1 A Transient Buzzword

The concept of kokusai kōken (国際貢献) revolves around a discourse that promotes Japan’s increased engagement in international development cooperation. Word-for-word, the kokusai means international, and kōken means contribution. In a broad sense, kokusai kōken refers to positive ways of international engagement that should be undertaken by the Japanese government and the Japanese public. The Japanese government might, for example, request more kokusai kōken, or request participation in undertaking kokusai kōken.

However, a search on the Internet for the term international contribution yields numerous English translations of Japanese websites. This implies that the term international contribution does not fit well into English. Even though kokusai kōken is idiomatically translated into English as Japanese contribution to international society, it is unclear who or what international society is—the object lacks specificity—making it unclear what values are being promoted through its contribution. In order to comprehend such an untranslatable concept, it is necessary to contextualize the concept of kokusai kōken historically and regionally.

The prevalence of discourse promoting kokusai kōken in Japan extends beyond government agencies, encompassing the private sector and the public. This is similar to the way in which actors have justified their actions in reference to Sustainable Development Goals discourse in recent years. Figure 1 illustrates the frequency of the use of kokusai kōken in the National Diet and in popular national newspapers. The frequency of use of kokusai kōken increased considerably in the early 1990s, but enthusiasm cooled rapidly from the mid-1990s onwards.

Fig. 1
A multiline graph graph compares the word frequencies over months from 1986 to 2005. The lines remain at 0 until 1990, then rise gradually. The lines for Nihon Keizai Shimbun and Yomiuri Shimbun peak at the end of 1991, while the lines for Asahi Shimbun and National Diet peak in 1992.

Frequency of the use of kokusai kōken in Japan (1986–2005). Source Oyama (2021). Compiled from the National Diet Record (National Diet Record Search System), Asahi Shinbun (Kikuo II Visual), Nihon Keizai Shinbun (Nikkei Telecom), and Yomiuri Shinbun (Yomiuri Database Service).

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This chapter explores what prompted the fervent search for kokusai kōken. How did it emerge, and what impact did it have on Japan’s involvement in international development cooperation? The discursive framework that shaped this concept emerged in the 1970s and 1980s, and gained popularity during the early 1990s. This coincided with a time when Japanese participation in international development cooperation had significantly increased. Japan’s official development assistance (ODA) being recognized as the largest in the world (1991); the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) were deployed for the first time in peacekeeping operations under the United Nations (1992); and the number of Japanese overseas volunteers grew substantially. Analyzing the rise and fall of the concept of kokusai kōken serves as an attempt to clarify the discursive foundation on which Japan’s involvement in international development was based.

In the following section, I will trace the genealogy of kokusai kōken and its impact on Japan’s international development cooperation. After reviewing the historical context in which the term was coined, I will identify the impact of kokusai kōken in Japan, and examine the process through which this enthusiasm has waned since the mid-1990s. Through this analysis, I will position kokusai kōken as a “buzzword as fuzzword” (Cornwall 2010) that has guided the involvement of Japan in international development and highlight the changing perspective on international development that prevailed in the Japanese society.

2 Emergence of the Concept of Kokusai Kōken

The section begins by discussing the emergence of the concept of kokusai kōken against the background of the following historical developments: (1) Japan’s international status increased due to its economic growth after World War II, (2) greater international responsibilities were expected of Japan, especially by Western countries, and (3) Japan took measures to ensure its fair participation in kokusai kōken (Oyama 2015, 2021). This historical overview illustrates that the concept of kokusai kōken evolved as Japan endeavored to position itself within a hierarchical framework of the international order.

2.1 Awareness of Growing International Status

During the Eisaku Sato administration (1964–1972), Japan’s growing international status began to be discussed in Japan. Throughout this period, there was a growing awareness that Japan had emerged from the post-World War II reconstruction phase and had entered a period of rapid economic expansion. In 1964, Japan became a member of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and also held Article VIII membership of the International Monetary Fund. In Japan, these achievements were seen to confirm that Japan had joined the ranks of developed countries. By 1968, Japan had become the world’s second largest economy after the United States. Recognizing these shifts in power, Prime Minister Sato articulated the following in his policy speech upon assuming office: “I aim to actively contribute to the maintenance of world peace while simultaneously taking prompt action to enhance Japan’s international status” (Sato 1964, emphasis added).

In the latter half of the Sato administration, it was acknowledged that “Japan was entering an era in which its national power would carry unprecedented weight with respect to the rest of the world” (Sato 1970a). Building on this recognition, Sato declared the following in his general address during the 25th session of the United Nations General Assembly in October 1970:

World history has shown us that countries with significant economic power have been tempted to possess commensurate military forces. However, I wish to emphasize that my country is committed to utilizing its economic prowess for the promotion of world peace, with no intention whatsoever to allocate a substantial portion of it for military purposes (Sato 1970c).

The stated policy aimed to increase Japan’s ODA to 1% of its GNP by 1975. In response to concerns from foreign nations about Japan’s growing economic influence potentially transitioning into military domination, the Japanese government sought to clarify its foreign aid commitments. Based on his international statements, Prime Minister Sato declared to the Japanese public that the Japanese government was determined to contribute to the building of peace in the world (Sato 1970b, emphasis added).

2.2 Awareness of Growing International Responsibility

Rising status necessitated the shouldering of greater responsibility. Only in the late 1970s did Japan formally prioritize its allocation of ODA as a strategy for fulfilling international responsibilities that came with its elevated international status. Japanese diplomats began to realize that they were required to fulfill their responsibilities in building a stable international order, as both developed and developing nations regarded Japan as a great power (Nishiyama 1977, p. 8, p. 4). The Takeo Fukuda administration’s five-year plan to double ODA, introduced in 1977, reflected this acknowledgement and demonstrated Japan’s commitment to circulate its current account surpluses back into the international community. During Yasuhiro Nakasone’s administration from 1982 to 1987, the prime minister re-affirmed in the Diet that the expectations and demands placed on Japan by various countries were proportional to the nation’s enhanced status in the international community. Furthermore, he stressed that fulfilling international responsibilities might require citizens to shoulder occasional burdens (Nakasone 1984).

After the Tokyo Summit in 1986, Prime Minister Nakasone was acutely aware that “Japan’s status in the international community, not only economically but also politically, has risen significantly.” Furthermore, he emphasized the need for further foreign engagement and asserted that Japan should move away from being “a unilateral beneficiary of world peace and prosperity” to “shouldering its fair share of the burden and actively contributing to the international community” (Nakasone 1986). The subsequent administration under Noboru Takeshita inherited recognition that as “one of the major leaders in the international order … Japan itself must sweat hard and willingly bear the … cost,” and adopted the concept of “Japan contributing to the world” as the guiding principle of the administration (Takeshita 1987). In response to the growing criticism of the economic egoism of Japan, particularly from the United States, and to mitigate these concerns, discourse on kokusai kōken came to the forefront.

In the post-World War II era, Japan refrained from political and military involvement in foreign affairs and cultivated its national image based on postwar pacifism to distinguish itself from the belligerent empire of Japan. Thus, as the Japanese government deepened its commitment to the maintenance and management of international order, especially in the political and military spheres, it was required to justify its increased engagement in foreign affairs in a manner aligning with these national images. The discourse of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in these circumstances focused on Japan’s international status, responsibilities, and contributions as a great power or a major leader in the international order. It was crucial for both the government and the LDP to construct a discourse that encouraged civic society to supply international public goods as an economic superpower. In this regard, participation in international development was considered as an area that aligned with Japan’s desires for pacifism and its reputation as a great power. This historical background gave rise to the concept of kokusai kōken and its associated discursive framework.

2.3 Disseminating the Concept of Kokusai Kōken in Political Circles

References to kokusai kōken rose in November 1990 (Fig. 1). In August of that year, the United Nations imposed economic sanctions and deployed coalition forces in response to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. Faced with this situation, the Japanese government deliberated on the type of cooperation it could offer as an economic superpower. The Japanese government, however, was tied to its commitment to postwar pacifism and could only provide financial assistance. This led to increased criticism of Japan in the U.S. Congress. President George W. Bush demanded Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu allow the JSDF to join the multinational force (Bush 1990). In October, the Japanese government proposed the United Nations Peace Cooperation Bill to the country’s House of Representatives, which was intended to provide a framework for the JSDF’s first overseas deployment. Nevertheless, because of the growing pacifist sentiment in Japanese society against overseas military deployments, the bill was withdrawn on November 9.

Although the bill, which included the deployment of the JSDF to overseas operations, was premature, it created a sense of urgency in Japanese public discourse. It underscored the idea that Japan needed to demonstrate its commitment to restoring international order not only through financial assistance but also through the deployment of personnel. After the bill was withdrawn, the ruling LDP, the opposition Komeito party, and the Democratic Socialist Party signed the “Memorandum of Agreement on International Peace Cooperation” on November 8, 1990. Subsequently, major newspapers began using the concept of kokusai kōken to report on this political movement (Asahi 1990; Yomiuri 1990). Notably, neither the government nor the ruling LDP officially promoted the term, and it was not used in the tripartite agreement. The origin of the concept of kokusai kōken can be traced to Komeito, which held the decisive vote in the Diet and had anticipated the failure of the bill since the end of October. Komeito had advocated a compromise bill, tentatively named the “Basic Bill on Kokusai Kōken,” to bridge the gap between the ruling and opposition parties. The concept of kokusai kōken was accepted and used in accordance with Komeito’s objectives.

3 The Dissemination of Kokusai Kōken to a Wider Japanese Society

The term kokusai kōken, initially coined by Komeito, resonated with popular sentiment and spread rapidly. This allowed a wide range of foreign policies and practices that transcended, or reshaped, the left–right ideological divide. This section highlights two examples of novel policies and practices fostered by the discursive framework associated with this concept: (1) the overseas deployment of the JSDF and (2) the engagement of Japanese citizens in international cooperation.

3.1 The Overseas Deployment of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces

The deployment of the JSDF overseas for the first time took place in April 1991, less than six months after the withdrawal of the UN Peace Cooperation Bill. Following the Gulf War’s stable armistice in March, the administration considered JSDF minesweepers for clearing floating mines in the Persian Gulf. Surprisingly, despite striking public opposition to the deployment of military personnel overseas approximately six months earlier, contemporaneous public opinion polls in March and April showed support for the JSDF’s deployment. The previously established anti-military sentiment in Japanese society rapidly changed amidst the widespread adoption of the concept of kokusai kōken (Oyama 2017).

The Cabinet Intelligence and Research Office (CIRO) commissioned the Council for Public Policy Foundation to conduct a public opinion poll in late March 1991. Although the details of the questions asked in the poll were not disclosed, 62% of the respondents were in favor of deploying the JSDF minesweepers, while 29% were opposed, marking the first time that a majority was in favor of deployment (Asahi 1991b). Yukihiko Ikeda, then Director-General of the Defense Agency, argued in the House of Councilors that “the public’s view of the role of the JSDF and the thinking of kokusai kōken” was increasing, citing the opinion poll (Ikeda 1991). Furthermore, Ikeda pressed Prime Minister Kaifu, who was reluctant to deploy the JSDF overseas, by pointing out, “You emphasize the importance of public opinion, but the poll results show that a significant number of people agree with the deployment” (Asahi 1991b).

In mid-April, CIRO commissioned the company Central Research Services to conduct another poll. A CIRO insider explained that the reason for conducting a second poll was that “the numbers are better than expected. We want to reaffirm the will of the people” (Asahi 1991a). While the exact details of the questions in the second poll also remained unclear, the percentage of the responses reported as “should be deployed overseas” appeared to be even higher than that in the first survey. In response to these poll results, Komeito’s Natsuo Yamaguchi cautioned against unquestioningly accepting the interpretation put forward by the government and the LDP, emphasizing that it is difficult to ascertain the underlying assumptions of this public opinion and the information on which people base their views (Yamaguchi 1991). In particular, he pointed out that the premise of the question might be more nuanced, possibly framing the deployment as kokusai kōken, which is not justified by the Japan Self-Defense Forces Law, rather than ensuring the safety of the nation’s ships, which is justified by that law.

As can be inferred from Yamaguchi’s statement, these polls have produced results that seemingly overturned the prevailing public opinion by positioning the overseas deployment of the JSDF as a vital component of kokusai kōken and by relegating military and security aspects that are likely to provoke protest. This represents a significant shift in the axis of confrontation in the debate over Japan’s foreign policy. The political confrontation was initially conservative (emphasis on military defense policy centered on Japan-United States relations) versus progressive (pursuit of international neutrality and anti-militarism), a confrontation that formed shortly after Japan’s defeat in WWII. It also shows the appeal of kokusai kōken. It was the spread of the concept of kokusai kōken, stemming from Japan’s increased economic power and international status that engendered a new political cleavage between those who allocate more resources to international public policy, including human resources (kokusai kōken beyond conventional frameworks), and those who only provide financial contributions to international affairs (kokusai kōken within conventional frameworks). The stance focused solely on providing economic aid was scorned as one-country pacifism (ikkoku heiwashugi), and the perspective advocating political and military kokusai kōken gradually became the dominant discourse in Japanese society.

In this context, Prime Minister Kaifu made the decision to deploy the JSDF minesweepers, who departed for the Persian Gulf on April 26, 1991. The fact that the JSDF was described as “deploying the Hinomaru [national flag] under the banner of ‘contribution’” (Asahi 1991c) indicates that the JSDF was perceived as an entity actively engaged in kokusai kōken on behalf of Japan. It also suggests that the JSDF had assumed a new role beyond that of a military organization dedicated solely to national defense. Subsequently, the Act on Cooperation for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Other Operations (Act No. 79 of June 19, 1992) provided the legal framework for the JSDF to participate in UN peacekeeping operations in Cambodia (the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia) and East Timor (the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor, and the United Nations Mission of Support to East Timor) to participate in UN peacekeeping operations. During these operations, the role of the JSDF expanded to include reconstruction and development assistance in post-conflict areas, with a particular focus on repairing infrastructure such as roads and bridges (Fujishige et al. 2022, pp. 85–122). This form of kokusai kōken allowed the JSDF to engage in overseas reconstruction and development assistance, which was consistent with the anti-military norms that had become entrenched in Japanese society.

3.2 The Growing Involvement of Japanese Citizens in International Cooperation

The widespread use of the concept of kokusai kōken in the Japanese media has led to a change in the perception of non-governmental organizations (NGOs). In contrast to the situation before the Gulf Crisis, when NGOs were regarded as unattractive in Japan, they have become essential participants in international development in Japan, operating in areas beyond the reach of government. This section provides an overview of the political, economic, and social changes that have influenced the development of NGOs in Japan.

First, the growing interest in kokusai kōken made Japanese politicians increasingly aware of the underdeveloped state of NGOs in Japan. In light of Japanese growing interest in participating in UN peacekeeping operations, a cross-party Diet group participated in the monitoring of the national elections in Bangladesh in late February and early March 1991. Here, they observed Western NGOs playing active roles in various fields. After a cyclone hit Bangladesh in April 1991, a member of the Diet observed that “NGOs from Western countries played a very central role” in the distribution of relief supplies and other activities (Kitagawa 1992). The Diet members who visited the region expressed “sadness” at the lack of Japanese NGOs that could have participated in UN-led peace operations (Taneda 1991a). Thus, they advocated for the creation of “a mechanism that would enable the citizens and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to work together for kokusai kōken” (Taneda 1991b).

Second, the Japanese government increased financial allocation to support NGOs, which until then had encountered funding constraints when attempting to carry out their operations. In January 1991, the Japanese government launched a new system called the Postal Saving for International Voluntary Aid (POSIVA) in conjunction with efforts to expand support for NGOs within framework of NGO project subsides and small-scale grant aid initiated under the banner of Japan Contributing to the World during the Takeshita administration. POSIVA is a voluntary program that collects the interest on regular savings deposited in post office saving accounts. These donations are then allocated to support funds for NGOs operating abroad. This program was conceived even before the Gulf War and against the background of Japan’s rise to economic superpower status. It aimed to stimulate “such contributions that every Japanese citizen [and not just the government] would also participate in the international community” (Fukaya 1990). Over the years, donations from depositors increased, and the number of depositors reached over 20 million by the end of June 1996. The Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications felt that “the program was widely accepted as a convenient means of kokusai kōken” (Nikkei Kinyu 1996), and post office tellers also felt that many people said, “I can do something useful by simply saving money” (Nikkei 1997). As the concept of kokusai kōken gained popularity, systems and practices for supporting NGO were enhanced.

The third change, marked by the heightened interest of the public in international philanthropic activities, stands out as the most significant. Although the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) had previously hired only around 30 new graduates each year, the number of requests for information materials surpassed the number of recruits, reaching 2,300, 5,000, and 9,000 for the 1992, 1993, and 1994 editions, respectively. In May 1995, it was reported that the number of people requesting information in 1995 was “close to 20,000” (Asahi 1994a). JICA officials attributed the reason for this change to the increasing debate on kokusai kōken. It was observed that there was an increasing awareness among the public about the need for kokusai kōken, and the desire of the public to be involved in such contributions was escalating (Asahi 1994b). One NPO stated that “Citizens have become aware of ‘kokusai kōken’ as if they ‘must do something’” (Asahi 1994a).

Thus, the growing awareness of issues related to kokusai kōken prompted the public in Japan to act. Once viewed as eccentric (Asahi 1992) and anti-establishment (Homma 1994), NGOs began to engage in foreign aid activities in cooperation with the government during this transition. In 1994, amid the turmoil of Rwandan civil war and the consequent displacement of refugees, Japanese NGOs offered assistance on the ground ahead of the government’s deployment. Furthermore, the Japanese government aimed to bolster its support for NGOs by offering financial aid, equipment, and other forms of assistance, thereby enhancing the presence of Japan in the region. As kokusai kōken gained momentum, Japanese NGOs transformed themselves into international development actors.

4 Subsiding Enthusiasm for Kokusai Kōken

The concept of kokusai kōken has significantly expanded Japanese participation in international development efforts. This started with a remarkable increase in ODA, then led to the deployment of the JSDF abroad, and the promotion of international volunteerism. Although these attempts provided the Japanese people a sense of pride in contributing to the international society, Fig. 1 indicates that the utilization of the term kokusai kōken then rapidly diminished. This section offers an outline of the factors that contributed to the short-lived nature of the term and practice of kokusai kōken.

The bursting of the bubble economy, which decimated disposable income, and a growing sense of economic stagnation were the primary factors that led to the shift away from kokusai kōken in Japanese society. In the official journal of the Democratic Socialist Party, which had previously touted Japan's economic superiority, an essay appeared with headline “Removing the ‘Economic Superpower’ Mentality,” which argued that “we must not be smug” and that “the era of chasing the dream of an economic superpower has ended” (Yajima 1994). By the mid-1990s, Japanese society came to “dislike the term ‘kōken’” because “as taxpayers, we tended to think in terms of ‘our money’” (Asahi 1996). Consequently, “the debate on kōken in Japan has lost some of the enthusiasm it once had,” and attitudes began to “think less about responsibility and more about ‘how will this benefit Japan’” (ibid.). The latter attitude centers the concept of kokueki (national interest/benefit).

Figure 2 depicts the frequency of kokueki in the Diet debate. Its frequency was relatively low from the late 1970s to the early 1990s, which coincided with a dominant discourse emphasizing the need to fulfill responsibilities based on international status. Since the mid-1990s, the frequency of kokueki gradually increased as kokusai kōken declined. Although the concept of kokueki, the opposite of kokusai kōken, is positioned as a translation of the English concept of national interest, it is also used with a meaning that is relatively similar to that of economic benefit. As early as the mid-1980s, the plant industry, which was suffering from a slump in exports, began to emphasize kokueki-oriented aid, that is, tied aid that would encourage Japanese companies to expand overseas, which gradually came to dominate as the Japanese economy became notably stagnated in the mid-1990s. This phenomenon exemplifies the shift from altruistic to self-interested discourse (Oyama 2021).

Fig. 2
A line graph depicts the frequency of the word National Diet over the years. The line peaks at 400 between 1971 and 1973, while it remains at 0 between 1961 and 1965.

Frequency of the use of kokueki (national interest/benefit) in Japan (1961–2005). Source Oyama (2021). Compiled monthly by the author from the National Diet Proceeding (National Diet Proceedings Search System).

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This shift in discourse was widely adopted in the realm of Japanese foreign aid in 1997. The impetus was Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto’s directive for a comprehensive reform to reduce the ODA budget, in light of the shrinking national budget and economy. In reaction, the Economic Planning Agency, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which were responsible for ODA, as well as several stakeholder industry associations, submitted policy recommendations based on the concept of kokueki. Their recommendations emphasized the concept of face-to-face assistance, that is, aid that would clearly demonstrate Japan’s presence as a donor to the recipient country and earn the gratitude of the recipient country. This initiative to bolster Japan’s presence contrasted with the trend since the 1970s, exemplified by the triangular development cooperation project, which had rendered Japan invisible as an aid donor, careful not to antagonize the Southeast Asian recipient countries with which Japan had once fought during World War II (Kim 2022).

By the late 1990s, it was said that “kokusai kōken and aid were clearly no longer ‘in season’” (Shimomura 1997). After the economic recession hit and international pressure, particularly from the United States, lessened, the Japanese populace lost interest in foreign aid. Japanese foreign aid was not motivated by internal factors, but instead by external factors based on the concepts of international status, responsibility, and contribution that were formed through symbolic interactions with other nations. Furthermore, the concept of aid for kokueki came to be used in the context of defending the interests of aid stakeholders against declining national budgets, but it never generated widespread public interest.

5 Conclusion: What Was Kokusai Kōken?

The concept of kokusai kōken generated a discursive framework, composed alongside the following discussions: (1) improvement of international status associated with economic growth, (2) international responsibility as an economic superpower, and (3) contribution to bridging the gap between the ought-self and the actual-self as an economic superpower. In the process of generating and disseminating this concept in Japanese society, the involvement of Japan in international development was increased by a greater ODA budget, the overseas deployment of the JSDF, and international cooperation by civilians through NGOs. Thus, one can infer that this concept played an indispensable role in framing Japan as a major actor in international development. Although this discursive order was cultivated particularly from the late 1970s to the early 1990s, it collapsed in one fell swoop in the mid-1990s in the wake of Japan’s economic downturn.

What is the reason for the untranslatability of the concept of kokusai kōken or the Japanese contribution to the international society? After rebuilding relations with former enemies in the post-World War II era, colonies, and occupied territories as a defeated nation, Japan’s national pride lay in being recognized as one of the world’s responsible powers, particularly by western industrialized nations and international organizations, without posing a threat to Asian nations. Especially after becoming an economic superpower, Japan has sailed between the Scylla of appearing too passive and the Charybdis of appearing too proactive in its foreign policy. Japan placed high value on gaining international recognition and status in terms of its national identity. This historical sense is not shared by English-speaking countries. Wanting to be recognized as a prominent non-Western economic power by Western industrialized countries, although it is geographically a part of Asia, render the concepts of the international society in Japan and kokusai kōken difficult to translate. It was within this historical context that Japan's international development cooperation experienced rapid growth. The lack of a shared historical context was why “foreign observers, even aid experts” found it “difficult to understand why Japanese ODA, of all foreign policy instruments, was the first to gain international attention” (Yasutomo 1989, p. 38).

Simultaneously, particular nuances in the conceptualization of the international society have been rendered invisible in Japanese. The extent to which the concept of the international has changed since the late 1990s, when kokusai kōken lost its momentum, and how it is used in Japanese discourse, remains to be seen.