Regionalism is an ambiguous term, so it is necessary to first define its meaning with reference to the current existing research (Hurrell 1995; Gamble and Payne 1996; Pempel 2005). In this chapter, “regionalism” is used to describe a situation where multiple states located in a given geographical scope promote coordination of policies and regional cooperation in an effort to attain peace and prosperity within the region in question. It is a political orientation that develops a “cohesion” that is more than a mere gathering of states. Hence, regionalism is a concept that indicates a process where actual cooperation and policy coordination are being promoted by states under such an orientation. Further, regionalism is not limited to the conclusion of regional trade agreements (RTAs) or free trade agreements (FTAs) but may include cooperation in a wide range of fields, such as politics and security as well as culture and society. Regionalism should be distinguished from “regionalization,” which is defined as a process that leads to a deeper degree of economic interdependence within this area.

Asia has been dominated by various conflicts, rivalries, competitions, antagonisms, and divisions. Nonetheless, even under such circumstances, various forms of regionalism have developed, and solidarity and coalition between nations have been sought based on them, leading to the formation of a number of regional institutions.

This chapter deals with what kind of ideas on regionalism have been advocated in Asia, how regionalism was actually promoted, what kind of regional institutions were established, and what kind of activities were developed there. It will also discuss the reasons why various kinds of regionalism have developed and how a lot of regional institutions were established even in regions such as Asia where conflicts are unremitting.

1 History of Regionalism in Asia

1.1 Independence Intent and Cold War Factors

Since before the war, the emergence of regionalism has been seen in forms such as the Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR), a non-governmental regional organization established in 1925. IPR was a non-governmental regional institution in the Pacific during the interwar period and one of the pioneers of regionalism in the region (Katagiri 2003). Additionally, Japan advocated regional ideas, such as the “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere” (Gotou 1995). Yet, the advent of regionalism, promoted by sovereign states on at least formally equal footing, had to wait until after World War II.

As the Japanese empire collapsed in defeat and the order of the Asian region changed drastically, the move to decolonize each region accelerated, bringing about the birth of various newly independent states in each region, even as some aspects of the Cold War had repercussive influences that entangled Asia. Under such circumstances, early Asian regionalism was strongly influenced by two factors: the desire of each Asian country for autonomy and the strategic choice of each to deal with turbulent regional circumstances caused by the Cold War.

In 1947, the United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE), the first intergovernmental international organization in Asia, was established (Wightman 1963). In 1950, the Colombo Plan was established as a framework for developed countries in the (British) Commonwealth of Nations, such as Australia, to support the underdeveloped regions of Asia under the idea of preventing the spread and penetration of communism in Asia (Watanabe 2014). Support for this idea gained momentum as the US in 1951, and Japan in 1952, joined the Colombo Plan. Likewise, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), which was established after the First Indochina War, was a regional security alliance that was strongly encouraged because of the Cold War (Fenton 2012). However, SEATO’s joint defense obligations were vague, and in fact, it hardly functioned during the 1960 Laos Crisis and the subsequent Vietnam War.

In the 1960s, inspired by the European integration that evolved throughout the 1950s, regionalism became particularly vigorous in non-European countries, such as Latin America, Africa, and Asia. In 1961, Thailand, the Federation of Malaya, and the Philippines formed the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) with the aim of economic, social, and cultural cooperation. In 1963, the Federation of Malaya, the Philippines, and Indonesia agreed to establish the Maphilindo. However, both of these groupings collapsed amidst a territorial dispute over Sava and the conflict over the formation of Malaysia.

The “hot wars” of the Cold War in Asia, such as the outbreak of the Vietnam War, boosted the tendency for a type of regionalism that aims to counter the threat of communism. The Asia–Pacific Council (ASPAC) was established in 1996, prompted by the proposal of South Korean President Park Chung-hee. Due to the efforts of countries such as Japan, Thailand, and Australia to dilute the anti-communist orientation that ASPAC had at the outset, the cooperative content shifted to economic, social, and cultural cooperation (Oba 2004, pp. 195–204). The Ministerial Conference for Economic Development of South-East Asia was first held in 1966 as a framework for Japan’s support for anti-communist countries and countries closing to the western camp (Oba 2004, p. 98; Hoshiro 2008, pp. 249–258). However, ASPAC collapsed in response to drastic changes in the strategic environment due to the China-US rapprochement in 1972 (Oba 2004, pp. 219–220). The Ministerial Conference for Economic Development of Southeast Asia also halted its activities in the early 1970s (Oba 2004, pp. 98–100; Hoshiro 2008, pp. 298–299).

1.2 Establishment and Development of ASEAN

Many of the above institutions were short-lived. However, the institution established in those times that survives to this day, and since those times has become the core of Asian regionalism, is the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), which was founded in August 1967 by five countries, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand.

While ASEAN highlighted economic, social, and cultural cooperation, its true purpose was exceedingly political (Yamakage 1991, pp. 111–115). The initial intention was for anti-communist (pro-Western bloc) countries to unite and counter the threat of communism. Leaders of ASEAN’s original member countries shared the objective of preventing the penetration of communism domestically in their countries and in the Southeast Asian region. Even more important was the stabilization of relations between the founding ASEAN states. Conflicts continued between these countries from the early-to-mid 1960s, including the mackerel issue, the armed confrontation between Indonesia and Malaysia, and the independence of Singapore from Malaysia. Hence, there was a need for a mechanism to stabilize their own relationships. Acharya (2001, pp. 4–8) argues that the process of advancing cooperation among ASEAN countries are leading to the construction of a regional “security community” in this region.

At the time of its inception, the internal and external assessments and expectations of ASEAN were not high; yet, after that, ASEAN overcame the crisis that brought about an order change in the Southeast Asian region and deepened and expanded cooperation. Following the communization of the Indochina Peninsula in 1975, the first ASEAN Summit was held in February 1976, and the Declaration of ASEAN Concord was adopted, proclaiming cooperation in various fields, such as politics, economy, society, and culture. The Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC), which was signed at the same time, included ASEAN’s norms and rules, such as respect for national sovereignty, non-intervention in domestic affairs, peaceful resolutions of disputes, and the renunciation of the use of force. These norms and rules were later collectively referred to as the “ASEAN Way,” along with practices such as maintaining informality and making consensus-based decisions (Acharya 2001, p. 61; Severino 2006, pp. 35–37).

The “ASEAN Way” has enabled ASEAN to partially maintain solidarity and unity among the various member states. And, as will be described later, such efforts have facilitated the expansion of ASEAN. Conversely, the more emphasized the principle of national sovereignty and non-intervention in domestic affairs, the more limited the cooperative content that can be agreed upon, and the more difficult it is for practical cooperation to proceed.

1.3 The Emergence of Asia–Pacific Regionalism

In the 1960s, Pacific cooperation became a hot topic, and private organizations were established, such as the Pacific Basin Economic Council (PBEC) in 1967 and the Pacific Trade Development Council (PAFTAD) in 1968 (Woods 1993). In November 1979, the advisory study group to Japanese Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira advocated a Pacific basin community, the Pacific Rim Solidarity Initiative (Oba 2004, pp. 266–271; Tian 2013a). Taking the opportunity afforded by this idea, the Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference (PECC), consisting of industry, government, and academia, was established in the early 1980s (Oba 2004, pp. 272–284; Tian 2013b). Again, in the 1980s, the ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference (ASEAN-PMC), bringing together ASEAN and ASEAN dialogue countries, functioned as a framework for informal government-level dialogue on politics and economics in the Asia–Pacific region.

Asia–Pacific regionalism has become even more active since the mid-1980s. Foremost, it was stimulated by the renewed intensification of regionalism in North America and Europe. Moreover, since the Plaza Accord in 1985, Japanese investment in Asian NIEs and ASEAN countries of the day (6 countries) has increased, and many Japanese companies have relocated their production bases to the ASEAN region, which has deepened and expanded the borderless production network (Hatch and Kozo 1996). Driven by this, the economic interdependence of East Asia has intensified, East Asia has received a great deal of attention as a growth center, and the recognition that cooperation for sustaining its development is necessary and has been strengthened in each country concerned.

In addition, the US intensified its protectionist trade policies. We strongly pressured Asian countries, including Japan, Asian NIEs, and ASEAN countries, to open their market to reduce the trade deficit of the US. These Asian countries were seriously annoyed by the US’s intense pressure. They began to plan a forum to talk about trade, economics, and other Pacific-wide issues to mitigate trade frictions (Ravenhill 2001; Oba 2004, p. 314).

Under these new circumstances, Japan and Australia took initiatives that led to the November 1989 launch of Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). APEC’s “open regionalism” aims to be a regionalism that contributes to the liberalization of the world by implying that APEC extended its trade liberalization to any non-APEC member countries on a most-favored-nation (MFN) basis (Ravenhill 2001, p. 165). This open regionalism was instrumental in showcasing the characteristics of Asia–Pacific regionalism at that time.

2 Intensification of Regionalism During the Post-Cold War Period

2.1 Regionalism and the End of the Cold War

The drastic changes in the strategic environment following the end of the Cold War in 1989 acted as a factor in activating regionalism in various parts of the world (Fawcett 1995, p. 17). Asia was no exception. Although the threat of full-scale nuclear war disappeared due to the retreat of the Soviet Union, the question of how to incorporate China, which had been isolated internationally after the Tiananmen Square incident, and the USSR/Russia, into the regional order has come to be recognized as a serious issue. While the conflict over ideology has been resolved, threats such as the possibility of regional and local conflicts, terrorism, and cross-border crime have gained recognition. The end of the Cold War also meant that capitalism and market economies had defeated socialism and planned (command) economies. Hence, the idea that it is advantageous to promote economic cooperation aiming at development in the market economy has been given greater credence. In order to construct a stable and prosperous new regional order in the changing regional circumstances mentioned above, various movements to promote regionalism appeared in Asia.

2.2 Rapid Development of Asia–Pacific Regionalism

In response to alterations in the strategic environment due to the end of the Cold War, as early as 1990, Canada and Australia advocated the establishment of an organization in Asia similar to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). In 1991, Japan’s Foreign Minister, Taro Nakayama, made a proposal to utilize ASEAN-PMC as a framework for dialogue in the new era. In the end, in July 1994, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) was established (Katsumata 2009). It was the first political and security cooperation and dialogue organization in the Asia Pacific region. At the second ARF in 1995, it was declared that this organization would be placed at the core of ASEAN and operate in accordance with the consensus-oriented ASEAN style, and it would deepen cooperation via three steps: (1) trust building, (2) preventive diplomacy, and (3) cooperative security.

APEC also expanded and developed after the end of the Cold War. In 1991, China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong simultaneously joined APEC. Additionally, the US put its hope on APEC as an organization that would achieve liberalization of trade and investment, which created the direct momentum for an attempt to provide support that led to the rapid institutionalization of APEC. A manifestation of this was the first APEC Economic Leaders’ Summit hosted by the US as the chair of APEC in 1993.

While some countries, such as the US and Australia (following in the wake of the US), tried to accelerate APEC cooperation as an organization to speed up liberalization and facilitation of trade and investment, other ASEAN countries strongly opposed such acceleration because they did not want rapid economic liberalization. However, at the second APEC Leaders’ Summit presided over by Indonesia in 1994, the “Bogor Declaration” was adopted with time-frame goals for APEC members: developed countries to fulfill trade liberalization by 2010 and developing countries by 2020. At the time, this was regarded as a groundbreaking agreement. (Kikuchi 1995; Ravenhill 2001; Oba 2014, p. 113).

2.3 Stalling of Asia–Pacific Regionalism

Nevertheless, since the mid-1990s, Asia–Pacific regionalism has lost momentum. A serious problem was the actual effectiveness of Asia–Pacific regional institutions. ARF surely includes various countries, some of which had serious conflicts with each other, like India and Pakistan. North Korea, which does join a few regional institutions, also joined ARF. Inclusiveness of ARF comes from its strictly following principles of respect for national sovereignty, non-interference, consensus decision-making, and informalism, which are the core elements of the “ASEAN Way.” However, because of such a soft and informal approach to institutionalization, ARF could not produce concrete results through dialogue and cooperation in the traditional field of security, which is directly related to the individual interests of each country. Hence, ARF has focused on cooperation in non-traditional security, where agreement is relatively easy to reach. ARF has often been ridiculed as a place to “talk shop” because its work does not go beyond dialogue and exchange of opinion.

APEC also showed its limits. At the Osaka APEC in 1995, it was agreed that liberalization of trade and investment should be promoted voluntarily while flexibly considering the circumstances of each country, and it was confirmed that trade liberalization in APEC would be promoted by an informal and non-binding procedure (Oba 2014, p. 115). Since many member countries opposed strengthening the binding force of APEC and the directional shift to promoting rule-driven liberalization of its forum, settling on such a policy was unavoidable. However, the momentum to promote substantial liberalization with APEC was lost. Finalization of the GATT Uruguay Round negotiations in 1994 and the establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995 also made APEC relatively less important (Oba 2014, p. 115). Moreover, the lack of any real response to the 1997 Asian financial crisis further reduced confidence in APEC (Ravenhill 2001).

3 Emergence and Rapid Development of East Asian Regionalism

As the Asia–Pacific regionalism to bring peace and prosperous regionalism stalled, East Asian regionalism flourished in the mid-1990s and 2000s (Oba 2001; Stubbs 2002; Terada 2003; Ba et al. 2016). East Asian regionalism initially emerged in the early 1990s with the proposal of the East Asian Economic Group (EAEG) by Malaysia’s Prime Minister Mahathir. This proposal aimed at pursuing dialogue and cooperation on the economic issues of East Asian countries consisting of Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia. The US and Australia expressed strong opposition to this idea, and Japan and China also expressed reluctant attitudes from beginning to end. The EAEG proposal was not supported by ASEAN countries, and, upon consultation in ASEAN meetings, it was renamed as the East Asian Economic Caucus, before actually being shelved.

Even so, the move toward grouping East Asia did not disappear. In the process of preparing for the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) launched in March 1996, Japan, South Korea, China, and the ASEAN countries were regarded as East Asian countries. Then, in December 1997, after the Asian financial crisis broke out with the Thai baht plunge in July 1997, the first ASEAN Plus Three (APT; Japan, China, and South Korea) Summit was held. This summit had been planned and decided before the crisis, but in hindsight, it functioned as a forum to confirm the will of East Asian countries to promote cooperation both to overcome the damages by the crisis and to reconstruct a resilient and durable regional economy. The APT Summit became a regular fixture and was rapidly institutionalized as a framework for promoting wide-ranging East Asian regional cooperation on political, economic, social, cultural issues. A notable advancement was financial cooperation. For instance, specific schemes, such as the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) launched in 2001, were advanced in the form of cooperation under the ASEAN + 3 Finance Ministers’ Meeting.

Further, ASEAN + 3 decided the setting of the East Asia Vision Group (EAVG) in 1998, which comprised of non-governmental experts from ASEAN + 3 countries in order to examine the future vision of East Asian cooperation. The EAVG released the final report in 2001, which advocates the construction of an “East and progress” in East Asia (East Asia Vision Group 2001). It also provided a lot of recommendations, including establishment of an East Asia Summit (EAS) and East Asia Free Trade Area (EAFTA). The East Asian Study Group (EASG) comprised the representatives from the ASEAN + 3 member countries’ government reexamined the recommendations by the EAVG final report and positioned EAS and EAFTA as long-term goals. After that, discussions on an East Asian Community activated, and in conjunction with this, the establishment of the EAS became a specific political agenda. After discussions with countries concerned, EAS was established in December 2005 as a framework to take “an important role” in the establishment of an East Asian Community (East Asian Summit 2005).

3.1 Expanding and Deepening ASEAN Integration

ASEAN has notably shown immense development in response to changes in the environment since the end of the Cold War. First, the end of ideological confrontations has enabled ASEAN to expand. In addition to the removal of ideological obstacles, expectation that ASEAN would serve as the gateway to economic development pushed non-ASEAN member countries in Southeast Asia to eagerly join. Although, until the 1980s, economic cooperation did not directly cause the economic development of ASEAN member countries at that time. Furthermore, ASEAN member countries also welcomed and supported the expansion of ASEAN because they wanted to achieve the long-term goal of the construction of a community that included all of Southeast Asia. Against this backdrop, Vietnam became a member in 1995, followed by Laos and Myanmar in 1997, and Cambodia in 1999, expanding ASEAN membership to ten (Yamakage 1991, pp. 157–187; Acharya 2001, pp. 102–127; Severino 2006, pp. 53–67).

Second, a shift has taken place in ASEAN’s strategy toward external powers. Until the end of the 1980s, ASEAN took a passive/defensive approach to reduce the influence of great powers. However, after the end of the Cold War, ASEAN began to take a more proactive approach toward external powers (Ba 2009, p. 179). In the 1990s, it expanded its Dialogue Partners, initially limited to Western powers including Japan, the United States, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and the European Economic Community (EEC), to welcome China, Russia, and India. In the 2000s, ASEAN tried to enhance such ASEAN + 1 relations by allowing each external power to sign the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) and to conclude a FTA with ASEAN. ASEAN began to take positive roles to construct a new regional environment the initial manifestation of this shift was the accession of ASEAN member states to APEC. In the 1990s and 2000s, the proactive ASEAN external strategy led to the formation of various ASEAN-centered regional institutions embracing broader regions, such as ARF, APT, EAS, and ADMM+. In this way, a multi-layered ASEAN architecture was formed.

The formation of the ASEAN architecture was seen as evidence that “ASEAN centrality” was working. The “ASEAN centrality” concept states the importance of ASEAN-led regional architecture. Simultaneously, it includes the implicit assertion of ASEAN countries that ASEAN plays a major role in maintaining broader regional order in Asia–Pacific/East Asia through the ASEAN architecture, and that ASEAN should continue to play such a role (Ho 2012; Oba 2016). Thus, it became a stock phrase used to explain the usefulness, or role, of ASEAN.

Third is the substantial and proactive promotion of ASEAN economic cooperation to realize ASEAN-wide economic integration (Severino 2006, pp. 202–250). From the 1970s to the 1980s, ASEAN tried to develop several schemes for economic cooperation, but these cooperation schemes provided small outcomes. However, at the Fourth ASEAN Summit in Singapore in January 1992, it was agreed to create the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) by 2008. The motivation of ASEAN countries to promote economic integration was to enhance international competitiveness of ASEAN’s local industries, further expanding market size, securing economies of scale and attracting more foreign capital.

In the early 2000s, East Asian regionalism and ASEAN cooperation showed remarkable progress. In the midst of this, the competition for leadership between China and Japan over the promotion of regionalism became apparent. For instance, during the process of establishing the EAS, China and Japan clashed over members to include in this new framework (Oba 2017). China insisted on the establishment of the EAS in the member states of APT, while Japan insisted upon ASEAN + 6 (extra states being Australia, New Zealand, and India), finally, the EAS was established as a framework comprising ASEAN + 6 members per Japan’s insistence. In addition, it was also decided that APT would continue to exist even after the establishment of the EAS, and those two frameworks would be set to each contribute to the formation of the East Asian Community.

Since the 1990s, the move toward negotiation of Free Trade Agreements (FTA) became a new trend. Apart from ASEAN’s agreement to establish the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) in 1993, there was less momentum for concluding FTAs in this region—bilateral or multilateral—in comparison with other regions. However, Japan had a large economic presence in Asia during the late-1990s and sought an FTA in tandem with global liberalization (Munakata 2001; Solis 2017; Katada 2020). Momentum accelerated in competition with China.

Then, during the 2000s, various FTAs were concluded in Asia. First, an FTA was signed between Japan and Singapore in January 2002. In November 2001, ASEAN and China declared that they would conclude an FTA within ten years. China and Japan competed with each other over the conclusion of an FTA with ASEAN, and the ASEAN-China FTA (ACFTA) was signed in 2004. Also, the ASEAN Japan Comprehensive Economic Partnership (AJCEP) was signed in 2008. In parallel with the conclusion of the FTA with ASEAN, Japan signed bilateral FTAs with each member country of ASEAN.

In addition, South Korea, India, and Australia-New Zealand (Common Economic Region) also each negotiated an FTA with ASEAN. Finally, those countries’ negotiations with ASEAN resulted in five ASEAN + 1 FTAs being signed in the 2000s.

3.2 Moving Toward Regional Integration with Mega-FTAs

After the rush to sign all the ASEAN + 1 FTAs had settled down, a move toward mega-FTAs aiming for economic integration across wide geographical areas, such as the Asia–Pacific and East Asia, took off in the latter half of the 2000s. The EAFTA, mentioned above, aimed at concluding an FTA comprising of the ASEAN + 3 member countries, and China and South Korea mainly supported this concept. On the other hand, Japan proposed the creation of the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement of East Asia (CEPEA), adding Australia, New Zealand, and India. The parallel examination of these two proposals for a mega-FTA in East Asia was deeply intertwined with competition between China and Japan over leadership to promote regionalism and regional integration (METI 2006).

On the other hand, movement to promote a mega-FTA in the Asia–Pacific also emerged. The Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership (TPSEP or P4 [four Pacific Rim countries]) was signed in 2005 by Singapore, New Zealand, Chile, and Brunei. The establishment of P4—aiming for advanced and comprehensive economic liberalization—acted as a factor to boost the momentum for economic integration throughout the Asia–Pacific region. It became feasible to talk about the idea of a Free Trade Area in the Asia Pacific (FTAAP), which aimed to realize economic integration of All APEC member economies. The US, fearing that the movements of EAFTA and CEPEA would promote economic integration in a way that excluded it, supported FTAAP and showed enough interest in the P4 agreement. The US’s strong interests in FTAAP and P4 became the “driving force” to encourage Asia–Pacific regional integration (Oba 2014, p. 235).

Then, in March 2010, Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotiations commenced among the P4 members and the US, Australia, Vietnam, and Peru. And, in October of the same year, Malaysia joined the negotiations. Commencement of TPP negotiations served as a catalyst for the unification of the two EAFTA and CEPEA initiatives for regional integration in East Asia since China feared exclusion from the TPP (Oba 2014, p. 238). In the summer of 2011, Japan and China agreed to shelve membership and jointly consider East Asian regional integration. And, worried that the unity of ASEAN would be damaged by the TPP, ASEAN came up with the idea for an FTA comprising the six countries (China, Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, and India) that had already signed FTAs with ASEAN. Thus, in November 2012, it was announced that the ten ASEAN countries and those sixteen countries were launching negotiations in the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP).

3.3 ASEAN Charter

Every time ASEAN was exposed to upheaval in the external environment, it continued to show its intention to deepen regional integration by advancing the schedule for elimination of tariffs and expanding the scope of that elimination, even after the setback of the Asian financial crisis.

The Declaration of ASEAN Concord II (Bali Concord II) was adopted at the ninth ASEAN Summit held in Indonesia in October 2003 (ASEAN 2003). This declaration made it clear that the ASEAN Community (AC), comprising the ASEAN Security Community (ASC), ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), and ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC), would be established by 2020. Subsequently, the ASC was renamed the ASEAN Political Security Community (APSC). Furthermore, in order to reform and strengthen ASEAN, the formulation of the ASEAN Charter was started in 2004. The ASEAN Charter was signed in 2007 and came into effect in 2008 (ASEAN 2008).

The ASEAN Charter clarifies the principles, objectives, structure, and procedures of ASEAN as an organization, based on the practices accumulated so far and the contents of documents issued. In the process of formulating this charter, discussions were held to review decision-making by consensus in order to promote effective cooperation to speed up integration; yet, in the end, respect for sovereignty and non-intervention in domestic affairs were kept as the core tenets of the “ASEAN Way,” which was reconfirmed as the ASEAN principle.

On the other hand, new elements were introduced to the Charter to strengthen democracy, enhance good governance and rule of law and promote and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms. These are all clearly stipulated in the objectives and principles of ASEAN. The ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights was established in 2009, and the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration issued in 2012. The inclusion of provisions on the state of the domestic political system and human rights meant that ASEAN embraced norms that contradicted the conventional “ASEAN Way,” which had emphasized the principle of non-interference.

4 Regionalism in the Transformation of Order

4.1 Gathering Momentum of Wide-Area Regional Economic Integration

In the 2010s, the change in the balance of power between the US and China became visible. The balance of power between China and Japan also changed after China’s nominal GDP overtook Japan’s in 2010. Furthermore, competition between the US and China escalated with these changes. In the 2010s, the regional order of Asia became unclear due to the regional transformations mentioned above. As planned, AC was established in 2015, and within one of its integral components, the AEC, efforts toward economic integration of Southeast Asia continued.

One of the characteristics of regionalism in Asia during the 2010s was that negotiations of mega-FTAs advanced and actually led to concluded agreements. The TPP negotiations, an attempt to integrate the Asia–Pacific region, and RCEP, aiming at East Asia regional integration, had been promoted in parallel (Wilson 2015).

The TPP agreement was signed in February 2016 by 12 member states. However, the US under the Trump administration withdrew from the agreement in January 2017. The rest of the eleven countries renegotiated because the TPP could not proceed without the US. Finally, with Japan’s leadership a comprehensive and progressive TPP (CPTPP) was signed in March 2018 and came into effect at the end of that same year. On the other hand, the RCEP negotiations were difficult and slow. In November 2019, India announced its withdrawal. The other member countries were shocked, but they kept and rather accelerated negotiations in 2020 despite the COVID-19 pandemic. Eventually, in November 2020, RCEP was signed by 11 member countries, excluding India, and came into effect in January 2022.

4.2 Intensifying Strategic Competition and Regional Integration

The negotiation processes of these mega-FTAs were greatly influenced by changes in the strategic environment of the region, including intensifying competition between the US and China, and the strategic implications of these mega-FTAs grew stronger. China’s assertive policies toward neighbor countries, which had been strengthened in the last stage of the Hu Jintao administration, was further strengthened after the Xi Jinping administration took over. China’s foreign policy has moved ahead in stick-and-carrot fashion, with the stick being wielded in an attempt to change the status quo by force in the East China Sea and the South China Sea, including efforts concerning the Senkaku Islands, while the carrot has taken the form of expanding investment and aid. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is an example of the latter and was seen as a tool for China to attempt to form a new order that reflects a new balance of power. The BRI has stimulated some of the TPP member countries, leading them to increase efforts in negotiations, and vice versa (Ye 2015).

Again, in the 2010s, due to concerns about the expansion of China’s political and economic influence, the US, Australia, India, and Japan proposed the concept of the “Indo-Pacific”—One strategic space comprising of the two sea regions of the Indian and Pacific Ocean, including their surrounding areas. The “Indo-Pacific” concept has spread rapidly. Various “Indo-Pacific” proposals have been put forward, including whether to consider China as a threat and thereby try to counter it, or to strengthen cooperation, including with China. From the perspective of balancing China’s influence, Japan and the US, in particular, have come to place importance on cooperation with India. Japan, the US, Australia, and India revived the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) in 2017, which once had a meeting in 2007 but had been suspended for about ten years. Quad has been developing rapidly. In March 2021, the first Quad summit was held online, and four leaders adopted the “spirits of the Quad,” which clearly stated that the four countries “commit to promoting a free, open rules-based order” (Quad 2021).

4.3 Relationship with a Free and Open Liberal Economic Order

The CPTPP and RCEP are frameworks for promoting trade liberalization in the region and further strengthening the free and open liberal economic order. And they share a common characteristic in that they are agreements that go beyond conventional FTA agreements, further expanding the formulation of common rules in various fields, such as investment, rules of origin, intellectual property rights, e-commerce, and government procurement. And despite being in a situation where the US has withdrawn from the TPP and India has withdrawn from the RCEP, Asia widely shares the perception that the conclusion and effectuation of both mega-FTAs means that the importance of a free and open economic order is essential to future development and prosperity.

On the other hand, the difference in strategic and economic implications of TPP/CPTPP and RCEP should also be noted. These two initiatives have different members. RCEP is a framework centered on ASEAN, with ASEAN taking the initiative in the negotiating process. Whereas, TPP/CPTPP has only four members from ASEAN (Brunei, Malaysia, Singapore, and Vietnam), so, in a sense, it is a framework that divides the AEC. And CPTPP/TPP sets a higher liberalization level than the RCEP. The TPP covers a wider range of fields, such as labor, environment, and state-owned enterprises, while the RCEP does not. The RCEP is also the first FTA in which Japan, China, and South Korea are participating together. At this juncture, it is estimated that Japan will benefit most from the efficacies of tariff elimination (Petri and Plummer 2020). Yet, if the RCEP has the effect of deepening and expanding the already existing East Asia cross-border production network, and if consideration is given to the core position of the Chinese economy in that network, the RCEP can be expected to increase China’s economic leverage, as well.

5 Conclusion

Regionalism in Asia is undergoing new developments in connection with escalating strategic competition. This chapter raises some points that should be noted for the times ahead. The first point is the trend surrounding the CPTPP. In September 2021, amidst a backdrop of domestic politics presuming that the US will not return to the CPTPP, China and Taiwan applied in quick succession to participate in the agreement. With escalating US–China competition entangling issues further, it is unclear whether China and Taiwan can individually join. The second point is that amidst the intensifying conflict between the US and China, economic statecraft has become an important theme—hence, in the name of strengthening supply chain resilience, it is apparent that moves are being made in the areas of cutting-edge technologies and strategically important supplies as well as moves to enclose supply chain networks related to them. These are also moves that contain contradictions to the liberalization of trade and investment under the mega FTAs, such as the CPTPP and RCEP. In October 2021, the US Biden administration announced that it would propose a new economic framework and established the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) in May 2022. The IPEF is composed of four pillars: (1) trade facilitation; (2) supply chain resilience; (3) clean energy, decarbonization, and infrastructure; and (4) tax and anti-corruption (White House 2022). Approximately 14 countries, including Japan, India, and seven of the ASEAN countries joined, but the effectiveness and endurance of this framework are still unclear.

Furthermore, the impact of European re-entry into Asia will also be a point of focus moving forward. Throughout the 2010s, the EU entered into individual FTAs with some Asian countries, such as South Korea, Singapore, Vietnam, and Japan, which meant transregional economic partnerships developed. Additionally, with growing suspicions and concerns about the rise of China and the intention of relativizing economic relations with China alone, Europe, in tandem with the above-mentioned move to conclude FTAs, has launched various Indo-Pacific strategies from the latter half of the 2010s. Subsequently, in January 2021, the UK applied to participate in the CPTPP, and negotiations for membership began in June of the same year. In other words, at present, economic partnerships concluded originally in Asia are expanding beyond their initial regional geographical sphere.

Finally, although ASEAN has played a central role in the institutionalization of regionalism in Asia after the end of the Cold War, the prospect of ASEAN is unclear. The unity of ASEAN has been shaken by the disagreement among member countries’ attitudes toward the South China Sea issue. Recently, the differences of opinion between the member countries toward democracy and human rights issues have come to the surface in efforts to address the coup d’état in Myanmar. Moreover, as China and the US intensify their offensives under the banners of “BRI” and “FOIP,” ASEAN’s role in the regional order seems to be decreasing. In an era of intensifying strategic competition that threatens the existing international order, it is rather significant that the ASEAN architecture provides a forum for dialogue and cooperation among the major Asian countries. However, it is incontrovertible that the effectiveness of regionalism in Asia, including not only the ASEAN architecture but also APEC and mega-FTAs, will be further questioned over the peace and prosperity of this region.