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“Debt Trap Theory”: The Logic of Power Politics in India

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The Reality and Myth of BRI’s Debt Trap

Part of the book series: Indo-Pacific Focus ((IPF))

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Abstract

In recent years, the U.S.-led officials, media, and scholars have publicly criticized China for bringing a “debt trap” to the developing countries, while the “debt trap theory” about BRI was first proposed by Indian scholars and medias. India’s hype on the “debt trap theory” in Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Nepal and the Maldives presents the characteristics and trend of “internal and external interaction” and “Indo-Western linkage”. On the one hand, the “debt trap theory” is effective if state solidarity did not exist; on the other hand, India and the West can form a powerful political tradition based on realism. Although the “debt trap theory” was hyped by Indian scholars and the media, it has been internalized into India’s power political strategy. This has been verified in the change of power in Maldives. In India’s “debt trap theory”, the island country Maldives in the Indian Ocean has unparalleled typical significance. It is hard to tell whether the signal releasers and the actors of the “debt trap theory” believe in the “debt trap”, but for the Indians, who believe in the power tradition, the truth is secondary. What is important is that in the change of state power in Maldives, India has made full use of the “debt trap theory” as the starting point to exert the power and political influence among countries.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Chellaney (2017a).

  2. 2.

    Debt-trap Diplomacy. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Debt-trap_diplomacy.

  3. 3.

    Morgenthau (2006).

  4. 4.

    Ibid, p. 148.

  5. 5.

    Shixiong (2016).

  6. 6.

    Libin (2018).

  7. 7.

    Ibid.

  8. 8.

    Chellaney (2017a).

  9. 9.

    Chellaney (2017a).

  10. 10.

    Chellaney (2018b).

  11. 11.

    Chellaney (2017a).

  12. 12.

    Chellaney (2018b).

  13. 13.

    In February 2018, Sri Lanka held local elections seen as a bellwether for the 2020 general election, with former President Rajapaksa’s Popular Front party crushing Prime Minister Wickremesinghe's United National Party and President Sirisena's Sri Lanka Freedom Party by nearly five times. At the same time, Sirisena and Wickremesinghe and their party escalated the tension, and on 26 October President Sirisena announced the dismissal of Wickremesinghe as Prime Minister and the appointment of former President Rajapaksa as Prime Minister of the new government. Wickremesinghe said he would not step down as prime minister, and the dispute between the government and the house once again caused political tensions, and Sri Lanka fell into a constitutional crisis.

  14. 14.

    Chellaney (2018c).

  15. 15.

    Chellaney (2018a).

  16. 16.

    Ibid.

  17. 17.

    Chellaney (2018c).

  18. 18.

    Ibid.

  19. 19.

    Ramanathan (2017).

  20. 20.

    Ibid.

  21. 21.

    Ibid.

  22. 22.

    Chaudhary and Marlow (2018).

  23. 23.

    Ibid.

  24. 24.

    Ibid.

  25. 25.

    Chellaney (2018d).

  26. 26.

    Ibid.

  27. 27.

    Fearing Debt Trap (2018a).

  28. 28.

    Ibid.

  29. 29.

    Ibid.

  30. 30.

    Fearing Debt Trap (2018c).

  31. 31.

    Ibid.

  32. 32.

    Chellaney (2018a).

  33. 33.

    Fearing Debt Trap (2018c).

  34. 34.

    Ibid.

  35. 35.

    Chellaney (2018a).

  36. 36.

    Libin (2018).

  37. 37.

    Ibid.

  38. 38.

    Chellaney (2015).

  39. 39.

    Chellaney (2009, 2015); China’Sole Ally (2016); The Bull in the China Shop (2017); China’s Creditor Imperialism (2018); How Can America Change Pakistani Behavior (2018); China Ensnares Vulnerable States (2018; Why the South China Sea (2018); Beijing Loses a Battle (2018); The China Backlash (2018); China’s Imperial Project Runs (2018); Democracy in Danger (2018); Belt and Roadblocks (2018); Chellaney (2018d); Insecurity in India’s Maritime Backyard (2018).

  40. 40.

    Chellaney (2009).

  41. 41.

    Chellaney (2015).

  42. 42.

    Chellaney (2017a, b).

  43. 43.

    Modi (2018).

  44. 44.

    Australian Parliamentarians (2018).

  45. 45.

    Hendler (2018).

  46. 46.

    Joint Statement (2018).

  47. 47.

    Chellaney (2018e).

  48. 48.

    Mohan (2014, p. 122).

  49. 49.

    Ibid.

  50. 50.

    Brewster (2016, p. 82).

  51. 51.

    Lei Jia Mohan: The Grand Maritime Strategy of China and India, p. 123.

  52. 52.

    Ibid, p. 124.

  53. 53.

    Brewster (2016, p. 82).

  54. 54.

    Li Zhonglin, A Review of the Monroe Doctrine in India, Asian-African Review, No. 4, 2013, p. 15.

  55. 55.

    Ibid.

  56. 56.

    Brewster (2016, p. 84).

  57. 57.

    Ibid.

  58. 58.

    Constantino Xavier, “New Delhi Can’t Hope to do a Male in Colombo”, Hindustan Times, October 31, 2018, https://www.hindustantimes.com/analysis/new-delhi-can-t-hope-to-do-a-male-in-colombo/story-EoYKpms3TZIe6VMzvhJKzL.html.

  59. 59.

    Mohan (2014, p. 122).

  60. 60.

    Brewster (2016, p. 89).

  61. 61.

    Chaudhary and Marlow (2018).

  62. 62.

    Maldives Election Changing Days (2018).

  63. 63.

    Double priority refers to India’s “neighbour first” and the Maldives’ “India first”.

  64. 64.

    On February 1, 2018, the Maldives Supreme Court acquitted former President Nasheed and opposition leaders from President Yameen and government authorities, triggering ongoing political conflict in the Maldives.

  65. 65.

    Press Release on India’s Reaction (2018).

  66. 66.

    Situation in Maldives (2018).

  67. 67.

    Press Release on Situation in Maldives (2020), https://www.mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/29501/Press_Release_on_situation_in_Maldives.

  68. 68.

    Press Release on the situation in Maldives (2018).

  69. 69.

    Revocation of State of Emergency (2018).

  70. 70.

    Press Release on the Political Situation in the Maldives (2018).

  71. 71.

    Government of India (2018).

  72. 72.

    Chellaney (2018a).

  73. 73.

    “The Maldives’s New Regime (2018).

  74. 74.

    Chellaney (2018c).

  75. 75.

    Joint Press Statement (2018).

  76. 76.

    Ibid.

  77. 77.

    India Our Best Friend (2018).

  78. 78.

    “Tried to Play (2018).

  79. 79.

    Visit of Foreign Minister of Maldives to India (2018).

  80. 80.

    Ibid.

  81. 81.

    Ibid.

  82. 82.

    India (2018).

  83. 83.

    Ranjan (2018).

  84. 84.

    Joint Statement (2018).

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Yang, S., Jiang, A. (2024). “Debt Trap Theory”: The Logic of Power Politics in India. In: Peng, N., Cheng, M.Y. (eds) The Reality and Myth of BRI’s Debt Trap. Indo-Pacific Focus. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-97-1056-0_3

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