The Arab Gulf States in Transition: Power Centralization, Economic Transformation, and Neo-Nationalism

Abstract

The Arab Gulf States survived through the Arab Spring, but they still have faced a series of challenges in recent years: the Yemen war, the Qatar diplomatic crisis, the game of thrones, the shale gas revolution, the rivalry of great powers, and the emergence of a young generation. Along with all these factors, there’s a trend of new nationalism springing across this region. The power of Gulf Arab states is transferring from experienced older princes to the hands of a determined young generation, which may shape the future of these states for decades. At the same time, all of these states are launching their national economic projects, such like UAE Vision 2021, Saudi Vision 2030, Oman Vision 2040, etc. The new leadership, ambitious economic projects, and rapidly growing population under stalled globalization bred neo-nationalism in the Gulf region. What are the driving forces behind their transition, how do the Gulf states transform, and what are the potential impacts? These are the questions this paper tries to answer.

Many thanks to Professor Tim Niblock, Prince Turki Al-Faisal, Professor Eugene Rogan, and Professor Wang Suolao for their enlightening comments.

In the past decade, new developments emerged in these six Arab Gulf states: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Since the Arab Spring, a series of mass protests, significant chaos, and civil wars that spread across much of the Arab world in the early 2010s, many Arab authoritarian states like Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, and Yemen collapsed. However, the Arab Gulf states eventually survived even facing contestation and serious challenges. The decline of traditional Arab powers like Egypt and Syria paved the way for the Gulf monarchies to rise as new leaders in the Arab world.¹ As Professor Abdulkhaleq Abdullah of UAE stressed just after the Arab Spring, “Not only was 2011 an exceptional year, but it was also a formative one, with transformations of such depth and magnitude that they have cancelled all of the postulates, institutions, personalities, mentalities, and behaviors that existed prior to 2011, while laying the foundations for what would come to replace them.”² In the aftermath of the Arab Spring, different domestic and international dynamics are at play, and the changes in the geopolitics of the Middle East have transformed the regional policies of the states of the Gulf countries.³ The Arab Spring has infiltrated the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, but the repercussions and manifestations vary from one Gulf state to another.⁴ Some Gulf states suffered heavy damages due to a combination of social, economic, and political repercussions of the Arab Spring, while others succeeded in exiting the turmoil with the least damages. The UAE and Qatar experienced very limited unrest, while at the other end of the spectrum, Bahrain experienced the most unrest. In fact, Bahrain was the only monarchy where the protest movement called for the abdication of the ruling family.⁵

Ten years down the lane, the Gulf monarchies have seized the initiative and have emerged as powerful regional players.⁶ As Badar Al-Seif, an assistant professor of Kuwait University commented, “The weakening of traditional Arab centers of power due to the Arab Spring… has made the Gulf, for the first time in modern history, the center of Arab power”.⁷

Meanwhile, the pace of transformations is picking up in the Arab Gulf states. A pattern is emerging that seemingly sidelines religion but consolidates political power and diversifies economic development with these traditional monarchies. The power of Gulf Arab states is transferring from experienced older princes to the hands of a young determined generation, which may shape the future of these states for decades. In 2015, Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud became Saudi king upon the death of his elder half-brother, King Abdullah. Three months after becoming king, Salman appointed his full nephew Muhammed bin Nayef as the new Crown Prince to replace his youngest half-brother Muqrin. But in 2017, King Salman replaced the 57-year-old Muhammad bin Nayef with his 31-year-old son, Mohammed bin Salman, as crown prince, signaling a clear break from a decades-old tradition of building consensus. That implies a return to the absolute monarchy established by Saudi Arabia’s founder, King Abdulaziz Ibn Saud. In structural terms, Saudi Arabia is no longer a power-sharing gerontocracy. It has returned to the absolute monarchy that it was under Ibn Saud himself. Power is concentrated entirely in the hands of the king, who has delegated most of it to his son, and the new crown prince.⁸ Before or after that, Qatar, Bahrain, UAE, and Oman have already transferred the ruling power and concentrated the state power into the King or de facto ruler. Like in May 2022, de facto becomes de jure as Crown Prince Muhammed bin Zayed (aka MbZ) was named UAE President.⁹

At the same time, the issue of economic diversification has gained a renewed sense of urgency in Gulf Arab countries. All of these states are launching their national economic projects, like UAE Vision 2021 and Abu Dhabi Vision 2030, Saudi Vision 2030, Bahrain Economic Vision 2030, Qatar National Vision 2030, Kuwait Vision 2035, and Oman Vision 2040. These ambitious economic plans have spread like vines across the Gulf region, but most have yet to achieve their goals (Table 1).

Table 1 Visions of the Arab Gulf MonarchiesFootnote

Source: Collected by the author based on websites of Gulf Arab States, like Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, https://vision2030.gov.sa; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, State of Kuwait, https://www.mofa.gov.kw/en/kuwait-state/kuwait-vision-2035/; the Government of Abu Dhabi, https://www.actvet.gov.ae/en/Media/Lists/ELibraryLD/economic-vision-2030-full-versionEn.pdf; United Arab Emirates, https://www.vision2021.ae/en; Bahrain, https://www.bahrainedb.com/about-us/national-development-strategy/.

Moreover, the geopolitics in the Gulf traditionally dominated by Saudi Arabia is reaching a new balance of power and gaining a more important place in the Middle East region. The growing political and military presence of UAE, which was dubbed the “Little Sparta” by former U.S. Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis, is the result of years of dedicated investment and demonstrate ambitions.¹¹ Qatar has long practiced an ambitious foreign policy with different priorities to other Gulf states, and it became subject to a boycott by Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt in 2017.¹² Even though the Qatar blockade is over, the Gulf division still lives on. And the regional reconciliation of GCC hasn’t solved the core differences that divide Qatar and Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain.¹³

In late 2014, an ongoing multi-sided civil war began between the Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi-led Yemeni government, with support from a Saudi-led coalition, and Iranian-backed Houthi rebels.¹⁴ Beginning in March 2015, an intervention launched by the Saudi government led to a campaign of economic isolation and air strikes against the Houthi rebellion, after the president of Yemen Hadi fled to Saudi Arabia. Numerous Iranian weapons shipments to Houthi rebels, and Saudi intervention, drew this desperately poor country into part of the Iran-Saudi Arabia proxy conflict or the Middle Eastern Cold War.¹⁵ The intense power struggles between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Islamic Republic of Iran not only impact the civil wars of Syria and Yemen, but it also extends to the conflicts in Bahrain, Lebanon, Qatar, Afghanistan.

The new leadership, ambitious economic projects, and rapidly growing population under stalled globalization, bred neo-nationalism in the Gulf region. What are the driving forces behind their transition, how do the Gulf states transform, and what’re the impacts? These are the questions this paper tries to answer.

1 Power Transitions and Centralization in the Arab Gulf States

As Samuel Huntington said, “In every society affected by social change, new groups arise to participate in politics… new men, new viewpoints, new social groups may replace each other at the core of the system with bewildering rapidity.”¹⁶ In the past ten years, the very stable gerontocracy of Gulf monarchies has witnessed a transition of power from the elder generation to a younger generation as follows (Table 2).

Table 2 Power transition in the Arab Gulf States

1.1 Game of Thrones in Saudi Arabia

King Salman took the throne from his half-brother King Abdullah in January 2015 and replaced the crown prince twice in the following two years, signifying a new era of Saudi politics.¹⁷ Before 2015, there was a strong presumption that succession proceeds within a generation, and all the subsequent successions were between brothers.¹⁸ After decades of collective leadership between senior Al Saud brothers who had dominated Saudi politics since the early 1960s, the power is now concentrated in the hands of King Salman and his favorite son Mohammed bin Salman, whom he made deputy prime minister and crown prince in June 2017. By then, King Salman had successfully sidelined royal rivals through a process of governmental reorganization, tossing aside established norms of seniority and power-sharing.¹⁹

It is quite clear that the rule of primogeniture does not apply in the Saudi kingdom since its establishment in the 1930s. Now, most policies are driven by the King’s young son, the de facto ruler of Saudi Arabia, with input from a small set of commoner advisors and international consultants. Through his father, Mohammed bin Salman elevated young royals beholden to him, while appointing technocrats and empowering a coterie of nonroyal advisors to act as champions of this nationalist program and enforcers of his rule.²⁰ In practice, Saudi Arabia's internal problems are more vital than its external problems. This power centralization is coupled with an increase in institutionalization. The Saudi crown prince’s ambitious national economic programs and hardline attitude toward Iran and Yemen acknowledge that a new decision-making pattern has affected the evolution of Saudi internal and foreign policy.²¹

1.2 Concentration of State Power in the UAE

The economy of the UAE has grown tremendously since its establishment in 1971, with a stable political, economic, and social environment provided by the government to all citizens from seven emirates. However, in 2008, the global financial crisis shook Dubai’s economy and worsened its debt crisis. Ultimately, Abu Dhabi has been instrumental in providing liquidity support of $32 billion to UAE banks and agreed to refinance $20 billion to Dubai to alleviate its debt.²² The most visible sign of its helping hand has been the purchase by the UAE Central Bank of a $10 billion bond issued by Dubai under a $20 billion bond program in March 2009.²³ Economic dependence on Abu Dhabi has resulted in the loss of Dubai's influence and triggered a power shift within the UAE, which has facilitated Abu Dhabi's ability to concentrate more federal power in the diplomatic and security spheres. After 2011, the centralization of power is accelerating in Abu Dhabi, and more importantly in the crown prince Mohammed bin Zayed. In 2014, the current President of the UAE and Ruler of Abu Dhabi, Khalifa al Nahyan, suffered a stroke and was retained as a ceremonial president.²⁴ The crown prince of Abu Dhabi, Mohammed bin Zayed carries out state affairs and decision-making of Abu Dhabi and the UAE since then. The power transition in Abu Dhabi and the concentration of state power in the UAE stimulated a trend toward comprehensive and uncompromising authoritarianism and a more aggressive foreign policy and military-backed regional interventionism in Arab Gulf states after Arab Spring. Eventually, President Khalifa bin Zayed al Nahyan of the United Arab Emirates died on May 13, 2022. And he was immediately succeeded by his half-brother, de facto ruler Muhammad bin Zayed, as emir of Abu Dhabi and president of the federation.²⁵

In the past decade, the internal and regional dynamics enabled and triggered the fundamental shift in the UAE’s foreign policy toward assertiveness, militarism, and self-reliance.²⁶ Under Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan, the founding president of the UAE during 1971–2004, the foreign policy of the UAE is mildness and bandwagoning. Each small emirate still retained certain sovereign rights, such as limited military forces, the control of customs, and international communication. And wary of local inequalities that could spur dissent, Abu Dhabi is aiming to instill nationalist sentiment in the UAE, especially in northern emirates, through cultivating a military ethos.²⁷ This is part of a wider trend of militarized nationalism among Gulf monarchies. As a rising power capable of guaranteeing its interests, the UAE frequently intervened in regional affairs, like the Yemen civil war, Libyan civil war, and Qatar crisis, by military strikes if necessary. As commander of the UAE armed forces, Mohammed bin Zayed has a strong military background as he was trained at the British Military Academy of Sandhurst, and he steers the Emirates’ domestic and foreign policy.²⁸ This ambitious and military-driven foreign policy will require military manpower to protect these interests for the foreseeable future.²⁹ At the time of its foundation, the UAE was militarily weak relative to most of its neighbors, like Iran, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia.³⁰ Now, Abu Dhabi is leading the effort to boost a new type of nationalist feeling combined with economic achievement, patriotism, foreign intervention, and martial triumph.

1.3 Smooth Succession in Oman and Kuwait

The smooth transition of the throne in Oman was announced on January 10, 2020, following the death of Sultan Qaboos bin Said, who ruled Oman for nearly 50 years. As the longest-serving leader in the Middle East and Arab world for the past four decades, Qaboos had no children nor publicly appointed a successor. He traveled abroad for medical reasons at least twice since 2014 and secretly recorded his preference to succeed him in a sealed envelope given to the royal family council.³¹ Qaboos’s selection of his cousin Haitham bin Tariq, instead of other potential candidates Asad and Shihab—both military men and Haitham’s brothers—tends to show his preference to perpetuate Oman’s role as a mediator in this turbulent region.³² Prior to succession, Haitham has served as Minister of Heritage and Culture from 2002 to 2020 in the Cabinet of Sultan Qaboos. One year later, Sultan Haitham issued a decree for succession on 10 January 2021, and the government published a new “fundamental law” stipulating the throne succession behind it. The law stresses that the Sultan’s throne “is passed on to the eldest of his sons, then to the eldest of the latter’s sons, and so on,” making Theyazin bin Haitham—the oldest son of Oman’s sultan—the first crown prince in the country’s history.³³

Unlike the Sultan of Oman, the gerontocracy greatly impacted the succession in Kuwait. On September 29, 2020, Kuwaiti Emir Sabah al-Ahmad al-Sabah, a respected mediator in a conflicting region, passed away after ruling for 14 years due to his long-term health issues.³⁴ Kuwait’s new leader, Nawaf Al-Ahmed Al-Sabah, 83, succeeded his half-brother Sabah who died at the age of 91. New Crown Prince Meshal al-Ahmad al-Sabah, also in his 80s, has been asked to carry out some of Emir’s constitutional duties on a temporary basis.³⁵ Kuwait has both a royal family and a parliamentary body, the National Assembly, which draws a different political system than other Arab Gulf States.³⁶ Meanwhile, the new leader comes to power at a time when Kuwait is facing the highest budget deficit in its history. Since late 2020, political gridlock exists between the Cabinet and the National Assembly, an active legislature body that can pass and block legislation.³⁷ A potential solution to its brewing liquidity crisis has been blocked by parliamentary opposition by a law that would allow the government to borrow, as other Gulf nations have done in response to the dual crisis. Behind the current leadership and political struggles, it will be more important to observe potential successors to the throne in the next generation of the Al-Sabah family.

2 Economic Diversification in the Arab Gulf States

Economic diversification plays a vital role in long-term economic growth. Vibrant economies usually generate a large share of their GDP to the manufacturing and service sectors. However, the economy of Arab Gulf states heavily depends on the income of resources and budget revenues, which makes sustaining long-term economic growth almost impossible. In practice, the abundant natural resources may hurt macroeconomic development, as many economists described this phenomenon as the “Dutch disease” or resource curse.³⁸

2.1 Economic Challenges

The issue of economic diversification has gained a renewed sense of urgency in Gulf Arab countries. A global economic slowdown induced by the coronavirus pandemic pushed Brent crude prices down from $64 per barrel at the start of 2020 to a low of $23 in April 2020.³⁹ (see Fig. 1).

Fig. 1

Spot Crude Price 1990–2020Footnote

Source: International Monetary Fund Data, “Primary Commodity Price System: Spot Crude, US Dollars, Monthly”, https://data.imf.org/?sk=471DDDF8-D8A7-499A-81BA-5B332C01F8B9&sId=1547558078595.

This has placed substantial pressure on the fiscal positions of Gulf Arab monarchies, which are expected to run budget deficits averaging 9.2% in 2020 and 5.7% in 2021.⁴¹ Considering the rapid population growth in these states (see Table 3), the financial challenge seems to be more serious. Many young people in the Gulf states find it difficult for them to reach the income levels of their parents.⁴²

Table 3 Population of GCC states 2016–2020Footnote

Source: The World Bank, Population of Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Oman, Kuwait, Qatar and Bahrain, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?locations=QA-SA-OM-AE-KW-BH.

The GDP growth of Gulf Arab States slowed down since 2000 (see Fig. 2), which made these states more concerned about the sustainability of their hydrocarbon revenues for decades. Bahrain and Oman are in the most precarious position, with reserves expected to run out within the next decade for Bahrain and within 25 years for Oman.⁴⁴ Before the pandemic, the International Monetary Fund estimated that, unless GCC countries undertake substantial fiscal and economic reforms, they will deplete their conserved wealth by 2034.⁴⁵ The pandemic and decline in global oil demand have likely shortened this timeline. Three states with the largest deficits in 2020—Kuwait, Bahrain, and Oman—are projected to remain in deficit throughout 2021–2023.⁴⁶ (Fig. 3)

Fig. 2

GDP Growth of Arab Gulf States 1990–2020Footnote

Resource: World Development Indicators, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?end=2020&locations=QA-SA-OM-KW-AE-BH&start=1966&view=chart.

Fig. 3

GDP of Arab Gulf States 1980–2020Footnote

Resource： World Development Indicators, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?end=2020&locations=QA-SA-OM-AE-KW-BH&start=1965&view=chart.

The challenges of fiscal deficit and fall of revenues have long motivated Gulf Arab States to diversify their economies to private sectors and digital economy outside oil and gas. Promoting private sector development and a productive economy remains at the core of national economic diversification. Unfortunately, Gulf Arab States continue to rely heavily on government-funded projects and consumption that are ultimately supported by oil and gas revenues.

2.2 National Economic Visions

Since 2014, the oil-rich Arab Gulf States have suffered a prolonged drop in oil prices, pressure of continued population growth, and a worsening fiscal deficit. From a 2010 to 2014 average of roughly $100 per barrel of crude, world prices have approximately averaged at $50 per barrel from 2015 through the beginning of 2018.⁴⁹ The International Monetary Fund (IMF) also warned the Arab states of the Gulf Cooperation Council about the financial, macroeconomic, and political risks of oil dependence and of the need to diversify sources of economic growth and employment⁵⁰ (Table 4).

Table 4 Demographics and economies of the Arab States of the Gulf 2021Footnote

Resource: Countryeconomy, https://countryeconomy.com/countries/groups/cooperation-council-arab-states-of-the-gulf.

Against this backdrop, all the Arab Gulf States have published development plans and visions in the past ten years, like Saudi Vision 2030, Abu Dhabi Vision 2030, 2035 New Kuwait, etc. Compared with their formal development planning since the mid-1970s, the current economic vision in these states seems to be a new model, which sets aims and projects for public and private sectors to pursue development targets. To transform these plans into practice, the leadership needs reliable information reflecting the dynamics and reality of society. Then, the state will invite well-known advisory institutions or companies to draft plans and implement them. Yet, such implementation is much more challenging for broad economic, financial, or social reforms such as the fiscal or labor market reforms within the current plans. More important, it is of great concern whether the policymakers of these states could get access to real and reliable information about society. And the advisory institutions or companies in charge of the ambitious national plans are usually outsiders of the states and have a limited understanding of the local culture and situation.

3 New Nationalism of Arab Gulf States

The Arab Gulf States, especially Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Qatar, are embracing a new nationalism, which combines domestic and foreign policies. Although all GCC states did not become independent countries until 1971, and the ruling elites of these relatively new states are now paying increasing attention to haweeya al-watani (national identity) and heritage within their countries.⁵² Since these Arab Gulf States do not have a “nationalist” history, the leaders tended to use tribal and religious identities to reinforce their domestic legitimacy.

Meanwhile, the world has witnessed the rise and spread of new nationalism in various forms in the twenty-first century. And the Middle East region, as one of the most important regions of the world, with a strong history of traditional tribalism, has not been immune to the effects of this wave. The rentier social contract in these resource-rich countries will be difficult to sustain in the coming years, and so they are experimenting with ways to adapt it, attempting to instill greater economic self-reliance and less expectation of government jobs and other forms of state largesse—without undermining their own legitimacy.⁵³ And the economic downturn that began in 2008 emphasizes political vulnerabilities of a social contract in these oil monarchies, through which political acquiescence among nationals was rewarded with social and economic security.⁵⁴ Thus, a new nationalism rooted in patriotism and national identity underlying a campaign of rulers to reconstruct the basis of legitimacy from “Support us because of the good life we can provide you” to “Support us, not because we provide for you, but because you are citizens of this great country and we are its leaders,” emerged.⁵⁵ The emergence of a new nationalism in these traditional states with a monarchical political system and traditional values will have a great social and political impact in the future.

3.1 National Identity and New Nationalism

In the past decade, Arab Gulf States have undertaken steps to promote national identity and inculcate a stronger sense of national belonging that ties citizens to the state and its leadership. This represents a shift in policy for these Arab monarchies that had previously viewed national mobilization as more of a threat than an asset.⁵⁶ A combination of political, economic, and geopolitical factors is driving these projects of national identity. The mechanisms that shape this emerging identity are varied and include national days, national dialogues, and national service.⁵⁷ Over the past two decades, the governments of Arab Gulf States have been implementing top-down identity projects to forge homogeneous and recognizable national identities. These states establish heritage projects, museums, and archives, like Diriyah Gate Project of Saudi Arabia and the Sheikh Zayed Grand Mosque of Abu Dhabi. Since 2007, the Qatari state has been focused on a complete renovation and reconstruction of its national museum to align with an updated national narrative, and it opened its new national museum which embraced the site of Sheikh Abdullah bin Jassim Al Thani’s palace to the public in 2019.⁵⁸ As Anderson once said, “museums and the museumizing imagination are both profoundly political.”⁵⁹ The states also use social media and communications to reinforce emerging nationalism. The expatriates and foreign workers, especially from South Asia, make up a high percentage of the Arab Gulf nationals. Some states even developed National Identity Programs to strengthen national belonging and to build an identity more inclusive of all residents, like cultural pluralism and global engagement.⁶⁰ The Yemen war and Qatar diplomatic crisis both reflect the national ambition and rumbling nationalist sentiment of these Gulf states. These “hot button” issues strengthen the complexity underpinning nationalism and national identity across the region. And the key factor of the new nationalism is mobilizing citizens in support of the country and its leadership.

The “tribal identity,” on the basis of kinship, distributes power and wealth in the Gulf states. Yet, this traditional model has resulted in relative marginalization of Bedouin, or more recently settled populations. And the national identity still faces challenges from Islamic identity, pan-Arabism, or regionalism.

The population growth, employment pressure, financial challenges, regional rivalry, and transnational ideologies and movements are leading factors for the Arab Gulf states to promote a new nationalism in response to these risks and challenges. In sum, the rise of the “new nationalism” in the Gulf region reflects the decline of the power of the welfare state and the demand on citizens.

3.2 Militarized Nationalism

The United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia are promoting militarization as a way to strengthen their rule and national identity. The UAE, Qatar, and Kuwait have introduced conscription for male nationals, which highlighted concerted efforts to introduce militarized nationalism. And these post-rentier states are increasingly relying on a military dimension to drive their national identity projects, like National Day celebrations and military parades.⁶¹

This is not a new element in Gulf countries’ state formation process. The military played a vital role in the creation of Saudi Arabia, wherein the Saud family with the Wahhabis and tribal fighters (the Ikhwan) conquered the current kingdom’s territory. But in the UAE and Qatar, the role of the military was absent from state-building, which was instead driven by external powers and diplomatic negotiations. Since the traditional social pact no longer seems able to ensure loyalty and cohesion, militarization offers a top-down process focused on identity and shared values, in which military narratives and symbols can boost patriotic feelings and mobilize citizens around flags and leaders.⁶²

In addition, the effects of geopolitics, especially wars and diplomatic crises, will also strengthen national identity. The atmosphere of patriotism is tangible as the state has rallied support for the Yemen War and encouraged demonstrations of support for the troops.⁶³ The Saudi intervention in the Yemen war has brought the urgency of nationalism and national identity in the kingdom. And, so did the 2017–2021 Gulf diplomatic crisis to the Qatari citizens.

The military has gradually become an important tool of nation-building and state leaders have been utilizing militarized nationalism to forge a new nationalism of shared identity and patriotism. Qatar has become the world’s third-largest importer of arms, reflecting a 282% rise in military purchases between 2012 and 2016. Qatar and the UAE each spent around 10% or more of their GDP on defense in 2018.⁶⁴ In 2018, Saudi Arabia’s military spending amounted to an estimated $67.6 billion, 8.8% of its GDP. It was the third-largest military spender globally and by far the largest military spender in the Gulf region.⁶⁵

In Saudi Arabia, militarization reflects the power centralization of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. While in the UAE, militarized nationalism was mainly promoted by the crown prince of Abu Dhabi to support the Emiratis’ ambitious plans as a rising regional power. In Qatar, militarization is a defensive method: since the Qatar diplomatic crisis in 2017, it signed a $12 billion deal with U.S. manufacturer Boeing for 36 advanced F-15QA fighter jets and a letter of intent with the United Kingdom in September 2017 for 24 Eurofighter Typhoon fighter jets.⁶⁶

As part of militarized nationalism, national holidays and ceremonies aiming to enhance national identities with military factors, for example military demonstrations, and National Day parades with propaganda campaigns. In 2018, one year after the Gulf diplomatic crisis, the military dimension became more prominent in Qatar’s 2018 National Day celebrations. The 2018 military parade was three times larger than in 2017, and the Qatari armed forces sang patriotic songs and chanted the slogan, “As long as it was proven by our deeds, Qatar will remain free.”⁶⁷

4 Conclusion

Rapid social and economic change, including population boom, increases in education and gender equality, new media expansion, expands political consciousness, multiplies economic demands, and broadens social participation of people in the Gulf states. These changes undermine traditional sources of political authority and traditional political institutions, and they enormously complicate the problems of creating new bases of political association and new political institutions combining legitimacy and effectiveness.

The Gulf region survived the Arab Spring, but it has faced a series of challenges in recent years such as the Yemen War, Qatar Crisis, the game of thrones, shale gas revolution, the rivalry of great power, and emergence of the young generation. Along with all these factors, there’s a trend of neo-nationalism springing up across this region. The power of Gulf Arab states is transferring from experienced older princes to the hands of a young determined generation, which may shape the future of these states for decades. At the same time, all of these states are launching their national economic projects, like UAE Vision 2021, Saudi Vision 2030, Oman Vision 2040, etc. The new leadership, ambitious economy projects and rapidly growing population under tearing globalization bred neo-nationalism in the Gulf region. Regardless of how these changes might evolve in the future, they mark a transition period of society, politics, and economy for the Arab Gulf States, with profound implications for their development in the decades ahead.