Over the past three decades, the Asia Pacific saw the gradual erosion of hope for cooperation that initially budded with the end of the Cold War. Instead, opposition between major powers and neighboring nations became notable. The goal of this chapter is to clarify major currents within the entire region and the overall composition encircling the specific points of opposition, such as the international relations surrounding the flashpoints that made long-standing crises in the Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan Strait. Before getting into the details, it is worthwhile to point out the major characteristics of the region that ran throughout this entire period.

First, U.S. presence is preeminent. The U.S. continued to entrench regional engagement based in predominant power and the forward deployment of military strength. And by adjusting and revising the San Francisco System that took form during the Cold War (Calder 2004), the U.S. was able to wield strong influence in the region even after the end of global rivalry. However, the U.S. did not always have a constant clear vision regarding the formation of regional order. While the U.S. did stand out from other nations in proclaiming political values like liberalism, democracy, and the rule of law, the U.S. also took many actions that contradicted this in consideration of strategic benefit, such as supporting political leaders who could not be called democratic. Also, the U.S. has often reacted to the development of events. From the late 2010s, Washington reviewed its engagement policy with China since reconciliation in the 1970s, which has deepened distrust of Beijing and fear of its technological growth. As a result, a new rivalry between the U.S. and China emerged, and it largely influenced political and social economic relationships in the region.

Second, the rise of China has resulted in a clear change in the power balance of this region. China was not even 10% of the U.S. nominal GDP in 1990 but rose to the level of 50% in 2011 and 70% in 2021. China not only became the world’s factory, but it also became the world’s market, and its economic power leads the world. In the global value chain, China has risen to displaying a presence second only to the U.S. Its scientific and technological expertise also grew rapidly, and from the mid-2010s onward, its number of journal articles in cutting edge fields has become comparable to that of the U.S. It has also inflated its military budget. The modernized People’s Liberation Army has come to possess a level of power that overwhelms its neighbors through naval and air strength, missile capabilities, and cutting-edge technology. Against this backdrop, the political influence of China is also growing, particularly in surrounding areas such as Southeast and Central Asia, not to mention the world stage as well. (An analysis spotlighting China is explored in chapter “Japan’s Economic Growth and Engagement in Asia”.)

Third, in the late twentieth century, Japan, which was defeated in the Asia Pacific War, rose to become the strongest power in Asia and the second strongest economic power in the world, and it strengthened its economic and diplomatic involvement in the region. In recent years, with Japan’s power relatively low compared to both the U.S. and China, debate has been divided on just how much Japan’s political influence and presence can sway international relations in the region. However, Japan is gradually rethinking its previously cautious diplomatic stance and is increasing its presence not only in the economic sphere, but also in terms of security as well. While Japan has practiced caution towards the rising power of China and North Korean nuclear missiles and participated in international operations such as Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) and the counter-piracy task force, Japan has also modernized the capabilities of its Self-Defense Forces, even revising the legal platforms concerning its so-called Peace Constitution and expanded its sphere of military and police action throughout the world. Its economic diplomacy, through providing economic aid and promoting free trade, is also vigorous, and its political influence in the region is still large.

Fourth, in this region, emerging market-based countries, also called middle powers, have come to employ a large amount of influence in the formation of regional order. These are nations such as Australia, India, Indonesia, and South Korea. As the fifth point, there are numerous regional institutions in Asia. The viability of regional cooperation achievable by these groups is loose compared to Europe, but the formation of forums presupposing consensus building among nations, as exemplified by ASEAN, can also be considered to provide a different model for international collaboration. (This point will be explored in the  chapter “Regional Concepts and Regionalism in Asia”).

Sixth, domestic politics and governance capacity face many obstacles. Not only is nationalism on the rise following the worldwide trend, there are still now many countries in which democracy and civil liberties are restricted, and there are also many countries that have backed down from a certain level of free and democratic society. Furthermore, while the governance capacity of central and local governments was generally low in the region, it is hard to say that it has been sufficiently strengthened even following economic growth. Large disparity in the development rates inside nations still persists. There are places where the feebleness of governance capacity is robbing governments of the ability to handle largescale disasters and transmittable disease pandemics. (The problem of democracy is discussed in chapter “The Cold War in Asia After 1953”.) There are even cases where because governance capacity is weak, countries allow an adjacent major power the ability to exercise policing power, and problems related to sovereignty have arisen.

Seventh, enduring rivalries define international relations in Asia. Continued political opposition arises from differences in opinions related to the demarcation of territory and historical perceptions. For this region, major examples include Japan–China relations, Japan–South Korea relations, China-India relations, and India-Pakistan relations. In China-South Korea relations as well, friction has arisen in recent years. After democratization in Taiwan, the Taiwanese identity is growing even stronger. South Korea and North Korea recently engaged in dialogue, but this fell apart. It is definitely true that U.S.–China opposition is a major theme in recent Asian international relations, but rival relationships between local nations is still a major opposition axis.

In this chapter, the development of regional critical problems will be presented in chronological order. First, throughout the gradual end of the Cold War from the 1980s to the 1990s, the region experienced economic growth and the democratization of the Philippines, South Korea, and Taiwan. Regional institutions for security cooperation were explored through efforts such as the recognition of South Korea as a nation by China and Russia. The region as a whole saw a plentitude of bright hope for the future. Moving forward, this chapter will consider the deepening of opposition between nations that developed from the 1990s onward by looking at the examples of the Taiwan Strait and North Korea nuclear crises and the South China Sea territorial disputes. Furthermore, friction between major powers grew in intensity between the U.S. and China and between Japan and China. The bitterness therein would continue to grow in the late 2010s.

1 The End of the Cold War in Asia

1.1 Formation of Cooperation: The 1980s to the 1990s

From the 1980s through the 1990s, positive currents were seen to a level that justified an optimistic view of the future in Asia. Economic growth was actualized, and the fruits of this were extending throughout Asian society. As seen in The World Bank’s (1993) publication of “The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy,” growth in various Asian countries was astonishing up to the mid-1990s. And this was not all. In the late 1980s, democratization was accomplished in the Philippines and South Korea, and martial law was lifted in Taiwan. There was also hope for political development as well. In Cambodia, peaceful general elections were held after a long period of conflict.

Furthermore, many new systems were proposed to ensure peace and prosperity in the region, and some of these were actualized. Led by Australia and Japan, Asia Pacific nations gathered to establish a new body toward an open, free trade-oriented institution, and Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) was created. In addition, amidst an atmosphere of Cold War tensions relaxing in Asia, countries like Russia, the U.S., and Japan explored new security collaborations. Proposals from and regional diplomacy by Japanese Foreign Affairs Minister Taro Nakayama bore fruit in the establishment of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). Concerning the manifold positive changes that came to Asia after the U.S.-Soviet Cold War ended, Amitav Acharya accurately summarizes: “Asian security was shaped by economic nationalism, security bilateralism, and political authoritarianism. These have gradually but unmistakably given way to market liberalism and economic interdependence, security multilateralism (coexisting with US-centric bilateralism) and growing political pluralism” (Acharya 2014).

Politicians of the time felt that positive, elevated atmosphere as well. Minister of Foreign Affairs Yohei Kono, who was present at the establishment of ARF in July 1994, expressed the following candidly.

In the economic sphere, the Asia-Pacific region has achieved dynamic growth benefiting from diversity and liberation and has developed interdependent relationships one step at a time. Meanwhile, in the sphere of security, because the peoples, religions, and ideologies are diverse in the Asia-Pacific region, and because there are many threat concerns as well, unlike Europe for example, the difficulty of advancing talks in a region-wide manner has been the topic of repeated discussions. It is true that in regions which have seen continued unrest and opposition, just a few years ago starting region-wide political and security related talks was nothing more than a mere dream … ARF is a historical opportunity arising within that kind of rise in awareness.

In Asia, the end of the Cold War did not eliminate problems sparked by security concerns and political conflict. First of all, after normalization of their relationship in 1979, the U.S. and China deepened their full-fledged economic, security, and technological cooperation in the 1980s, together with Japan and the European nations. When the Tiananmen Incident occurred in 1989, the differences in political values between China and Western nations became clear. However, due to a hope for Chinese economic growth and political reform in the future, there were repeated efforts to stabilize U.S.–China relations. The uncertainty of China’s future remained a problem as its economic power rose in the 1990s. Second, the structure of differing political bodies vying over legitimacy of control in the Korean Peninsula and Taiwan Strait continued even after the Cold War. In fact, growth and democratization in South Korea and Taiwan altered the identity of people there, and the problems actually increased in complexity. Third, democratization and growth of civil society seen across the entire Asian region accelerated friction revolving around historical perceptions as represented by the tensions seen in Japan–South Korea relations.

Even still, it is also an undeniable truth that in this era, cooperation in Asia did grow and relations between nations were relatively stable. Not only did democratization spread, but also large-scale wars between nations did not occur, and numerous frameworks formed for new international cooperation in military, economy, and financial arenas. Another factor is, the U.S. was once again accepted by countries in the region as a force to actualize stabilization in the region. For example, when U.S. military presence in the Subic Bay of Luzon Island became problematic due to politics within the Philippines, Singapore decided to provide an alternative location to ensure continued U.S. military presence in the region. Japan, which was located within the region, did not serve that kind of a role, and the rivalry with China dragged down Japan’s leadership power (Goh 2013). The regional economy was deeply connected by the division of production processes, and the migration of people became energetic. It is true that there were many challenges, but hope for peaceful order was not lost for this region.

1.2 The Seeds of Conflict: The 1990s to the Early 2000s

From the 1990s onward, there were incidents that pointed to the uncertainty of stability and prosperity in East Asia. North Korea nuclear missile development, the Taiwan Strait crisis (1995–1996), and the Asian financial crisis are all good examples of this. Territorial disputes and competition for military superiority following economic development rang alarms indicating a potential to destabilize the order of this region. There was enduring rivalry and a wall of mistrust among nations, which prevented them from negotiating toward comprehensive solutions. The global structure of the Cold War had partially contributed to such relationships, but the indigenous background in each case can explain the long-lasting existence of problems and the difficulty of concessions.

1.2.1 The North Korean Nuclear Missile Problem

Around the time the Cold War ended, a new current started to flow through the Korean Peninsula. South Korea was suffering under the repressive politics of the Chun Doo-hwan regime, and forces seeking democratization began forming a coalition. There was also pressure from the international community, including the U.S., and in 1987, the constitution was revised to allow direct presidential elections. Roh Tae-woo was elected as the first president after democratization. Against the backdrop of economic growth and the preparation of an international environment, including improvement of relations with China and the Soviet Union as Northern Diplomacy, Roh Tae-woo explored beneficial negotiations with North Korea. Diplomatic relations were successfully normalized between South Korea and the USSR in 1990 and between South Korea and China in 1992. And partially thanks to persuasion by China, the North and South were simultaneously granted membership to the United Nations in 1991. North Korea, which understood the implications of the dramatic changes in the international environment due to the end of the Cold War, was amenable to foreign diplomacy with South Korea and participated in repeated high-level talks between the North and South. The results of this culminated in the “Inter-Korea Basic Agreement.” This was a landmark agreement stating that each side would recognize the political system of the other, stop actions to overthrow the other, and promote mutual interaction. A joint declaration regarding the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula was also made during this period.

However, this positive atmosphere in the Korean Peninsula was swept away by suspicions of nuclear development in North Korea. North Korea had already been involved in nuclear cooperation with the USSR since the 1950s. According to American intelligence agencies, North Korea embarked on its operation of a nuclear facility in the Yongbyon area in the 1980s, and it was assessed that plans were advanced to include plutonium reprocessing for weapons development. It is highly likely that even during this period, North Korea had already started viewing nuclear arms as an important means for surviving within an environment of international isolation. North Korea joined the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1985 and agreed to safeguard measures with IAEA in January 1992. IAEA began having more serious suspicions starting with an inspection in 1992 and requested an unusual special inspection in 1993. This was also backed by the United Nations Security Council. However, amidst the restarting of Team Spirit, the U.S. and South Korea joint military exercise, which had not been executed the prior year, North Korea declared a withdrawal from the NPT. This was partially an attempt by North Korea to force the U.S. into talks. The U.S. and North Korea held repeated high-level talks in New York and Geneva as an attempt to find common ground. However, in March 1994, North Korea refused a follow up IAEA inspection. And with UN sanctions becoming a potential reality, the North Korean representative declared, “If there is a war, Seoul will become a sea of fire.” Furthermore, in May, North Korea publicly announced that it extracted nuclear fuel rods. Tensions reached an all-time peak.

But why was there such a strong concern that North Korea may possess nuclear weapons? The reason is that the North Korean secretive political system and the actual existence of covert operations, which had been repeatedly carried out up to that point, had sparked a fear of possible North Korean nuclear arms possession. This was not only a concern to the U.S., but across the entire world. U.S. Secretary of Defense William Perry considered it a top priority to do whatever they could to prevent North Korea from obtaining nuclear arms and recalls that he believed a surgical strike against North Korean nuclear facilities was absolutely necessary even if masses of civilians were caught up in a North Korean counterattack. In the face of that imagined massive scale of devastation, President Clinton did not put this plan into action. Nonetheless, U.S. forces at that time systemically prepared for the outbreak of war, taking measures such as updating weaponry deployed in the Korean Peninsula and convening high level meetings among military officials.

An ease to tensions came suddenly. Former U.S. President Jimmy Carter visited North Korea without a strong push from the Clinton administration and intervened between the two governments. In response to Carter reaching out, President Clinton requested actions such as freezing nuclear development and Kim Il-sung agreed to some basic concessions, including promises to allow IAEA inspectors back into North Korea to resume operations for monitoring equipment. Immediately after, the demise of Kim Il-sung was announced. Nevertheless, in October 1994, “The Agreed Framework” was formed, the supply of light-water reactors and heavy oil was planned, and the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) was established to implement the agreement. At the time, it was thought that this arrangement would halt nuclear development for the time being (Oberdorfer and Carlin 2014).

South Korea was not able to display leadership during the central point of the crisis, but after the Kim Young-sam administration proposed a four-party dialogue framework, the Kim Dae-jung administration actualized an engagement policy. This is also called the Sunshine Policy, and the core concepts are the regulation of military provocation, a renunciation of attempts to absorb and unify the North and South, and the promotion of amicability between the South and North. Meanwhile, in the U.S., Perry was reappointed to the role of special envoy at the request of the president, where he began the Perry Process. He applied a comprehensive approach while forming a foundation made up of the coalition of Japan, the U.S., and South Korea through shuttle diplomacy. And regarding the missile problem, he also expanded negotiations there as well. North Korea also responded by sending an envoy to the U.S., its highest military officer who was also the third highest official in North Korea, to announce a joint U.S.-North Korea communique. Following this, U.S. Secretary of State Albright visited North Korea. In these ways, international relations were on a positive footing. Towards the end of his administration, President Bill Clinton prioritized Middle Eastern peace negotiations and did not visit North Korea. However, an Inter-Korean summit was held. The North–South Joint Declaration envisioned the construction of a long-lasting relationship. Plans including a Kaesong Industrial Region initiative and Mount Kumgang tourism initiative were promised. And it became a groundbreaking turn that would actualize the strengthening of economic and social relations.

1.2.2 Taiwan Strait Crisis

After the normalization of diplomatic relations in 1979, both the U.S. and China strove to maintain a stable relationship. The U.S. had discovered the strategic value of China in resistance against the USSR and the stabilizing of Asian international relations, and it freely gave aid to support modernization in China. As seen in its response to the Tiananmen Incident, the U.S. did not renounce engagement with China, even when relationship-building was strained over issues such as human rights. Instead, it continued a policy of stabilization in diplomatic relations across multiple U.S. administrations. In the 1990s, the relationship between China and Taiwan was strained over the Taiwan Strait, and the U.S. was forced to respond. While both China and the U.S. flaunted military strength amidst an increase in tensions, a military clash was ultimately avoided. Hope for beneficial outcomes in both American industry and Chinese business, coupled with a strong desire for change in China, resulted in the U.S. continuing to aim for a stabilized relationship with China after the crisis. This bore the fruit of both China and Taiwan being admitted near-simultaneously to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in December 2001 and January 2002 respectively.

The event that served as the direct trigger for the Taiwan Strait crisis was a June 1995 visit to the U.S. by President of the Republic of China Lee Teng-hui, who was scheduled to speak at his alma mater Cornell University. He attempted to expand Taiwan’s presence in the international space and change the approach in Washington political circles regarding cross-strait relations from the 1970s. When strong support from the U.S. legislature resulted in both houses of Congress passing a resolution to ask the President to let Lee Teng-hui to make a private visit, the Clinton administration had no choice but to approve the visa. China displayed a bitter reaction to Lee Teng-hui’s U.S. visit, aborted government talks with the U.S., recalled her Ambassador from Washington, and delayed approval for the U.S. Ambassador to Beijing. In the subsequent month (July 21–26), China conducted largescale military drills in the East China Sea, in the northern area of Taiwan’s maritime territory, that included firing DF-15 and DF-21 missiles. Earlier that year President Jiang Zemin had offered the Eight-Point Proposal and had taken a positive stance towards cross-straits talks. However, his distrust deepened due to the actions of Taiwan and the U.S., and he developed a hardline stance.

Both the U.S. and China worked to calm the situation, and diplomatic efforts brought temporary stabilization to the relationship by autumn. However, in the winter, both China and the U.S. ramped up military activity in the Taiwan Strait, including the Fujian coastal area. Then, with the March 1996 Republic of China presidential election approaching in Taiwan, the situation became even more tense. China commenced military drills that included the firing of DF-15 missiles landing several dozen kilometers off the ports of Kaohsiung City in southern Taiwan and Keelung City in northeastern Taiwan. Additionally, China mobilized the People’s Liberation Army, about 150,000 troops. The U.S. was outraged, and U.S. Secretary of Defense Perry told the Communist Party delegation visiting the U.S. that this would bring “grave consequences.” Furthermore, the U.S. dispatched two aircraft carriers to the Taiwan Strait in an effort to clearly communicate the U.S. administration’s position of opposition. China’s desire was to close off any active foreign diplomacy by Lee Teng-hui that attempted to expand Taiwan’s international space. And China believed the U.S. government response to Chinese action would not be more than mild, so it chose to implement a threatening message through military strength. The U.S. hardline response exceeded China’s expectations. To avoid creating the impression that its actions were restricted by threats from other nations like China, and to avoid suffering a resulting blow to their own credibility, the US ultimately chose a path of strong action to show its resolve (Ross 2000). Incidentally, in October 1995, leadership from the People’s Liberation Army commented to a former high-level government official in the U.S., “Would you sacrifice Los Angeles to protect Taiwan?” However, apparently the threat of nuclear attack by China was not taken seriously.

After the Taiwan presidential election was completed, neither China nor the U.S. took any new action, and the crisis cooled. Afterwards, the U.S. put even more effort into managing its relationship with China and simultaneously started putting pressure on both China and the democratized Taiwan to avoid breaking down stability in the Taiwan Strait. This crisis should not be seen as a successful case of military threat from China. Instead, it was a continuation of the unchanged American China strategy to avoid conflicts in East Asia. The Clinton administration put more value on directly engaging with China, rather than being cautious, and claimed that if China took steps to join the international community, universal values would spread within the nation. While visiting China in 1998, President Clinton publicly announced his “Three No’s.” In 1999, an accidental bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade occurred, but permanency of the most-favored-nation trade status of China was enshrined in law, and China’s advance towards WTO membership progressed.

The origin of the 1995–1996 crisis was generated through the democratic process of Taiwan and differed from a past that had culminated out of crises born from Chiang Kai-shek’s dream of a counteroffensive toward mainland China and mobilization by the People’s Liberation Army (Garver 1997). Mutual mistrust formed a foundation of suspicion in which responses only pushed the crisis into progressively dangerous territory. However, it cannot be said that any of the three parties involved foresaw at the time how dramatically the situation would change, or what the cost would be of military action. In the end, the crisis ended with the conclusion of the election as a thankful gift. While U.S. efforts contributed partially to hamper further deterioration of the situation, both sides were satisfied to display their military strength. However, this was not the result of a shared diplomatic effort on the part of the U.S. and China, nor did it signify any effect of restraining war though an interdependent relationship.

As seen in the examples of North Korea and the Taiwan Strait, the U.S. played the role of actualizing a stability in the region that nations like Japan and China could not achieve. It is true, of course, that in the Asian financial crisis, Japan was a key part of the process, and China, as well, did start increasing its presence in the region together with its economic growth. The Japanese proposal for an Asian Monetary Fund was halted by opposition from the U.S. and Chinese ambivalence, but Japan worked to stabilize currency in Asian countries, and this effort was deployed as the New Miyazawa Initiative. Furthermore, Japan, China, and South Korea formed the group “ASEAN Plus Three” (APT), and Southeast Asian regionalism and Northeast Asian leading countries strengthened ties in a quest for stability and prosperity in the region. Even still, the American role was critical both militarily and in terms of diplomatic negotiation on the economic front through APEC and bilateral negotiations. Japan possessed preeminent economic strength in the region and exercised political influence in times when it promoted regional cooperation from behind the scenes. However, friction over historical perceptions had already begun to form with a democratized South Korea.

2 Arising Frictions: The 2000s to the Early 2010s

Following the September 11 attacks in 2001 and the onset of the “War on Terror,” not only did allied nations such as Australia, Japan, and South Korea intensify their security collaboration with the United States, but Singapore and Thailand also enhanced their security cooperation. Counter-terrorism efforts are a significant concern in Southeast Asia, leading to increased collaboration with the U.S. in this area. Regionally, the U.S. placing importance on the anti-terrorism war would also bring criticism for the resultant perceived lack of focus on Asia diplomacy. Entering the twenty-first century, economic growth in the various Asian countries was significant. Supply chains grew across Asia, region-internal trade was invigorated, and the individual nations became strongly linked to the global value chain. There were significant aspects of Chinese economic growth, but in addition to this, many economies throughout Asia experienced growth. Countries that became wealthy simultaneously increased their military budgets, and arms trade aimed at Asia rapidly accelerated.

Though the global financial crisis sparked by the American subprime loan problem tied up the world economy, the Chinese economy was able to escape that fate with extraordinary speed through immense fiscal spending. This left an imbalance in the domestic Chinese economy from preferable treatment to state enterprises, but externally there was an increase in the severity of conflict revolving around maritime security and surrounding nations in a fashion that could reflect Chinese overconfidence in its power.Footnote 1 Regional frameworks such as the East Asia Summit, including both the U.S. and China were actively deployed, but power politics in East Asia gradually became rocky.

2.1 Maritime Security Sharpens

Conflict over maritime territory in Asia grew in severity. This first started arising around the South China Sea, for which conflicting international claims overlapped in complicated ways. Immediately after the Chinese government was established, it claimed sovereignty over the South China Sea, but when its military strength increased and opportunity arose from the movements of other major powers, it began taking concrete steps. After U.S. forces withdrew from South Vietnam, in 1974, China expelled South Vietnam forces from the Paracel Islands and seized the entire territory. Also, after China-Soviet relations improved, in 1988, China clashed with Vietnam and obtained territory including the Fiery Cross Reef. In 1992, China established the territorial waters law. This act claimed as Chinese territory the South China Sea and the Japanese Senkaku Islands (the Diaoyu Islands), and it also made unique claims that differed from the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (formed in 1994). Thus, the territorial waters law seemed to foreshadow subsequent conflict between China, the surrounding areas, and even the U.S. as well.

From the late 2000s onward, China strengthened its forays into the sea. The background elements behind this are cited as a deepening desire for maritime interests, to gain resources and energy following economic growth and to secure sea shipping lanes due to an increase in trade, and also newly built confidence as U.S. strength began to weaken. Using maritime law enforcement agencies, China strengthened actions claiming sovereignty over Vietnam, the Philippines, and Japan as well. ASEAN nations began to worry, and maritime problems came to be frequently brought up in regional frameworks led by ASEAN. Meanwhile, the U.S. under the Obama administration announced its pivot to Asia and began moving to increase diplomatic influence. In this effort, the U.S. used the maritime problems as a rare opportunity to strengthen relationships with ASEAN nations.

Japan and China experienced deepening political conflict revolving around resource development in the East China Sea and the Senkaku Islands. In 2010, when a Chinese fishing ship collided with a Japan Coast Guard patrol boat and was seized, the governments of both countries entered into intense negotiations revolving around the release of the Chinese ship captain. Furthermore, in 2012, the Chinese government forcefully protested against the Japanese government nationalizing some of the Senkaku Islands and began to repeatedly penetrate marine territory with government boats in the Senkaku area, which was effectively controlled by the Japanese government. Japan transitioned from a government predominantly led by the Liberal Democratic Party, which had been in power for many years, to one led by the Democratic Party. This change was a significant factor behind the inability to properly manage relations with China (Sahashi 2015). Afterward, even when relations between Japan and China stabilized, action by Chinese government ships and aircraft in the Senkaku area remained active (Sunohara 2020).

In the South China Sea, starting from around the end of 2013, what are referred to as artificial islands were constructed by China from massive landfills in the Spratly Islands. Moreover, the construction of military facilities was gradually confirmed through satellite photographs. Additionally, People’s Liberation Army exercises intensified, and pressure on surrounding nations also increased. In response, diplomatic resistance from other countries in the region also increased. For example, the government of the Philippines initiated an arbitral tribunal that was established based on the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, and the 2016 ruling for that arbitration generally dismissed China’s claims. The U.S. government stance towards China started to become hardline. Towards the end of the Obama administration, it publicly announced the Freedom of Navigation Operations and began to clearly demonstrate a stance of not accepting China’s claims. Additionally, the U.S. and Japan started providing aid to strengthen the maritime security of nations in the region. However, economic ties with China became important to each nation, and the composition of international relations made cooperating with the opposition difficult to navigate.

2.2 Strengthening the American Ally Network

After the end of the Cold War, the U.S. revised its alliances with Japan and Australia. The cooling of relations with Japan over trade friction was an issue of concern, but with the Korean Peninsula crisis serving as a motivating opportunity, both governments developed closer relations, and in 1996, the Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security was issued. In the same year, the U.S. and Australia also reaffirmed the importance of their alliance through the Sydney Statement. In addition to the clear purpose of security cooperation for the Korean Peninsula threat, uncertainty about the future regional balance and factors such as China’s growth also served as background for the U.S. decision to pursue maintaining alliances. And, as touched on above, the War on Terror also reminded the U.S. of the importance of allied nations and partners.

To make an even more complex network out of the hub-and-spokes structure with the U.S. as the hub, from the 2000s onward, actions to strengthen cooperation among the spokes increased. Japan, Australia, and India strengthened intra-spokes security cooperation. Additionally, unallied Southeast Asian nations started increasing cooperation with the U.S., Japan, and Australia as maritime security became an issue.

The Obama administration called for a rebalancing policy toward Asia, but it cannot be said that the administration had gone all the way up to envisioning measures to cut off Chinese growth. By strengthening bilateral alliances and enhancing cooperative relationships among a small number of nations called minilateralism, and by advancing cooperation even with unallied Southeast Asia nations, the U.S. formed an advantageous network. This allowed the U.S. to gently increase their ability to curb China. It should be thus said that the U.S. was acting to apply pressure on China to assimilate into the existing international order. However, starting right about this time, the debate in China became critical towards the actions of the U.S. In particular, the discussion in favor of strengthening partnerships with surrounding nations gained momentum in Chinese academic circles. Additionally, amidst growing distrust towards the U.S., the Xi Jinping administration began to put out feelers for exploring a new international order (Lim 2020).

2.3 The Second North Korea Crisis

The 1990s North Korea nuclear crisis appeared to have been resolved. And, under a stabilized international environment, in September 2002, Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi visited North Korea, shaked hands with Chair of National Defense Commission Kim Jong-il, and the governments of both nations released the Pyongyang Declaration. However, that next month, the North Korean government failed to deny U.S. diplomatic officials’ suspicions of an uranium enrichment program, and once again suspicion of North Korean nuclear capabilities became a destabilizing element in the region. The George W. Bush administration was already in disagreement with the Clinton administration’s framework, and at Bush’s State of the Union Address in early 2002, he placed North Korea in the Axis of Evil along with Iraq and Iran. The U.S. halted energy aid to North Korea, and in 2003, North Korea once again declared that it would withdraw from NPT.

Crisis tensions increased, but the U.S. was pursuing the Global War on Terror and did not have much leeway to act. A Six-Party Talks framework commenced under the leadership of China, including North Korea, South Korea, the U.S., Japan, and Russia. After the Fourth Round in 2005, a Joint Statement was issued. North Korea promised to abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs. For its part, the U.S. assured that it had no intent to attack North Korea. It seemed as if stability had been reached, but when the strongly suspicious U.S. instituted sanctions on the Macau-based bank Banco Delta Asia (BDA), which was North Korea’s financing source, North Korea rebelled. In addition to implementing a missile firing test in 2006, it finally conducted its first nuclear test.

Afterwards, there were times when both the U.S. and North Korea showed a willingness to compromise, and the Bush administration lifted both its BDA sanctions and its designation on North Korea as a State Sponsor of Terrorism. However, North Korea did not abandon nuclear missile development. It conducted its second nuclear test in 2009, its third nuclear test in 2013, and then three more times between 2016 and 2017. Additionally, North Korea conducted tests on long-range missiles with artificial satellites, showing that its missile technology is overall very advanced. In 2010, the Cheonan sinking incident and the Yeonpyeong Island bombardment incident occurred, repeatedly stretching tensions between North and South Korea.

Even after Kim Jong-un took over as the new leader in North Korea, the situation did not change. In fact, when the Libyan Gaddafi regime, which had stopped its nuclear development program in the past, was overthrown, North Korea took this as a lesson and strengthened its resolve to possess nuclear capacity. The U.S. did not wish to be disturbed by brinkmanship policy with North Korea and instead maintained an approach of strategic patience, which values waiting for economic sanctions to have sufficient effect to motivate them into negotiations. However, North Korean development kept advancing. And towards the end of the Obama administration in 2016, the U.S. saw North Korean nuclear and missile development as a grave threat. When the Trump administration began to develop even more concern over the potential of intercontinental missiles with a firing range that could reach the U.S. mainland, the U.S. strengthened its hardline stance.

3 Increasing Force of Opposition and the Continuing Search for Cooperation

After passing through 2020, international relations in the Asia–Pacific region experienced not only an escalation of rivalry between the U.S. and China and continuing nuclear missile development in North Korea, but also the strain of severe impact to the economy and society by the coronavirus pandemic. And national border issues continued to remain unstable, as seen in the 2020 clashes along the China-India border that incurred deadly casualties. The interests of the involved nations were in opposition, caught between both Japan and China, in disputes over the South China Sea, and places like Sabah. There were also non-traditional security issues, including human trafficking, piracy, terrorist actions, and the inability of governments to effectively counter them.

Therein, we may ask, what will happen to the future of peace and prosperity in the region? What country will shoulder the important role of fostering peace and prosperity? In other words, will the players be major powers like the U.S. and China, or will change be actualized by the efforts of cooperation and institution-building by the regional states?

3.1 The U.S.–China Relationship and Their Contest of Power

From 2014 through 2016, numerous cyber-attack incidents thought to have originated in China occurred on U.S. government facilities and businesses. Moreover, in the South China Sea, China installed a landfill in rock reef areas by constructing an artificial island and started work to turn it into military bases. This resulted in increased tensions over territorial claims. Because of these factors, the U.S. gradually developed a growing hardline stance towards China. The U.S. responded by deploying the Freedom of Navigation Operations in the South China Sea and increasing aid to allies and partner nations. Concerns were growing that China was in the process of developing the capability to inhibit U.S. military actions in the Western Pacific region, and this was also thought to pose the possibility of severe impact to U.S. alliances. Support for America’s previous mainstream policy of engagement with China was also weakening. The Obama administration had, up to that point, favored a position of deepening regional involvement while valuing dialogue with China, but it began to display a transition to a policy that valued more hardline pressure on China. Meanwhile, China did not change its existing policy regarding territory sovereignty and maritime interests.

During the Trump administration, U.S.–China relations changed dramatically. Initially, U.S.–China leadership talks were held in April 2017 with a visit to the U.S. by General Secretary Xi Jinping, and the U.S.–China comprehensive dialogue was newly established. Expectations even existed for China to play a role in resolving the problem of North Korea advancing with nuclear missile development. However, by 2018, a change in U.S.–China relations was becoming apparent. In an effort to eliminate a massive trade deficit, the Trump administration strengthened pressure on China, and from July onward both countries began to retaliate against each other by expanding tariff targets. Moreover, in addition to Chinese military expansion, its political maneuverings towards other foreign nations and technology thefts from U.S. companies and universities also garnered attention. Awareness also spread of China beginning to close in on the U.S. in terms of science and technological capabilities. The U.S. under the Trump administration began to lay down laws and regulations restricting exports to China, the usage of Chinese goods, and investments and the inflow of people from China. The Chinese government continued talks aimed at stabilizing their relationship with the U.S., and this led to the Phase One deal of trade talks with President Trump. However, diplomatic efforts failed in settling down the deep-rooted distrust between the two nations. Suspicions of human rights violations in the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region and the decrease of civil liberties in Hong Kong led to an acceleration of an anti-China stance in the U.S., particularly in 2020 after the outbreak of the coronavirus pandemic.

Both the U.S. and China are dissolving economic dependence on each other and strengthening policy to enhance their own competitiveness in innovation. The U.S. is attempting to respond by increasing not only its military budget, but also its science and technology budget as well, and it is also strengthening its industrial policy. China has accepted the need to renew itself from a long-term perspective and is making an entire nation backed effort to advance growth in science and technology. In addition, it is commanding an acceleration of national defense buildup and strategic deterrence capability. In the public opinion within both countries, harsh stances towards the other are surfacing.

In consideration of the globalized economic social structure, global environmental and health problems, and the necessity to manage the high risk of military clashes for both nations, Beijing and Washington will probably maintain dialogue and explore paths to stabilized relations. However, when looking at U.S.–China relations in the long-term, it is most likely that neither party will be able to set aside mistrust of the other, and both will most likely act to maintain even just a small edge over the other in terms of competitiveness in science and technology, military might, and political influence. The difference in political values between both the U.S. and China are clear, and China is growing more concerned over American alliance strengthening and its closer ties to Taiwan. The U.S. under the Biden administration is basically maintaining the stance of the Trump administration in that it considers China the only competitor against the international system.

This U.S.–China rivalry is necessarily beginning to vastly impact the region and global order. ASEAN countries are taking a position called hedging and maintaining policies of not taking sides between the U.S. or China while simultaneously working to take leadership in regional order and rulemaking. Meanwhile, the U.S. and its allied nations have made clear their policy of strengthening ties in the form of bilateralism and minilateralism. Not only is the U.S. strengthening its direct partner alliances to Japan and Australia, in 2021, AUKUS was formed between the U.S., Australia, and the United Kingdom as a new security cooperation framework. Furthermore, the QUAD framework between Japan, the U.S., Australia, and India has taken to frequently holding leadership talks. The U.S. has come to recognize not only the importance of Taiwan geopolitically, but also its economic importance as well, and has started strengthening its relationship with Taiwan without much reservation. Regarding the relationships between nations in Asia, frameworks of security cooperation between nations have become closer knit and more diverse than ever before. However, as to whether this will lead to stability in the region, that is still not known.

3.2 Crisis Revolving Around North Korea

In 2017, President Trump displayed strong interest in the North Korea nuclear missile problem, and within the U.S. government, a limited military strike proposal was considered. Increasingly concerned over the deteriorating situation, South Korea’s Moon Jae-in administration moved for mediation diplomacy between Trump and North Korea’s Chair of State Affairs Commission Kim Jong-un. In the spring of 2018, an Inter-Korean summit was held at Pyongyang, soon followed by the U.S.–North Korean Summit in Singapore. North and South Korea went so far as to sign a landmark military pact. However, regarding the U.S.–North Korea relationship, the Hanoi Summit of the subsequent year ended inconclusively, and while the leaders of both countries did meet again at Panmunjom in the DMZ, the Trump administration withdrew without any notable advancements in U.S.–North Korea relations. Moving forward, North Korean missile development continued, and capability was increasingly significant. South Korean government exploration of North and South Korean relations ultimately could not break through the situation.

Considering the significance of nuclear arms to the North Korean government from a security viewpoint, it is clear that the road to denuclearization is steep. And in fact, when one looks back on the North Korea crisis spanning the past 30 years, it is doubtful if any lost opportunities existed that could have created a situation in which North Korea did not possess nuclear arms. In 2008, North Korea performatively demolished part of its Yongbyon nuclear facilities. But countless other nuclear facilities remain in the country, and many scientists and technicians are involved in the work, with some nuclear warheads already completed and stored. Even if North Korea agreed to denuclearization, there are many obstacles to just how that would even be achieved.

3.3 An Active Japanese Security Policy

Japan pressed forward with economic growth during the time overlapping with the Cold War era and secured the economic strength of the second strongest economic power in the world. However, militarily, Japan had an allied relationship with the U.S. And while it did establish U.S. military bases on Japanese territory, it continued to have a passive stance militarily. But from the 1990s onward, Japan started to engage in active international contribution. This was not limited to beefing up economic aid, but also seen in efforts such as United Nations Peacekeeping Operations in places like Cambodia and dispatching the Japanese Self-Defense Forces overseas for disaster relief. Simultaneously, with the continuation of crises breaking out in nearby areas such as the Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan Strait, Japan continued to place importance on its alliance with the U.S. even after the end of the Cold War. And in 1996, a joint declaration from both heads of state was issued. This was also called a reaffirmation of the Japan-US alliance.

Entering the twenty-first century, in addition to a long period of economic stagnation referred to as the lost decade, Japan experienced domestic political turbulence and an absence of leadership. Most notable, the prime minister changed six times in six years from 2006. This also contributed to Japanese diplomacy losing influence in Asia. Moreover, domestic nationalism in Japan rose, and due in part to a similar rise in nationalism in China and South Korea as well, control became difficult in Japan–China relations and Japan–South Korea relations, not only in terms of the governments but also in terms of the sentiment of the populaces. As a rare long-lasting administration, the Shinzo Abe administration governed Japan from the 2012 until 2020. During this time, Japan clarified its diplomatic policy of a free and open Indo-Pacific (FOIP), strengthened its alliance with the U.S., proclaimed the importance of forming rules founded in the promotion of free trade, and simultaneously strove to repair its relations with China and South Korea. However, escalation of the U.S.–China competition placed Japan in a difficult diplomatic position because, like other countries in Asia and around the world, it had deep political and economic ties to both countries.

Despite the change in leadership, the administrations following Abe have continued to prioritize relations with the United States, centering their policies on traditional security and economic security. Particularly, under the administration of Fumio Kishida, a revision of the National Security Strategy was undertaken in 2022, which included a rapid increase in defense spending and the adoption of counter-strike capabilities, as well as the unveiling of advanced concepts in cyber and space strategies. These moves can be attributed to the domestic political vulnerabilities of Prime Minister Kishida and his pursuit of political survival. It is also likely due to a significant shift in security consciousness within Japan following the Ukraine war, accompanied by increasing concerns regarding the future of security in East Asia (Teraoka and Sahashi 2024).

Furthermore, Japan-South Korea relations were difficult to repair, with both sides demanding concessions from the other related to historical problems. However, with the emergence of a conservative government in South Korea in 2022, Japan–South Korea relations rapidly improved. Supported strongly by the United States, a trilateral summit among Japan, the U.S., and South Korea was held at Camp David in August 2023, during which an unprecedented level of cooperation in security was promised.

3.4 The Asia–Pacific Region After the Coronavirus Pandemic

The regional economy in the Asia–Pacific formed via a global value chain that was sturdily assembled through the frequent traffic of people and intermediate material trade. Japan and China were not the only advanced scientific, technological, and production hubs. Instead, these hubs were sprinkled throughout the entire Asian region. However, with the spread of the coronavirus, a growing authoritarian strain crossed national borders at the same time people experienced difficulty traveling. Furthermore, with the continuance of U.S.–China rivalry, revisions to supply chain networks begins to be needed.

As to the question of whether the Asia–Pacific region could continue to act as the engine for the world economy, the answer rests not only in the power of growing economies such as China, but also on whether or not the free trade system can grow. The U.S. withdrew from the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP), but even after this, action in the region arose in the form of Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement of Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) and Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). Meanwhile, there is an increase in unfair trade practices such as digital localization efforts and industry subsidies. Amidst a wobbling WTO system, the question of whether or not liberalization can advance in this region rests in the question of whether or not the major powers, including the U.S. and China, can form and comply with agreements.

The future of this region is becoming increasingly more influenced by geopolitical elements. The U.S. and Japan have brought forth the concept of a free and open Indo-Pacific and are displaying efforts to actualize a balance of power against China and place value on the existing liberal international order. Meanwhile, with the hope to maintain a peaceful and mutually beneficial order in the Asia–Pacific region, there are many countries that desire protection against the U.S.–China power competition impacting the region. The ASEAN nations are a classic example of this, but not the only one. Furthermore, one viewpoint is that China exudes a larger impact on its surrounding adjacent area, the mainland, while the U.S. maintains more influence among the region’s maritime nations. However, most countries firmly distance themselves from the contest of power between the U.S. and China as much as possible.

The formation of order is not accomplished only by major powers, but also constructed through the conduct of the many nations who participate therein. If the influence of ASEAN, and nations like Japan and South Korea, grows even stronger, a new order and set of rules in the region will surely arise while conflicts restrained. Should the United States experience a rapid decline in credibility in its foreign strategy due to changes in leadership, resulting in a loss of influence, the weakening and confusion of the Asia Pacific order would likely accelerate further.