1 Introduction

Despite the significance of Asianism (Ajia shugi, アジア主義) in Japan’s international relations, there has been no consensus on how to define the term. Indeed, as Yoshimi Takeuchi (1963) warns, tracing the historical development of Asianism as a term may be impossible. This chapter recognizes Asianism as encompassing various meanings and lexical iterations including Pan-Asianism (Han-Ajia shugi, 汎アジア主義) and Greater Asianism（Dai-Ajia shugi, 大アジア主義）in the pre-war and wartime period. However, what interests the authors in this chapter is not the lexical history of the term but the concepts behind it and how they have been used to define Japan’s foreign and international cooperation policy from the early Meiji period to the present.

The concept of Asianism is inextricably linked to the concept of Asia. While this may seem obvious, Asia was not defined by the kingdoms and territories in the region until first contact with the West in the 1600 s (Saaler and Szpilman 2011). Even then, it took 200 years and the threat of Western imperialism to solidify the concept of Asia amongst Asians (Matsuda 2011). Asianism, with its origins in Japan, grew out of the conundrum of how to deal with Western expansionism. The extent to which Asian solidarity could be employed to counter Western influence and Japan’s role vis-à-vis Asia have defined the various approaches to Asianism over the course of history. The Asia in Asianism has been defined by various actors both conceptually and geographically based on combinations of geographic proximity, nationality, race, language, culture, religion, spirit, history, tradition, art and civilization for purposes economic, social and political. The authors align with Hotta (2007) who suggests two fundamental features of Asianism:

  1. (1)

    The existence/creation of a distinct Asia with shared characteristics (the characteristics themselves are debated).

  2. (2)

    The potential for Asia to resist/counter Western power.

While several typologies of Asianism have emerged, the authors utilize two types: Alliance-style and Leadership-style Asianism. A third ideological (Nakajima 2014) or teaist (Hotta 2007) type centers on the East–West philosophy of Tenshin Okakura and Rabindranath Tagore, promoting a spiritual, morally pure vision of Eastern high culture to counter the science- and rationality-based Western claims to higher civilization. While these spiritual-cultural conceptions of Asianism may underlie other iterations of Asianism, many of the writings of this genre were in English and were intended for an international audience and did not exert direct influence over Japan’s pre- or post-war foreign policy or international cooperation policy. The following instead delineates Alliance style and Leadership style Asianism as two major types, then show how elements of each have influenced Japan’s foreign policy and international cooperation policy over time, currently manifested through the concept of Asian regionalism.

Asianism has been discussed both as Asian regionalism and as a precursor to Asian regionalism. Yet if regionalism “involves the reorganization of political, economic, cultural and social lives along the lines of an imagined region rather than according to the standard political unit of the nation-state” (He 2017, p. 1), or “regional cooperation and integration based on a shared perception of the region’s present, past, and future” (Saaler 2007, p. 1) then perhaps Asian regionalism does not exist. While Asian regional concepts, cooperation and institutions have grown in recent decades, none have attempted to transcend the nation. Indeed, a common denominator linking conceptions of Asian regionalism across Asian nations is nationalism (He 2017). Further, shared perceptions have been largely absent from Asian regionalism. Despite, or perhaps because of the heavily national character of Asian regionalism, Asianist ideas have been expressed through Japan’s Asian regional concepts in the post-war era.

2 Alliance-Style Asianism and Japan–China Cooperation

Alliance-style Asianism advocating for a political alliance with China based on shared culture gained influence in academic and political circles during the early Meiji period. The East Asian Common Culture Association (Tōa Dōbun Kai), established in 1898, was an early proponent of Alliance-style Asianism, asserting that Japan is an Asian nation that must stand in solidarity with Asia. This represented the antithesis to the Meiji government’s project of rapid modernization through emulation of Western powers. Faced with the Tripartite Intervention of Germany, France and Russia in the wake of the Sino-Japanese War, a profound sense of crisis contributed to this plea for solidarity. In the face of Western diplomatic pressure aiming to limit Japan’s presence in China, the Association was established by leading Japanese politicians and thinkers who sought a political and cultural alliance with China, including Atsumaro Konoe, politician and first chairman of the House of Peers, philosopher Setsurei Mitake, former cabinet member Tsuyoshi Inukai and revolutionary Toten Miyazaki.

Konoe founded the Association based on his belief in “the Orient for Orientals” and a “racial alliance” of the “yellow race,” establishing resolutions that included “protecting China,” “aiding the development of China and Korea,” “investigating and regulating the contemporary affairs of China and Korea” and “sparking national debate” (e.g., Kurita 2017; Fujita 2012). Thus, albeit with somewhat paternalistic overtones, the founding principle of the Association rested on the idea of a united Asia. According to Konoe, “the handling of Oriental affairs is the responsibility of Oriental people. Though the power of the Qing Dynasty has declined, this must be blamed on politics, not the people. Working hand in hand to preserve the Orient should not be a difficult task” (Takeuchi 1993, p. 423).

The rise of “Yellow Peril,” the Western perception that a unified “yellow race” would threaten Western power, prompted fear of retaliation in Japan. Japanese intellectuals, politicians and educators increasingly gravitated toward Konoe’s vision of establishing a partnership with China to counter the anticipated Western response to Yellow Peril. Konoe’s vision necessitated support for China’s modernization efforts, and there was a large, albeit temporary, swell of aid after the Sino-Japanese War from the latter half of the nineteenth century to the beginning of the twentieth century. Indeed, even as early as a few years following the Sino-Japanese War, Chinese reformers such as Youwei Kang and Qichao Liang began to turn toward Japan in the face of Russian encroachment (Smith 2022). Further, recruitment of Chinese intellectuals into the Raising Asia Society (Kō A Kai) and the later Tōa Dōbun Kai widened channels for Asianist thought to flow between Japan and China (Smith 2022). This lay the foundations for Yat-sen Sun’s advocacy of Asianism in the 1910s, asserting that “after all, Asia belongs to Asia’s people … Asia’s peace must be protected by Asia’s people, and above all Japan and China must cooperate with each other” (Saga 2020, p. 135). While Japan’s eventual descent into imperialism prompted China to dismiss Japan’s Asianism as an emulation of Western imperialism, China never fully rejected Asianism, instead constructing a new Asianism with China at the center (Smith 2022).

The Idea of a Japan–China partnership to counter Western power was not limited to the political sphere. The above-mentioned Toten Miyazaki, a civil rights-oriented scholar of Asianism, supported the Chinese revolution and the restoration of human rights and freedom of the oppressed in other Asian countries such as Siam and India. Jigoro Kano, a leading scholar of Japan–China cooperation, expressed his vision of the Japan–China partnership when the first government-sponsored international students from China arrived in Japan. According to Kano,

In the first place, Japan and the Qing Dynasty are just across the ocean from one another. Through the import of systems and culture from China and subsequent creation of our own ancient civilization, we were able to become an advanced country in the Orient. The close relationship between our countries is incomparable with that of Western countries. Through the protection and development of Qing China, the movement toward peace in the Orient can be maintained. Considering the interests of Russia, we can afford nothing less than our best efforts to support Qing China (Kano 1903a, p. 5).

The historic and geopolitical significance of the newly established student mobility between China and Japan and Kano’s expectations for such mobility are readily apparent. Further, in his Issues in Chinese Education (1903b), Kano argues for the unification of the “yellow race,” asserting the significance of Asian regional cooperation for world peace from the perspective of the East–West power balance:

Today’s world is a racial world, a world of racial rivalry. The White race is the most powerful and the Yellow race cannot oppose it. Why is it that we, the Yellow race, must be so divided that we cannot cooperate with one another? … Let us open our hearts to our own race. Japan, Korea and Siam should be regarded as one, united in confronting the White race. Our enemies claim they will not instigate war, but by demonstrating our mutual communication and spirit, we can maintain the momentum toward world peace (Kano 1903b).

Kano’s words capture the essence of Alliance-style Asianism based on Asian solidarity in the face of the Western Other.

Discussions of an Asian alliance to combat Western encroachment were not limited to Japan and China. In Korea, Asianism, together with nationalism, contributed to discussions of Korean national identity during the tumultuous period from the late 1880s to the early 1900s (Shin 2005). In line with Asianist discourse traveling from Japan and China, Korean Asianists envisioned a united China, Japan and Korea in the face of encroachment from Western imperialism. Such unity was not only considered in terms of geography but also along cultural and racial lines, with intellectuals such as Ch’iho Yun advocating for a common aim between the countries based on race, religion and writing systems, and Chunggun An calling for a “Theory of Eastern Peace” (Shin 2005). Yet such conceptions of Asianism would soon come to an end with Japan’s annexation of Korea in 1910 (Shin 2005). Thus, while conceptions of Asianism in Japan during this period both influenced and were influenced by developments in other parts of Asia, the rise of the Japanese empire and the cooption of Asianism for imperial gains all but silenced calls for Asian unity based on Asian equality.

3 Leadership-Style Asianism and the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere

While the preceding discussion of Alliance-style Asianism depicts an egalitarian approach to Asia, this was not uniformly the case. A fluidity of ideas and thinkers supported Asianism in some form or another, and while most accepted the existence of Asia and the idea of Asian solidarity or cooperation in the face of Western encroachment, not all accepted the idea of Asian nations as equal entities. The solidification of Asianism from a loose set of ideas and ad hoc activities by disparate groups into a state ideology coincided with war. With a weakened China and Western powers encroaching, Japan was at a crossroads in its foreign relations. Is Japan a part of Asia? If so, what does this mean for Japan in the face of Western expansionism? Alliance-style Asianists may have supported Japan’s equal participation in a unified struggle between Asia and Western powers, but these ideals did not play out. Neither did Japan “depart from Asia” (Datsu-A-Ron), breaking ties with Asia to follow the West (Iida 1997), as advocated by Yukichi Fukuzawa following Chinese defeat in the Sino-French War. Instead, Japan positioned itself as the only nation that could lead, protect and emancipate Asia in the face of Western aggression and colonization. This “Leadership-style Asianism” culminated in the unilateral creation of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere.

While Alliance-style Asianism and the spiritual-cultural Asianism of Okakura Tenshin were primarily discussed and enacted by politicians and intellectuals, the translation of Leadership-style Asianist thought into political action can be observed in the activities of the Genyōsha (Dark Ocean Society) founded in 1881 and led by Toyama Mitsuru, and its offshoot organization the Kokuryūkai (Black Dragon Society) founded in 1901 and led by Uchida Ryohei. Core organizations of Japan’s ultra-nationalists leading up to World War II, the groups were influential in their promotion of Japanese expansionism based on Asianist thinking (Takeuchi 1963). Despite contributing little to the development of the term itself, the Kokuryūkai was instrumental in translating Asianism into foreign policy through various forms of pressure on the Japanese government (Saaler 2014). At the core of Toyama and Uchida’s Asianism was the idea of a strong Asia to resist Western power, and the Kokuryūkai supported revolutionaries in Asia trying to overthrow Western imperial domination (Saaler 2014).

Even within these organizations, however, there were varying views of Japan’s role in Asia. One example is the 1910 annexation of Korea and alignment with Tarui Tokichi’s Union of the Great East (Daitō-gappō-ron). While most Kokuryūkai members supported the annexation, others had advocated for an equal union between Japan and Korea more in line with Alliance-style Asianism (Saaler 2014). Ultimately the Kokuryūkai came to define the annexation of Korea rhetorically as a “union” with Korea (Saaler 2014). Thus, in addition to Asian unity against Western power, Leadership-style Asianism encompassed a sense of Japanese superiority that was not present, or at least not central to Alliance-style Asianism, despite invoking in the same language. Indeed, Asia gave Japan a conceptual tool not only to combat Western encroachment but also to imagine international relations outside of the existing Sinocentric order (Matsuda 2011).

Due in part to the influence of the Leadership-style Asianist-ideas of the Kokuryūkai, the Japanese government established colonies and territories across Asia from the late Meiji period. By the 1930s, Japan’s imperialist ambitions to expand into the Asian continent could no longer be hidden. To counter intervention by the League of Nations, triggered by the Manchurian Incident, new Asianist ideas such as “The Asian Monroe Doctrine” emerged, asserting that issues in Asia should be solved in and by Asia. While this argument echoes Alliance-style Asianism, in practice it allowed for unilateral decision-making, justifying Japan’s prewar foreign policy, including the “unification” of Japan and Manchuria and forceful “collaboration” with China. Such actions culminated in the formation of the “New Order in East Asia” by the second Konoe Cabinet in 1937. The New Order proclaimed:

The establishment of this new order shall be based on the foundation of a relationship of mutual assistance and cooperation among the three countries in all areas, including politics, economy and culture, and shall be aimed at the establishment of international justice in East Asia, the realization of joint defense, creation of a new culture and the realization of economic integration (Saga 2020, p. 211, emphasis added).

Thus, even during Japan’s imperial expansion, Asianism continued to be framed by the government as “mutual assistance and cooperation” with a focus on “international justice in East Asia,” in striking contrast to the realities on the ground.

In a final extension of Leadership-style Asianism, the “Imperial Way” was established based on Mitsuru Toyama’s “Imperial Asia” principle. The principle is clearly expressed at the policy level in the “Education Policy for the Construction of Greater East Asia: Measures for the Nurturing of the Greater East Asian Nations” issued by the Greater East Asia Council during the Pacific War in the same year:

In accordance with the principle of “Eight Allies for One World” and in light of the fundamental principles of national governance and leadership, we shall establish measures for the development of the people of Greater East Asia, with the following objectives:

Thoroughly expound the world-historical significance of the construction of Greater East Asia with the Empire at its core and instill in the peoples of the world that the completion of this project is the joint responsibility of all.

Eliminate conventional notions of Western superiority and the Anglo-American view of the world, and promote the Imperial Way, while respecting the unique culture and traditions of each nation.

Strive to avoid generic blanket policies, instead making efforts to nurture those in Greater East Asia in their daily lives by through the leadership of the Yamato race (Ishii 1981, p. 8, Footnote 15).

Through this “proclamation of the Imperial Way,” Leadership-style Asianism became explicit, and with the foreign policy philosophy of “imperialism at the core” and efforts toward the “leadership of the Yamato race,” Japan upheld Leadership-style Asianism until its surrender at the end of the Pacific War.

In much of the Anglophone literature on Asianism and Japan, Alliance-style Asianism and Leadership-style Asianism are conflated under the umbrella term “Pan-Asianism” (han Ajia shugi, as in Duara 2001; He 2004; Saaler and Koschmann 2007; Peters 2019; Campagnola 2022). Such discussions have tended to gloss over the early days of Alliance-style Asianism as lacking influence or as functioning simply as a basis for the later Leadership-style Asianism. Certainly, there is continuity between Alliance- and Leadership-style Asianism through the idea of a united region or race to counter the forces of Western imperialism based on common racial and cultural origins. Nonetheless, the idea of Japan as part of Asia as an equal member versus Japan as the leader of Asia, is a crucial difference between the two. Saaler (2007) recognizes this shift in his discussion of Pan-Asianism as a concept that “had developed from a vague romantic and idealistic feeling of solidarity into an ideology that could be applied to the sphere of Realpolitik,” (Saaler 2007, p. 7) while Morifumi (2007) advocates for a distinction between “early” and “late” Asianism based on Japan’s shifting attitude toward China as one of equality to one of nationalist expansion. However, as shown above, there was no linear transformation of Asianism from Alliance-style to Leadership-style. Instead, Japan’s position in relation to Asia, whether it be in, with or for, were discussed simultaneously, until the Japanese imperialist project silenced other sides of the debate. Yet Leadership-style Asianism, despite its prominence in the literature, was but one iteration, or perhaps more accurately a perversion, of a larger concept that neither began nor ended with Japan’s imperialism.

The above sections have shown that Japanese conceptions of Asianism shifted between the pre-Pacific War and wartime periods yet maintained two core elements of the existence of “Asia” as a concept and the potential for a united Asia to counter Western encroachment. The following sections will show how certain elements of Asianism have been maintained through the concept of Asian regionalism and reflected in Japan’s post-war foreign policy and international cooperation efforts. The authors will argue that Japan has kept Asia at the center of its foreign and international cooperation policy while simultaneously moving away from the idea of Asia as a challenge to Western power.

4 Reparations and the Commencement of Japanese ODA

Asianism as a term disappeared from public discourse after World War II as it had come to represent the ideology underlying the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. Yet far from a desire to disengage with Asia, the post-war period saw a great deal of Japanese involvement in the region through the provision of Official Development Assistance (ODA). Roughly 90% of Japan’s ODA went to Asia in the 1970s (Kawai and Takagi 2004), and while this percentage has steadily declined since then, over 60% of bilateral aid was allocated to Asia in 2021 and Asia also topped the list of regional recipients of multilateral aid (OECD 2023). The start of Japanese ODA is officially recognized as Japan’s participation in the British-led Colombo Plan in 1954 (MOFA 2022). However Japan had been providing aid in the form of war reparations since the early 1950s (Kuramoto 2003). Reparations were paid to Myanmar, the Philippines, Indonesia and South Vietnam from 1955–1965 while “quasi reparations” were provided to Thailand, Korea, Singapore and Malaysia in the form of economic assistance tied to agreements to renounce claims for formal reparations (Kawai and Takagi 2004). While official reparations were never paid to China, the sizable amount of aid given to China since 1979 has been viewed as reparations from Japan’s perspective (Kawai and Takagi 2004).

Japan’s sustained engagement in Asian development through ODA provision can be viewed from several perspectives. An instrumentalist perspective can explain Japan’s eagerness to provide ODA as an investment in Asia for the growth of foreign markets for Japan’s post-war economic recovery. Indeed, the international community has criticized Japanese aid as overly opportunistic (Takamine 2006). Nonetheless, Japanese aid to Asia continued. Aside from economic rationales, there is some evidence of ideological continuity in aid provision between the pre- and post-war eras in terms of Japan’s relationship with Asia. While the term Asianim has never been explicit in Japan’s ODA policies past or present, Kuramoto (2003) points out the continuity between pre-war and wartime economic support to Japanese colonies and post-war provision of ODA. Not only were implementation strategies virtually the same, focusing on self-help, mutual interests and long-term, state-centered development plans; many of the people in charge of designing these strategies remained the same from the colonial to the post-war period (Kuramoto 2003). Notably, Kuramoto argues that such institutional continuity allowed for ideas to be carried over from the wartime to post-war periods, including the creation of an Asian economic bloc previously embodied by the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.

When considering the creation of an Asian economic bloc in terms of He’s definition of Asian regionalism, “the organization of political, economic, cultural and social lives along the lines of an imagined region rather than according to the standard political unit of the nation-state” (He 2017, p. 1), Japan’s reinterpretation of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere in terms of Asian regionalism comes into focus. While Japan is not at the center as an imperial power, and though bloc economies have since fallen out of fashion, the idea of an Asia-centric economy became an anchor-point for Japan’s Asian regionalism.

5 The Bandung Conference and South-South Cooperation

In the year following Japan’s inaugural participation in the Colombo Plan, Japan sent a delegation to the “Asian-African Conference” in Bandung, Indonesia, after being invited (albeit controversially) as a member of the region. At the conference, led by Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser, Chinese Prime Minister Zhou Enlai and Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, the “Declaration on the Promotion of World Peace and Cooperation” (the so-called Ten Principles for Peace) was adopted by 29 participating countries. Japan enthusiastically supported the Declaration, and Minister of Foreign Affairs Mamoru Shigemitsu reiterated this support in a diplomatic speech in the same year, stating “it is Japan’s long-cherished desire to establish friendly relations with the liberated Asian countries” and “economic and commercial relations with neighboring Asian countries are today a matter of life and death for Japan.” Further, he asserted that the Japanese delegation at the Bandung Conference “widely disseminated the aims of our peace diplomacy and made meaningful proposals for economic cooperation and cultural exchange within the region” (Japanese Politics and International Relations Database). At least rhetorically, these statements echo earlier calls for Asian unity and maintain a vision of an economically integrated region. Politically, they can be interpreted as an attempt for Japan to rebrand itself as a peaceful nation, appealing to other Asian nations based on common experience while downplaying Japan’s own imperialist past (Dennehy 2007).

The Bandung Conference, however, was not solely attended by countries in the Asian region as it also included newly independent African countries; however the subsequent Non-Aligned Movement Summit, which originated from ideas formed at the Bandung Conference, was not attended by Japan. Nevertheless, the Bandung Conference influenced the direction of Japanese diplomacy to a certain extent, which can be observed in the frequent references to the Conference and the “Bandung Spirit” in speeches and foreign policy documents by prime ministers and foreign ministers. Two years after the Conference, the Kishi Nobusuke administration formulated the “Three Principles of Diplomacy,” which, along with “UN-centeredness” and “cooperation with liberal countries,” stated that “Asia is bound to our country by deep geographical, historical, cultural and spiritual ties” and that Japan should “firmly maintain its position as a member of Asia” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1958, p. 6). This principle became the basis for Japan’s policy of putting Asia at the center of foreign cooperation and promoting South-South cooperation through ODA.

Thus, while again not explicit, Japanese participation in the Bandung Conference and subsequent promotion of South-South cooperation can be considered a re-engagement with some of the sentiments underlying Alliance-style Asianism while simultaneously taking a turn toward economic concerns, which would come to define Japan’s stance toward Asian regionalism.

6 The Fukuda Doctrine and Assistance for ASEAN

The anti-Japanese protests that confronted the Japanese delegation during Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka’s visit to Southeast Asia in 1974 triggered a fundamental rethinking of Japan’s policies in Southeast Asia. In 1977, Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda visited six Southeast Asian countries, ending the diplomatic tour in Manila, the Philippines. There he laid out the basic policy of Japan’s new diplomatic approach in Southeast Asia in a speech which later became known as the Fukuda Doctrine:

First, Japan, a nation committed to peace, rejects the role of a military power, and on that basis is resolved to contribute to the peace and prosperity of Southeast Asia, and of the world community.

Second, Japan, as a true friend of the countries of Southeast Asia, will do its best for consolidating the relationship of mutual confidence and trust based on "heart-to-heart" understanding with these countries, in wide-ranging fields covering not only political and economic areas but also social and cultural areas.

Third, Japan will be an equal partner of ASEAN and its member countries, and cooperate positively with them in their own efforts to strengthen their solidarity and resilience, together with other nations of the like mind [sic] outside the region, while aiming at fostering a relationship based on mutual understanding with the nations of Indochina, and will thus contribute to the building of peace and prosperity throughout Southeast Asia (Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1977).

Two observations can be made. First, while the existence of Asia and Japan’s friendly relations with Asia are explicit, there is no indication of unity or solidarity between Japan and Southeast Asia. Instead, Japan vows to support ASEAN’s own internal solidarity as an “equal partner.” This differs from both Alliance- and Leadership-style Asianism as Alliance-style Asianism envisioned a united Asia with equal members and Leadership-style Asianism envisioned one Asia with Japan at the helm. Instead, in the Fukuda Doctrine Japan maintains distance from the region on the one hand while simultaneously pledging heavy support on the other. The Doctrine is regarded as the forerunner of Japan’s diplomatic and international cooperation philosophies in Asia, delineating Japan’s plan to double ODA to Southeast Asia over the subsequent five years. Indeed, support for ASEAN has become a priority of Japan’s foreign policy and foreign cooperation policy in Asia.

Second, the inclusion of “other nations of the like mind outside the region” in the third pillar of the Doctrine reveals both a shift away from Asianism and a movement toward a more open interpretation of Asian regionalism. Whereas both Alliance- and Leadership-style Asianism promoted a united Asia in the face of Western encroachment, the inclusion of “other nations … outside the region” in the Fukuda Doctrine leaves the door open for wider participation. Thus, while pledging support for a united Southeast Asia and the emerging Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Fukuda Doctrine also foreshadowed an increasingly open stance in Japanese regional conceptions.

7 The Pacific Basin Cooperation Concept and APEC

From the late 1970s Japan began to form and disseminate its own Asian regional concepts. Proposed by Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira in 1978, the “Pacific Basin Cooperation Concept” was a regional framework based on the newly formed concept of the “Pacific Basin.” This new concept was based on previous regional concepts such as Kojima Kiyoshi’s “Pacific Free Trade Area” concept and Foreign Minister Takeo Miki’s “Asia–Pacific Regional Cooperation” concept in the 1960s and refined through discussions at the Pacific Basin Cooperation Study Group chaired by Saburo Okita and attended by prominent researchers such as Seizaburo Sato and Tsuneo Iida. The purpose of the group was to distill the concept of Pacific Basin Cooperation to its essence, which, as clearly stated in a report issued by the group, aimed for “open regionalism” to challenge the growing forces of bloc economies and regional protectionism. Specifically, it attempted to counter trends toward protectionism such as the single market strategy in Europe and negotiations of free trade agreements in North America (Tanaka 2007).

It is by no means an exclusive and closed regionalism vis-a-vis outside of the region. Seriously concerned over what appears to be a decline in the free and open international economic system grounded in the GATT and IMF arrangements, we sincerely hope that the Pacific countries can capitalize upon their characteristic vigor and dynamism to become globalism's new supporters (The Pacific Basin Cooperation Study Group 1980, “The Pacific Basin Cooperation Concept”).

The Pacific Basin Cooperation Concept led to the establishment of the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC) in Canberra, Australia in the late 1980s. Leading up to the establishment of the PECC, Asia–Pacific regional economic cooperation advanced against the backdrop of deepening economic interdependence and rapid economic development in the region, as well as the need for a coordinated response to trade friction with the United States. Japan’s Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) later initiated a ministerial-level meeting in the region, elevating discussions beyond the PECC. The Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Ministerial Conference was subsequently formed in 1989 when Australian Prime Minister Bob Hawke called for an Asia–Pacific ministerial meeting, including the United States. While the initiative was jointly led by Japan and Australia, Japan was hesitant to advocate directly for an Asian regional framework due to the not-so-distant memories of previous wars and control in the region, especially the promotion of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere (Tanaka 2007). Thus, Australia was asked to take on the role of core organizer of the initiative, extending official invitations to each country.

APEC is a forum for regional multilateral cooperation in Asia recognizing the potential of the Asia–Pacific region as a center for world economic growth. Designed to liberalize and facilitate trade and investment and economic and technological cooperation in the region, the guiding principle of APEC is “open regional cooperation,” a direct extension of the Pacific Basin Cooperation Concept. Through such cooperation APEC aims to expand free trade in the region, eventually extending to the global stage.

APEC, which includes North America, has become the most important regional framework guiding Japan’s economic diplomacy in the “Asia–Pacific,” including North America. After its establishment under the leadership of Australia and Japan, APEC gradually evolved from an economic ministerial meeting to a summit meeting, and the Japanese government’s strategic priorities for the regional framework similarly expanded to include policy areas beyond the economy, including Official Development Assistance (ODA) policy. In the 1992 Official Development Assistance Charter, for example, APEC is mentioned explicitly: “In order to cope with transnational regional problems, Japan will cooperate more closely with international organizations and other frameworks for regional cooperation such as the Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)” (Government of Japan 1992, Sect. 4).

While the Fukuda Doctrine foreshadowed a broader regional definition, Japan’s participation in APEC further widened the scope of Japan’s conception of the Asian region to include Australia and the United States. This stance was also evidenced by Japan’s lack of support for Malaysian Prime Minister Dr. Mahathir Mohamad’s proposal for an “East Asian Economic Group” (EAEG) due to its exclusion of Western countries (Yunling 2005). Movement toward open regionalism diverges from the Asianisms discussed earlier in the chapter. The inclusion of Australia and the United States nullify the potential for a united Asia to counter Western power, while the idea of Asia as a region based on shared characteristics also falls out of reach. Viewed from another angle, however, the original impetus behind APEC was to protect against the threat of “Fortress Europe” or a single European market (Tanaka 2007). In this sense, although the definition of Asia was expanded to the Asia–Pacific, APEC was founded as a counterbalance to the threat of Western (in this case European) economic encroachment, in line with Asianism.

8 The East Asian Community Concept and ASEAN+3

As discussed above, until the 1990s Japan’s conception of Asian regionalism was developed through two regional frameworks: Southeast Asia and the Asia–Pacific. Yet from the late 1990s, the simultaneous emergence of the ASEAN+3 framework, the East Asia Summit framework and the Trilateral Summit framework has, together with the existing frameworks of APEC and ASEAN, transformed Asia into a multilayered venue for regional cooperation.

The ASEAN+3 regional forum attended by the ASEAN member countries and Japan, China and Korea, was initiated in 1997 in response to the Asian currency crisis. The crisis has been viewed as a trigger for a “new” Asian regionalism that features a focus on economic interests, equal participation and consensus (Yunling 2005). This renewed solidarity and regional identity was built upon both a sense of shared crisis and growing disillusionment with the United States and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), largely seen as ineffective in resolving the crisis (Kim and Lee 2004). ASEAN has been at the center of the “new” regionalism, with ASEAN+3 prompting the leaders of the three East Asian countries to attend the ASEAN Summit later in the same year.

Later, in the 2000s, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi started to advocate for an “East Asian Community” concept based on the ASEAN+3 framework. In a policy speech titled “Japan and ASEAN in East Asia: A sincere and open partnership” given in Singapore during an official visit to ASEAN in January 2002, Koizumi shared his vision for a new regional framework based on ASEAN+3. The new framework, based on the concept of “community,” notably included Australia and New Zealand, yet diverged from the APEC framework in that it did not seek the participation of the United States or other North American countries. Further, though the speech focused on economic cooperation, it also approached cooperation from a broader perspective: “While recognizing our historical, cultural, ethnic and traditional diversity, I would like to see countries in the region become a group that works together in harmony.” The focus on regional cooperation is also apparent in the Second ODA Charter, revised in 2003, which calls for the strengthening of economic partnerships in East Asia through use of ODA:

Asia, a region with close relationship to Japan and which can have a major impact on Japan’s stability and prosperity, is a priority region for Japan … In particular, the East Asian region which includes ASEAN is expanding and deepening economic interdependency and has been making efforts to enhance its regional competitiveness by maintaining economic growth and strengthening integration in recent years. ODA will be utilized to forge stronger relations with this region and to rectify disparities in the region, fully considering such factors as the strengthening of economic partnership with East Asian countries (Government of Japan 2003, Sect. 4).

Following the developments observed in the Fukuda Doctrine and APEC, the East Asian Community concept viewed Japan as a “partner” with East Asian countries, rather than Asia as a unified whole with Japan as a member or leader. The strong focus on economic rationales and the inclusion of Australia and New Zealand further distance Japan’s concept of Asian regionalism from previous Asianist thought.

Over the course of his tenure, Prime Minister Koizumi promoted the concept of the “East Asian Community,” introducing the concept in his address to the United Nations General Assembly in 2004. In the same year, the “Establishment of an East Asian Community” centered upon ASEAN+3 was included in the “Action Strategy on Trilateral Cooperation” adopted by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of China, Japan and Korea. The idea of establishing an East Asian Community gained further momentum in 2005 when the ASEAN and ASEAN+3 meetings were joined by Australia, New Zealand and India to form the “East Asia Summit.” Further, while Chinese, Japanese and Korean leaders have convened in the ASEAN region since the establishment of ASEAN+3, the first independent trilateral summit meeting was held in Fukuoka, Japan in 2008. The summit served as a venue for the deepening of the commitment to building an East Asian Community, with ASEAN+3 again at the center of such efforts. Such momentum was maintained and strengthened despite subsequent political change in Japan. When the Democratic Party of Japan came to power in 2009, the establishment of an East Asian Community became a top priority for Japanese diplomacy. Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama was an avid supporter of the concept, incorporating his own idea of a “fraternal” spirit, and even began to advocate for the establishment of a collective security system in East Asia.

Thus, Japan’s support for and participation in ASEAN+3, as well as the establishment of the East Asian Community concept, can be seen as further attempts to show solidarity with the region, although much of the spirit of Asianism has been lost. On the other hand, rising competition with China for regional leadership has been a major force driving the participation of both Japan and China in ASEAN+3 (Nabers 2010). However, such leadership is a far cry from that conceptualized as part of Leadership-style Asianism. Indeed, ASEAN+3 has been considered a key structure for ensuring that neither Japan nor China take sole leadership in the region (Nabers 2010). However, Japan–China relations rapidly deteriorated with the Senkaku Islands nationalization crisis in 2011; and relations between Japan and South Korea were also strained due to disputes over interpretations of history. Thus, when political power was returned to the Liberal Democratic party in 2012, the second Abe Shinzo cabinet made no mention of the “East Asian Community” concept, and the efforts toward the establishment of an “East Asian Community” toward a policy of Asian regionalism were completely derailed.

9 The Asian Gateway Initiative and TPP/RCEP

While the Asian currency crisis of the late 1990s prompted a temporary slowdown of the regional economy, by the 2000s East and Southeast Asian economies were growing rapidly, led by China. Meanwhile, Japan was stuck in an economic slump following the bursting of the bubble economy in the 1990s. Faced with this situation, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe (the first Abe Cabinet), who took office in 2006, proposed the “Asian Gateway Initiative” at the 165th session of the Diet. The initiative envisioned “Japan as a bridge between Asia and the world for the movement of people, goods, money culture and information” to “introduce the growth and dynamism of Asia and other foreign countries to Japan” (Office of the Prime Minister 2007). The following May 2007, the Cabinet Secretariat established the “Asian Gateway Strategy Council,” for which Abe appointed Tokyo University Professor Ito Motoshige as the Chair.

In the Council’s report, “The Asian Gateway Initiative” (Asian Gateway Strategy Council 2007), the Initiative recognizes that “Japan’s relationship with Asia was once viewed as a vertical one, emphasizing the difference between the two. The relation now becomes a horizontal and strategic one, with more emphasis on Japan’s place in the region” and states a core goal “to play a responsible role in the development of Asia and its regional order” (Asian Gateway Strategy Council 2008, pp. 2–4). The Initiative is anchored by three basic philosophies: “To make Japan a country that people want to visit, study, work and live in;” “To maintain and further deepen an open regional order with an emphasis on the economy” and “To establish relations of mutual understanding and trust while respecting the region’s diversity” (Asian Gateway Strategy Council 2008, p. 4). By creating an open Japan, horizontal relations between Asia and Japan can be formed, leading to the further development of Asia (Asian Gateway Strategy Council 2008, pp. 2–4). Here too, equal partnership between Japan and Asia, the inclusion of the Pacific West and a focus on economic goals can be observed in Japan’s approach to Asian regionalism.

This philosophy was maintained and carried over to the second Abe administration when Prime Minister Abe took office again in 2012. In 2015, during Prime Minister Abe’s tenure, Japan’s ODA Charter was revised, with the new Charter delineating Asia’s importance for the Japanese economy:

In Asia, hard (physical) and soft (non-physical) basic infrastructure built with development cooperation has contributed to improving the investment climate. Development cooperation’s role as a catalyst promoted private investment, which in turn has led to economic growth and poverty reduction in the recipient countries. It is important to recognize that, through these processes, Asia has developed into an important market and investment destination for Japanese private companies, and therefore, an extremely important region for the Japanese economy (Government of Japan 2015, p.12).

Further, the 2016 Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and 2022 Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), strongly promoted by the second Abe administration and achieved through Japan’s leadership efforts, were the very embodiment of the Asia Gateway concept based on horizontal relations between Asia and Japan.

10 Conclusion

In this chapter, we have shown how Asianism has developed historically as a concept influencing and influenced by Japanese diplomacy and international cooperation, and how it has appeared in and disappeared from Japan’s Asian regionalism. In its modern history, Japan has proposed a diverse range of regional concepts, initiatives and policies including Japan–China cooperation, the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere, South-South cooperation, support for ASEAN, the Pacific Basin solidarity concept, the East Asian Community concept, the Asian Gateway concept and the strategy for a Free and Open Indo-Pacific. These concepts have varied in their definition of the term “region” and have covered a wide range of goals, philosophies and sectors. Further, Japan’s positioning within the Asian “region” and its relationship to regions outside of Asia (e.g., Europe) have likewise been diverse. What has held true throughout such shifts in terminology and meanings, however, is Japan’s focus on Asia as the primary region of its foreign policy and international cooperation efforts.

Further, currents of Asianism run through many of these concepts, initiatives and policies, although weakened over time. At the beginning of the chapter, Hotta’s (2007) fundamental elements of Asianism were introduced. They are:

  1. (1)

    The existence/creation of a distinct Asia with shared characteristics.

  2. (2)

    The potential for Asia to resist/counter Western power.

During the pre-war and wartime periods, both elements were visible in Japan’s foreign policy while in the post-war period both elements have slowly been eroded over time with the increased involvement of the US and other Western states in economic and security policy. This shift from closed to open regionalism signifies a move from regionalism based on inter-regional competition to regionalism supporting the transition to globalization, including cooperation and partnership with the social economies of Europe and the United States. Adherence to the existence/creation of a distinct Asia with shared characteristics has also weakened over time. At the Japanese government-sponsored Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) held in Kenya in 2016, Prime Minister Abe announced the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy,” a direct response to Chinese President Jinping Xi’s “One Belt, One Road” Strategy. The Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) Strategy advocates for regional cooperation linking Africa and Asia across the Indian and Pacific Oceans to ensure the rule of law, freedom of navigation, free trade and economic partnerships. While the FOIP does not explicitly exclude China, it is seen as a US-Japan-led attempt to challenge China’s economic and political rise through the redefinition of Asia based on democratic principles and has overshadowed previous regional concepts influencing Japan’s foreign policy. Further, the concept of the “Indo-Pacific” has been promoted by Japan at international conferences since 2017 and has begun to permeate the foreign policy of the United States and Australia. Though tentatively accepted by some other nations in the region, it has also been eyed with suspicion by ASEAN nations wary of the US’s confrontational stance toward China (Shoji 2021).

While Asianism has informed Japanese conceptions of Asian regionalism in the post-war period, recent developments and redefinitions of Asian regionalism have weakened the influence of Asianism on Japanese foreign and international development policy. In the recently revised ODA Charter (MOFA 2023), the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” has replaced any mention of Asia; indeed, the term does not appear in the Charter. This idea of a new, “Asia-less” Pacific region can perhaps be seen as a step away from Asian regionalism and toward internationalism.