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The Cultural Revolution and Mao Zedong: The Outcome of a Revolution without Revolution

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Mao Zedong and Contemporary China

Abstract

This chapter focuses on the Cultural Revolution, which, along with the Great Leap Forward, was one of the worst major tragedies of the Mao era. I trace the process that led to its occurrence and considers why Mao launched this movement. I also present my hypothesis on the mechanism of why and how this “Revolution” took place and unfolded. Then I present my own viewpoint on how this Revolution should be evaluated as a whole. I consider this from two perspectives: One is that it was a struggle over ideals and ideology, and the other is that it was an internal political struggle over power.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    For example, Yan and Gao (1996) provide excellent commentary, and Wang (2013) gives a powerful record of his own experience as a mid-level cadre in Tianjin and his observations amid this Revolution. For full-scale research, see Kokubun (2003), Yang (2006), or Kagami (2001). Relatively recently published analytical books on the Cultural Revolution include Walder (2019), Yang (2019), and Dikӧtter (2016).

  2. 2.

    This dozen-page summary was distributed at a meeting of the Political Bureau Standing Committee held the day before the report. According to Zhang (2006), Mao did not express any critical opinion on it, probably because the summary had already been decided and he did not have time to put forward a different opinion.

  3. 3.

    It is extremely rare for a rapporteur to address an official and important report without a manuscript in a dictatorial country like China. To avoid political risks, most usually read a preprepared manuscript.

  4. 4.

    While Qian Liqun regards Mao and Liu as basically not in conflict at this stage (Qian 2012a, Vol. 1, p. 530; Qian 2012b, Vol. 1, p. 95), Li Zhisui says, on the other hand, that when Mao learned of Liu’s report at the Conference, he was furious that “he [Liu] was not maintaining a class standpoint.” (Li 1994, Vol. 2, p. 110)

  5. 5.

    A record of Mao Zedong’s speeches and writings published unofficially during the Cultural Revolution.

  6. 6.

    According to Zhang Suhua, this talk was revised and printed in February 1966, that is, just before the CR movement, based on the 1962 edition by Peng Zhen, Chen Boda, Wang Renzhong, and others. Mao must have read it, naturally, so the “left leaning” tone of the time is strongly reflected in the talk. Zhang describes Mao’s talk based on the 1962 edition.

  7. 7.

    To be precise, the term “class struggle” appears only at one point, that is, when Mao says, “We have a series of experiences in class struggle.” As pointed out above, the 1966 version of this speech differs in content from the 1962 version which was first published, in that it emphasizes the long and intense nature of the class struggle at the socialist stage.

  8. 8.

    This refers to a field that is cultivated and managed responsibly by farmers belonging to production teams.

  9. 9.

    On the movement toward a household production contracting system in Anhui Province around 1960–61, and the accompanying correspondence between Provincial Secretary Zeng Xisheng and Mao Zedong, see Nakagane (1992, Chap. 7), and Wang (2012).

  10. 10.

    According to Li Zhisui, Mao refused to approve the report and wrote in the margin: “The report describes a very dark situation and does not show even a ray of light. This man, Chen Yun, comes from a family of small merchants. He is unable to dismiss his bourgeois nature. He always leans to the right” (Li 1994, Vol. 2, p. 119).

  11. 11.

    In order to understand the changes in Mao’s mindset, I will rely on the following realistic descriptions by Lin (2005) and others.

  12. 12.

    It refers to the movement to rectify and discipline against the corruption, speculation, waste, decentralization, and bureaucratism of cadres in the urban area.

  13. 13.

    At this time, Mao quoted Du Fu‘s following poem: Draw your bowstring taut and strong, Use arrows that are straight and long. Shoot the horse before the rider’s harm, Capture the king before his band takes alarm.

  14. 14.

    The true intention behind Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping’s remarks to Mao remains unclear. If interpreted generously, it could have been meant as, “Chairman, you are old and your health is not good, so please rest.” If interpreted negatively, it could have been an attempt to keep him at a distance because his involvement would complicate matters.

  15. 15.

    It is commonly believed that the Cultural Revolution began from there, but in the preceding year (June and July 1964), Mao Zedong had encouraged his nephews and nieces, saying “Schools should allow students to rebel. Take the lead in rebelling,” and “Class struggle is your main subject” (Qian 2012a, Vol. 2, p. 25; Qian 2012b, Vol. 2, p. 19). As result a rebellion began primarily among the students of high-ranking officials. In October 1965, the son of a cadre who was at a middle school affiliated with Tsinghua University posted a “small character poster” (xiaozibao) with the words “Long live the spirit of rebellion” (ibid.).

  16. 16.

    Liu Xiaoqi branded the principal and Party secretary of the First Middle School affiliated with Beijing Normal University as an “anti-Party, anti-socialist element,” and “personally led the work team. He even had the work group and his own daughter fight against this principal.” (Wang 2017)

  17. 17.

    The “five black categories” refer to the group consisting of landlords, rich peasants, counterrevolutionaries, delinquents, and rightists, corresponding with the “non-people” described in Chap. 3. They are, so to speak, the “lower caste.” The opposite upper caste comprises the “five red categories,” consisting of revolutionary cadres, revolutionary martyrs, revolutionary soldiers, workers, and peasants. Yu Luoke also uses the term “castes” to refer to these two groups.

  18. 18.

    Chen Yi was a general who fought along with Mao Zedong against the Kuomintang forces at Jinggangshan. After the founding of the country, he served as Mayor of Shanghai, Vice-premier of the State Council, and Minister of Foreign Affairs. Tan Zhenlin was a political commissar of the Red Army during the revolutionary struggle, and after the founding of the New China he became Secretary of the Party Committee of Zhejiang Province and then a member of the Party’s Political Bureau.

  19. 19.

    From June to July 1967 in Wuhan, a violent confrontation broke out between the rebel factions and the mass organization “Million Heroic Lions” (baiwan xiongshi), and Wang Li, a member of the Central CR Subgroup, was captured and detained, despite his efforts to mediate between these two confronting factions.

  20. 20.

    This is based on the official explanation, but it is not necessarily clear whether a coup plan was actually planned by the Lin Biao faction.

  21. 21.

    The civil rights that Yang Lijun refers to indicate the totality of rights that civilians should and do have. Although her concept of “civil right” does not seem to be elaborated, I will follow Yang’s usage here to use the term civil rights.

  22. 22.

    Qi Benyu served as Deputy Director of the Central Propaganda Department and Deputy editor-in-chief of the Party magazine the Red Flag.

  23. 23.

    In China, household registers (huji) are divided into agricultural registers for farmers and non-agricultural registers for non-farmers, or city dwellers and during the Mao era it was almost impossible for farmers to change their household registration. In this sense, Chinese society was a dual society, and although it is now relatively easy to change household registration, the dual structure of society has not fundamentally changed.

  24. 24.

    During the CR period, many homes of intellectuals were ransacked by the Red Guards, and valuable books and cultural assets were confiscated.

  25. 25.

    Ye Jianying was one of the generals of the People’s Liberation Army. At the time of Mao’s death, he played a major role in the expulsion of the Gang of Four as a member of the Standing Committee of the Party’s Political Bureau and Vice President.

  26. 26.

    Even during the land reform, a staggering number of victims, said to be 2 million, were recorded (see Chap. 3), and it is believed that the government’s official death toll of 1.72 million during the Cultural Revolution greatly underestimates the reality. Regardless of the number of deaths, the Cultural Revolution and land reform were similar in terms of brutality. The difference is that the land reform targeted mainly landlords and rich peasants in rural areas, whereas the CR movement targeted various classes, strata, and groups, including urban and rural, intellectuals and peasants, cadres and masses.

  27. 27.

    It is well known that Song Binbin met Mao Zedong in August 1966, representing the Red Guards and attached a “Red Guard” armband to Mao. In the post-Mao era, She studied in the United States to obtain a doctorate, then returned to China, and acknowledged and apologized for her mistakes during the Cultural Revolution.

  28. 28.

    See Xu (2006) for more detailed information on this incident.

  29. 29.

    In response to incidents of armed struggle, destruction, and looting in Guangxi and other areas, the CPC Central Committee and others jointly issued a proclamation on July 3, 1968, calling for the immediate cessation of armed struggle and the return of looted goods.

  30. 30.

    Many witch hunts are said to have occurred against the backdrop of religious conflicts, such as the persecution of heretics and conflicts with them. If religious conflicts are replaced by ideological conflicts, witch hunts and the class struggles of the Cultural Revolution seem very similar.

  31. 31.

    When Edgar Snow asked Mao Zedong in December 1970 as to when he decided to overthrow Liu Shaoqi, Mao replied that it was at the National Work Conference held in Beijing in January 1965, the meeting that decided the “Twenty-Three Articles” (Yan and Gao 1996, Vol. 1, p. 9).

  32. 32.

    According to Li Zhisui, Mao was constantly changing his place of residence due to anxiety. For example, in July 1966, when he returned to Beijing from the other parts of China, he moved to the villa “No. 1” in the suburbs, but after a few days, “the Chairmen complained that the place was polluted—he thought it was contaminated with poison.” (Li 1994, Vol. 2, p. 236)

  33. 33.

    For him, ideals could be compromised to some extent, but power could never be compromised. Even the dreamer Mao Zedong must have realized, if he thought about it calmly, that the “Great Harmony” could not appear in China in the near future, or not in its complete form.

  34. 34.

    It is said that in the transition from feudal to modern society is characterized by a shift from status to contract. The fact that the status order system of the household registration remains, and that a new status class of Communist Party members has been created, seems to indicate that contemporary China, to exaggerate slightly and if I may add a touch of irony, is a “semi-feudal” system, of course in a different sense from that defined by Mao Zedong.

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Correspondence to Katsuji Nakagane .

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Nakagane, K. (2024). The Cultural Revolution and Mao Zedong: The Outcome of a Revolution without Revolution. In: Mao Zedong and Contemporary China. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-97-1761-3_8

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