Kyrgyzstan’s Nation-State Building Under the Dual Effects of Nationalism and Tribalism

Abstract

Like other countries in Central Asia, Kyrgyzstan embarked on a state-building journey to independence after the collapse of the Soviet Union. However, three special alternations in power in the 30 years after independence have made Kyrgyzstan a special case among Central Asian countries, which significantly undermined the state-building process. Taking the power alternation in 2005 as an example, this article is trying to explore the state-building process of Kyrgyzstan from the perspective of nationalism and tribalism. Despite the efforts of Kyrgyz leaders to construct state nationalism, the return of tribal politics and ethnic nationalism hindered the formation of a unified national identity and weakened the strengthening of the state’s control over society, which ultimately slowed the building of the state.

Translated by Zhu Ruiqing.

In the early 1990s, a plethora of emerging nation-states became independent following the successive disintegration of the Soviet Union, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and the Czechoslovak Federal Republic. By early 1993, as many as 21 emerging nation-states had been recognized by the international community.¹ The emergence of so many new countries may result in domestic and regional instabilities. This was especially obvious in Central Asia around the collapse of the Soviet Union. The weak national power of the extreme late-developing countries² has rendered Central Asia on the brink of collapse. Therefore, establishing a dominant ideology as soon as possible is conducive to maintaining the stability of the regime. The ideological confusion and the pervasive nationalism in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe made the Central Asian countries naturally seek legitimacy for the newly independent states under the flag of nationalism.

Due to the relatively short history of the emerging extreme late-developing countries, their national and ethnic identities are still changing. Therefore, it is easier to find out the characteristics and reasons for the construction of national and ethnic identities in this region by observing the changes in national politics in various countries around the “founding of nations”. Kyrgyzstan did not voluntarily secede from the Soviet Union at first. Therefore, being forced out, it could only mobilize the people for state-building by constructing nationalism at the state level. Jack Snyder argued that “Like Western Europe before the eighteenth century, they³ are at a prenational stage, where the masses are not yet sufficiently mobilized into political life to sustain a coherent nationalist movement.”⁴ Nationalism in Central Asia typically features state involvement. One of the doubts remains as to whether this officially constructed nationalism can promote the construction of national and ethnic identities. Taking Tajikistan after the civil war as an example, “the eventual anarchy resulted in civic disputes among local social groups, few of which could be technically called ethnic or nationalistic.”⁵ Intense jockeying for state power triggered a civil war in Tajikistan, whereas Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan which established strong presidential systems after the collapse of the Soviet Union, retained stability. Kyrgyzstan took a different path to Western-style democracy, which has earned it the reputation of “Central Asia’s Island of Democracy”.

1 Nationalism, Ethnic Identity and State-Building

The relationship between nationalism, ethnic and national identities is intricate. In general, nationalism provides inexhaustible power and legitimacy for the construction of national identity; meanwhile, the inherent dual natures of nationalism may backfire when it comes to national identity. Given the complex relationship between the two, this part mainly introduces the relevant theories from the related research of nationalism and the influence of nationalism on state-building.

1.1 Nationalism-Related Research

As a prestigious researcher of nationalism, Anthony D. Smith’s elaboration on nationalism stands out. He defines nationalism as “An ideological movement for attaining and maintaining autonomy, unity and identity for a population which some of its members deem to constitute an actual or potential ‘nation.’”⁶ As an ideology, nationalism holds that the world is divided into nations, each of which has its own character and destiny; that individual’s first loyalty is to his or her nation; that the nation is the source of all political power; that to be free and fulfilled, the individual must belong to a nation; that each nation must express its authentic nature by being autonomous; and that a world of peace and justice can only be built on autonomous nations.⁷

Nationalism has three fundamental goals: national autonomy, national unity, and national identity. Whichever goal is pursued, nationalism can provide a powerful force to mobilize. Moreover, Smith argues that nationalism includes one or more of the following three connotations: a language and symbolism, a sociopolitical movement, and an ideology of the nation.⁸ The language and symbols of the nation are crucial to the formation of nationalist ideology, while the political movements and ideology of the nation are more formed and operated under the banner of nationalism. Of the three fundamental goals of nationalism, national identity is central to state-building. Smith summarizes the basic characteristics of ethnic identity as follows: 1. a historical territory, or homeland; 2. common myths and historical memories; 3. a common, mass public culture; 4. common legal rights and duties for all members; 5. a common economy with territorial mobility for members.⁹ These elements reveal the complexity of national identity as a collective identity and easily confuse the concepts of ethnic identity with national identity.

From the aforementioned Smith’s point of view, he advocates the construction of ethnic identity in terms of history, which endows the nationalist ideology with great power of action. While clarifying the concepts of ethnic identity and national identity, the construction of ethnic identity naturally leads to two kinds of nationalism: ethnic nationalism and state nationalism. Based on his further analysis, Smith proposes the ethnic-symbolism analytical paradigm, which “attempts to explain by linking national identity to the ethnic ties that precede it, and by showing the influence of the subjective factors like shared symbols, myths, and memories.”¹⁰

Corresponding to Smith’s points of view, Eric Hobsbawm advocates examining nationalism from the changes in the connotation of the nation in modern times. Nationalism comes from before nations. Nations do not make states and nationalisms but the other way round.¹¹ Therefore, with the changes in the connotation of the state and nationalism, the nation has also evolved from citizens with equal rights and obligations after the French Revolution to a community formed through political modernization. Hobsbawm adopted Ernest Gellner’s definition of nationalism, i.e., “the political and national unit should be congruent”.¹² We must be very cautious about this definition: if a “political unit” refers to a nation-state, it conforms to the political structure of a single nation-state in the real world, but ignores the fact that most countries in the world are multi-ethnic states; if it refers to ethnic autonomous regions in a multi-ethnic country, such nationalism can hurt national identity.

The reason nationalism can establish a modern state system is that nationalism spurs a natural sense of belonging to the nation and creates a cultural scenario so that it can transform the people passively subordinate to the state into active citizens.¹³

While agreeing with Smith’s view of constructing ethnic identity from ethnic history, Hobsbawm also points out its drawbacks. Relying on ethnic history to construct the identity is a universal practice, but it is equally universal to deify and fabricate history, as well as arbitrarily obliterate and distort history.¹⁴ This ethnic identity is conducive to integrating the people in the short run, but it remains questionable whether it can facilitate ethnic development in the long run.

The term “nationalism” is highly controversial, which is directly due to the different understandings of “nation”. Benedict Anderson and Ernest Gellner define nation from the constructionist perspective. Anderson believes that a nation is an imagined political entity; Gellner advocates that “nations can indeed be defined in terms both of will and of culture, and indeed in terms of the covergence of them both with political units”, that is, nationalism engenders nations.¹⁵ Both emphasized the importance of culture for nation formation, while nationalism was a social reality. Anthony Smith argues that a nation is “a named human community residing in a perceived homeland, and having common myths and a shared history, a distinct public culture, and common laws and customs for all members.”¹⁶

Research abounds in “nationalism”, which also shows that academia is very controversial on this issue. Researchers don’t even unanimously agree on the identification of “nation”. The above mainly introduces Smith, Gellner, and Hobsbawm’s definitions of nationalism. These theories are largely based on European nationalism, we thereby must consider their applicability. Taking Kyrgyzstan in this paper as an example, tribes or tribal politics in Central Asia where the country is located plays an important role in the formation of nationalist ideology: On one hand, when the tribes/tribal leaders reach an agreement, it is easier to integrate the mass of people so that it facilitates a unified national identity; on the other hand, tribes/tribal politics’ featuring fragmentation would hinder the formation of nationalism. As part of the academic discussions, this article tends to adopt Smith’s definition of nationalism, i.e., nationalism is “An ideological movement for attaining and maintaining autonomy, unity and identity for a population which some of its members deem to constitute an actual or potential ‘nation’.”¹⁷

1.2 Nationalism and State-Building

The complex relationship between nationalism and state-building has been mentioned above, but if the theory of state-building is examined separately, it entirely differs from that of nationalism. This is mainly due to the incomplete equivalence between the national unit and the political unit (the state), that is, the uneven analysis units for comparison. The theory of state-building mainly analyzes from the state level or how to construct the state, while the theory of nationalism focuses on analyzing how to construct the national identity.

The state-building theory has evolved through two crucial stages. The first stage featured the classic state-building theory with “state and war” as its core topic in the 1970s. The main representative is Charles Tilly, who believes that state-building is “the strengthening of state power over society”. He argues that war plays an important role in achieving centralization, and war can significantly promote state-building. He emphasizes the state’s power control over society. The second stage is the state-building theory that has been formed since the 1990s for the reconstruction of “failed states” and the capacity building of “weak states”.¹⁸ The main representative is Francis Fukuyama. He believes that state-building is all about the establishment of new government systems and the strengthening of existing government systems.¹⁹ He emphasizes the important role of state capacity building, and external intervention is the main means of state-building for weak and failed states.

Both state nationalism and ethnic nationalism have an impact on state-building. In general, state nationalism is conducive to state-building, while ethnic nationalism is a double-edged sword—it is likely to foster separatism and also to promote pluralistic state-building.

Nationalism promotes the building of a nation-state generally two forms: one is to create a new nation-state; the other is to complete the integration of nationalism within the existing national framework, that is, through integration, different ethnic groups in the country can generate a common national consciousness and national identity.²⁰ From the beginning, nationalism has been an inclusive and liberating force, breaking down all kinds of localism based on regions, dialects, customs, and clans, and helping build strong nation-states through centralized markets and systems of administration, taxation, and education.²¹ The key to the second form lies in how to achieve a balance between ethnic identity, national identity, and state identity. The prerequisite for the sustained existence of a nation-state is a nation’s identification with the nation-state. In a multi-ethnic country, there are generally multiple collective identities, such as religious identity, language identity, ethnic identity, tribal identity, etc. The integration of these identities is a crucial step in building national identity. The ultimate goal of integration is to ensure that national identity prevails overall identities and only then is the whole entity of the state easier to be maintained.

The book Nation and Nationalism: Theoretical Basis and Historical Experience by Gil Delannoi delves into the relationship between nationalism and state-building. It mentions the nationalism wave of the late twentieth century. This wave was unique due to the collapse of the communist system. Unlike previous waves of nationalism, “it was at this stage that nationalism largely showed its power to tear apart the existing nation-states. Its staggeringly destructive force shocked those people who used to passionately extol it.”²²

2 The Core of Kyrgyzstan Nationalism-Tribalism

Central Asia is often academically regarded as a relatively unified and independent political unit, which is naturally inseparable from the shared geography and history of Central Asian countries. If one looks at nationalism in Central Asian countries, a very different picture emerges. For instance, as both are dominated by Turkic-speaking ethnic groups, the nationalism of Kyrgyzstan is completely different from that of Uzbekistan. The biggest difference stems from the historical nomadic and settled way of life. The political communities formed based on the two lifestyles are naturally quite different. The nomadic historical origin and lifestyle have created the Kyrgyz ethnic group with the tribe as the basic organizational unit. Therefore, to correctly understand Kyrgyzstan’s nationalism, one must clarify the relationship between tribalism and nationalism.

2.1 Tracing Tribalism in Kyrgyzstan

As a form of organization, Tribes have never disappeared from world politics. In the Middle East, Central Asia, Africa, and other places, tribes still participate in national politics and even play a decisive role in political development in some countries. This has something to do with the hierarchical nature of the tribal structure. There are obvious structural differences between the cultural traditions of Central Asia and the Middle East. The Turkic-Mongolian cultural tradition of Central Asia is a hierarchical structure, while the indigenous tribal culture of the Middle East is an egalitarian structure.²³ The hierarchical characteristics of Central Asian tribes feature the tribal leader’s absolute authority over all tribal affairs and the stability of the tribal political structure. The sense of hierarchy in the Turkic-Mongolian social structure culturally facilitates people’s acceptance of differences in status.²⁴ The hierarchical clan structure legitimized differences within the tribes and clans, which was an important reason for the stability of the tribal political structure. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, tribalism was quickly restored to stabilize the newly independent regime.

Tribalism in Kyrgyzstan is influenced by the distribution of tribal regions. Due to the influence of historical and geographical factors, Kyrgyzstan’s north–south conflict, an indicator of its political situation, has a long history. As a traditionally nomadic people in history, the Kyrgyz have retained the tradition of tribalism; geographically, the Tianshan Mountain stretches across the territory of Kyrgyzstan. The Kyrgyz people mainly live on the north and south sides of the Tianshan Mountain, which provides a geographical basis for the north–south conflict. The historical traditions and geographical barriers divided Kyrgyz people into north and south parts in terms of geography while retaining the political tradition as nomads. The differences and conflicts between the north and the south are manifested politically in the fierce competition between the tribes correspondingly. This is a typical feature of contemporary Kyrgyz politics.

The social structure of traditional Kyrgyz society is comprised of as many as about 40 different tribal unions based on kinship. Each tribal union consists of different family units. These tribal unions merged to form three major alliances: the Right Wing (Kyrgyz: он канат; Russian: правое крыло), the Left Wing (сол канат; левое крыло), and the Ichkilik Tribal Alliance (Kyrgyz: ичкилик). Each tribal union has political sovereignty and exclusive territory, which, even today, coincides with the division of northern and southern regions.²⁵

2.2 Contemporary Kyrgyzstan Tribal Politics

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, tribalism, disguised as modern politics, still played an important role in Kyrgyzstan’s domestic politics, which is typically exemplified by the invisible mechanism in which the representatives of the north and the south take the power in rotation, such as the north (Askar Akayev) → the south (Kurmanbek Bakiyev) → the north (Almazbek Atambayev) → South (Sooronbay Jeenbekov). Meanwhile, prime ministers are usually from a different party than the presidents to maintain the balance of political power. The existence of the Kyrgyzstan north–south conflict has made domestic political instability a norm. Therefore, although tribalism is prominent in Kyrgyzstan, no one particular tribe is in a dominant position, but only for a certain period.

Askar Akayev (Аскар Акаев) had been the president of Kyrgyzstan until the change of power in 2005. His Sarybagysh tribe (Сары-Багыш)²⁶ was at the center of tribal politics in Kyrgyzstan for fifteen years after the collapse of the Soviet Union. This is due not only to the support of his tribe but also to his wife, Mairam Akayeva (Майрам Акаева). Akayeva’s tribe is the ruler of the Talas Valley, the Kushchu tribe (Кушчу), which belongs to the Left Wing. The branch tribes of the Left Wing are mainly located in Talas. Unsurprisingly, Akayev came to power with the support of the tribal elites of the Talas Region.²⁷ As a representative of the northern tribes, Akayev naturally sought more interests for the north after he became the president. This is one of the characteristics of tribal politics.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Central Asia faced with the dilemma of choosing a path, that is, choosing a secular nation-state path or a theocratic state-building path. Behind the two choices is the interaction of nationalism and Islamism. We must consider tribalism when examining Kyrgyz nationalism, which is a core element of Kyrgyz nationalism.

3 The Power Transition in 2005 and Kyrgyzstan’s State-Building

The change of power in 2005 is a landmark event in the contemporary political history of Kyrgyzstan. This incident showed the ordinary people the possibility of changing the political situation with their power and foreshadowed the frequent political turmoil in Kyrgyzstan in the future. There are various theories about the reasons for the incident, such as corruption, poor economy, dictatorship, and intervention by Western countries. The event also indicated the failure of Kyrgyzstan’s state-building fifteen years after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The following section will mainly introduce the development of nationalism and tribalism in Kyrgyzstan before the incident, and explore the role of the two in state-building.

3.1 Nationalism and Tribalism in Kyrgyzstan Before the Power Change in 2005

As the president of Kyrgyzstan, Akayev had been in power for fifteen years. During his reign, Kyrgyzstan underwent major changes in various fields, and nationalism also showed a new trend. The development of nationalism in this era can be interpreted from two aspects: first, the opportunities and dilemmas of Akayev’s construction of state nationalism; second, the impact of the return of tribalism on nationalism. Akayev’s priority at the beginning of his tenure was politics, rather than economic development. By 1990, strongly inspired by the Soviet dissident Andrei Sakharov (Андрей Сахаров),²⁸ he prioritized the development of democracy as his main goal. This set Akayev apart from other more cautious leaders of Central Asian countries.²⁹ When he finally shifted to address economic development issues, his views were strongly influenced by foreign experts and international financial institutions. The implementation of his plans was not always smooth at all. “The road we are taking is a third road based on capitalism and socialism”. He said in 1991. This statement indicated the ambiguity of his thinking and a complex balance between political and ideological forces within Kyrgyzstan’s leadership.³⁰ This has something to do with the power vacuum caused by the collapse of the Soviet Union. It is against this background that Akayev became the first president of Kyrgyzstan as a political amateur.

Akayev built nationalism mainly by accommodating the interests of domestic minorities. The Kyrgyz-Uzbek ethnic conflict in Osh in 1990 raised the alarm, making Akayev aware of the need to solve the problem of relations between minorities and different ethnic groups. The awakening of national consciousness at the end of the Soviet Union was manifested in the rise of ethnic nationalism in southern Kyrgyzstan. As the two major ethnic groups in the south, the Kyrgyz and the Uzbeks have obvious differences in residence, socioeconomic development, and political enthusiasm. This structural difference is an important element in the contemporary Kyrgyzstan ethnic political ecology.³¹ Ethnic nationalist groups subsequently emerged in Kyrgyzstan: “Osh region” (Kyrgyz organization) and “Adolat” (Uzbek organization). The two organizations have different political propositions. The “Osh Region” advocates suppressing Uzbek separatism, while “Adolat” demands a high Uzbek autonomy.³² Ethnic nationalism exacerbated tensions between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks, culminating in serious ethnic conflicts. Ethnic nationalism can be manifested by the parliamentary election of Kyrgyzstan in February 1995. Kyrgyz members accounted for about 90% of the total number of MPs, even though the Kyrgyz only constituted 52.4% of the country’s total population; whereas the Russians accounted for 20.9% of the total population only got a share of 6%.³³ Minorities are seriously underrepresented at the national level, which is detrimental to the development of national nationalism.

Ever since Akayev came to power, he took various measures to allay ethnic conflicts. For example, Kyrgyz-Uzbek University in Osh and the People’s Friendship University in Jalalabad have been established and courses were taught in Uzbek. He even opened Kyrgyz-Russian Slavic University in the capital Bishkek. Akayev also advocated Uzbek-language radio stations. He proposed the concept of Kyrgyzstan as a “shared community”, and established the Kyrgyz People’s Congress (Ассамблея народа Кыргызстана) on his initiative to coordinate the relations between the various ethnic groups in the country. Akayev’s series of policies were warmly welcomed by the Uzbeks and Tajiks in the Ferghana Valley of Kyrgyzstan, which was mainly why they supported Akayev. These measures are aimed at defusing the tensions with Uzbeks and northern Russians and regulating nationalist sentiments between Kyrgyz and other ethnic minorities, and ultimately advancing the development of state nationalism. These moves were a major reason for Akayev’s successful fifteen-year rule in Kyrgyzstan.

Akayev also took the following measures: Article 15 of the Constitution stipulates that everyone is equal before the laws and courts of the Kyrgyzstan Republic. No one shall be subject to any discrimination or violation of rights and freedoms based on origin, sex, race, ethnicity, language, religion, political or religious beliefs, or any other personal or public factors.³⁴ In August 1995, Kyrgyzstan held an event to commemorate the 1000th anniversary of “Manas”, awakening the national awareness of the people through historical memory. Furthermore, according to the Manas Declaration adopted in April 1995, “any attempts at separatism, tribalism, and nationalism that undermine the unity of the people and the country shall be resolutely crushed”. In 1997, criminal acts endangering ethnic unity and national unification were incorporated into the criminal law, and criminals would be held accountable. The instigation of ethnic confrontations through the use of mass media and other information communication platforms was prohibited following the promulgation of the “Mass Media Law”; the “Law on state guarantees to ethnic Kyrgyz people returning to their historic motherland” was announced to provide legal support for foreign Kyrgyz people to return to their historical motherland. It should be pointed out that in the Constitution, it was emphasized that citizens were the subjects of rights, instead of nationalities or tribes. This move was to promote the development of nationalism at the state level. In 2001, Akayev amended the constitution to upgrade Russian from an inter-ethnic language to the official language. Akayev tried to accommodate the national sentiments of the northern Russians in Kyrgyzstan and promote the identification of Kyrgyzstan as the motherland.

Another important element of nationalism is the return of tribal politics. In Kyrgyzstan, tribes have traditionally fought for power and influence, even after the country’s independence. Such struggles are generally implicit but with a clear stance. They juggle between periodic intensification and de-escalation.³⁵ For example, in the 1970s and 1980s, a relative balance was reached among the tribes: the spheres of influence of the northern and southern tribes were divided, and both sides were satisfied with it at that time. However, the disintegration of the Soviet Union caused political chaos, which subsequently intensified the relationship between tribes. As the previous system of spheres of influence fell apart, there emerged a new division of state property and lucrative government positions during the reform process.

Akayev’s northern tribal origin determined that he needed the support of southern tribes. He then launched the so-called “Southern Policy”, the core of which was to redraw the administrative division of the Kyrgyz part of the Ferghana Valley. He established three new regions in the Ferghana Valley: Osh, Jalalabad, and Batken. This move, to a certain extent, divided the area where the southern tribes (including the Ichkilik Tribal Alliance and the Adyginye Tribal Alliance (Адыгине) under the branch of the Otuz uul of Right Wing) inhabited into three: the Ichkilik tribal confederation is mainly located in Batken Region, with a small amount of them in Osh Region and Jalalabad Region; the Adyginye tribal confederation is mainly located in Osh Region. Akayev intended to weaken the influence of southern tribes in Bishkek, for which he made the city of Osh the southern capital and set up the president’s office there. Fearing challenges from the southern tribal elites, Akayev formed a team made up of southern administrators and supporters who were completely loyal to him.³⁶ Through the above measures, Akayev consolidated his ruling position while trying to divide and weaken the southern tribes, which was conducive to the development of state nationalism.

After Akayev came to power, the northern tribes rose rapidly. There were two main reasons for the rise of northern tribes at the time: First, the inherent advantages of northern tribes. There are developed industries in northern Kyrgyzstan but is a small population. Apart from the Kyrgyz, there are also ethnic groups such as Russians, Ukrainians, Kazakhs, Uyghurs, and Dungans living here. Northern tribes had always been ruling Kyrgyzstan from the mid-twentieth century until Akayev’s collapse (except for Absamat Masaliyev (Абсамат Масалиев), the last leader of Kyrgyzstan before the fall of the Soviet Union, who came from the south). The northern tribes joined the Russian Empire in 1855, while the southern tribes of the Ichkilik tribal confederation (mainly located in what is now southern Osh) joined the Kokand Khanate in 1876. The south is mainly agricultural, with a dense population but scarce land and water resources. The industrial base is also weak. Russian culture is less influential in the South. Apart from the Kyrgyz, the Uzbeks and Tajiks have a larger population. Therefore, the religious atmosphere in the south is quite strong and Islam has an especially great influence in Osh and Jalalabad. Second, is the reappearance of the tribal rotation of the north and the south. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the southern tribes represented by Masaliyev also stepped down along with the collapse of the original Soviet political system. This stood as a good opportunity for the northern tribes to regain control of the regime.

As for Islam, it was not a priority in Akayev’s agenda that was mainly focused on developing national ideology, because he preferred to obtain moral and spiritual guidance through other means. At first, the governments of Kyrgyzstan and other Central Asian countries pledged to embrace Islamic traditions as part of their national culture and took various measures to live up to their fulfillment. They later addressed the Islamic revival more cautiously, seeking to bring Muslim organizations and movements under state control. These measures have not been successful in some countries, which reveals that re-Islamization in Central Asia is entirely possible. In the Ferghana Valley (including the part of Kyrgyzstan), the political and economic power of nationalities, ethnic groups, and tribes are far less than that of Islam under the influence of Islamism. In Kyrgyzstan, Islamist forces did not achieve sustainable development under his rule because Akayev himself lacked sufficient affinity for religion.

3.2 The Transition of Power in 2005 and Its Failed State-Building

The third parliamentary election held in February–March 2005 sparked the transition of power in that year. This parliamentary election underwent two rounds. The first round (2005.02.27) elected a total of 32 seats. Akayev’s eldest son, Aydar Akayev (Айдар Акаев) was far ahead, reaching 80%. The remaining 42 seats entered the second round (2005.03.13) because the candidates failed to obtain more than 50% of the votes in the constituencies.³⁷ The second round was entered by the top two candidates with the most votes in the first round in each constituency, and the one with the higher percentage of votes would win in the end. A total of 39 members were elected in the second round. Akayev’s eldest daughter, Bermet Akayeva (Бермет Акаева) was elected with 42% of the votes, much higher than the 13% of another candidate in the same constituency. The results of the third parliamentary election are as follows (Table 1).

Table 1 Results of Kyrgyzstan’s third parliamentary electionFootnote

Data source: Выборы Депутатов Жогорку Кенеша Кыргызской Республики. Цифры и факты, 2005, Бишкек, 2006, с. 438–439.

In this parliamentary election, most political party candidates nominated themselves as independent candidates. Hence, the vote did not turn out to confirm Akayev’s prediction that a new version of the republic’s constitution would promote party building. It is in such lobbying that the interests of pro-government parties were realized.³⁹

After the first round of elections, the opposition parties jointly formed the People’s Unity Coordination Committee (Координационный совет народного единства) and elected Kurmanbek Bakiyev (Курманбек Бакиев) as a leader. The main purpose of the committee is to abrogate the results of the first round of elections and call for a presidential election ahead of schedule followed by a new parliamentary election.⁴⁰ Not surprisingly, the demands of the opposition were not taken seriously by Akayev.

The second round of voting was on March 13. As most anticipated, the “Forward, Kyrgyzstan!” won an absolute majority of seats. The party, founded by Bermet Akayeva in 2003, can be regarded as the party of the kinship of the Akayev family. and it is unacceptable for the opposition to gain so many seats. According to the voting of this parliamentary election, pro-government and neutral people won 90% of the seats. The opposition did not even gain more than 10% of the seats, although at least 30% is expected. Opposition leaders Agahan Madumarov, Kurmanbek Bakiyev, Ismail Isakov, and many other politicians failed to gain seats in parliament.

The announcement of the election results completely angered the opposition. Supporters of the failed candidates in parliamentary elections have staged mass protests demanding to cancel the election results. The transfer of power began in southern Kyrgyzstan with clashes between the president’s supporters and the police and the opposition in the top two cities in the south, Osh and Jalalabad. Then, the central government of Kyrgyzstan lost control of the southern region and the northern state of Talas. Protests in Bishkek were more and more frequent and even the enforcement agencies cannot stop the wave of protests. On March 24, thousands of opposition supporters stormed the “White House”, the government building in Kyrgyzstan. Akayev and some of the authorities had already left before the demonstrators stormed the building. Then the Akayev government officially collapsed.

Akayev’s much-touted democracy appeared fragile under siege by the opposition. Western political science believes that elections are the most important indicator of democratic development. However, if one looks at the course of political development in the post-Soviet area, it is not difficult to see that elections, due to the intensification of external interference, are increasingly becoming the trigger for serious political upheaval, and can even be considered a dangerous balancing act that brings society to the brink of civil war. The transfer of power in March 2005 proved this. The highly rigged parliamentary elections for the first time brought together the anti-government forces and established a unified opposition camp, the People’s Unity and Coordination Committee. The coalition of opposition politicians from southern Kyrgyzstan eventually overthrew Akayev’s rule.⁴¹ The opposition aroused people’s dissatisfaction with the incumbent government as well as the nationalist sentiments of the Kyrgyz people, which dominated the political development of Kyrgyzstan at that time.

From the perspective of state-building theory, Fukuyama’s proposed external intervention for state-building has not worked for Kyrgyzstan. The transition of power in 2005 illustrates this point. Akayev has taken many measures to promote state nationalism, but he has never been able to get rid of the significant influence of tribalism. Tribal politics severely weakened the Akayev government’s state capacity, making it difficult to control the development of domestic political ideologies. In addition, Kyrgyzstan’s heavy dependence on Russia also hampers the state-building process to a certain extent because the starting point of Russia’s intervention is based on the “re-russification” of Central Asia.

3.3 Kyrgyzstan Nationalism After the Power Transition in 2005

The northern tribes had been controlling the country’s development for 15 years until the independence of Kyrgyzstan, which eventually led to regime transition. Shortly after that, the southern tribes (Bakiyev) took over the country’s power. This was also an important reason for the continuous protests by southern tribes at the end of Akayev’s reign. The jockeying for power between northern and southern tribes was most conspicuous during Bakiyev’s regime when there was no suitable opportunity for him to play the nationalist card during the 2005 transition of power. Bakiyev’s regime was in jeopardy. The Kyrgyz-Uzbek inter-ethnic conflict following the second transition of power in April 2010 tore apart the political community that had been built over 20 years after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Large numbers of Uzbeks had left Kyrgyzstan, and there had been a loss of trust, increasing estrangement, and hostility between ethnic groups. Ethnic nationalism was on the rise again and would become the main direction for the development of nationalism in Kyrgyzstan in the next 10 years.

Bakiyev seemed ambiguous about the treatment of nationalism, and instead, he constantly strengthened tribalism and his authority. His family-tribal rule led to a decline in people’s identification with nationalism and a shift in values toward religious identification. This is also an important reason for the rampant activities of Islamism in this period.

A new change took place in the tribes of Kyrgyzstan during the political development process between 2010 and 2020: tribes had become increasingly tolerant. It is no longer that one party held the majority of power, but the other party also shared part of the country’s power and participated in national politics as an opposition party. A delicate balance was struck among the Kyrgyzstan tribes. However, this balance was disrupted in the 2020 parliamentary election.

On October 4, 2020, Kyrgyzstan held its seventh parliamentary election since independence (which was later deemed invalid).⁴² A total of 44 political parties registered to participate in the parliamentary election, of which 16 were finally eligible to participate.⁴³ A total of 4 parties crossed the 7% electoral threshold to enter the Parliament in the election. However, after the announcement of the preliminary election result, the political parties that failed to enter the parliament expressed strong dissatisfaction, believing that the election was rigged and severely fraudulent. They did not recognize the election results, which eventually triggered the third transition of power in Kyrgyzstan since its independence, leading to another unusual change of regime.

The third transition of power can be interpreted in terms of the external features (displaced democratization) and internal features (politics) of Kyrgyzstan politics. The borrowed democratization is not in line with the realities of Kyrgyzstan’s tribal politics. This kind of “dislocation” has become an undercurrent of political instability in Kyrgyzstan, coupled with the power struggle of political elites, which intensified the conflicts between the northern and southern tribes before it finally resulted in the abnormal power replacement. Since the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the tribal rotation mechanism of the presidential position of Kyrgyzstan has not united all tribal forces to promote national development, nor has the major political factions been integrated when the president was in power. Fragmented tribal politics exacerbated power struggles among tribes that eventually rose to the national level, leading to regime change.

Domestic ethnic nationalism was extremely rampant after the inter-ethnic conflict in 2010. The government is trying to weaken ethnic conflicts through a more inclusive political system. The strong presence of ethnic nationalism implements official nationalism by the government a daunting task. Atambayev, the former president of Kyrgyzstan, once said, “What constitutes the national spirit of the Kyrgyz people? First of all, it refers to Manas, our legends, the songs and dances of the Kyrgyz people, and our mother tongue. The most important thing is not to let other rules (including religious rules) marginalize this spiritual wealth”. As for the government, they naturally want to curb Islamization, but it is hard to achieve this in Kyrgyzstan, where central authority has been weakened. Therefore, extreme nationalism will have to find its place in Kyrgyzstan. The incumbent Sadyr Japarov (Садыр Жапаров) has successfully won support and ascended the highest political stage in Kyrgyzstan.

4 Conclusion

As the most open country in terms of form or fact among the five Central Asian countries, Kyrgyzstan has the support of Western countries, which made its political elites blindly pursue democracy. However, Kyrgyzstan’s reputation as an “Island of Democracy” was severely tarnished in the 2005 change of power. The subsequent transition of power in 2010 and the third change of power cast a shadow over the political development of Kyrgyzstan. Three abnormal power transitions have set back social and economic development for many years, and the state system has been severely damaged.

Abnormal power transition results from the failure of Kyrgyzstan’s state-building. Kyrgyzstan’s leaders have never been able to weaken the influence of tribal politics, which has led to a failure of efforts to integrate different ethnic groups to form a common national consciousness and national identity. In this context, a unified national identity is also difficult to achieve. Kyrgyzstan’s leaders’ endeavor to promote state nationalism finally turns out busy for nothing other than the clan-tribal rule.

Taking the third transition of power as a boundary, Kyrgyzstan has never been able to establish a strong government institution and system, and it is difficult to strengthen its power over society, which has caused serious obstacles to the interactions between the state and society. Weak state capacity eventually results in a state-society relationship of “weak state and strong society” in Kyrgyzstan, which is not conducive to state-building in Kyrgyzstan featuring strong tribalism and prominent ethnic nationalism.

However, with Sadyr Japarov coming to power, state nationalism became the main ideological tool to unite the people in the country, and tribalism was suppressed. Sadyr Japarov restored the presidential system by amending the constitution, strengthening the authority of the president, which is necessary to strengthen the national capacity building of Kyrgyzstan; he also dissolved the cabinet headed by Ulukbek Maripov (Улукбек Марипов) and appointed a new government headed by Akylbek Japarov (Акылбек Жапаров), the former Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Economy and Finance, emphasizing the importance of economic development. The formation of the new government did not follow the tradition of tribal politics in the past. People are selected and employed mainly based on the actual needs of national development. This is a manifestation of Sadyr Japarov’s suppression of tribalism. It is foreseeable that a vigorous promotion of state nationalism and the suppression of tribalism is conducive to promoting the development of ethnic and national identity so that they can further promote the building of Kyrgyzstan’s nation-state.