Experiencing Development: The Resistance and Adaptation of Thailand Over Half a Century

Abstract

This chapter examines Thailand’s postwar development experience, highlighting the country’s exposure to sequential waves of international influence. The term “experience” here refers to the continual (re-)formation of norms and perceptions among the populace. By analyzing the various “mediums” that shaped this experience, the chapter elucidates how local and global interactions have facilitated the formation of national identities throughout the development process.

The elucidation of immediate experience is the sole justification of any thought; and the starting point for thought is the analytic observation of components of this experience.

-Whitehead (1930)

1 “Development” in Southeast Asia

1.1 Economic Miracle and the Development Dictatorship

East and Southeast Asia are known for their remarkable successes in economic development in the latter half of the twentieth century. The World Bank report The East Asian Miracle published in 1993 reflected on the amazing growth rate of the region and glorified the proactive role of the state (World Bank 1993).¹ To date, the region’s strong economic growth has more than tripled household income and greatly improved access to basic services, such as health care, education and electricity. As a result, a billion people have been lifted out of extreme poverty, which is an outstanding achievement, particularly compared to other geographical regions and earlier time periods (UNESCAP 2020, p. 1).

Table 10.1 demonstrates a relatively constant rise in GNI per capita in the region despite certain regional variations in time and place. Growth was characterized by a strong emphasis on intra-regional trade stimulated by investment from multi-national companies into increasingly open markets (Goto et al. 2020). ASEAN as a region has faced many challenges in the past decades, including increased domestic income gaps, environmental damage, and a range of human security threats associated with centralizing state power.

Table 10.1 GNI per capita in Southeast Asia (1975–2019 in USD)

One important aspect of development in Southeast Asia is the role of authoritarian regimes. Political leaders in the eras of growth in each region, particularly in the 1980s, also tended to be despotic figures who created strong governments, and might be labeled as “development dictatorships.” They include the Sarit-Thanom regime in Thailand (1957–1973), the Suharto regime in Indonesia (1965–1998), Marcos’ in the Philippines (1965–1985), Mahathir’s in Malaysia (1981–2003), and Lee Kuan Yew’s in Singapore (1959–1990). Under these regimes, “development” was a socio-economic allure to legitimize power, often supported by a public who were blinded from the brutal dimension of dictatorship.² As mentioned earlier, development under strong leadership had real and positive impacts on improving quality of life indicators such as literacy and health. Nevertheless, there was also political sacrifice such as curtailed freedom of speech and democracy.

1.2 Focus on People’s Experience

The meaning of “development” varies depending on the standpoint of the observer. It is for this reason that we focus on the experience of people who went through such “development”, despite international influence. “Experience” here refers to the constant (re-)forming of norms and perceptions of living people. Experience of development must be felt. Also, since “development” is an abstract concept, its experience has to be mediated by something such as access to improved goods and services.³ Accounting for experience, therefore, requires an identification of such “mediums” and the long-term perspective on how actors interact with them.

This chapter examines the postwar development experience of Thailand, a country that has been exposed to sequential waves of outside influence seeking development opportunities. Despite its success in avoiding direct colonization, Thailand sequentially dealt with dominant influences from the U.S., Japan, and China. Thailand provides a powerful case to examine how the government and the people experienced such waves and positioned themselves in the process. We argue that the encounter and struggle to respond to a series of waxing and waning of influence and confronting dominant forces coming from abroad forms the essence of development experience. Examining the long-term trajectory of a particular region with a focus on the multi-layered “makeup” of a country allows us to produce valuable insights unavailable to previous research that treats the nation state as a monolith.

In Thailand, development (phatthana) was pervasively promoted under Prime Minister Sarit Thanarat (1959–1963). Sarit was the first to formulate the idea of development as one of the main drivers for political reform (Thak 2006, p. 9).⁴ The motto of the administration was, “good roads, running water, and bright light,” and those years have been labeled as the “era of development” in modern Thai history (Pinyapan 2015, p. 3).

From the perspective of Thai people, there have been continuous waves of foreign influence that have (re)shaped the idea of what “development” means. Conventional analyses have emphasized economic aspects by using the generic term “globalization” (e.g., Felker 2008), yet our approach focuses more on the sequential adaptations to such external forces and its domestic repercussions from taking an inside-out approach (Sato and Sonoda 2021).

By examining the experience of Thailand since the 1950s, we explore how waves of development have impacted Thai society and how, through these waves, the image and idea of development have been mediated and practiced within Thailand and beyond.

2 The Wave of Americanization in the 1950s to the 1970s

The initial global wave of development that reached Thailand's shores after the Second World War was shaped by the influence of the United States. American interest, driven by national security and anti-communism, resulted in a lasting impact that surpassed its strategic goals.

American engagement with Thailand intensified toward the end of World War II when the Thai elite, growing wary of the Japanese military, increased collaboration with Allied powers. The U.S., envisioning the postwar landscape, recognized an opportunity to forge an alliance with Thailand (Kakizaki 2006, p. 184). This partnership was solidified when Thai troops were deployed to support the U.S. military during the Korean War (Thak 2006, p. 155).

Unlike in other Southeast Asian countries, anti-Western sentiment was not intense in Thailand as it had never experienced direct colonization. This unique condition also motivated the U.S. to influence Thailand to lean further toward them.⁵ Southeast Asia, therefore, turned out to be the frontier at which the U.S. experimented tested its model of political influence through foreign aid (Montgomery 1962, p. 6).

Thailand was considered one of the countries least susceptible to the perceived threats of communism. However, the United States invested in Thailand primarily because of the political situation in neighboring Laos after the retreat of the French occupation and the war in Vietnam. Consequently, USAID (U.S. Agency for International Development) made substantial investments in the northeast of Thailand, focusing on the reconstruction of strategically important roads. U.S. development investments constituted approximately 10% of Thailand’s National Budget between 1951 and 1954 (Issara 1968, p. 29). At a more macro level, the first wave of Americanization from the 1950s to the 1970s brought about urbanization, the establishment of military bases, modernization of weaponry, and a corresponding increase in GDP.

American intervention was most impactful in its investment in human resources, especially in the planning section of the government. In 1959, a World Bank mission to Thailand similarly recommended the establishment of a planning machinery within the government (IBRD 1959). Nevertheless, the financial support in the form of loans and grants from the U.S. far surpassed that of the World Bank and other countries (see Table 10.2). For the Thai government, the United States played a crucial role in constructing institutions to facilitate aid, primarily from America. Even a formidable leader like Sarit found it necessary to rely on foreign capital and expertise to implement his development vision.

Table 10.2 International Aid to Thailand in the 1950s (unit: 100,000 baht)

Although the Governmental Committee to Implement the Point Four Program of President Truman in July 1950 was placed under the National Economic Council—a creation of the Sarit administration from 1959 to 1963 (Issara 1968, p. 29)—the salary of the TTEC staff was being covered by the United States Operations Mission (Issara 1968, p. 37). The U.S. not only established these institutions but also funded the training of personnel working within them (Baker and Pasuk 2009, p. 151). Subsequently, this organization underwent reforms and evolved into the Thai Technical and Economic Cooperation Committee (TTEC), which later transformed into the Department of Technical and Economic Cooperation (DTEC) in 1963. Consequently, the initial influence of American power became ingrained in the Thai government’s operations, persisting even after American cooperation ceded to Japan in the 1970s (Muscat 1994, p. 7).

The strong influence of the U.S. and World Bank on Thailand did not, however, necessarily mean that their policy recommendations were followed. In the first National Economic Development Plan (1961–1966), the Thai government emphasized irrigation and agriculture, though they were not highly emphasized by the U.S. and World Bank (Thak 2006, p. 169). In doing so, the Sarit administration gave priority to the domestic needs of the farmers in the impoverished regions rather than focusing exclusively on strategic roads and communication under a narrow application of phatthana.

Perhaps more importantly, the American and World Bank approach to development that encouraged the activation of private sector business to promote growth met with resistance and hesitation from Thai elites who feared an increase in Chinese influence in the business sector. Though the prevailing economic model suggested that the economy needed the Chinese, policymakers could not separate it from the communist ideologies attached to their participation in business (Riggs 1966, p. 390).

From the perspective of ordinary people, American influence was felt most strongly through music, movies, and television. Thailand was the first country in Asia to introduce major record shops such as Capitol and Columbia (Pichai 1986, p. 45). America’s RCA won its bid to set up a television network in 1953, initially broadcasting mostly American programs (Pichai 1986, p. 48). Behind the scenes, the United States Information Agency was operating most of the media exposure in Thailand with strategic objectives (Findley 2016).

One critical period was during the Vietnam War. From the beginning of the Richard Nixon administration in 1969 until the Paris Peace Agreement in 1973, there was a progressive American disengagement from Thailand (Kullada 2010, p. 75). In 1969, Henry Kissinger, the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs, observed that Thai-U.S. relations were undergoing “the greatest strain since the Laotian crisis.” He noted that the challenges stemmed from “Thai sensitivity to being treated as something less than a full partner in the struggle for Southeast Asia” and “displeasure that its contribution to the Vietnam effort has not been fully appreciated” (Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Vol. 20: 42).

Thanat Khoman, the Thai Foreign Minister from 1959 and a staunch supporter of pro-American policy, also began expressing clear doubts about U.S. intentions. In a paper written in 1973, he argued that the foreign military base in Thai territory was deemed “outdated” and unnecessary for Thailand within the swiftly evolving international context. He harbored doubts regarding the U.S. commitment to combating communism in the region and questioned the profit-driven agenda of the U.S. military (Thanat 1973, pp. 31–34). Thanat concluded that Thailand “earned the least benefit but bore the most burden” as the presence of American forces led to problems such as cultural and societal degradation, prostitution, and drug-related issues (Thanat 1973, p. 35). Consequently, he began to advocate for the withdrawal of U.S. troops.

Despite U.S. efforts to win hearts and minds through various propaganda techniques, an undercurrent of anti-American sentiment emerged. Although the Thai government asserted that U.S. military bases were established to prevent Thailand from falling into the hands of vilified communism, public opinion took an increasingly critical stance. Over time, skepticism grew regarding the true intentions of the United States and the purpose of phatthana. The U.S. was perceived as a “white threat,” a form of “imperialism” attempting to control Thai politics, the military, and culture, leveraging USAID as a political tool for intervention (Pattajit 2020, pp. 18–19). From 1968, Student movements in Thai politics gained momentum.⁶ Led by the National Student Center of Thailand (NSCT), students were organizing a campaign against the U.S. military presence in Thailand, presenting arguments that largely paralleled those of Khoman. Some argued that the construction of U.S. military bases itself posed a threat to neighboring communist countries and conveyed undesirable signals about Thai intentions toward North Vietnam, and thereby endangered Thailand (Kullada 2010, pp. 86–87).

Anti-American sentiment intensified in the subsequent years due to several incidents. In January 1974, a C.I.A. agent sent a letter to Sanya Dharmasakti, the Prime Minister at the time, falsely claiming to be from an insurgent leader seeking peace with the government. This incident was viewed as interference in Thai affairs and led to vigorous protests from student organizations (Clanty 1974, p. 4). In 1975, associates of Thanom handed over tin mining rights to the U.S. company TEMCO in exchange for kickbacks. In May, the Khmer Rouge seized the U.S. merchant vessel Mayaguez, prompting the U.S. to mount a rescue operation using the U-Tapao military base without permission from the Thai government. This triggered anti-American movements three times in the same year. A song titled “American Antarai” (“Dangerous American”) by Karavan, released in 1976 to criticize the imperialistic nature of the U.S., gained popularity during this period. The tone of the song can be gauged from the following lyrics:

Let us come together, go forward with the people with a great hope.

Thailand is our land. Why would we let them in? The imperial American came to oppress us…Thailand is Thai’s, not theirs, the American’s. The imperial American, they love to invade all other countries… Let us come together as Thai people, American must get out, so that we could have full sovereignty.

Crystalizing anti-American sentiment, the newly established Kukrit government in 1975 pledged that U.S. military bases would withdraw from Thai soil within the first year of their administration. The successful withdrawal was completed in 1976.

As the Vietnam War unfolded in the late 1960s, the American strategy of engagement with the Third World started to become a burden for itself. The U.S. began to shift its reliance towards countries that had achieved a certain level of economic development to share the burdens of defense and development (White 1974, p. 215). This change in policy, coupled with the forced withdrawal of military bases, led to the handing over of development initiatives to Japan.

U.S. influence diminished in the late 1970s due to a decrease in economic aid and the withdrawal of American expertise and military presence following the Vietnam War. Concurrently, a violent crackdown on the student movement and the 1976 coup d'état reestablished authoritarian rule in Thailand, silencing expressions of dissatisfaction for about a year. As the wave of Americanization receded, it paved the way for a second wave—Japanization—to emerge.

3 The Wave of Japanization in 1970s to 1990s

Since the conclusion of World War II, Japan has existed in the shadow of American political and military influence. The foundation of the so-called “Yoshida Doctrine” was the entrusting of Japan's security and defense to the U.S., coupled with a commitment to economic development in Southeast Asia.

In the 1960s, a wave of Japanization began to sweep into Thailand. Aligned with the phatthana doctrine, Thai policymakers initiated the first Industry Promotion Acts in 1954, offering a range of economic incentives for industries.⁷ These included tax exemptions on raw and imported materials, reduced export tariffs, and relaxed immigration control for highly skilled foreign professionals. Japan, resurging as a dominant economic and developmental force in the 1960s, actively responded to this initiative. Throughout the 1960s and most of the 1970s, Japan emerged as Thailand's primary trading partner and foreign investor, contributing to 35.4% of Thailand’s total trade volume in 1969 (Institute of Developing Economies 1970, p. 285).

Japan's monopolistic capital exerted influence over the Thai economy, particularly in transport equipment, textiles, automobiles, chemical products, and electrical appliances (Institute of Developing Economies 1970, p. 285). During this period, the majority of products from Japanese-related companies were consumer goods tailored for the domestic market. Noteworthy Japanese enterprises that established a presence in Thailand during the 1960s and 1970s included Ajinomoto (1960), Panasonic (1961), Mitsubishi Motors (1961), Toyota (1962), Suzuki (1967), Toshiba (1969), Wacoal (1970), Sharp (1972), Shisedo (1972), and more (Tongta 2010).

Concerns about the “over-presence” of Japanese people and consumer products became a focal point in Thai media, articulated by both politicians and the popular press. In 1969, Minister of Commerce Bunchana Atthakorn described the Japanese presence as follows:

Japanese visitors arrived via Japan Airlines, accompanied by guides from Japanese travel agencies. They traversed Bangkok in Japanese-made buses, lodged in Japanese hotels, dined at Japanese restaurants, and went to Japanese nightclubs. (Thanet 1972, p. 58)

A poem crafted by Sakda Chintanawikan in the Thairat newspaper in 1972 encapsulates the essence of Thai sentiments towards the Japanese presence and the impact of Japan on Thai society.

After waking up, I brushed my teeth with White Lion,

Brewed a cup of tea with National, set my hair with Tancho.

Then I wear Toray Tetoron, on my way out I wear Seiko (watch).

For news, I tuned in to Sanyo, then pick up my girl with Toyota.

“Where should we go shopping?”

Daimaru has it all.

…

In our modern daily lives, doubt starts to creep,

So, I ask the mirror named Asahi,

Am I still a Thai? Watashi wa Taijin desu ka?

(Sakda 1972, p. 9)

The trade deficit echoed a similar narrative, adding fuel to the fire. While Thai exports to Japan primarily comprised agricultural products, the production process by Japanese industries in Thailand heavily relied on imported capital equipment. Over the ten-year span between 1967 and 1977, the value of Thai–Japanese trade quadrupled from 11 billion baht to 44 billion baht, and Thailand experienced a rapid increase in GDP from 5.6 billion in 1967 to 19.7 billion in 1977. Concurrently, it also sustained a consistent trade deficit. Thailand's trade deficit with Japan surged from 5 billion baht in 1967 to 16.4 billion baht ten years later (Suthi 1983, p. 80).

The “over-presence” of Japanese products in the Thai market triggered the rise of anti-Japanese sentiment. In 1972, college students under the NSCT organized an anti-Japanese product movement. This sentiment expanded into a large-scale anti-Japanese movement, coinciding with Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei’s visit to Southeast Asia in January 1974. Moreover, an opinion survey conducted by Khien Theeravit in 1974 revealed that among 1,985 respondents, 45% of ordinary citizens perceived Japanese enterprise investment as a form of imperialism, 54% viewed Japanese investment as unequal to Thailand, and 54% expressed concern about the trade deficit with Japan (Khien 1975).⁸ In the 1970s, Thai media characterized Japan as an “economic animal” with imperialistic tendencies, Japanese enterprises as “exploiting” local resources, and Japanese people as “arrogant and selfish” (Pattajit 2017, p. 45).

In response to the growing anti-Japanese sentiments in Southeast Asia during the 1970s, Prime Minister Fukuda Takeo introduced a new doctrine, replacing “contact through money and goods” with “contact between good friends.” To counter accusations of imperialism, the Fukuda Doctrine pledged that Japan would not become a great military power again. It further assured that Japan would seek a “heart-to-heart relationship” with Southeast Asia, and Tokyo would actively play a political role by supporting ASEAN as a regional organization and acting as a bridge between ASEAN and the communist Indochinese countries for regional peace and stability. In 1977, Fukuda declared in Manila:

It is not enough for our relationship to be based solely on mutual material and economic benefit. Our material and economic relations should be animated by heartfelt commitments to assisting and complementing each other as fellow Asians.

…speaking repeatedly of the need to communicate with each other with our hearts as well as our heads, the need in other words for what I call “heart-to-heart” understanding among the peoples of Japan and Southeast Asia. (Speech by Takeo Fukuda 1980, p. 71)

While most literature acknowledges that the Fukuda Doctrine marked a new chapter in Japanese diplomacy toward Southeast Asia (Sun 2012; Fukushima 2011), this does not necessarily indicate a perceptual shift by Thai people toward Japan. Several years after the launch of the Fukuda Doctrine, criticism persisted from Thai scholars. Rachaneekorn (1980) contended that “ASEAN leaders were delighted to hear the speeches by Prime Minister Fukuda in the capitals of each country… However, today, a year later, Japan acted completely differently from what it has promised” (Rachaneekorn 1980, p. 137). Nantawadee wrote in 1983 that “Southeast Asia nations continue to doubt Japan’s intention” (Nantawadee 1983, p. 167). Prasert (1985) posted the following question.

Fukuda emphasized mutual trust and heart-to-heart relationship. However, Japan did not regard overdependence of these countries on Japan its problem. This led me to question: if the general populace, if not the elites, felt a high degree of dependence on Japan, how could they trust Japan? Despite having a thorough understanding of Japan, the prevailing image of Japan remained negative. (Prasert 1985, p. 32)

Following the declaration of the Fukuda doctrine, Official Development Assistance (ODA) and cultural exchange programs saw a significant increase. Yet again, despite the substantial sums invested in ODA and exchange programs that aimed to improve the quality of life and expand educational opportunities for the Thai people, Japan encountered resistance. There still existed anti-Japanese sentiment, albeit on a smaller scale, during the 1980s. Figure 10.1 depicts the cover of an anti-Japanese album released in 1988 by Katon. A piece of sushi is shaped like the map of Thailand, held by chopsticks ready to be consumed. This sushi sits on a circular red plate on a white tablecloth, resembling the Japanese national flag, suggesting the metaphorical idea that Thailand was at risk of being economically devoured by Japan.

Fig. 10.1

Source taken by the first author

The sleeve design of “Yipun-Yunpi,” an anti-Japanese album by Katon.

It is noteworthy that much of the criticism directed at Japanese Official Development Assistance (ODA) and cultural exchange during the 1970s and 1980s centered on the notion of Japan’s “lack of sincerity” (Mai-Ching-Chai). Prasert (1990) clarifies the concept of “sincerity” in the Thai context as “the absence of any calculated desire to profit from an act of generosity” (Prasert 1990, p. 16). He explicitly states that in the Thai context, the act of “giving aid” should be genuinely altruistic, with no expectations of reciprocity. He underscores that “if giving is coupled with taking, it is not giving; it is business” (Prasert 1990, p. 16).

The discourse around the “lack of sincerity” in Japanese aid and cultural exchange during the 1970s and 1980s can be attributed to two factors. Firstly, the assistance was perceived as “string-attached.” Given that a substantial portion of Japanese Official Development Assistance (ODA) funds were allocated to large-scale infrastructure projects, the primary beneficiaries were seen as the contractors, engineers, and architects involved in these projects rather than the local communities (Prasert 1990, p. 16). The “tied” nature of the grant aid was also considered problematic, exemplified by the construction of the Thailand Cultural Center in 1984 and Ayutthaya Historical Study Center in 1987, which were criticized as instances of Japanized Thai cultural buildings. Many Thai architects viewed these projects as a form of “cultural invasion” and, in more severe terms, “cultural enslavement” (Yupa 1998, p. 19). This discontent manifested in a resistance campaign during Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro’s visit to Thailand in 1987.

Secondly, there was a belief that assistance and cultural exchange initiatives were orchestrated to divert attention from “real” economic problems. Prasong (1987) interestingly depicted the situation as follows: “Japan, the economic animal, uses cosmetics called ‘cultural exchange’ to make it appear more human” (Prasong 1987, p. 26). The string-attached nature of the aid, coupled with the concurrent cultural exchange programs and trade conflicts, fueled skepticism among many Thais regarding Japan’s “real” intentions.

However, the situation began to change in the latter half of 1980s, with a crucial milestone being the year 1985 when the Plaza Accord came into effect.⁹ The dramatic appreciation of the Japanese yen compelled Japanese companies to seek cheaper labor in other countries. Japanese investment, previously focused on import-substituting industries in the 1970s, shifted towards an export-oriented strategy based in Thailand. Consequently, the export volume witnessed a significant increase. By 1991, Japanese firms in Thailand accounted for over one-fifth of the country’s total exports.

The influx of Japanese investment significantly boosted Thailand’s GDP and created job opportunities. Starting in 1988, Thailand experienced over 10% annual GDP growth for three consecutive years, marking the highest growth record in its history. It is estimated that Japan’s direct investment contributed to about 2% of the 11% growth in 1987 (Liu 1994). The economic growth also resulted in the expansion of the middle class, with Japanese products becoming an integral part of everyday life for the new generation. This shift, combined with the adaptation of Japanese companies and increased cultural exchange programs under the Fukuda Doctrine, gradually improved Japan’s image. Since the 1990s, anti-Japanese sentiment has become a relic of the past.

While the wave of Japanization began to decline with the collapse of the Japanese economic bubble in the 1990s, Japan has consistently remained the largest foreign investor, holding that position as of 2023 (National News Bureau of Thailand 2023). Additionally, Japan retained its status as Thailand’s primary trade partner until 2013, when it was surpassed by China.

4 The Wave of Chinization in the Late 1990s and Onward

The wave of Chinization¹⁰ accompanied massive economic influence beginning in the 1990s. However, strategic and military cooperation had already started a decade before that. The shared perception of national interest and cooperation over the Cambodia conflict in the 1980s had helped foster trust between Thailand and China, particularly between their militaries. This laid a solid foundation for bilateral relations to grow in the post-Cold War era.

After the end of the Cold War, China faced two forms of isolation: economic sanctions by Western countries following the Tian’anmen incident and its newfound status as the sole socialist superpower after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The fact that ASEAN countries, adhering to non-interference principles, refrained from making critical statements on China’s domestic politics allowed Beijing to view the region positively (Peh 2018).

Isolated by the West, China began shifting its diplomatic focus from the United States to neighboring Asian countries. In the 1990s, China restored and established diplomatic relations with all Southeast Asian countries, strengthening its ties with ASEAN. Thailand, as the first ASEAN member to strictly follow the One China policy (Storey 2011, p. 132), played a pivotal role in smoothing relations between the two countries.

Economic ties between China and Thailand deepened through commercial and economic agreements, resulting in a tripling of trade volume between 1990 and 1999. Furthermore, relations were reinforced after the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, during which China contributed $1 billion USD to the International Monetary Fund’s $17.5 billion rescue package (Storey 2011, p. 133). Additionally, the Chinese government’s decision not to take advantage of the crisis by devaluing the Yuan earned praise from leaders in the region.

China’s role in the development of Thailand has become increasingly prominent, particularly since the Thaksin Shinawatra administration (2001–2006). During this period, Thaksin’s foreign policy prioritized ASEAN neighbors India and China. Among these, China emerged as the country best positioned to assist Thailand in achieving its economic development goals. Thaksin aimed to leverage China’s economic strength to propel the growth of the Thai economy, seeking to ride on China’s economic coattails for mutual benefit.

Thailand has faced political upheavals, marked by two coups d'état in 2006 and 2014, which saw first the end of Thaksin’s premiership, and later that of Yingluck Shinawatra. These events triggered various international responses. The U.S., for instance, suspended military aid and distanced itself from the junta government, while Europe halted trade negotiations. In contrast, China adhered to its non-interference principle, recognizing the new junta government and even extending a substantial $49 million military credit to Thailand (Storey 2015, p. 21). In the interim between the two coups, Abhisit Vejjajiva, a civilian leader of the conservative Democrat Party, served as Prime Minister from 2008 to 2011. Despite his political affiliations differing from his predecessors, this shift did not alter the trajectory of China-Thai relations. The following excerpt is from his 2015 interview with Benjamin Zawacki, shedding light on his perception of China.

When China emerges because of her size, because of history, some other countries start talking about a China threat. But for Thais, because we are so close by blood, we are naturally more at ease in engaging with China. You would be surprised at how many western delegations came through that used the term “China threat” or “Chinese threat”, and my response was always, “Well, what threat?” We didn’t see China as a threat. We obviously saw her as a major power and therefore maybe having a lot of influence, but we didn’t have this feeling that she would be a threat.¹¹

Maintaining strong relations through numerous changes in government, China has held the position of Thailand's largest trading partner since 2013 (Fig. 10.2).

Fig. 10.2

Source IMF Direction of Trade Statistics Database

Changing trade volumes between Thailand and three major countries: Japan, US and PRCFootnote

The trade volume was calculated based on imports on a cost, insurance and freight (CIF) basis, and exports on a free on board (FOB) basis. Data on China excludes Macao and Hong Kong.

.

Given the generally positive stance of Thai leaders towards China, it appears that Thailand is open to embracing the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).¹³ To achieve its goals, China has sought cooperation with countries along the corridors and maritime silk road by accelerating economic growth, trade, and investment. This involves constructing infrastructure and transportation routes and launching cultural exchange programs.

Thailand’s strategic location at the center of the China-Indochina Economic corridor, coupled with the availability of its workforce, raw materials, and convenient transportation, makes it an ideal hub for trade and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) from China’s perspective.

While there are concerns regarding the true intentions behind China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), most Thai leaders view the rise of China positively. They anticipate that China will play a significant role in both regional and global economic development (Anuson 2015; Piratorn and Jiranuwat 2018; Pattajit 2020). Chulacheep (2009) summarizes the perception of Thai leaders as follows:

The majority of Thai leaders perceived the rise of China as an opportunity for economic cooperation. They believed that economic growth in China should be encouraged not only because it created valuable trade and investment opportunities but also because it kept China stable and facilitated its integration into the regional community and the world, giving China a stake in the international status quo.

Thai leaders also recognized that China is destined to be a major military power and could upset the regional balance of power. This did not mean that China would pose a threat or come into conflict with countries in Southeast Asia. The feeling instead was that China mainly wanted to be recognized and respected as a major power. (Chulacheep 2009, pp. 98–99)

However, while the wave of Chinization is generally welcomed by the Thai government, civil society does not wholly share this perception. The most prominent wave of Chinization was experienced by Thai society through the influx of Chinese tourists, which began to soar after the slapstick comedy named “Lost in Thailand” became popular in 2012. The number of tourists reached 4.6 million the following year, increased to 7.9 million in 2015, and hit 10 million in 2018, accounting for almost 30% of the total visitors and overall tourism receipts (Ministry of Tourism and Sports of Thailand 2020).

Although the influx of Chinese tourists brought GDP growth to the country, criticism over rude manners, such as spitting, littering, cutting lines, and flouting traffic laws, were frequently reported in the media, and sparking anti-Chinese tourist sentiments (The Associated Press 2014). A poll conducted in February 2014 by Chiang Mai University, located in a popular destination among Chinese tourists, found that 80% of 2,200 Chiang Mai residents said they were highly displeased with Chinese behavior. The survey, along with numerous comments on Thai social media, blamed Chinese visitors for “uncivilized” behaviors.

Skepticism toward the nature of this rising power has been expounded by its dam-building and rapid blasting activity in the Lancang-Mekong River, which affects the ecosystem and lifestyles of people in riparian communities. Also, Thailand has recognized lessons from investments made by China in infrastructure and transportation projects in Myanmar, Laos, and Cambodia where the lives of inhabitants were strongly affected. The “over-presence” of Chinese capital in Sihanoukville and Northern Laos confirm that concern over Chinese influence in the Thai economy is warranted (Yossapon 2020).

To comprehend how Thai people perceived this wave, we conducted interviews with people who experience the wave of Chinization.¹⁴ The interviewees included three researchers (referred to as R1, R2, and R3), two opinion leaders (referred to as OL1 and OL2), one diplomat (referred to as D1), and two ordinary people (referred to as P1 and P2). Here are the answers to the questions, “Can you use three keywords to define China?” and “Do you regard Rising China as a threat or an opportunity?”.

As depicted in Table 10.3, a majority of the word choices, such as ‘strong,’ ‘confident,’ ‘paradise’ and ‘harmonious,’ are positively inclined. Notably, five out of eight interviewees perceive China more as an opportunity than a threat. However, it is essential to acknowledge that a sense of threat has begun to gain momentum.

Table 10.3 Perceptions of China by our interviewees

Interestingly, the criticisms directed at Chinese tourists share similarities with those targeted at the Japanese in the 1970s. A researcher highlighted that one of the contributing factors to anti-Chinese sentiments was the perception that ‘the tourists arrived with a budget tour group, stayed in Chinese-owned hotels, dined in Chinese restaurants, and shopped in Chinese-owned stores’ (R3). This phenomenon led Thai business owners to question the benefits Thailand gained from this influx.

The third wave of Chinization expedited internal and regional connectivity, fostering infrastructure development, and bolstering economic progress. Nevertheless, the surge of Chinese companies into the real estate market within the Eastern Economic Corridor (EEC), along with opaque deals associated with High-Speed Railway projects and a rise in “grey businesses” in Thailand, has also stirred skepticism regarding China's intentions (Sophon 2018).

One researcher (R2) explicitly likened Chinese people to a ‘grasshopper in the paddy field,’ signifying that ‘they come here to eat rice and then go back.’ The assertion is that Chinese companies are earning profits by ‘exploiting’ Thai resources to sell back to the Chinese market. Examples supporting this claim encompass Chinese involvement in the real estate business, durian trading, the employment of Chinese migrant workers, and the operations of Chinese tour agencies in Thailand (P2, R2, R3, OL2).

With the upsurge of anti-government protests in 2020, the Thai government’s perceived deferential stance towards China came under renewed scrutiny, leading to China itself becoming the subject of criticism. Since the coup in 2014, the Thai government has faced international condemnation for repatriating over a hundred Uyghur refugees to China. Additionally, it drew attention by opting to purchase millions of doses of the Sinovac vaccine as the primary solution for combating the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020. This perceived overdependence on China has earned Thailand the derisive moniker of being the “Thailand Province of China” [tai guo sheng] (Wasana 2022). The slogan “Thailand and China are one family” (Zhongtai Yi Jia Qin) is now used in a more sarcastic context.

In our interviews, some participants argued that the Thai government exhibits excessive subservience to China (R2, D). Another shared perspective was: ‘The Thai government places disproportionate value on ‘sincerity’ and ‘friendship.’ China is likened to a big brother surrounded by many younger brothers, and what it decides to give depends entirely on its discretion’ (D1). A different viewpoint highlighted that ‘China is not as generous as many Thais might think; its actions are clearly driven by self-interest’ (R2). Simultaneously, most interviewees acknowledged the existing power imbalance and a sense of helplessness in the situation. However, as expressed by two participants, ‘Although we may be dissatisfied with certain aspects, we lack the power to negotiate being a smaller country’ (P1, OL1). They added, ‘Quarreling with China would yield no benefit to Thailand; it would be akin to trying to lever a log with a small piece of wood’ (P1, OL1). Despite uncertainties regarding China’s intentions, most interviewees concurred: ‘It is challenging to envision a conflict between Thailand and China, or even an anti-Chinese movement in Thailand’ (D1, P2, OL2). In the end, the stark reality of an unbalanced power dynamic prevailed.

In recent years, the anti-Chinese tourist sentiment has seen improvement, attributed to the adaptability of Thai society and the evolving behavior of Chinese tourists (Itthichai 2019). The onset of the COVID-19 pandemic prompted a realization of the extent to which the Thai economy relies on Chinese companies and tourists. In response, in 2023, Thailand initiated the waiving of tourist visa requirements for Chinese nationals to entice their return. Despite some individuals having negative experiences or feelings toward China, a consensus has emerged: regardless of these sentiments, China will stay integral to the Thai economy.

5 Redefining “Thainess” Through Development Experience

An analysis of the three waves of external developmental power at the macro level emphasizes the profound impact of foreign influences. This viewpoint, however, leans towards portraying Thailand as a passive recipient of political influence during the era of Americanization under the ‘anti-communism’ ideology, economic influence from the wave of Japanization under foreign aid, and societal and economic influence from the wave of Chinization through mass tourism and construction. Yet, a closer examination of the people’s experiences unveils two crucial insights.

Firstly, as societal development unfolds, resistance to new forces tends to precede adaptation. Given Thailand’s history of avoiding direct colonization, the population initially felt relatively less hostile to foreign influence. Nevertheless, the Thai experience highlights the price the country paid in its effort to accommodate waves of external influence for the sake of phatthana and GDP growth. The influx of American personnel into the government, Japanese companies and products into the Thai market, and the substantial flow of Chinese tourists into Thailand during the ‘waxing’ phase of each wave exhibited a similar pattern of initial resistance.

While Thailand may be perceived as a ‘passive receiver’ in the eyes of an (ostensible) donor, the Thai people strongly identify with and claim ownership of their cultural and physical assets. The direct resistance from the populace, especially against the Americans in the 1950s–1960s and the Japanese in the 1970s–1980s, eventually compelled powerful donors to acknowledge the true ‘owners’ of the country. This recognition led to the necessity for policy adjustments that emphasize equal treatment with sincerity and respect. During the height of anti-U.S. sentiment in 1974, actions by the U.S., which ‘made it look as though Thailand was a territory of the U.S.,’ became a significant cause of antagonism (Kullada 2010, pp. 86–87).

Various expressions of resistance, such as the song from Caravan urging ‘Americans must leave, so that we could have full sovereignty,’ the poignant poem by Sakda ending with the question ‘am I still a Thai?,’ and the opposition against the construction of Japanized Thai cultural buildings in Ayutthaya and Bangkok, all highlight the resistance to external influences. These incidents turned the Thai people inward, sparking an introspective scrutiny of their ‘Thainess.’ In essence, the influx of external influences prompted a critical examination of self-identity. A similar process of resistance and a growing sense of cultural ownership can be observed against the Chinese after the 1990s.

However, examining Thai responses to the three waves indicates that, despite initial antagonism toward the influx of external influence, the impact of each developmental power permeated every corner of society, fostering social adaptation almost simultaneously. Throughout Thai history, there has never been a time when dependence on greater powers, whether economically, politically, or both, did not exist. The response of Thai society suggests that when external influences permeate society, initial resistance may naturally arise. However, a long-term perspective reveals that the crucial aspect lies in the continuous nurturing of a complex negotiation—embracing, negotiating, and adapting to social change. An exemplary instance of this evolving social sentiment is the Thailand Cultural Center. Initially heavily criticized as ‘cultural enslavement’ in 1987, it now stands as a symbol of ‘friendship’ between Thailand and Japan in the 2020s, portraying the transformative nature of such social dynamics.

Secondly, a reexamination of the Thai experience under the waves of development suggests the boundless nature of Thainess (Khwampenthai), a prevalent discourse representing a shared Thai identity. From this chapter. We can see that Thainess continually fluctuates, and identity is in constant negotiation. There are many interpretations of this term. For some, the core of Thainess presumes that a great leader selectively adopts only the ‘good things’ from foreign countries while preserving traditional values at their best. For others, it can also encompass attributes such as love for national independence, tolerance, and compromise or assimilation (Thongchai 1994, p. 3–4).

Thongchai argues that ‘Thainess’ is often defined through ‘negative identification,’ meaning that once the ‘un-Thainess’ is identified, its opposite, Thainess, becomes apparent (Thongchai 1994, p. 5). Throughout history, the opposite of Thainess has been defined by different ‘others’ depending on the standpoint and ideologies. In the nineteenth century, for the administration, the Chinese were used as negative identification, and during the Cold War, the Vietnamese played a similar role. For left-wing nationalism during the Cold War, the ‘others’ were equated with the U.S. and Japanese. Thainess has been redefined by others over time, depending on the global and social context in each period.

However, as this chapter illustrates, the self and external others are not two dichotomized concepts. Through recurring interactions and the enduring legacies of external developmental powers, Thai people have adeptly positioned themselves in relation to the external world. Developmental powers left long-lasting legacies, ubiquitous in the Thai lifestyle, through the medium of their experience, which in turn becomes a medium of their expression.

For instance, a young Thai might wear Nike shoes, sport a Xiaomi watch, carry her iPhone into a Honda car, drive on a road built by USAID, cross a bridge constructed through Japanese ODA, watch a Hollywood movie in a department store built with Chinese capital, and finally, enjoy sushi at Ootoya in Siam Square. The legacies from these waves of development are seamlessly woven into the Thai lifestyle. However, the essential question arises: do these infrastructure, commodities and experiences make Thai people any less Thai? The resounding answer is “no”.

In a globalized world, independence does not necessarily exclude dependence or interdependence, and Thai identity need not be defined solely through negative identification. To accurately reflect reality, “Thainess” should no longer be exclusively tied to exceptional identification. Instead, it should be embraced as an inclusive definition derived from intertwined experiences of negotiation and adaptation that extend beyond national borders.

6 Conclusion

The experience of modernization and the development changes it forms depend on one’s standpoint. One can easily draw a success story by focusing on the economic transformation and integration of the region into the global market, highlighting material improvements in living standards. One can also draw a negative portrayal of what happened in the same period from the perspective of agency and self-determination. Shifting the perspective toward experience moves us away from the conceptualization of Thailand as a monolithic entity designed by the state planner to the diverse members of civil society proactively navigating themselves through the waves of influence from external powers. These navigating experiences are sequential and cumulative, preparing actors through and between each wave.

If one shifts the emphasis to external relations, one can look back and see modern Thai history as a series of incomplete endeavors by Americans to Americanize, the Japanese to Japanize and the Chinese to Chinize. Conversely, one can also turn the perspective around to focus on the Thai people's journey as they strategically position themselves to resist these influences, navigating the forces—at times riding the wave, at times reconstructing identities, and at times cultivating wisdom and resilience. It is this latter narrative that we aim to convey.

Whether what we observed in Thailand can be observed more broadly in other parts of Asia remains an open question. Yet, one can safely recognize that globalizing forces do not simply nullify local cultures; they can facilitate their self-discovery by strengthening identity at the local level where bottom-up development is expected to occur.