Keywords

Introduction

In 2019, Taiwan implemented a policy of providing humanitarian aid to Hong Kong citizens in response to the Anti-Extradition Law Amendment Bill Movement (Anti-ELAB Movement) generated in Hong Kong. This social resistance movement emerged through combined public support, operating without a centralised leadership structure. Frontline participants, often strangers to one another, relied on ad hoc consensus to resist the armed police, who acted under the authority of the Chinese government (Li, 2021). Violent clashes and bloody suppression were frequently reported on social media and mainstream news outlets. Within protester circles, there occasionally surfaced unverifiable reports of police sexual violence towards movement participants in enclosed spaces, unidentified bodies found floating on the sea or suspected of having fallen from high-rise buildings, and organised workers being stalked and harassed by individuals with Chinese accents. As a result of facing threats of political violence and living under a high-pressure terror rule, many protesters have sought help from civil society organisations (CSOs) and the government in Taiwan.

In addition to the police violence, China, at the time, was in the process of systematically constructing an oppressive regime in Hong Kong (Fong et al., 2020). In early 2020, Covid-19 swept the world and many countries implemented measures such as border closures and restrictions on gatherings, significantly reducing social activities. The pro-democracy camp in Hong Kong, having learned from the painful experience of the SARS outbreak in 2003, self-regulated and initiated anti-pandemic actions, such as organising purchases of masks from foreign countries and reducing gatherings (Tsui, 2023). However, the Chinese government took advantage of the situation and implemented the Hong Kong National Security Law (HKNSL) in response to months-long social protests. This law completely destroyed the remaining space for civic freedom and political autonomy in Hong Kong, rendering the “one country, two systems” framework meaningless. Organisers of the Hong Kong democracy movement faced systematic and comprehensive suppression, and traditional civic organisations, autonomous student groups, and public media were forced to disband (Wu, J., 2022). The effects of the HKNSL have triggered a new wave of emigration from Hong Kong, including many civic organisation workers who have chosen to seek political asylum in Taiwan.

The plight of Hong Kong protesters seeking asylum in Taiwan differs from that of typical refugees, as they continue to face the threat of cross-border oppression by the Chinese regime. Some activists advocating for Hong Kong issues have been subjected to harassment and violent intimidation while in Taiwan, and the heightened cross-border law enforcement by the Chinese police has raised concerns among democratic countries regarding China's authoritarian expansionism (Safeguard Defenders, 2022). The provision of protection to Hong Kong protesters in Taiwan is complicated by Taiwan's diplomatic isolation, which stems from China's suppression of Taiwan's international status.

Taiwan's policy towards China is critical to maintaining peace in East Asia. A conservative and stable policy towards China is in Taiwan’s Western allies’ interest, to avoid overstimulating China. However, Hong Kong's young protesters, who grew up after Hong Kong's sovereignty was transferred to China in 1997, have solidified their sense of an independent identity in response to Beijing's violation of the promises made in the Sino-British Joint Declaration, its suppression of Hong Kong's cultural identity, and its blatant police violence (Tsui, 2023). In the eyes of the Chinese government, these protesters, seeking national self-determination, pose a tangible national security threat; any civil action challenging China's territorial claims or the authority of the Chinese Communist Party must therefore be absolutely prohibited. The Taiwanese government, which chooses to provide protesters with protection, is viewed as an outright hostile force. Therefore, a human rights-based aid policy immediately escalates to a national security-sensitive issue.

Due to national security sensitivity and cross-border pressure from China, Taiwan-based Hong Kong protesters often live “unrecognised existences”, making it difficult for the public to know anything about the practical implementation of humanitarian aid policies for Hong Kong in Taiwan. One reason for the lack of clear guidance on Taiwan's policy of sheltering Hong Kongers is that Taiwan has never established a complete refugee policy framework. Its refugee law has been stalled in the legislative process for decades, with no political momentum to move it forward. Despite the emergence of a need to provide asylum to Hong Kong protesters in the aftermath of the Anti-ELAB Movement, this political opportunity has not been able to effectively drive the advancement of refugee legislation. Without a clear legal framework, the Taiwanese government bureaucracy could not prepare for the immediate needs of fleeing Hong Kong protesters. The inefficiency of the bureaucratic system and the absence of legal institutionalisation have resulted in the need for CSOs to bear the cost of accommodating and facilitating the social integration of protesters.

This chapter addresses the primary question of how Taiwan can continue to develop a substantive aid policy for Hong Kong while protesters are “unrecognised”. From this perspective, what are the limitations of Taiwan's aid policy towards Hong Kong, and what are the prospects for future development?

The authors of this chapter were key participants in the development process of Taiwan's aid policy towards Hong Kong. We previously served in a local non-governmental organisation in Taiwan, the Taiwan Economic Democracy Union (t'ai wan ching chi min chu lian hê). We worked with CSOs such as the Taiwan Association for Human Rights (t'ai wan jên ch'üan ts'u chin hui) and the Judicial Reform Foundation (min chien ssu fa kai kê chi chin hui) to urge and supervise the government in gradually implementing its aid policy towards Hong Kong. Therefore, the essential perspectives of this chapter, and most of the data, come from our first-hand operational experience, as well as our interviews with civil society partners and relevant individuals within the government. We also cite publicly available information from media or government reports to corroborate information that we cannot publicly disclose due to secrecy. This research approach provides an insider's view but, as well as being a positive factor, such a viewpoint can in itself be said to limit the research perspective of this chapter. Nevertheless, our position remains consonant and perspicuous. Hitherto, we have steadfastly advocated for the formulation of a refugee legislation or an equitably structured legal framework by the Taiwanese government, with an ardent commitment to proactively ensuring the protection and well-being of Hong Kong refugees residing in Taiwan. Through our analysis, we hope to provide a more comprehensive public discussion foundation for this policy area.

This chapter reviews the various stages of Taiwan's aid policy towards Hong Kong during its critical turning points and further expands related analysis and discussions through crucial concepts such as national security, public–third sector cooperation, and the institutionalisation of shelter policies.

Three Stages of Taiwan's Aid to Hong Kong

From July 2019 to June 2020: Civilian Guarantees and Case-by-Case Project Review

On the night of 1 July 2019, Hong Kong protesters occupied the Legislative Council chamber for the first time in history, demanding immediate implementation of universal suffrage in both the executive and legislative branches. At midnight, a large number of riot police stormed the Legislative Council and violently cleared the area. Based on past experiences, the Hong Kong government was highly likely to charge the protesters with the “riot” offence, which carries a maximum sentence of up to ten years. Moreover, the judicial system in Hong Kong lacked the spirit of the rule of law. Therefore, many protesters began considering fleeing overseas, with Taiwan being the primary option due to its close geopolitical ties.

On 12 August 2019, President Tsai Ing-wen of Taiwan expressed her willingness to provide humanitarian assistance to Hong Kong protesters through her party spokesperson (Ye, 2019). Tsai's statement motivated many young Hong Kong protesters. During the peak of the movement, we found that many young protesters faced despair due to high-pressure political violence and even experienced family breakdowns due to their differing political views with their family members. The commitment of Taiwanese politicians was like a lifeboat in the ocean, providing a brief hope for survival amidst the stormy seas. However, the then administrative bureaucracy in Taiwan had yet to gain systematic experience in implementing political refugee protection, let alone proposing any policy implementation guidelines. In the absence of any policy and institutional preparation, the government was unable to promptly establish any public ways to receive applications from refugees seeking assistance. Consequently, these political refugees, who had just arrived in Taiwan, had no official channels to seek help from the authorities.

We noticed that, faced with the imminent political crackdown by the Hong Kong government, the first wave of protesters fleeing to Taiwan acted quickly. They initially obtained short-term stay permits through tourist visas and then tried to seek assistance from familiar social networks in Taiwan. Due to the lack of an official coordination mechanism, a plethora of urgent requests for asylum flooded human rights groups, political parties, as well as organisations or individuals who had established personal connections with Hong Kong's social activist circle. As we experienced, in response to this urgent situation, several CSOs came together to organise humanitarian aid for Hong Kong refugees, leveraging their networks of people with similar backgrounds, who were dealing with the same issues, and building on the trust they had developed thanks to past collaboration with social activists.

As we encountered, under the political mandate of President Tsai, the Taiwanese government had maintained a friendly attitude towards Hong Kong refugees. However, officials had become accustomed to relying on the past case-by-case review model for handling foreign refugees. Government agencies could only offer temporary solutions within the limited legal framework, while applicants awaiting official responses had to rely on the assistance of CSOs. The previous legal framework was not easily applicable given the circumstances at that time. This was primarily due to the overwhelming influx of people arriving in Taiwan within a short period, and the tendency of individuals involved to seek assistance discreetly and in secrecy. Despite frequent interactions between Taiwanese CSOs and Hong Kong activists, they still faced difficulties in verifying the identities of a significant number of asylum seekers through their existing networks.

The absence of a structured leadership core in the Hong Kong protests effectively shielded protesters in the short term, as the Hong Kong government was unable to concentrate its efforts on arresting leaders within a specific area. However, this outcome posed an immediate challenge in terms of identifying the participants involved in the protests. Moreover, most young protesters might face economic difficulties, but the Taiwanese government had yet to establish a refugee resettlement institution that provided emergency living assistance. Most significantly, owing to the spectre of Chinese government infiltration into overseas democratic societies, Hong Kong political refugees faced safety risks that prevented them from openly seeking media interviews or making widespread appeals to the community for assistance. Instead, they had to rely on existing social networks and cautiously communicate their difficulties and needs. We learned that these specific contextual factors constrained CSOs from making immediate and extensive efforts to develop feasible operational models.

Based on our findings, initially, the government proposed several short-term measures to address the pressing needs caused by the rapidly evolving situation in Hong Kong. The Taiwanese government expressed a clear willingness to assist the protesters; however, it encountered challenges due to a lack of basic administrative procedures and the necessary human resources to undertake further protection efforts. The initial proposals put forth by the government were also deemed impractical and difficult to implement. In light of the chaotic situation, CSOs had to tentatively establish mechanisms to provide assistance to the substantial number of protesters who arrived in Taiwan in early July. During that period, the civilian shelter mechanism was roughly divided into three steps:

  1. i.

    Attempting to understand the background of each case from the fragmented network of original information.

  2. ii.

    Establishing a standard interview procedure to build the necessary information file for each case to apply for residency.

  3. iii.

    Negotiating with the government to obtain residency status (Chiang, 2020).

Based on our understanding, many civil society workers were fully dedicated to building the mechanism individually and commenced case management, resulting in the formation of a temporary collaboration for civilian refugee resettlement. This was achieved under the highly mobilised configuration of CSOs, overcoming practical difficulties such as identity confirmation, emergency resettlement, and protecting asylum seekers’ privacy. The government passively endorsed the civilian mechanism. If applicants were assisted by the specific and reliable alliance of CSOs, there was a high likelihood of receiving administrative assistance from the government, such as extending short-term visas and mitigating administrative obstacles during the residency application process. In our analysis, we have summarised this model as the “civilian guarantees and case-by-case project review” mentioned in the title of this section, which had led to a preliminary consensus on public–third sector cooperation.

During this stage, CSOs were the actual implementers of President Tsai Ing-wen's humane policies towards Hong Kong protesters. In our experience, the civil society-led shelter mechanism often encountered financial and human resource constraints. Additionally, as CSOs lacked official power, individuals seeking help from them could not receive official guarantees through the third-sector procedures. Consequently, we noticed that some individuals were unwilling to trust, and refused to join, the civil shelter mechanism, leaving them in a vulnerable situation where the Taiwanese government could not provide further assistance.

However, we found that Tsai's verbal commitment gave protesters confidence that official assistance would be available, which increased their willingness to flee to Taiwan. This further intensified the burden on CSOs responsible for providing shelter, as they had to raise funds while refining the civil mechanism based on the lessons learned from implementation. After several months of trial and error, CSOs developed a stable intervention mechanism. This mechanism included strengthened case management for refugee placement, provision of emergency accommodation, psychological support, medical services, insurance coverage, legal aid, assistance in applying for residency in Taiwan, and career development planning. Furthermore, regular monitoring of the living conditions of these individuals was conducted by CSOs to help them achieve self-sufficiency. Other civic resources were gradually integrated into the network, such as the “Taiwan Volunteer Lawyers Group Supporting Hong Kong Protesters”, which was officially launched during the 29 September “Taiwan with Hong Kong” rally (Lu, 2019). The lawyer’s group established a public Telegram (a social media platform widely used by Hong Kong protestors for secret communication during the Anti-ELAB movement) account to help Hong Kong protesters inquiring about the basics of the civil shelter mechanism in Taiwan through social media.

From July 2020 to July 2022: Establishment of a Semi-Official Project Office

After nearly a year of refugee resettlement efforts led by CSOs, the Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) finally announced the “Hong Kong Humanitarian Assistance and Care Action Scheme” (the Scheme) on 18 June 2020, gradually taking over the management of individual cases and related administrative tasks from civil society organisations (Mainland Affairs Council, 2020). This Scheme was established under the “Taiwan–Hong Kong Service and Exchange Office” (t'ai kang fu wu chiao liu pan kung shih, Exchange Office) under the Taiwan–Hong Kong Economic and Cultural Cooperation and Promotion Council (t'ai kang ching chi wên hua hê tso ts'ê chin hui, ECCPC). This council was initially established with government funding and maintained relationships with Hong Kong's political and civil society sectors in a semi-official capacity, often hosting cultural exchange events. Taiwan's government chose a semi-official, culturally oriented institution to manage the refugee asylum work, demonstrating its desire to downplay the political nature of the Scheme. At the time, as the HKNSL was preparing to be implemented, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) government also responded strongly, stating its determination to “provide necessary assistance to the people of Hong Kong, showcasing the government's commitment to upholding universal values and supporting Hong Kong's pursuit of freedom and democracy” (Mainland Affairs Council, 2020).

While Taiwan's support for Hong Kong's position was evident, the wording of official documents was consistently subjected to scrutiny, strictly adhering to soft language to avoid any perception of being overly politicised. This approach involved the use of terms such as universal values, cultural exchange, and caring, which were carefully chosen to convey the message without raising unnecessary political sensitivities. We knew that CSOs who were involved in the previous stage of the shelter work spent several months carefully monitoring whether the Scheme’s assistance mechanisms would be fully integrated into the government’s internal processes. Due to the CSOs’ effort, on the date of the Scheme’s announcement, the Exchange Office opened a formal online application window, allowing Hong Kong protesters to seek assistance by phone or email. Most relevant expenses related to the care and resettlement of protesters were borne by the government, and CSOs’ resources were redirected to a few financial items that the government was unwilling to bear. This allowed CSOs to focus more on monitoring the effectiveness of the Exchange Office's operations. It is worth noting that the Exchange Office has never publicly disclosed its work details. Even the relevant public information section of the government's financial budget did not show its financial scale. There have been legislators’ inquiries regarding the 2021 budget of the ECCPC, questioning officials from the MAC. The official response only mentioned that the ECCPC allocated NT$31.42 million as the total annual expenditure amount (Chen, 2021).

The Taiwanese government chose to keep the operational details of their Scheme undisclosed, citing the need to protect the safety of protesters and other widely accepted reasons. Among these reasons, two stood out: First, publicly disclosing the application process may make it easier for Chinese-affiliated intelligence agents to infiltrate and obtain sensitive information about protesters’ identities; second, publicising the details of the Scheme's execution may allow the Chinese government or its local collaborators in Taiwan to gain a complete understanding of the Scheme, which could potentially jeopardise the safety of protesters. In our advocacy experience, we often encountered opposition from some individuals from Hong Kong who, due to these two security concerns, opposed the legislation of the asylum mechanism.

Given the cross-border oppression tactics of the Chinese regime, CSOs did not dispute the importance of protecting the identity of protesters. However, they repeatedly called on the government to examine the rationale for not making the details of the Scheme transparent (TNL, 2020). In the absence of an official mechanism that was transparent and accountable, the potential costs and risks were shifted to the asylum seekers. At this stage, several everyday tensions between the government and applicants had emerged:

  1. i.

    Applicants were unable to discern the application process and had no clear information on when they would receive notification and feedback from the government.

  2. ii.

    Applicants were unaware of the criteria for review and were unsure how to prepare their documents to increase their chances of passing the inspection.

  3. iii.

    Some applicants who had not received official responses faced the issue of their passport expiration. As a result of unclear procedures, they did not have enough information to determine whether they should leave Taiwan early and seek refuge in a third country.

To gain insight into the logic of the official system, civilian actors and public media utilised case interviews and incomplete information to piece together the government's internal review process, while also offering suggestions and criticisms. The following is a model of the review process by officials, pieced together from the information available:

  1. i.

    Asylum seekers apply for a general stay visa to enter Taiwan (usually holding a tourist visa).

  2. ii.

    Applicants call or email the Exchange Office and submit preliminary identification information, as well as a description of their involvement in the protests.

  3. iii.

    Exchange Office staff arrange an interview to clarify and document the applicant's protest participation and the legal risks associated with returning to Hong Kong.

  4. iv.

    Exchange Office personnel consult with third-sector experts and scholars for evaluation of the individual case.

  5. v.

    A government review committee composed of officials decides whether to provide the applicant with assistance and care. Once approved, the Exchange Office continues to provide care and assistance in daily living, including most of the support services designed by CSOs in the first stage.

  6. vi.

    Due to other government regulatory procedures, applicants may be required to undergo further interviews with border or immigration agencies.

  7. vii.

    Finally, interdepartmental government personnel form a joint review committee to decide whether to grant the applicant “Scheme-based status” (Liu, 2021).

From the perspective of CSOs, one of the criticisms of the process was that even if an applicant successfully obtained the “Scheme-based status”, it did not necessarily mean that they were granted refugee status or any other valid residency rights (Liu, 2021). The government did not provide applicants with any official documentation to attest to the receipt of the “Scheme-based status”, nor did it offer any other opportunities for residency outside of the usual channels. Therefore, applicants who had completed the screening process typically received only verbal notification from personnel at the Exchange Office that they had obtained the “Scheme-based status”. Subsequently, these individuals had to consider whether to pursue higher education, which was the most feasible pathway for young protesters to gain eventual citizenship in Taiwan's existing legal framework.

During this stage, the official application process had not been subjected to a thorough examination due to the curtailment of personnel mobility stemming from the Covid-19 pandemic. At the outset of the pandemic, the Taiwan government promptly implemented quarantine measures for individuals from China, Hong Kong, and Macao and suspended all entry of foreign nationals from 19 March 2020 (Bureau of Consular Affairs, 2020). With the exception of foreign nationals with residency status, individuals with general tourist visas were unable to enter Taiwan. The border ban on Hong Kong nationals persisted until 20 February 2023, for a period of almost three years. Many Hong Kong protesters chose to obtain student status in Hong Kong and enter Taiwan with a student visa (Bureau of Consular Affairs, 2020).

However, these protesters faced a predicament when they reached out to the Exchange Office to express their intention to apply for assistance, as the staff seemed to provide vague reasons for not accepting their cases, leaving them perplexed (Liang, 2022). “Not accepting the case” did not mean rejecting the application. We had several instances where we accompanied the applicants during phone calls to the Exchange Office. These conversations often resulted in a logical impasse, as the perspectives of the applicants and the Exchange Office staff could not align. From the government's viewpoint, successful entry into Taiwan for students meant that they did not necessarily require special assistance since they had already obtained residency status. As a result, the Exchange Office staff indicated their limited ability to offer further legal protection or assistance. Instead, they offered consultation services and encouraged the applicants to seek help if they encountered any future difficulties. However, from the applicants’ standpoint, this rhetoric appeared as a disingenuous and tactful refusal. They firmly believed that they needed government assistance, as their involvement in the protests could expose them to harassment or arrest by the Hong Kong government if they were to return. They expected a more straightforward approach from government employees who, operating within an official capacity and wielding the mechanisms of public power, they thought should not employ ambiguous language.

During this stage of Taiwan’s aid to Hong Kong, we observed two levels to the role of the Exchange Office:

  1. i.

    At the level of resettlement and care, it was true that the Exchange Office faced significant challenges in immediately handling all the cases of protesters sent by CSOs, given its recent establishment. This situation was worthy of criticism as the government took nearly a year to establish concrete financial planning and personnel structures to implement President Tsai Ing-wen's promise of providing humanitarian assistance to Hong Kongers. Within the public sector, the Exchange Office gradually developed a systematic workflow, albeit at a slow pace.

  2. ii.

    At the level of legal protection, the Exchange Office, as a semi-official agency, did not have the power to resolve the long-term residency issues of applicants comprehensively. In other words, while the Exchange Office had replaced CSOs, the ruling party had yet to present a residency application mechanism specifically designed for Hong Kong protesters. The resulting legal and regulatory impasse significantly affected the mental and physical health of applicants, as a lack of legal identity made it challenging for them to feel secure in Taiwan and develop their personal lives (Chen et al., 2019). Therefore, at this level of legal protection, the Taiwanese government had yet to make a clear statement, and the mechanism for sheltering Hong Kong protesters had been stalled.

The non-disclosure of information might, in specific circumstances, be disadvantageous to the ruling party's interests. If the government's assistance was effective, the confidentiality of information might prevent them from promoting their achievements. In February 2022, after approximately a year and a half of operation, a veteran journalist from the Liberty Times, who was well-versed in the business of the MAC, published a report stating that the Scheme had assisted over 130 Hong Kong protesters seeking refuge in Taiwan due to “political reasons” since 2020. The government anticipated that 400–500 Hong Kong residents would continue to seek shelter through this channel in the future. Among these individuals, the youngest protester was not even 18 years old, while the oldest was in their 40s (Chen, 2022a).

The number of 130 was slightly larger than the figures collected by CSOs. Through multiple interviews with limited sources of information, CSOs had learned that as of February 2022, the total number of individuals in the Scheme was approximately 110, with the majority consisting of those directly assisted during the stage one accounting for around 76%. Furthermore, despite the border restrictions imposed during the pandemic, the Taiwanese government still accepted approximately 20–25 individuals to enter with a visa due to exceptional humanitarian grounds, who subsequently became part of the Scheme. It was evident that the telephone and email application window announced by the Exchange Office had only seen around two to three successful applications. Without legal refugee status, most applicants chose to study, with approximately 60–70 applicants holding student visas. These Hong Kong individuals with student visas faced strict restrictions, resulting in many being unable to work full-time legally to earn income. Thus, they fell into financial hardship due to high tuition fees and academic pressure. Through private networks, we learned that some Hong Kong communities in Taiwan had initiated fundraising campaigns to share the burden of tuition fees for these youth protesters, easing the issue to a certain extent. Nevertheless, according to Table 5.1, approximately 16% of protesters who chose to study ultimately failed to adapt to campus life and shifted to employment. However, those who chose employment faced another difficulty. They could only obtain a short-term residency of up to three years, and although the residency could be extended, they could never obtain Taiwanese citizenship, which also prompted some protesters to consider the possibility of leaving Taiwan and moving to the UK. Regarding the Scheme-based status review process, more than 80% of applicants, shown in Table 5.1, successfully completed the final joint review and obtained the Scheme-based status, while the minority were still awaiting processing. Approximately one to three individuals did not pass the review due to unclear legal risks of returning to Hong Kong.

Table 5.1 Implementation status of the Humanitarian Assistance Scheme (as of February 2022)
Full size table

After July 2022: The “Quasi-Asylum Mechanism” Not Publicly Disclosed

In July 2022, the Taiwan government internally drafted administrative documents to address the issue of Hong Kong protesters who lacked legal asylum residency status. However, the government did not amend any existing laws or regulations publicly. Instead, all changes were communicated verbally to applicants by personnel from the Exchange Office. The media later summarised the full details of the mechanism from information obtained from Scheme applicants:

  1. i.

    Applicants who pass the final joint review and obtain the Scheme-based status are eligible to apply for a one year “personal work permit” from the Ministry of Labour.

  2. ii.

    With this “personal work permit”, applicants can apply to the National Immigration Agency (NIA) for a work residency permit, which will be renewed annually along with the personal work permit. The residency permit will also be extended.

  3. iii.

    From the day of obtaining the Scheme-based status, applicants can apply to become Taiwanese citizens if they have resided in Taiwan for five years and have an average monthly income of 1.5 times the minimum wage in the fifth year.

  4. iv.

    During the five-year residency period, applicants can participate in the labour market and enjoy national health insurance just like Taiwanese citizens. There are also no restrictions on studying and pursuing further education while working (Chun, 2022b).

At this stage, the general application channels of the Exchange Office were no longer the narrow gateways they used to be, with vague language and difficult access. At the time of writing this chapter, we found that many protesters’ applications had been successfully accepted and they had entered into the subsequent interview processes. Under the continuous supervision of CSOs, the Exchange Office had started assigning each protesting applicant a unique case number for tracking the progress of their case review. A responsible government official confirmed this new measure in a phone call with the authors. Although the government has not openly explained whether the aforementioned rule changes have affected the operating standards for case acceptance, it is evident that when the government proposed a superior institutional framework, providing applicants with the opportunity to obtain a dedicated legal residency status through a Scheme-based process, the operational efficiency of the government's front-end execution units functioned seamlessly as anticipated. In terms of the strict refugee legal framework in the international community, Taiwan's humanitarian aid measures for Hong Kong protesters cannot be considered complete. However, in terms of their substantive content, they have already covered the various needs and regulatory support required by asylum seekers in a foreign land (Table 5.2).

Table 5.2 Index of names of organisations in Taiwan
Full size table

Hong Kong protesters now had the right to submit Scheme applications to the Exchange Office, which, after specific review procedures, might offer the opportunity to obtain social rights such as work permits, health insurance, residency rights, and the chance to become a citizen of Taiwan. During the application period, applicants could receive rental subsidies, living allowances, and, when necessary, apply for psychological counselling services or emergency medical care. As such, Taiwan's assistance to Hong Kong protesters could be considered a “quasi-asylum mechanism”, but the government was reluctant to openly disclose the content of this mechanism due to its own safety concerns and other national strategic considerations, and was also unwilling to appeal to explicit laws. Under this restriction, long-standing problems persisted:

  1. i.

    If there is a change in the ruling party, and Taiwan is governed by a pro-China party, the Kuomintang (KMT) or Taiwan People’s Party may be quite likely to suspend the aid mechanism through internal procedures directly. External parties will find it challenging to supervise the amendment without explicit legal provisions as an advocacy lever.

  2. ii.

    Even if the DPP continues to govern in the coming years, President Tsai Ing-wen's second term will end in 2024. The question remains whether future leaders will still be willing to support this quasi-asylum mechanism.

  3. iii.

    Applicants must reside in Taiwan for five years before acquiring citizenship, during which any unforeseen circumstances lack legal provisions.

The Legal Challenges of Taiwan's Assistance to Hong Kong

The Use of Regular Immigration to Conceal Political Refugees

At the moment of writing this article, the Taiwanese government has not officially designated its assistance to Hong Kong as “political asylum”, and due to the absence of a comprehensive refugee law, protesters seeking refuge in Taiwan are unable to obtain legal refugee status. In the official definition, the assistance provided by the Taiwanese government to Hong Kong protesters seeking help is not heavily politically motivated “asylum”, but rather “humanitarian assistance” based on universal values and human rights concerns. Even after the establishment of a “quasi-asylum mechanism” in July 2022, the Taiwanese government had not officially acknowledged any protesters receiving official asylum through proper channels.

Compared to the previous KMT government, the Tsai Ing-wen administration had taken a more definitive stance, refusing and resisting China's intention to annex Taiwan's territory and making significant breakthroughs in foreign relations with democratic countries such as the United States and Japan to elevate Taiwan's actual national sovereignty status. However, President Tsai Ing-wen had consistently shown a tendency not to modify any legal frameworks related to Taiwan's policies towards China, not just concerning Hong Kong but also in issues related to economic security. Despite many international allies’ legal adjustments to defend or sanction China in response to its threats, the DPP government had only made minor administrative and regulatory adjustments in a small scope (Chiang, 2022). Regarding policies towards Hong Kong, the Taiwanese government has been unwilling to amend laws, let alone propose legal orders granting administrative agencies the authority to make changes on their own (Chiang, 2022). In the face of China's military threats and diplomatic pressures on Taiwan, President Tsai Ing-wen's cautious and conservative attitude has fundamentally limited the development space for legalising Taiwan's assistance to Hong Kong.

Within the confines of this policy, Taiwan's government formulated a basic strategy during the stage one and two, which aimed to extend humanitarian assistance to protesters for a limited duration, with the expectation that they would opt for the regular immigration channels rather than pursuing the path of asylum or refugee status in Taiwan. One of the quintessential cases illustrating this policy was the predicament of Mr. Lam Wing-kee, the proprietor of Causeway Bay Books, who hailed from Hong Kong. Mr. Lam and his Hong Kong associates operated a specialised bookstore offering publications banned or censored by the Chinese government, many of which divulged accounts of illicit or unethical activities of officials affiliated with the Communist Party. In 2015, Mr. Lam and his fellow shareholders went missing in Hong Kong, and Mr. Lam subsequently confirmed that they had been kidnapped by clandestine Chinese law enforcement personnel and transported to mainland China for trial. This event dealt a severe blow to the confidence of Hong Kong's civil society in the political freedom milieu of their city. Pressured by the increasingly repressive atmosphere for free speech in Hong Kong, Mr. Lam sought refuge in Taiwan in 2019 and founded a new bookstore bearing the same name, “Causeway Bay Books (Taiwan)” (Chen & Chiu, 2022). The Taiwanese government had repeatedly welcomed Mr. Lam's decision to sustain his publishing business in Taiwan, with senior government officials, including the president and the foreign minister, paying visits to the bookstore to unequivocally demonstrate Taiwan's unwavering support for Hong Kong. Bolstered by this strong government endorsement, Mr. Lam undoubtedly satisfied the criteria of being vulnerable to the Chinese government's intimidation and deserved Taiwan’s official protection. However, Mr. Lam availed himself of the aid and guidance of government personnel. He first attempted to apply for a start-up visa, but his application failed. Subsequently, he pursued a professional immigration visa, which ultimately culminated in him attaining Taiwanese citizenship (TNL, 2020).

In general, even for those who have fled their homeland or cannot return due to safety concerns, it is not necessary to apply for refugee status. Choosing whether to apply for refugee status or immigration status can be a strategic consideration based on one's own interests. If someone like Lam Wing-kee has sufficient resources and social support, becoming a Taiwanese citizen through the immigration pathway would naturally eliminate the need to go through the arduous process of seeking asylum, which increases their own security risks. However, not every Hong Kong protester who came to Taiwan has had the opportunity to meet the immigration policy standards and successfully obtain residency.

Taiwan's policy towards Hong Kong immigrants has differed from that of other foreigners. Prior to 2019, Taiwan adopted a lenient attitude towards Hong Kong immigrants, with low review thresholds and diverse application channels. The reason for this is that Taiwan was using the Republic of China constitutional framework, whose backbone was created in 1946 in China. Under this constitutional framework, many authoritarian legacies remained, and still remain to this day. Taiwan is unlikely to change this framework until it is able to gain widespread international support and declare de jure independence. Under this framework, the past KMT government stood on the “free and democratic” side of the Cold War binary opposition and hoped that overseas Chinese would choose to come to Taiwan and refuse to join the People's Republic of China. In addition, with the basic policy of ethnic nationalism, the Republic of China government previously identified all people of Chinese descent around the world as its quasi-citizens. Therefore, although Hong Kong Chinese were under British colonial rule, they were viewed by the KMT government as part of a temporary political state. In the long run, the colony of Hong Kong was still to be returned to the Republic of China.

At the time of writing this article, foreigners in Taiwan typically obtain a residency permit before applying for permanent residency. To naturalise as Taiwanese citizens, they must renounce their original nationality. In contrast, the immigration process for Hong Kong residents is fundamentally different. As quasi-citizens of the Republic of China, they can apply for citizenship without naturalisation if they meet specific criteria after obtaining residency. They do not have the option to obtain a non-citizen permanent residency status.Footnote 1 There have been various pathways for Hong Kong immigrants to come to Taiwan, including five common categories: “student immigration”, “marriage immigration”, “investment immigration”, “professional immigration”, and “entrepreneurial immigration”. “Student immigration” was a popular pathway for protesters during the first and second stages of the aid for protestors coming to Taiwan. To become Taiwanese citizens, they were required to study at a Taiwanese college or university, work in Taiwan for at least five years after graduation, earn an average monthly income that was at least twice the minimum wage in the fifth year, and have no gaps in their work history during this period. Additionally, each employer must be willing to apply for a work permit from the Ministry of Labour. In recent years, many economic immigrants from Hong Kong have chosen the “marriage immigration” and “investment immigration” pathways. The former required being married to a Taiwanese citizen for at least three years, while the latter required investing at least NT$6 million in Taiwan for one year. “Professional immigration” and “entrepreneurial immigration” were options that Lam Wing-kee tried. The former required recognition from a competent authority in the professional field and residence in Taiwan for at least one year, while the latter had more complicated criteria, higher thresholds and required residing in Taiwan for at least five years before applying for citizenship.

The Conservative Legislation Strategy

During the Anti-ELAB Movement, Hong Kong youths repeatedly urged the Taiwanese government to confront the unresolved issue of the lack of a formalised asylum mechanism. The ruling party leaders remained conservative and continued to guide protesters through the regular immigration channels. In September 2019, the internationally renowned Hong Kong activist Joshua Wong (2019) wrote a letter of opinion to Taiwanese media, pointing out that a refugee law or other legal mechanisms based on the Act Governing Relations with Hong Kong and Macau would be an excellent foundation for the DPP's Scheme legislation. Wong added that without solving this issue, many practical difficulties would arise for protesters coming to Taiwan. At that time, Premier Su Tseng-chang immediately denied the legitimacy of Wong's questioning, affirming that Taiwan's then mechanisms were complete and that there was no need to revise the refugee law (Chiao, 2019). In December 2019, violent clashes broke out as the police forcibly entered the campuses of several universities in Hong Kong, causing many injuries and turning the tide of the Anti-ELAB Movement towards a more pessimistic state of affairs (BBC News, 2019). The then president of the Hong Kong Baptist University Students’ Union commented on the DPP government's failure to establish a legal basis for an asylum mechanism, which was then spun by Taiwan’s pro-China media as the DPP's exploitation of Hong Kong protesters to gain votes. The negative effects of this incident continued to ferment in Taiwan’s media, and the Taiwanese government proved unwilling to address the core problem, resulting in a decline in the quality of public discourse. Eventually, the former president of the Students’ Union publicly apologised, putting an end to the chaotic situation (Huang, 2019).

Premier Su's notion of a “comprehensive legal system” referred to Article 18 of the Act Governing Relations with Hong Kong and Macau and Article 25 of the Enforcement Rules of the Act Governing Relations with Hong Kong and Macau, which provided a legal basis for the government to assist Hong Kong protesters facing political emergencies (Mainland Affairs Council, 2017). However, these two provisions contained only one sentence each, without regulating any procedures, working frameworks, or the legal rights of applicants. In June 2020, CSOs proposed a civilian version of the Enforcement Rules of Article 18 of the Hong Kong and Macao Relations Act, based on previous advocacy experiences, with the aim of improving the then weak and ineffective legal framework design (Taiwan Association for Human Rights, 2020). This version emphasised the supervision and participation of civilian experts and scholars. Former chairman of the MAC, Chen Ming-tong, accepted the group's opinion and proposed amending the enforcement regulation in the Legislative Yuan, prepared to institutionalise the existing shelter work system. Despite Premier Su's public opposition, the MAC persisted on its opinion, and the implication at that time was that the MAC would further strengthen the legal system of shelter in response to the HKNSL (Chen, 2020). However, after the establishment of the Exchange Office, Premier Su again publicly opposed the regulative amendment, citing the “completeness of existing laws and regulations” (Liu, 2020). He did not proactively explain how the government would operate a project without a legal basis, nor did he explain how previous practical difficulties would be solved in the new model of the Exchange Office. Premier Su's tough stance also suppressed public discussion of the issue within government departments, and even the DPP-dominated Legislative Yuan adopted a consistent stance, blocking all possibilities for amendment. However, the suppression of public discussion did not mean that social conflicts and practical difficulties no longer existed (Chiang, 2020).

Due to the practical difficulties encountered in its work, the MAC had to seek temporary solutions within the existing legal framework. In the second stage, in collaboration with the Ministry of Labour, the MAC invoked Article 51 of the Employment Service Act to exempt protesters who had obtained the Scheme-based status from work restrictions. This new administrative measure was not officially announced or implemented, but its implementation was verified through interviews with the protesters and direct contact with employers hiring these protesting individuals. The Employment Service Act has been the primary regulation relating to the employment of foreigners in Taiwan since it was enacted in 1992. Article 51 clearly stipulates that refugees with residency permits can join the job market under the same conditions as ordinary citizens. The concept of “refugee” was already included in the law when the Employment Service Act was enacted in response to the trend at the time of various countries enacting refugee laws. However, a Taiwanese version of a refugee law has never been enacted, being consistently delayed in the Legislative Yuan. Ironically, the existence of Article 51 served as evidence supporting the claim made by Su Tseng-chang regarding the “completeness of existing laws and regulations”. While it was difficult to ascertain Su's thoughts, from our perspective, this evidence actually highlighted the necessity of having a legal basis for asylum work. If there had been no Article 51, the influx of a large number of asylum seekers could have led to adverse consequences. The case-by-case processing approach failed to provide protesters with legal rights to participate in the labour market, instead placing a significant burden on public resources to cover their various living expenses, rather than facilitating their self-reliance. Taiwan's reluctance to amend its legal system to enhance its Hong Kong policy might have achieved geopolitical stability, but it also intensified the administrative burden on government agencies and CSOs. Moreover, the question remained as to whether the geopolitical consideration holds logical and substantial significance.

Troubling National Security Considerations

The Taiwanese government has consistently avoided public discussion of its support for Hong Kong and has refrained from making legislative changes, often citing the need for discretion. This approach is grounded in three analytical perspectives. Firstly, the government seeks to protect the safety of Hong Kong protesters by avoiding public disclosure of details regarding the aid projects. Secondly, the government aims to avoid the complex geopolitical issues that may arise from enacting asylum policies. Lastly, since existing legislation has been deemed sufficient, the government sees no need for further action. These perspectives seemed to be widely accepted in Taiwanese society, as evidenced by Lam Wing-kee's affirmation of the official position that “actions are more important than words” when evaluating Taiwan's aid to Hong Kong (Chung, 2020).

However, the term “Taiwanese government” does not denote a homogeneous entity with identical interests. Even the disagreement between the MAC and the premier exposed the fragility of the “actions are more important than words” approach. The modalities of executing the Scheme have remained contentious, revealing considerable debate within government agencies. Consequently, President Tsai Ing-wen's circumspection on the topic of legalising such initiatives for national security purposes might result in inconsistencies due to divergent interpretations and definitions of “national security” across various government and societal domains.

In August 2020, the MAC issued a regulatory order to amend existing laws in order to enhance national security screening. Under the new regulations, all Hong Kong residents applying for residency or citizenship in Taiwan were required to declare whether they were born in China, whether they had ever worked for a Chinese-funded institution, and whether they had any connections to the Communist Party or the Chinese government. The government did not explicitly state what direct effects would result if the answer to the aforementioned question were “yes”. At the time of its announcement, the amendment did not attract opposition, but rather was seen as a necessary response to China's continued military intimidation of Taiwan. However, when the first batch of immigration applications was processed under the new regulations, many Hong Kong investment immigrants found their applications rejected due to reasons such as “harmful to national interests” and “likely to engage in terrorist activities” (Lin, 2022). One widely publicised case involved an applicant who had worked at the Chinese University of Hong Kong (CHHK), which was deemed by the Taiwanese government to be a government-funded institution, and was therefore deemed to have connections to the Hong Kong government (Executive Yuan, 2022). This decision was difficult to understand, as staff at CUHK were not government officials, and many of them were even supporters of the pro-democracy movement. Some applicants who were dissatisfied with the government's screening opinions, questioned the NIA about the national security considerations underlying its decision-making. However, according to what applicants told us, the NIA's response admitted that due to the overwhelming volume of applications, the execution of its operations was not always adequate, and that there had been misunderstandings caused by the imprecision of details in the administrative documents. From the end of 2021 to the beginning of 2022, many media outlets reported on these failed immigration cases, exposing the chaos of the government's national security screening (Chun, 2022a; Kuo & Chen, 2022; Lee, 2023). The MAC clarified that the government rarely rejected applications based solely on the applicant's Hong Kong identity background, and that the majority of rejections were due to the applicant's failure to meet the investment immigration requirements (Shen, 2022).

In a parallel timeline, in April 2022, the MAC unveiled a plan to establish a new immigration route aimed at tackling the residency predicament faced by Hong Kong protesters residing in Taiwan. This initiative provided a plausible chance for these individuals to gain citizenship following their employment in Taiwan. Despite the apparent disconnect with political asylum, this move by the Taiwan government was consistent with their long-standing approach of sidestepping sensitive terminologies such as “political asylum” by embedding humanitarian aid within broader immigration frameworks (Shen & Chen, 2022). Surprisingly, members of the same political party opposed this bill. The DPP legislators castigated the MAC’s officials for their lack of adherence to national security duties, citing China's total control over Hong Kong. Thus, they argued that to ward off Chinese infiltration, Taiwan must eschew the creation of new immigration channels for Hong Kong residents and instead restrain them. The ruling party's “national security” discourse was confounding, as the head of the Executive Yuan claimed the extant legal framework for the humanitarian Scheme was comprehensive, thus rejecting the MAC's initial amendment proposal in mid-2020. Concurrently, DPP legislators cooperated in circumventing any policy discourse in the Legislative Yuan while abiding by the national security concerns of their superiors. However, the MAC twice proposed amendments that enfolded political refugees within immigration policies while taking into account national security considerations, only to be criticised by DPP legislators for their alleged lack of national security awareness (Wu, J., 2022). The convoluted discourse on national security emanating from the ruling party left many protesters feeling uneasy, according to our observation. The national security concerns have not brought about a sense of security; instead, they have led to troubling consequences. After several months of political negotiations and manoeuvring within the DPP, the Taiwanese government ultimately decided to transform the proposed legislative amendments into internal documents that would not explicitly alter existing laws, thus commencing the third stage of its Hong Kong aid policy.

Conclusion

Returning to the initial question of how Taiwan can continue to develop substantial assistance policies towards Hong Kong activists without being formally recognised, the lack of legal recognition of these activists is due to Taiwan's national strategic considerations. However, the operational definition of national security is riddled with flaws, resulting in many internal contradictions within the government system and the DPP. In other words, the government, even if it aims to prioritise national security concerns, lacks a consistent operational method to fully conceal the legal existence of activists and to convincingly demonstrate the effective upholding of national security. Therefore, under these circumstances, the government has difficulty completely denying the existence of political asylum for Hong Kong activists. By avoiding the root of the problem, the government misses the opportunity to foster good public discourse within a democratic society.

On the other hand, the critical factor for the existence of Taiwan's assistance policy towards Hong Kong lies in the substantial presence of Hong Kong exiles on Taiwanese land. The real presence of the exiled community inevitably brings urgent livelihood needs that require the government to use legal tools to intervene and protect their social rights, as well as to plan long-term citizenship pathways. The actual need for asylum makes the government have to consider how to create an effective mechanism within the system. In this process, advocacy actions initiated by CSOs and participation in assistance networks have played a significant role. It is precisely because of the flexibility and initiative of civil society that the government opened up to assistance work early on and created the foundation for subsequent public–third sector cooperation. At least within the scope of resettlement and care services, the government considers civil society opinions highly. Moreover, this foundation of public–third sector cooperation has led the MAC to propose further policy proposals for legalising asylum.

The result of the interaction of various factors has led Taiwan's assistance policy towards Hong Kong to be divided into three development stages since 2019. The common background that runs through the three stages is the consideration of national security and the real need for asylum. However, different actors in the process of developing humanitarian assistance continued to negotiate and to push for solutions, ultimately resulting in Taiwan developing its quasi-asylum mechanisms. This has successfully given hundreds of Hong Kong activists the opportunity to pursue a free life with government assistance, starting a new stage of their lives in Taiwan.