbachev assumed his position as the General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party in March 1985. It was well known that Gorbachev pursued the foreign policy of “new thinking,” which consisted of two basic principles: Mutual security and interdependence (Hasegawa 2011b, p. 339). The policy of “new thinking” would eventually make a significant contribution to the end of the Cold War. In 1985 and 1986, however, no diplomatic breakthrough had yet been made between the USSR and the West (Rey 2008, pp. 23–35; Taubman 2018, Chaps. 7, 11, and 13). Recent research argues that Gorbachev sought a Sino-Soviet rapprochement in Asia, or even a “triangle” alignment among the Soviet Union, China, and India, to counter the Reagan administration’s hostile Soviet policy (Zubok 2017, pp. 128–129; Radchenko 2014, pp. 98–100).

In this context, Gorbachev outlined his political vision for Asia during his visit to Vladivostok in July 1986. As “an Asian and Pacific country,” he emphasized, the Soviet Union hoped to build “together new fair, relations” and promote economic interdependence in this region. For this purpose, Moscow hoped to expand political and economic ties with China, Japan, ASEAN, and other countries. Gorbachev also proposed a collective security system in this region. This speech embodied the application of “new thinking” to the Asia–Pacific (Gorbachev 1986, pp. 250–258; Hasegawa 2011b, pp. 340–341).

In this address, Gorbachev also indicated his willingness to meet two of the “three obstacles.” He announced the partial withdrawal of Soviet troops in Afghanistan by the end of 1986. In addition, the Soviet leader mentioned the on-going talks with Mongolia over force reduction. Five weeks later, however, Deng (1986) criticized Gorbachev, who had “evaded” the question of Vietnamese withdrawal in Vladivostok. For Deng, this was “the main obstacle in Sino-Soviet relations.” Deng emphasized that “if he [Gorbachev] urges Vietnam to end its aggression in Kampuchea and withdraw its troops from there, I for my part will be ready to meet him.”

It is worth noting that Deng had already shown some flexibility. In April 1985, Deng remarked that the Soviets would not need to “lift all three obstacles at once.” “[T]hey can first eliminate one, then progressively one by one” (Gladstone 1985). After 1987, Sino-Soviet reconciliation proceeded as Deng had suggested. The Soviet Union started the partial withdrawal of troops from Mongolia in early 1987 and from Afghanistan in May 1988. By February 1989, all the Soviet forces left Afghanistan. During this period, from 1987 to 1988, US-Soviet relations improved at a rapid pace, especially in the field of nuclear arms control (McMahon 2003, pp. 162–165). Yet, a solution to the Cambodian problem was left up to the local actors in Indochina, and not in the hands of the major Cold War powers.

5.3 Sino-Soviet Normalization and the End of the Civil War in Cambodia

Throughout the 1980s, the quagmire in Cambodia continued. Phnom Penh was under the control of the pro-Vietnamese PRK government, while the CGDK in exile received wider international recognitions and held a seat in the United Nations. With Vietnamese hostility to China, Deng wanted Moscow to press Hanoi on the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops in Cambodia. The Soviets were reluctant. Vietnam was a strategic asset to counter the anti-Soviet coalition. And, unsurprisingly, the Soviet leaders did not want to “upset the fragile Soviet-Vietnamese alliance” (Radchenko 2014, p. 130).

Moscow’s attitude to Hanoi did not change even after Gorbachev took office. Like his predecessors, Gorbachev saw Soviet strategic interests in Vietnam. Indeed, Soviet assistance to Vietnam between 1986 and 1990 “amounted to 8.22 billion rubles, that is, a half of all of Soviet aid to Vietnam since 1955.” The aid to Vietnam, however, was a heavy burden. In addition, the Vietnam’s Cambodian quest hindered Moscow from improving its political and economic relations not only with China but also with the ASEAN countries. While hoping for a ceasefire to the Cambodian conflict, Gorbachev hesitated to put pressure on Hanoi (Radchenko 2014, pp. 130–139).

Meanwhile, from the mid-1980s, the Vietnamese were increasingly aware that a stable international environment was essential for economic recovery. In the middle of the 1980s, Vietnam suffered from “high inflation and lack of access to FDI [foreign direct investment].” To overcome the economic crisis, Vietnamese leaders adopted a policy of Doi Moi renovation in December 1986, which aimed for market-oriented economic reform. For this purpose, foreign policy had to be shifted. Vietnam’s high military spending caused a huge fiscal deficit, which in turn lead to high inflation. And because of the inflation, foreign investors turned their back on Vietnam. For economic recovery, Hanoi had to end the Cambodian war and normalize its relations with Western countries, the ASEAN powers, and China (Szalontai 2008, p. 244).

In the mid-1980s, other regional powers endeavored to settle the Cambodian conflict. In July 1987, Indonesia proposed a “cocktail party,” an informal talk among four Cambodian parties, Vietnam, and the ASEAN countries. Three months later, the PRK government announced that Prince Sihanouk and PRK Prime Minister Hun Sen would meet in Paris in December 1987 and January 1988. The meeting between the two Cambodian leaders paved the way to the first Jakarta Informal Meeting (JIM 1) in July 1988. JIM 1 was the first international meeting among all “the parties most directly involved in the conflict.” The second JIM was held in February 1989. The two JIMs helped clarify conditions for a peace settlement (Ratner 1993, p. 4).

Throughout 1987 and 1988, Vietnam sought for normalization with the ASEAN countries and China. In November 1987, 20,000 Vietnamese troops left Cambodia. Six months later, Hanoi announced that it would pull 50,000 troops by the end of 1988 and all troops by the end of 1990. In the meantime, Vietnam succeeded in improving its relations with Indonesia and Thailand. In contrast, the path for Sino-Vietnamese relations took a zig-zag. In the spring of 1988, the two countries clashed over disputed islands in the Spratlys. Eventually, however, they agreed to resume talks in January 1989 (Radchenko 2014, pp. 136–150; Szalontai 2008, pp. 230–245).

Deng continued to be concerned about the Vietnamese military presence in Cambodia. The Chinese leader thus hoped to ensure Soviet commitment on this issue. This was what the Chinese tried, in vain, to do during the Sino-Soviet foreign minister meetings in December 1988 at Moscow and in February 1989 at Beijing (Zubok 2017, pp. 136–137). After all, Deng had no choice but to decouple Sino-Soviet normalization from the Cambodian problem.

Deng’s decision opened the way to the Sino-Soviet summit. In late May 1989, Gorbachev visited Beijing. The Gorbachev-Deng meeting marked the end of the Sino-Soviet split and normalized relations. Yet, Sino-Soviet normalization did not bring peace to Cambodia. Two more years were needed for the four Cambodian factions and related regional powers to settle the problem with assistance from the United Nations. In October 1991, the Paris Peace Agreements, officially known as the Comprehensive Cambodian Peace Agreements, were finally signed (Ratner 1993). Next year, the United Nations dispatched around 15,000 peacekeepers under the United Nations Transitionary Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) to supervise the implementation of the Paris agreement (Hanhimäki 2015, p. 84). After national elections in September 1993, the new constitution of the Kingdom of Cambodia was promulgated, and Sihanouk returned as King of the constitutional monarchy.

6 Conclusion

Between 1953 and 1989, the evolution of Sino-US-Soviet “triangular” relations, which the Sino-Soviet split and the superpower détente had brought about, shaped the course of local and regional conflicts in Asia, and vice versa. For example, the US played a significant role in the making of the 1954 Geneva Accords, which divided Vietnam into two parts. Sino-Soviet competition in the late 1960s, which supported the DRV, helped Hanoi to keep fighting a protracted war against the US. And the Vietnam quagmire, along with the Sino-Soviet border clash, helped Washington to reorient its strategy towards superpower détente accompanied by Sino-American rapprochement. The same kind of complicated dynamics are also observed in South Asia.

Historian John Lewis Gaddis once called the Cold War the “long peace” (Gaddis 1987). This is certainly the case between the superpowers and in Europe, where there was no direct military clash among major powers. In contrast, the Cold War in Asia did not remain cold. There were “hot wars” in, say, Indochina, South Asia, and Afghanistan. In post-war Asia, there were many local and regional struggles that stemmed not only from the on-going decolonization process but also from historical rivalries among local and regional actors. Interventions by the Americans, Soviets, and Chinese often intensified and protracted these conflicts beyond what they likely would have become without external intervention.

It is difficult to make broad generalizations about the impact of the end of the Cold War on subsequent local and regional conflicts in Asia. As far as the examples examined in this chapter are concerned, it seems reasonable to make the following points. The cessation of foreign intervention brought about by the end of US-Soviet hostilities and Sino-Soviet normalization formed the background for solutions to local and regional conflicts. Nevertheless, the end of these conflicts seem to have depended on local and regional actors. Certainly, Sino-Soviet normalization removed a major obstacle for the end of conflict in Cambodia. However, the end of the civil war did not occur until the four Cambodian factions and the regional Southeast Asian powers agreed to terms of settlement. By contrast, the Indo-Pakistani conflict continued beyond the Cold War era. India and Pakistan conducted nuclear tests and again fought over Kashmir in the late 1990s. South Asia remains a potential flashpoint even after thirty years have passed since the end of the Cold War (Talmadge 2019). Yet, the Indo-Pakistani confrontation might have taken a different form in the twenty-first century if it had not been impacted by the Cold War. This suggests that there is still room for studying the history and legacy of the Cold War in Asia.