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The Tragedy of Peng Dehuai: The Lushan Conference and Its Aftermath

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Mao Zedong and Contemporary China

Abstract

From the start of the Great Leap Forward policy and the People’s Commune movement, the entire country was immediately plunged into chaos, and many people in rural areas began to starve to death. At the Lushan Conference of the Party held in July 1959, Peng Dehuai, then Minister of National Defense, euphemistically criticized Mao Zedong’s policies in a personal letter to him, which infuriated Mao, and Peng Dehuai, along with Zhang Wentian and others who agreed with him, were thoroughly criticized as an anti-Party group. Peng was allowed to work in Yunnan for a time, but when the Cultural Revolution began he was recalled to Beijing and brutally persecuted by the Red Guards, to the effect that he lost his life. I conclude with my own interpretation of the meaning of the Peng Dehuai’s tragedy.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Mao Zedong is said to have stated explicitly that he would “never self-criticize” (Guo 2007).

  2. 2.

    The name may refer to Bao Zheng, a famous vassal of the Northern Song Dynasty who was known for his integrity, bravery, and determination.

  3. 3.

    The use of vulgar expressions such as “If you have shit, let it out, if you want to fart, do it, it feels good to let it out and you will feel better” is very much like Mao Zedong. Only Mao could use such an expression in an official setting.

  4. 4.

    At this meeting, when someone criticized Peng along with his colleagues for forming a “military club” at the Lushan Conference, he asked Peng Dehuai to provide him with information on the organization, charter, objectives, and list the names of members of this club. Peng was so angry that he said, “Strip me of my Party membership and shoot me! And then you can tell me by yourself who belongs to the ‘military club’ among yourself!” (Li’s Notes (3), p. 309)

  5. 5.

    According to Yuan Xiaorong, the two cursed at the Standing Committee meeting on the 27th, where other Standing Committee members, such as Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, and Zhu De, were surprised and criticized Peng Dehuai‘s attitude (Yuan 2010, Vol. 1, p. 826).

  6. 6.

    Gao Gang, head of the State Planning Commission in the early 1950s, who is said to have had close ties with the Soviet Union, along with his associate Rao Shushi, opposed Liu Shaoqi and Zhou Enlai and attempted to seize leadership of the Party, resulting in his downfall in 1954. The truth of this incident, however, is unverified.

  7. 7.

    In fact, except for Peng Dehuai, the other three members of the “Peng Dehuai Group” have had their honor restored since the Seven Thousand Cadres Conference. Zhang Wentian became an economics researcher at the Chinese Academy of Sciences, Huang Kecheng was appointed as a Deputy Provincial Governor of Shaanxi, and Zhou Yizhou returned to Hunan Province, but was demoted to Deputy Secretary (from former Secretary).

  8. 8.

    Let us recall the “three-hundred-thousand-character opinion letter” that Hu Feng wrote to the Party Center (see Chap. 2). No matter how long a letter he wrote to the Party Center and Mao Zedong, once he was labeled as reactionary and anti-Party, it was seen as meaningless and only used as material for criticism.

  9. 9.

    Luo (1997) provides more details on this issue.

  10. 10.

    Third Front Construction refers to a policy based on Mao’s military strategy of moving coastal factories to the interior and building factories in the interior again in response to the escalation of the Vietnam War and the deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations. See Chap. 7.

  11. 11.

    According to Peng Dehuai himself, Mao told Peng at that time: “The most important strategic rear area is the Southwest region. There are various resources there, the geography is just right, and it’s worth doing (dayou zuowei). If Comrade Peng Dehuai goes, he might be able to achieve a little merit.” (Peng 1981, p. 289)

  12. 12.

    Before the start of the Cultural Revolution, Mao Zedong was said to have taken many measures to prevent a counterrevolutionary coup (Secret Records of Mao Zedong (I), p. 353).

  13. 13.

    Yang Jisheng argues that the West’s is a parliamentary politics (yihui zhengzhi) while China’s is a “conference politics” (huiyi zhengzhi), which he describes as characterized by “holding meetings to ensure the Supreme Leader’s ideas and holding conferences to lay siege to ideas that differ from those of such a great leader.” (Yang 2012, p. 274) Under a one-party dictatorship, “democracy” is a mere “decoration” for “concentration.”

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Correspondence to Katsuji Nakagane .

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© 2024 The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd.

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Nakagane, K. (2024). The Tragedy of Peng Dehuai: The Lushan Conference and Its Aftermath. In: Mao Zedong and Contemporary China. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-97-1761-3_6

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