1 Introduction

Climate change is exacerbating the sudden onset of disaster events worldwide. Most developing countries are at risk of these disasters due to the uncertain nature of hazard events, high levels of exposure and vulnerability, and low coping mechanisms and infrastructure available to them compared to developed countries.Footnote 1 Moreover, disasters mainly affect people with low income and aggravate their vulnerability.Footnote 2 The countries in the South Asian region are passing through a ‘new climate normal’ in which intensifying heat waves, cyclones, droughts, and floods are testing the limits of government, businesses, and citizens to adapt.Footnote 3 One of the significant consequences of climate change is the rise in the need for communities to relocate as their homes become increasingly exposed to climate-related hazards.

Despite the expectation that relocation will enable individuals to improve their well-being, the process is not always voluntary. Authorities may require displaced communities to permanently migrate even if they are not willing to, due to prevailing risks. Relocation is a strategy that has been adopted in many parts of the world, as reflected in a number of case studies from the United States of America (36), the Philippines (29), India (22), Sri Lanka (19), China (17), Indonesia (17), Vietnam (17), Fiji (15), Japan (15) and Colombia (8), among others.Footnote 4 Apart from the United States, Fiji and Colombia, the rest of the countries having the highest identified relocation projects are found in Asia. Involuntary relocation poses several key challenges in the form of livelihood disruptions and fragmentation of social ties for the displaced communities. Hence, policymakers face mammoth challenges in terms of envisaging a mechanism that protects people from natural hazards, while also respecting other fundamental rights.

As far as the policy frameworks are concerned, Sri Lanka has over the years established a robust catalogue of laws and policies to deal with environmental degradation and disaster management. However, it was only in 2011 that climate change became part of the explicit policy framework under the 2011 amendment to the Sri Lanka Disaster Management Act No 13 of 2005.Footnote 5 Even then climate-related human mobility was not explicitly addressed.

Even under the National Climate Change Policy in Sri Lanka 2012 there is no reference to climate-related human mobility.Footnote 6 However, from 2013, the Sri Lanka National Disaster Management Plan (2013–2017) and Sri Lanka Comprehensive Disaster Management Programme (2014–2018) link disasters, climate change, and displacement and highlight the need for relocation of people out of disaster-prone areas.Footnote 7 It should be noted that the National Involuntary Relocation Policy (NIRP, 2001), which emphasises the issues associated with involuntary relocation induced by development initiatives and emergencies, is the policy framework that addresses relocation in Sri Lanka, though it has no thorough focus on disaster- or climate-induced involuntary relocation.Footnote 8 A Resettlement Authority (2007) was established as an authority vested with the power to formulate a national policy and to plan, implement, monitor, and coordinate the relocation of internally displaced persons, and to provide for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto.Footnote 9

This chapter explores the socio-economic impacts of post-landslide-induced relocations in Aranayake, Sri Lanka. This study has two sub-objectives, namely identifying livelihood issues experienced by the relocated communities and identifying new forms of challenges experienced by them. This empirical study was conducted in two selected relocated sites, China Friendship Village and Panapurewatta. These villages were established to cater to the displaced community of landslide events that occurred in the ‘Samasara’ Mountain, which is located in the Aranayake divisional secretariat in the Kegalle district, Sri Lanka, in May 2017.Footnote 10 Qualitative data was gathered through twenty semi-structured interviews, five in-depth interviews, and observation in the two relocated communities, across 2022 and 2023.

The chapter is divided into four sections, starting from the introduction. Section two provides a brief introduction to the climate-induced disaster profile in Sri Lanka. The third section deals with landslides as a disaster in Sri Lanka with specific reference to Aranayake, displacement and relocation, assessing two selected sites. The fourth section provides conclusions.

2 Sri Lanka and Climate Change-Induced Disasters

Sri Lanka is an island in the Indian Ocean with a land area of 65,610 km2 and a population of 22.1 million.Footnote 11 Topographically, the island consists of a south-central mountainous region and is surrounded by broad lowland plains. The frequency of disasters in Sri Lanka has increased in the recent past, leading to an elevated risk of exposure to such incidents.Footnote 12 The devastating Indian Ocean Tsunami that occurred on 26 December 2004 had a profound impact on the social fabric and economic landscape of Sri Lanka.Footnote 13 In a span of fifteen minutes, the tsunami resulted in the loss of over 30,000 lives, inflicted injuries upon more than 15,000 individuals, and caused displacement for over 800,000 individuals, while causing the destruction of their properties.Footnote 14

Beyond the tsunami and its socio-environmental impacts, the climate crisis has been exacerbating in the recent past.Footnote 15 Major floods hit Sri Lanka in 2010, 2011, 2014, 2016, and 2018, and these events caused more than USD 2 billion in damages between 1990 and 2018 alone.Footnote 16

While the wet zone of the country is exposed to flooding, the dry zone has been continuously impacted by widespread drought. Landslides are uncommon, but when the rainy season arrives, they cause enormous human and physical harm and necessitate relocation programmes. These hazards and associated displacement become a huge burden on the country’s economyFootnote 17 and rob people of their lives and livelihoods.Footnote 18 As per the latest data available for 2017, the series of floods and landslides had a significant impact on fifteen districts located in the southern region of the country, and the financial impact of those events was estimated to be over 1,262,884 USD; the projected expenses for recovery were around 782,350 USD.Footnote 19

Thus, the country is suffering from the complex impacts of such climate change-induced disasters, which are further enhanced by the drowning economy of the country. The following section evaluates the threat of landslides as a disaster in the Sri Lankan context to later assess the relocation strategy for the landslide-affected population at Aranayake in Kegalle district, Sri Lanka.

3 Landslide as a Disaster in Sri Lanka with Specific Reference to Aranayake

Landslide events have traditionally been isolated incidents caused by local and natural factors in Sri Lanka, with around 20 per cent of the country’s land area being mountainous or hilly. However, the areas prone to landslides are now predominantly occupied by tea and cinnamon plantations, leading to about 35per cent of the Sri Lankan population residing in these areas.Footnote 20 Landslides occurring in Sri Lanka are not as dominant as other disaster events such as floods and drought but their impact has risen in the recent past. Based on the available data from the National Building Research Organisation (NBRO),Footnote 21 it is reported that there has been a significant increase in landslides during the years 2003, 2007, 2011, 2014, 2016, and 2017. Particularly between 2011 and 2018, there was a notable surge in landslides, with significantly higher mortality rates observed in 2003, 2014, 2016, and 2017. Despite the landslide rates reaching their peaks in 2007, 2011, and 2018, the mortality rates were not as high as those experienced in 2003, 2006, 2016, and 2017 in Sri Lanka.Footnote 22

Human-induced interventions such as rapid urbanisation, population growth towards the foot of mountains, inappropriate land management, deforestation in steep slopes, etc., have influenced nearly 70 per cent of the landslides in Sri Lanka.Footnote 23 These factors are further explained in detail in the next paragraph.

One of the most common causes in the Sri Lankan context is construction activity carried out on steep slopes, which can destabilise the soil and increase the risk of slope failure. The composition of the soil itself can also be a contributing factor, with loose and poorly compacted soils being more susceptible to landslides. Other factors, such as deforestation or urbanisation, can also have a significant impact on the stability of slopes. In addition, waterlogging—which occurs when the soil becomes saturated with water—is another factor that can contribute to landslides. Furthermore, human intervention, such as through mining or excavation, can alter the natural stability of slopes and trigger landslides in Sri Lanka.Footnote 24 The unpredictable rainfall patterns and the land-use-related practices seem highly impactful in this rise in landslides compared to the past. The districts in Sri Lanka namely, Kandy, Matale, Nuwara Eliya, Badulla, Kegalle, Ratnapura, Kalutara, Galle, Matara, and Hambantota have been declared as landslide-prone districts by the National Building Research Organisation (NBRO).Footnote 25 Though these landslide threats are visible, people tend to settle in these regions, which have favourable climatic and environmental conditions for living.Footnote 26 Therefore, the risk of landslides is further increased by settlements, rapid urbanisation, and modification of land in mountainous and sloped areas.

Landslides cause damage to life, property, infrastructure, and the natural surroundings. Due to floods and landslides in 2016, five million people were affected.Footnote 27 During May 2017, 35 landslide events alone were reported and those events accounted for 176 deaths out of a total of 219 fatalities caused by floods and landslides.Footnote 28 The estimated consolidated damages and losses from the floods and landslides in May 2016 were over 275,813,280 USD, and in the aftermath of the events in May 2017, it was estimated at 215,134,358 USD.Footnote 29 Hence, both years represent huge economic loss which makes the community and physical rebuilding process hard. The most severe landslides occurred in the Kegalle district, and the following table shows the impact of the said landslides.

Table 1 Affected people by Landslides in Kegalle District in May 2016

There does seem to be a gap between legal frameworks in relocation policies in Sri Lanka. Though the Disaster Management Act of 2005 and the National Policy on Disaster Management (2010) are available as legal policy frameworks to address disaster-related issues, an explicitly focused legal framework addressing climate and disaster-related relocation is not available. The concept of relocation can be found in the NIRP (2001) and the Land Acquisition Act (LAA) 1950, yet both of those are specially formed to facilitate development projects. Disasters and war are two of the many situations where the NIRP has been put into practice since its inception.Footnote 31 The official bodies design relocation planning while being inspired by the NIRP and due to the unavailability of a particular law that governs climate- and disaster-related relocation. Accordingly, the communities that were impacted by the Aranayake landslide were also considered under this policy regulation in terms of relocation.

Aranayake, a village area located in the Kegalle district of Sri Lanka, 70 km east of Colombo, was one of the sites of a devastating landslide disaster that left a lasting impact in 2016.Footnote 32 As previously explained, this district is in the country’s central highlands and is highly prone to landslide risks. Furthermore, as given in Table 1, the Aranayake landslide depicts the highest missing rate and a considerable death rate. The map in Fig. 1 shows the landslide hazard zones in the Kegalle district and the location of Aranayake is marked in red. The NBRO has classified the areas as portrayed in the map into four main categories: safe slopes, landslides not likely to occur, modest level landslide hazard, and landslides are to be expected. Accordingly, many areas in the Kegalle district including Aranayake have a high risk towards landslides. The next paragraph will briefly explain the landslide event that occurred in Aranayake in May 2016.

Fig. 1
figure 1

Map of landslide hazard zones—Kegalle district, Source: adapted from NBRO, n.dFootnote

NBRO (n 21).

On 17 May 2016, a massive landslide of large magnitude occurred on a mountain named ‘Samasara’ in Aranayake, leading to two additional landslide cases in the following days. This was triggered by heavy rainfall and slow-moving cyclone occurrences in those days.

In Sri Lanka, there are four rainfall seasons during the year, namely the southwest monsoon (May to September), the inter-monsoon period following the southwest monsoon (October to November), the northeast monsoon period (December to February), and the inter-monsoon period following the northeast monsoon (March to April). An annual average rainfall of 5000 mm is expected in the Kegalle and Nuwara Eliya districts.Footnote 34 The Aranayake landslide occurred during the rainy season of the southwest monsoon in 2016. The precipitation reached 446.5 mm in the three days, from 14 to 17 May, and this caused a landslip mass that travelled about 2 km, demolishing 75 buildings.Footnote 35

As reported by the Japan International Cooperation Agency’s (JICA), Sri Lanka Office, the Aranayake landslide is a very complex incident, and the anticipation of such landslides remains hard. However, they report that the Aranayake landslide was triggered by a failure of the crown area,Footnote 36 which was subjected to deforestation and rising human settlements.Footnote 37 Hence, the accumulation of climate-induced impacts and more direct anthropogenic factors have created the ground for this landslide.

The Aranayake landslide has impacted not only the community that settled in the mountain for the time being but also the peripheral communities settled in the low-flow channel of the mountain valley. The areas of the Aranayake divisional secretariat that the landslide abruptly impacted include Siripura, Elangapitiya, and Pallebage.Footnote 38 The landslide made the lower channel areas of the mountain risky for future landslides. Many houses and cultivation lands located on the hill were either highly damaged or buried due to this massive landslide. The infrastructural facilities in the area, such as electricity, telecommunication, water, and school facilities, were disrupted for the time being by the landslide occurrence. As Table 1 shows, 2756 people were affected by the Aranayake event. The landslide affected more than 600 hectares of land, with the mud level covering up to 30–40 feet in some areas.Footnote 39 Immediately following the landslide, the Government of Sri Lanka (GoSL) attempted to relocate the victims who lost their houses and/or families, as well as the population at risk of being victimised by future landslides. The following section elaborates on the process of relocation and its challenges.

3.1 Landslide and Relocation of the Victims in Aranayake

The displaced communities of the Aranayake landslide were relocated to permanent shelters after two years of stay in the temporary shelters. Some of the displaced lost their physical and non-physical assets such as family members and neighbourhoods. The others were considered at high risk of being impacted by the landslide though their physical and non-physical assets were not harmed. Those who were at risk were also considered victims here. The reason being, that although their houses and family members were not lost due to the landslide, their houses were not in a liveable state and the landslide made them leave their place of origin. Therefore, it is fair to consider both those directly influenced by the damage and those who were lucky enough to save their lives and houses, yet under severe risk, together as displaced. The quote below from one of the respondents proves the nature of their displacement:

I witnessed the landslide; it was so close to destroying my house too. Luckily my house was not destroyed. I escaped with my family as soon as possible. If another landslide happened our house would be wiped off. We were relocated to this village years after staying in the shelters. Though our house was not fully harmed, our land was. We were not allowed to live in there after the landslide. (Respondent 4, Panapurewatta, 47 years old)

The above quote shows the nature of the risk that some of the community members were under. Their houses were either damaged or partially damaged, yet they too were at a high risk of harm. It was prohibited to live in the evacuated areas and the community was moved to a transitional zone where temporary shelters were provided for nearly two years. A total of 512 families displaced due to this event were relocated within the Kegalle district.Footnote 40

The areas where the displaced were relocated were within the same province, yet away from the original location. The Kegalle divisional secretariat has 11 divisions, and a total number of 1729 houses were constructed to facilitate all landslide displaced in the said district, including the Aranayake displaced. The donor-driven approachFootnote 41 was used to build 211 houses, and the owner-driven approachFootnote 42 was used to build 949 houses in Government Relocation Sites (GRS). The government relocation sites were the lands owned by the government and dedicated to relocating people who were displaced by the landslide. A further 569 owner-driven houses were built at individual relocation sites which the community members had selected themselves.Footnote 43

The GoSL was able to relocate communities in the housing schemes that were built by the donors specifically for the landslide victims. The China Friendship Village (CFV) is one of the housing schemes built under the financial support of China, which became a relocated village itself. The Panapurewatta relocated site is one of the owner-driven sites in Aranayake. Though the communities were relocated to new spheres, the issues related to their well-being are notable in the empirical data as well as in the literature.

3.2 Research Methods and Techniques

The methods and techniques used for the study are elaborated here. Firstly, the conceptual foundation of the study relied on the definition of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) as given by the United Nations Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, 1998 (guiding principles). The guiding principles define IDPs as ‘persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of expanded violence, violations of human rights, or natural or man-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognised border’.Footnote 44 Further, the IASC Framework on Durable SolutionsFootnote 45 was also majorly used to strengthen the basis of the study. Along with that, relevant key principles of the Guidance on Planned RelocationFootnote 46 were also used in the analysis where necessary. The study employed an exploratory research design with the purpose of formulating a problem for more accurate investigation.Footnote 47

A qualitative approach was used for the study and semi-structured and in-depth interviews, together with empirical observations were the primary data collection methods. The selected relocated sites were China Friendship Village and Panapurewatta. The convenient sampling method was used to select the sample of 20 people (10 from each village) to conduct semi-structured interviews and these respondents were heads of the household of each family.

Given that females were predominantly not represented in the sample of heads of households, five female respondents were selected through the purposive sampling method from the same villages, to conduct in-depth interviews. Age was considered in selecting these female respondents, and they were ages 19, 27, 35, 54, and 70. Furthermore, five in-depth interviews were conducted with officials who were aware of the relocation process of the selected sites. In keeping with the ethical considerations, all the names of the participants are anonymised in the analysis.

3.3 Assessment and Analysis of the Relocation at Aranayake

The nature and the issues experienced by the communities due to relocation caused by the Aranayake landslide are evaluated in this section with special reference to the selected sites mentioned previously. As the Guidance on Planned Relocation affirms, governments may undertake relocation as an anticipatory measure where hazards threaten to render certain areas uninhabitable. This is further affirmed through the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030, which highlights the need for formulating policies to address the issues generated through relocation.Footnote 48 When appropriate policies are formulated, the relocation process will eventually contribute to reducing disaster risk.

However, relocation initiatives around the world illustrate that relocating people is a complex endeavour with a high risk of deprivation of basic rights leaving individuals significantly worse off. States, when confronted with scenarios requiring deliberate relocation, often lack clarity on the fundamental principles that apply to this demanding scenario. Even though Sri Lanka has previous disaster-induced relocation and resettlement experiences, the planning and success of those attempts have not been examined in depth, either by academic or policy actors. The lack of community-sensitive planning, influence of political agendas, improper use of funding, and limited holistic understanding of the events and the community’s unachieved expectations may have been the reasons behind the infant nature of relocation attempts in Sri Lanka. The most prominent example is this Aranayake event, which shows the incompatibility between community well-being and what the relocation has addressed.

3.3.1 Assessing the Relocation Sites at China Friendship Village and Panapurewatta

One of the key areas of post-landslide relocation planning was relocating communities from where they were temporarily accommodated to permanent settings. The preliminary evaluation of the Aranayake landslide-induced relocations seems to be a durable solution to address the extended stay in temporary shelters. Arranging their settlement or facilitating their settling in a safe, permanent environment has taken away their insecurities as they now have a place to permanently mobilise from the temporary shelters. The IDPs had no choice but to agree with relocation as moving back to the mountain was prohibited. They were supposed to apply for a village that they preferred for relocation. However, though some of their requests were approved, not everyone has received the village or the type of relocation assistance that they requested. The government officials decided on the allocation of some IDPs in relocated villages. This was mostly found in the Panapurewatta relocation site and the following quote of one of the respondents further proves that

When we were in temporary shelters, we had an opportunity to request one of the options the government gave us: to find a land value about 3 lacks, request for an already built house, request land to be built the house ourselves with the compensated money, were those options. Finding a nearby land for 3 lacks was very hard as those who had lands increased the prices of them. We did not want to take the burden of building a new house from the beginning. Therefore, many of us requested a built house. But including me, many of our wishes was not granted... (Respondent 11, Panapurewatta, 36 years old)

The above quote clarifies the nature of facilitation in relocation and the impact and practical status of the relocation measures. As per the findings of the study, a majority of the respondents in the Panapurewatta had a similar issue while the respondents in the China Friendship Village (CFV) were satisfied that their wish of having a built house was granted, though they had to face different kinds of issues after relocating there.

As mentioned previously, the CFV was a relocation project comprised of 60 housing units that were built and given to the IDPs. The housing units are two-story which were initially planned by the Chinese government and later built by the Sri Lankan government. As per the data received from an in-depth interview with an official, the initial plan was to build 100 housing units for the village, but it ended up building only 60 units in 2018. As previously mentioned not all the vulnerable were relocated and those who were in high-risk areas were relocated under the first phase due to the high demand which was driven by the higher number of landslide displaced communities. According to the information given by the respondents, another 100 housing units will be built in the CFV in 2023, for those who live in the areas which are classified as ‘moderate risk areas’ in the mountain, as they were not counted in the first phase of relocation.

The location of the CFV was originally privately owned land, and as per the respondents, the relocated communities were not given the deeds yet. The reason was that the land ownership-related clearance was yet to be received. The land selected for the relocation was compiled from two privately owned lands named Weediya Mankada Hena and Udu Wihara Thanna, which were initially a cemetery; though the government’s land acquisition regulations were followed in acquiring this land for this purpose, the multiple ownership demands made the process complicated and time-consuming.Footnote 49 Accordingly, the right to the land has not yet been given to the current settlers.

In contrast, the Panapurewatta relocation site is owner-driven, and the settlers were supposed to build their own houses by using the money given by the GoSL. The settlers were given 4,903 USD of which 1,225 USD were for the land and the rest was to be used to build the house. The said balance has been given to the community as instalments based on their progress in utilising the money provided. The government suggested a housing plan of 650 square metres with an estimation of 4,290 USD as the construction cost. Even if the relocated family wanted to build their house according to their plan, still the government would only provide the above-mentioned amount. The rest of the expenses would have to be covered by the members themselves. The lands provided for relocated communities affected by the Aranayake landslide span from a minimum of 250 square metres to a maximum of 650 square metres, and this is because of the limited lands available for relocation purposes.Footnote 50

While Panapurewatta is located around 4.4 kms away from the main road, the CFV is located 1.3 kms away. Comparatively, the CFV is in a community-friendly location which is accessible to the town area far more easily than Panapurewatta. The location of Panapurewatta is distant and can be defined as a more isolated relocated village. With reference to religion-wise composition, the CFV is religiously homogenous with a Buddhist population, while Panapurewatta is mixed with Buddhist and Catholic populations making it religiously heterogeneous.

The issues that occurred after permanently settling in the above two locations deeply affected their well-being particularly in economic and social spheres. This will be discussed in the following section with special reference to the identified dimensions of rights violations and vulnerability.

3.3.2 Assessing the Landslide Relocation: Post-Relocation and Issues.

The issues experienced by both the communities in the post-relocation phase are discussed here. The housing units in both villages are different as mentioned in the previous section. The residents of the CFV were given a built house while the Panapurewatta’s residents were supposed to construct their own houses. Despite the difference in the nature of construction, social and economic challenges were identified in both locations even after five years of their relocation. These issues will be discussed specifically within the framework of IASC Durable Solutions Guidelines. These guidelines aim to foster a better understanding of the concept of durable solutions for IDPs which makes the mechanisms implemented for IDPs effective and durable while ensuring the need to protect their rights.Footnote 51 Therefore, following these guidelines would be helpful in planning and initiating relocation in a way that people are experiencing satisfactory conditions.

As per the IASC Durable Solutions Guidelines, eight criteria determine the extent to which a durable solution has been achieved: (1) safety and security, (2) an adequate standard of living, (3) access to livelihoods, (4) restoration of housing, land and property, (5) access to documentation, (6) family reunification, (7) participation in public affairs, and (8) access to effective remedies and justice.Footnote 52 The satisfactory facilitation in these components can make the relocation process a success. However, within the relocation sites, there were issues that showed that the relocation process in Aranayake did not encompass these essential measures. This has resulted in multi-faceted issues and those are discussed below with relevant examples from the selected sites.

The first aspect to consider is the housing unit-related issues. The housing units in the CFV comprised two bedrooms, a living room, a kitchen, and a bathroom. These all-housing units were of the same size, i.e. 600 m2. However, as per the respondent’s perspective, there were issues with the new setting of the house, which was typically different from what they had in the mountain. Herein the issues they are experiencing are that the housing provided is not compatible with their needs or with the criteria on safety and security, adequate standard of living, access to livelihoods, and restoration of housing.

As shown in Image 1, the CFV community was given a house in a two-storey structure. However, the major concerns regarding the housing unit pertained to the limited space, the unavailability of an outside kitchen and toilet (they were given in-house kitchen and bathroom facilities), unsafe windows (windows without grills creating unsafe situations), and architectural concerns (wherein the architecture doesn’t facilitate any ventilation). These concerns will be further explained in the latter part of this section. The second image shows a stove built within the house to cook using firewood.

The following quote from a respondent further explains the issues mentioned above, as experienced by them:

We had 4 acres of land in the mountain with a large house of four bedrooms. But here we only have a very small space for six members. We had an outside kitchen to cook in and we used free firewood to cook, but here we didn’t have a kitchen that could use firewood and it was hard to spend on gas monthly. When gas was not available during the time of economic crisis, we had no solution but to build a small stove for cooking with firewood. Since our house is upstairs, it was not easy. We covered our small balcony and made a stove, but when it is cooking on it, the whole house is covered by smoke. (Respondent 2, CFV, 45 years old)

The relocated community had bigger houses in their previous location as compared to the houses that they were given under the relocation project. As per the above quote, it was not easy for them to adapt to the new setting. Being an extended family, they found it hard to fit into the limited space. This is further worsened by the changes in conditions that they were used to before, such as livelihoods, methods of cooking, structure of the house, and access to essential services and goods. Overall, the issues in these conditions limit their fulfilment of adequate standards of living which is what they were striving for.

The economic status of most of the respondents of the CFV was informal as most were engaged in tea and cinnamon cultivations in the mountains. This was their only income source. They had limited expenses in terms of food and gas, as they were used to growing their own food for household consumption and used the firewood collected from their own garden as fuel for cooking. Using gas and buying every food item was a novelty and not a part of their life in the previous locations. The relocation has compelled them to shift from their frugal living to entailing higher expenses on both food and fuel, as they do not have a substance garden space to grow their vegetablesFootnote 53 or a stove to cook using firewood.

Given that the economic crisis in the country exacerbated in 2022 up until early 2023, using or finding gas was challenging for them. Cooking gas was unavailable at the time, and it necessitated the need to go back to the use of firewood. The problem was the unavailability of space built to use for the said purpose. Since they were not allowed to upgrade the housing unit, they started covering the small balconies in their houses and made a stove to use firewood (shown in Image 2). The use of firewood aggravated the situation as the entire house would get filled up with smoke due to poor ventilation. This impacted their overall well-being and was violative of their right to live in a healthy environment and their right to access essential services.

Image 1 and 2
figure 2

Source By the researcher, 2023

Housing Units in CFV.

This leads us to the next set of issues experienced by the community in the CFV with respect to safety. Though safety and security are priorities of the IASC durable solutions framework, the physical structure of the houses and the nature of the facilities provided do little to allay fears with regard to safety. It is apparent from Image 3 that the windows in the houses in the CFV do not have grills thereby compromising on safety. This has been a common concern for the majority of the respondents and especially for families living upstairs and having little children. Having window grills is important as window grills unnerve burglars, and discourage them from targeting property; further, families with children do not need to worry about their children’s safety, thus upholding overall safety.

Image 3
figure 3

Source By the researcher, 2023

Unsafe windows.

The above windows were referred to by respondents as unsafe because they did not have grills. Many families with children who were occupying housing units upstairs complained about this saying that they could not keep the windows open as they did not have any cover. This limits the ventilation in the house that is further worsened by the smoke of the stove. Respondents living both upstairs and downstairs shared their fear of being robbed and the lack of privacy due to the nature of the windows. It is a fact that these windows are big enough for burglars to enter and houses across can see right through these large windows if they are not curtained. As a result, this has become a safety and privacy concern for them. Since the community has no experience of living in condominium housing-type structures, the structure itself makes the ‘restoration of housing’ in an environment with satisfactory conditions, problematic.

The IASC durable solutions framework adopts a rights-based approach encompassing key principles including among others, voluntary and informed choice on what durable solutions to pursue, and active participation in planning and management of durable solutions.Footnote 54 However, according to the respondents of the CFV, they did not participate in the planning stages and were only moved into built up houses after applying for them. The emergence of issues has a direct link with non-community inclusive planning. Accordingly, the CFV’s issues show that the relocation attempts were not durable as they did not fully address the needs of communities.

When considering the IASC Durable Solutions Framework, the ‘restoration of housing and land and property’ clearly relates to the current analysis as the relocation itself is the restoration of housing. However, the seven other criteria, which were mentioned previously, were more or less not covered in the CFV. The access to livelihoods can be elaborated as it is the most visible issue in this context. The following quote from a female respondent in the CFV explains this status.

I was used to helping my husband in tea cultivation. Since we are relocated away from our cultivated sites, both of us can't travel there. I need to take care of my children and there is no trustworthy person to keep them here. Many thieves are making money off our lands there. Now my husband is working as an informal labourer. I wrap beedi to earn some; since the companies are sending us essential stuff to our doorstep, I can engage in that work while working at home. (Respondent 12, CFV, 35 years old)

According to the Guidelines on Planned Relocation (15a), ‘planned relocation should provide opportunities and conditions to enable relocated persons to improve, or, at a minimum restore, their living standards’.Footnote 55 This is also highlighted in the criteria on durable solutions as ‘access to livelihoods’. In contrast, though the community was relocated physically, their livelihood restoration has not been done satisfactorily. Therefore, the females who used to support their family’s livelihood in their previous locations were no longer doing the same. The reasons were the hardships of travelling a long way from where they live now, and the safety of their children which is highly dependent on women in the Sri Lankan context. This was mentioned as a concern by many females interviewed, as previously they heavily relied on neighbours and relatives for childcare but this was not possible in the new locations. The relocated community belongs to the same mountain, but their previous neighbours and relatives are no longer with them in their new locations. Accordingly, the lack of childcare systems has compelled women to stay at home to take care of their children. It is clear that the above-mentioned durable solutions for ‘family reunification’ and ‘safety and security’ have not been properly addressed, leading to concerns about experiencing a quality life.

A new means of livelihood that of wrapping beedi was seen among many women in the CFV.Footnote 56 This is a locally used cigarette, and the companies supplied all the essentials to the village and women were able to wrap them while staying home. The following images show their new livelihood, Image 4 shows the beedi leaves, and Image 5 shows the final production.

Image 4 and 5
figure 4

Source By the researcher

Beedi wrapping, a common female livelihood in CFV.

Women were thus able to contribute to the household income through this as the sole breadwinner could not fulfil household needs anymore. They earn approximately 3 USD (1100 LKR) for wrapping 1000 beedis and the time that they spend on this task depends on their engagement in it while doing household chores. Accordingly, this has become a community-invented alternative livelihood which can be identified as one of their attempts in restoration of household income. Though the above-mentioned guidance on planned relocation highlights the need for the restoration of livelihoods, the community was not happy with the support of the GoSL. According to them, the Chinese Government Representatives were coming annually to give them a yearly parcel of essentials, but the GoSL has no such care for them. As highlighted by the respondents, the livelihood support systems for them were not sufficient. This shows the importance of identifying community needs deeply, before planning livelihood restoration methods in terms of uplifting the community directly.

Various housing unit-related issues are visible among communities in Panapurewatta as well. Unlike in the CFV, Panapurewatta’s communities were supposed to build their own houses by using the monetary compensation provided by the government. As noted in the current study, the majority of the housing units were partially completed and they didn’t have much equipment at their houses such as chairs, tables, beds, and electric items. According to the respondents, the reason behind the incompleteness of the houses was that the amount of money they were given was not sufficient to meet their home construction.

We could not complete my house because the provided money was not enough. One of the residents left the village for the mountain after laying the foundation, and now we only have 26 houses here. Like me, many of the others have not completed their houses yet. I have even applied for a bank loan to complete my house. (Respondent 9, Panapurewatta 51 years old)

The insufficiency of compensated money to build houses was a common concern for many respondents. The above respondent is planning to complete the house by using the money that he will receive through the loan he applied for. However, an in-depth interview with a professional involved in the relocation, highlighted that the community’s poor management of monetary support was the reason for the incomplete nature of houses. The contradiction between the community’s perspective on compensated money and the official’s perspective shows the complexity of the use and provision of money for this purpose. Still, what was identified was that the use of money was not properly managed by the people as they had multiple expenses other than building their house, such as transportation, food and water, and electricity. Furthermore, the surge in the prices of construction-related material prices, which was out of the control to the community, was what aggravated this issue.

Image 6 shows a partially completed housing unit, and Image 7 shows a house with a poorly constructed pathway that residents are required to take in order to access the house. Infrastructural facilities, specifically with respect to the quality of roads and access to water, are poor in this village. According to the Guidance on Planned Relocation, to address and reduce the risks of poverty, caused by landlessness, unemployment, homelessness, marginalisation, food insecurity, morbidity and mortality, loss of access to common property and services, social and cultural displacement, the states should offer adequate support, resources, and services to those who have been relocated.Footnote 57 Though the GoSL has relocated them and helped them become free from homelessness and landlessness, proper awareness and continuous community support system are needed to make the community use what they were given to build back better. The exceeding costs of building a new house beyond the GoSL estimate seemed to be the major reason behind the incompleteness of the houses in the Panapurewatta region. The poor management of money in the community has also impacted on the worsening of this concern.

Image 6 and 7
figure 5

Source By the researcher

Housing units in Panapurewatta.

This can be further identified in terms of livelihood issues that led them to move back to their original lands which was allowed by the government only for livelihood purposes (not for residential purposes).

I am a tea, pepper, and cloves cultivator. I’m not good at any other job. I travel daily to my old land where my cultivations are going on. I must take two buses every day and come back in the evening. I feel like going back and living in my former land is better than travelling every day by spending what I earn so hard. (Respondent 14, Panapurewatta 41 years old)

The trend of moving back to their original location to fulfil their economic needs is visible among both communities relocated, especially among the Panapurewatta’s community. As most of them were cultivating minor export crops, their life was bound to the mountain with those economic investments. However, the community had to spend a lot of time and money on daily travelling to their lands to cultivate, use economically grown plants, etc. The total area of the Aranayake landslide area has been cultivated with minor export crops such as cloves, cardamom, pepper, and tea.Footnote 58 The respondents were also used to cultivating some of those products, which was their usual livelihood, but this was hard to engage in while living in new locations. This shows how their lives are tied to the lands where they live, and their livelihood needs motivate them to move back either to live illegally or even under risk as travelling daily costs a lot. The non-restoration of livelihoods has led them to economic impoverishment drawing them to move back to their previous locations, where the risk is still detectable. Therefore, livelihood restoration has an unavoidable impact on the effectiveness and durability of the relocation which has been highly neglected in both selected sites.

Another major concern highlighted by the community was the mixed religious composition of the community and locating them near a village comprised of different religious groups. As reported, the Panapurewatta site was specifically reserved for the Catholic population and the community still has concerns about this decision taken by the government.Footnote 59 As per the current study, the community had both Buddhists and Catholics and the nearest small-town area named Thalgaspitiya comprises a majority of the Muslim population. Since the host community holds a different religious identity than the relocated community, this creates issues in terms of their cultural rights as well as overall well-being. For example, the unavailability of religious places and schools specifically reserved for the Muslim community makes this environment unsupportive to their life order. This compels the community to travel a long way to their religious places and schools. The community doesn’t have a cemetery and they are having issues regarding that as well.

As proposed by the Guidance on Planned Relocation, the rights to self-determination, preservation of identity and culture, and control of land and resources are important in planned relocation.Footnote 60 However, the mixed relocation of communities in Panapurewatta has negatively impacted the people by creating a non-cultural and conflicting setting which ultimately affects the fulfilment of their cultural rights. In this background, they have become a culturally isolated community while being physically distinct from the host community.

According to the planned relocation guidelines, the planned relocation ends when the relocated persons no longer have needs or vulnerabilities related to the planned relocation.Footnote 61 However, the communities in Panapurewatta are still experiencing issues specifically analysed before and specifically related to the poor infrastructure support provided. This can be specifically noted in terms of water and transportation. The drinking water facility is available, but for all other needs such as bathing and washing clothes, they are required to use the common well located away from their houses. This was challenging to them as they were used to having free water access at their previous locations and were now required to pay for drinking water. Furthermore, the poor transportation facilities have only added to their woes. The limited public transportation facility includes only two small buses that travel from the town to their village and those are not frequent, and they usually end up travelling from their village to the town, a distance of about 4.4 kms, using a hired vehicle or by foot. Since their economic status is not so strong in the community, they’re reluctant to spend on a taxi and mostly travel by foot, which is hard. Accordingly, the non-fulfilment of their needs makes them further vulnerable after the relocation. The realisation of their human rights needs to be fulfilled in the infrastructural as well as the social, economic, water, education, and cultural needs which are not being properly met, and which harms the realisation of the said rights. Moreover, the Panapurewatta’s relocated communities keep having to sacrifice their basic rights including the right to bury their dead, the right to water and sanitation, and the right to freedom of religion per se.

One of the major issues commonly visible in both the CFV and Panapurewatta was the unavailability of the deeds pertaining to the lands. It’s been almost five years since their relocation, yet the legal rights to their lands and houses remain pending. As previously mentioned, the IASC framework on durable solutions highlights the need for access to documentation, which is a right that a relocated community should have.Footnote 62 The document that proves their land tenure should be provided to them to legally confirm their rights to the land. As found in a previous study by Fernando and others, the possibility of selling lands by the relocated community has delayed this legal transfer process.Footnote 63 However, living on those lands without having legal rights creates uncertainty for the relocated community and aggravates insecurity in land tenure that can eventually trigger future issues in terms of unlawful acquisitions and even the inability to prove their lawful entitlement to the land or house.

Though the relocation of the Aranayake landslide victims has saved the lives of community members who were at risk of future landslides, this move has negatively impacted their social and economic well-being. It has led some to consider returning to their previous locations, despite being prohibited from doing so. If the community's needs had been adequately addressed and their participation included in the relocation planning process, these issues could have been avoided. The challenges faced by the community, which directly or indirectly infringe upon their rights, serve as a worthwhile lesson for future relocation attempts.

When comparing the two relocation sites, the CFV has relatively better conditions as the community was handed over built up houses and their right to shelter was granted through the relocation measures; however, this is unfortunately not the case with the community at Panapurewatta where a majority of the people continue to face multiple obstacles in their attempt to settle in the relocated site. Considering that Panapurewatta, followed the owner-driven approach, the actual issues on the ground have made it difficult for most members of the community to realise their right to shelter. The location of the CFV is closer to the city as compared to Panapurewatta and this helps the community to easily fulfil their needs from the city. However, Panapurewatta is in a more remote area, isolated from the city and the community faces daily issues specifically in terms of transportation. In terms of infrastructural facilities also, the CFV has better conditions which were fully taken care of by the Chinese Government directed funds. Panapurewatta, on the other hand, has limited infrastructural facilities including water, poor roads, limited transportation facilities, limited accessibility to religious places, lack of burial facilities, and so on.

Though the CFV has better conditions as mentioned above, they are also experiencing issues associated with the physical structure of the houses which are not compatible with their needs. In contrast, Panapurewatta’s community has had comparative freedom in the building of the house based on their requirements. Both the CFV and Panapurewatta have pros and cons with respect to their relocation and most of these issues have emerged due to the non-participation of the community in the exercise of relocation planning. Had both the communities been consulted and the planning process made participatory, the issues with respect to limited livelihood restoration and legal rights would not have emerged. Therefore, it is clear that for the relocation to be durable and effective, the processes should be community sensitive and participatory.

4 Conclusion

The chapter has discussed the vulnerability and disasters which have been exacerbated by climate change in Sri Lanka. Among the disasters affecting Sri Lanka, floods and droughts occupy prominent places. However, since 2003 landslides are also emerging as a prominent disaster affecting people and communities.

The chapter has analysed the pattern and model of relocation following the landslide at Aranayake, Kegalle. The analysis reveals that relocation measures were taken to build the lives of IDPs at the China Friendship Village and Panapurewatta relocation sites. However, even after seven years since the Aranayake landslide, and five years since the relocation, the communities at both the China Friendship Village as well as Panapurewatta are still experiencing issues associated with the relocation. There is a  mismatch in the community’s housing expectations and the reality of what was provided in terms of architecture and ventilation-related issues, diminishing of traditional childcare systems, the inability to livelihood restoration and absence of legal rights to the house, were all identified as problems in the donor-driven China Friendship Village. The same concerns of livelihood restoration and legal rights to the land were apparent in owner-driven Panapurewatta as well. The insufficient compensation in building houses, and limited access to basic, essential rights such as water, burial grounds, sustainable transportation, and non-availability of a religious place to access were found to be the major issues faced by the Panapurewatta community. The issues mentioned above prove that the relocation has threatened their social and economic sustainability, as the relocation has taken their basic rights away.

The lack of a direct policy to address relocation caused by climate-induced relocation essentially leads to involuntary relocation. A policy directly addressing these relocation needs and applicable to the Sri Lankan context must be formulated. That will help create a shift from involuntary relocation to an acceptable and voluntary move which will prove to be more stable and sustainable. It is apparent that the IASC durable solutions framework’s conditions have been largely incompatible with the relocation projects discussed here. In fact, some of the guidelines for planned relocation that were deliberated upon in this chapter were also not reflected in the relocation process of these communities. The failure of these attempts shows the need to address such events with a rights-based community-sensitive approach.

The current study highlights that the community should not be left out of relocation planning, and they should be considered authorised actors. At the end of the day, they are the ultimate beneficiaries of the planned outcome. Hence, a bottom-up approach which starts from the community and ends with the policymakers and the government would contribute to the non-violation of essential rights of the communities in terms of relocation. This will aid in shifting the paradigm from error correction to low-mistake facilitation in disaster-induced relocations.