Keywords

Although there are always different views on dignity in different historical periods and different ethical traditions, it is generally agreed that owning dignity means a human being “has supreme inherent value” and therefore “deserves moral consideration”. The term “human dignity” never appeared in the Confucian literature, but there are lots of discourses on “the supreme inherent value of human beings”, and that “human beings deserve moral consideration because of their inherent value”. Therefore, we can reconstruct the Confucian concept of human dignity by Confucian texts. Equality is the most important feature of the modern concept of human dignity. Confucian ethics seems to run counter to this modern understanding of human dignity in that it accepts hierarchy in society. Analysis of the relationship between the two kinds of dignity in Confucianism—universal dignity and acquired dignity—shows that, compared to hierarchy, equality is a more fundamental value. There is “human dignity” in the modern sense in Confucian texts. To elucidate the idea of equality embodied in Confucianism is the major task for the reconstruction of Confucian concept of human dignity today.

Diverse economic and ecological challenges, together with new technological possibilities, promote an urgent need to clarify the multiple meaning of autonomy and to reconstruct the basis and demands of social justice. A sufficient explanation for human dignity can plays a dominant role in this process and therefore determines how we evaluate technologies and policies from the perspective of morality. Confucian ethics systematically demonstrates the meaning, basis, and moral demands of human dignity. The Confucian concept of human dignity offers a crucial approach to reflecting on modern theories of human dignity and can contribute to the conceiving of a universally recognized concept of human dignity.

1 The Basis of Human Dignity in Confucianism

Confucian ethics holds that the essential feature distinguishing human beings from all other creatures is that only human beings can live a moral life. Therefore, human beings are the most precious in the world. XunZi said, “Water and fire have essences, but not life; herbs and trees have life, but not perception; birds and beasts have perception, but no sense of righteousness. The human being has essence, life, perception and, in addition, a sense of righteousness, and thus can be the noblest on earth” (Xunzi· Wangzhi).Footnote 1 In The Book of Rites, Confucius said, “the human being is the heart/mind of heaven and earth” (The Book of Rites· Liyun).Footnote 2 It means that humanity is the only agent that can comprehend good and evil, and the only agent to practice beneficence, hence the most precious being.

Like most of other philosophical traditions, Confucian ethics bases human dignity on morally relevant features, while the basis of human dignity in Confucian ethics is mainly moral potential rather than displayed moral ability. For Mencius, what make one qualified for being human are the “four hearts” (四心). “Without a heart that sympathizes, one is not human; without a heart that knows shame, one is not human; without a heart that reveres and respects, one is not human; without a heart that approves and condemns, one is not human” (Mencius· Gongsunchou I).Footnote 3 The “four hearts” are not virtues but “sprouts” of four cardinal virtues. “A heart that sympathizes is the sprout of beneficence; a heart that knows shame is the sprout of righteousness; a heart that reveres and respects is the sprout of ritual propriety; a heart that approves and condemns is the sprout of wisdom….” (Mencius· Gongsunchou I).Footnote 4 XunZi regards moral potential as the basis of human dignity too. “Human nature is natural Material; education is artificial carving and polishing by moral principles. If there is no moral potential, moral education has nothing to work on; if there is no education, moral potential cannot develop into virtue by itself” (Xunzi· Lilun).Footnote 5 Moral education can work on human beings, because there is a possibility to be beneficent in human nature. This possibility grants human being a supreme moral status.

There are different views on whether owning certain potential can be a sufficient condition for owning dignity. Alan Gewirth argues that dignity is a status owned by agents and that agency is the basis of moral status. Both Klaus Steigleder and Deryck Beyleveled accept this position, but they offered different arguments on how potential for agency per se can grant moral status. For Klaus Steigleder, “it is not possible that agency can in one case possess unsurpassing significance for the agent and in the other case (potentiality for agency) no significance at all. For the agent to judge otherwise would be inconsistent”.Footnote 6 But Beyleveled insists that, “it cannot possibly be true that it is dialectically necessary for agents to grant that being a mere potential agent…is sufficient for the possession of at least some intrinsic moral status.”Footnote 7 Some people hold self-consciousness and intelligence as the basis of human dignity. Among them, some believe the potential for these capacities cannot grant dignity. John Harris’ argument about “potentiality” is that “the bare fact that something will become X... is not a good reason for treating it now as if it were in fact X.”Footnote 8 But John Finnis objected to Harris’ position in “Euthanasia Examined, Ethical Clinical and Legal Perspectives”. He argued that “potential is an existing reality, a thoroughly unitary ensemble of dynamically inter-related primordia, of bases and structures for, development…A philosophical anthropology attentive to all the relevant data, including biological and zoological realities, can make a well-grounded affirmation of the personal nature of the human organism.”Footnote 9

Confucianism sides with the position that value potential. It holds owning moral potential to be the sufficient condition for owning human dignity. Every human being can be granted human dignity even without developing these inherent potential into virtues. There is a classic thought experiment in Mencius: suppose we witness a toddler (who is yet to fully develop her human potentials) approaching a water well, we would be prompted by our natural compassion to save her from the danger. According to Zhang Qianfan, although Mencius intended to use this example to illustrate that everyone has a heart that sympathizes, “it can be plausibly extended to show the general Confucian concern and respect for innate human potentials. Whether a person has actually developed these potentials (as he ought to), they are regarded as having value by themselves and deserve respect from others”.Footnote 10 Therefore, we should respect not only those with comparable moral achievements, but also every ordinary person, “whose innate capacities make human improvements an ever-present possibility”.Footnote 11 If we are unaware of the innate potentialities in every human being or unaware of the value of these potentialities, the development of these potentialities will be hindered. Famous Confucian Dong Zhong-shu said, “After humans understand their nature, they know that they are nobler than all other beings. After knowing that they are nobler than all other beings, they know propriety and righteousness. After knowing propriety and righteousness, they feel satisfied in good manners. After being satisfied in good manners, they are willing to follow the moral rules” (History of Han Dynasty).Footnote 12 Inherent potential grants every human being human dignity. Awareness of the dignity one owns is the necessary condition for everyone to develop these potentialities into virtues. Human dignity does not depend on manifested capacity; on the contrary, nurturing of typical human capacity depends on the awareness of one’s own dignity.

2 Two Kinds of Human Dignity in Confucianism

2.1 Universal Dignity

In Confucian ethics, moral potential is the basis of human dignity. Every human being is born with moral potential and thus owns human dignity. This dignity is called universal dignity, because it is owned universally by humans.

Firstly, every human being owns moral potential. Mencius believes that everyone is endowed by heaven with “four hearts”, “everyone has a heart that sympathizes, a heart that knows shame, a heart that reveres and respects, and a heart that approves and condemns” (Mencius· Gaozi I).Footnote 13

These four initiators are moral potential. “Human beings have these four initiators just as they have four limbs” (Mencius· Gongsunchou I).Footnote 14 Just like physical features, the potential to understand and practice moral rules is an inherent natural attribute of the human species.

Secondly, every human being owns moral potential equally. Yao and Shun were acclaimed models of virtuous men. But Mencius believes that “Yao and Shun were just the same as other men” (Mencius· Lilou II).Footnote 15 “The sages and others all belong to a single kind” (Mencius· Gaozi I).Footnote 16 The moral potential in them is no different from that in ordinary people. Their inherent natural attribute is essentially the same as others. The so-called sages are just those who “have developed their moral potential to the fullest extent” (Xunzi· Jiebi).Footnote 17 Mencius states, “it’s possible for everyone to become Yao and Shun” (Mencius· Gaozi II).Footnote 18 Xunzi agrees that “every ordinary person on the road may become Yu (a morally perfect man)” (Xunzi· Xing e).Footnote 19 Through hard practice, it is possible for everyone to develop her natural moral potential to the fullest extent and reach the highest realm of human life. Since everyone owns moral potential equally, every human being owns universal dignity equally.

The modern concept of human dignity mainly comes from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights proclaimed in 1948. Its fundamental difference from a pre-modern concept lies in its emphasis on the moral protection of each individual. The Declaration proposed that “all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience.” The Declaration grants human dignity to “all members of the human family” regardless of their other features, like race, gender, intelligence, faith, age, etc. In Confucianism, moral potential equally owned by all human beings grants universal dignity equally to everyone. The universal dignity is the equivalent of human dignity stated in the Declaration.

In most Western theories of human dignity, the moral demand of human dignity is unidirectional. It requires the owner of human dignity to be treated respectfully. Different from these theories, Confucian ethics deems the moral demands of human dignity as bidirectional. Universal dignity from a Confucian perspective not only requires others to treat the owner of dignity respectfully but also demands the owner of dignity to develop their moral potential. If a potential endows us with supreme inherent value, like dignity, then we have a moral obligation to develop it. This theory explains why dignity protects both negative rights and positive rights, and why dignity not only invests rights but also sets limits to human rights.

2.2 Acquired Dignity

In many ethical traditions, it is believed that, if an attribute can grant dignity, we have a moral obligation to conserve and develop this attribute. For instance, “Classical Greek philosophy views man as a living being with a rational soul united to a body who finds dignity in perfecting his reason”.Footnote 20 This view on human dignity not only tells us what human nature is, but also shows how the human species should ideally develop. “Another powerful source of a broader, shared notion of human dignity is the Biblical account of man as ʻmade in the image of Godʼ.”Footnote 21 “Being made in God’s image” is the source of the special moral status of human beings, and “could even be taken to imply a special responsibility on our part to perfect nature in order to finish God’s creation”.Footnote 22 A similar attitude was expressed in Confucianism explicitly. For example, Mencius said, “Since all men have these four initiators in themselves, they should develop the initiators as a fire begins to burn, or a spring begins to flow” (Mencius· Gongsunchou I).Footnote 23 “Anyone who has these four initiators but claims she cannot develop them is harming herself. Those who assert their monarch cannot develop the four initiators are harming their monarch” (Mencius· Gongsunchou I).Footnote 24 In Confucianism, the obligation to develop moral potential is of great moral meaning. If one does not try one’s best to develop one’s moral potential, one does not treat herself respectfully. Those who have developed their potential well are worthy of another kind of dignity, namely “acquired dignity”.

However, acquired dignity is unequal. Different people develop moral potential to different degrees. In some people, the potential falls into oblivion, while in others it grows full-fledged into virtues. The extent to which one earns her acquired dignity depends on how much her moral potential has been developed into virtues. The Confucian tradition divides people into different hierarchical orders according to their moral development. In dichotomization, people are divided into the gentleman and the petty man. Gentleman is a respectful title for those with virtue; Petty man refers to those who are morally bad. In five-level division, there are saints, scholar-officials, gentlemen, plebeians and petty men. Saint is the title for those who have completely developed their moral potential into virtues. Saints are people with perfect morality who own the highest acquired dignity. Becoming a saint is everyone’s ultimate goal and lifelong pursuit. Scholar-officials, gentlemen, plebeians and petty men rank one by one lower on the hierarchy of morality and acquired dignity. Some people failed to develop their moral potential or even completely discarded these potential, and thus have no acquired dignity.

Ideally, a person's social status should be consistent with her acquired dignity. People with high social status are all people who have better developed human nature. According to Mencius, “nobility of Heaven” (Tian Jue) is acquired dignity and “nobility of men” (Ren Jue) is social status. Mencius proposed that the possession of “nobility of men” should be the consequence of the possession of “nobility of Heaven”. Mencius said, “There is a nobility of Heaven, and a nobility of men. The nobility of Heaven includes practicing benevolence, righteousness, self-consecration, and fidelity, and enjoying doing good to others. While the nobility of men includes having official positions. The men of antiquity cultivated their nobility of Heaven, and the nobility of men came to them consequently” (Mencius· Gaozi I).Footnote 25 In Daxuezhangju variorum, the reason why the famous monarchs in history became monarchs is precisely that they developed their natural moral potential to the fullest extent. “From the beginning of the creation of human beings, heaven has endowed them with the nature of benevolence, righteousness, propriety and wisdom. However, not everyone is born to understand her own nature and preserve it. Once there is a wise person among the people who can fully display her nature, God will let her be the leader and mentor of all the people, govern and educate them, so as to restore people's nature. This is the reason why Fuxi, Shennong, Huangdi, Yao and Shun inherited the mandate of heaven to establish a system of government. It is also the reason for the establishment of other official positions” (Daxuezhangju variorum).Footnote 26

Under inequitable social circumstances, a person's social status may not conform to her acquired dignity. However, even in these cases, the acquired dignity gained by people through moral accomplishments will not be diminished by wrong treatment from society. “A gentleman is noble without rank, rich without fortune, trusted without talk, dignified without fury, glorious despite poverty, and content despite living alone” (XunZi· RuXiao).Footnote 27 One’s acquired dignity does not depend on one’s social status; on the contrary, one’s social status should match one’s acquired dignity. Correspondingly, one’s virtue should match her social status. In Zhouyi, it is proposed that, “If one’s virtue does not match one’s official position, one will encounter disasters” (Zhouyi Xici II).Footnote 28 “Virtue” maintained a dominant position to “official position”. The fact that those with “virtue” may not have corresponding “official position” and those with “official position” may not have corresponding “virtue” warrants the former’s observation, examination, criticism and disapproval of the latter. What serves as the fundamental basis for one’s social status should be her moral accomplishments.

2.3 Difference and Relationship Between Universal Dignity and Acquired Dignity

In Western moral theories, universal dignity and acquired dignity are also the two most important understandings of dignity. Before the 1990s, most theories of human dignity understood dignity as a term with a single meaning, either universal dignity or acquired dignity. Like Kant’s use of the term dignity or Stoic discourse on dignity. After the 1990s, more theories hold universal dignity and acquired dignity as two equally crucial meanings of the term human dignity.

Intrinsic dignity and inflorescent dignity in Daniel Sulmasy’s theory are corresponding to universal dignity and acquired dignity in Confucianism. Sulmasy wrote, “by intrinsic dignity, I mean that worth or value that people have simply because they are human, not by virtue of any social standing, ability to evoke admiration, or any particular set of talents, skills, or powers… Thus we say that racism is an offense against human dignity.”Footnote 29 “Inflorescent dignity is used to refer to individuals who are flourishing as human beings—living lives that are consistent with and expressive of the intrinsic dignity of the human.”Footnote 30 Roberto Andorno differentiates two meanings of human dignity for a similar reason. He proposes that it be necessary to distinguish different meanings of human dignity if we want to form a proper understanding of how the term human dignity works in bioethics.Footnote 31 “On the one hand, the inherent dignity, as it is inseparable from the human condition, is the same for all, cannot be gained or lost and does not allow for any degree. Even the worst criminal cannot be stripped of his or her human dignity and should consequently not be subjected to inhuman treatments or punishments. On the other hand, moral dignity does not relate to the existence itself of persons, but to their behavior and stems from their ability to freely choose good and to contribute beneficially to their own lives and the lives of others. It can be said that we give to ourselves this second kind of dignity by making good moral choices. This is why, unlike inherent dignity, which is the same for all, moral dignity is not possessed by all individuals to the same degree.”Footnote 32

Many traditional and current ethical theories emphasize that dignity cannot be lost because it does not depend on one’s virtues, behaviors, or achievements, and that it is equal among all human beings. But in reality, we often feel that people in some cases lose their dignity or different people have different degrees of dignity. Thus, such theories seem to contradict with common sense. But this apparent contradiction is overcome by the bipartite structure of human dignity as elaborated above.

Confucian ethics explained more explicitly the relationship between the two kinds of dignity. Universal dignity and acquired dignity are connected by moral potential. Universal dignity derives from moral potential while acquired dignity derives from the development of moral potential. Universal dignity reminds us that since the moral potential that people are born with grants intrinsic value to every human being, there should be a bottom line in one’s attitude towards others. In contrast, acquired dignity depicts us an ideal personality, demonstrates the greatest kindness we could show to our fellow human beings by having our moral potential fully developed. The ultimate meaning of life lies in pursuing this ideal personality. Confucius said, “If a person knows the right way to live a moral life in the morning, she may die in the evening without regret” (Analects· Liren).Footnote 33

Universal dignity is a moral status but acquired dignity is not. Acquired dignity cannot invest rights or constitute moral obligation. Moral status decides how certain beings should be treated. In case of conflict of interest between different beings, our moral judgement as to which side should get more protection should be based on the moral status of each party. It is not morally wrong or even morally praiseworthy to sacrifice the fundamental interests of the party with lower moral status to meet the needs of the party with higher moral status. This explains why acquired dignity is not a moral status. Having acquired dignity means one treats others as one’s moral equivalent. One can get acquired dignity only by becoming virtuous. The most crucial virtue in Confucianism is described as “do not do to others what you do not want to be done to yourself” (Analect· Yanyuan).Footnote 34 “The person of perfect virtue, help others to achieve their goal if she has the goal herself. To be able to get to know others’ needs by one’s own needs may be called the art of virtue” (Analect · Yongye).Footnote 35 Therefore, if one regards her own interest as more important than other people’s, she can hardly get acquired dignity. People having acquired dignity must be those who acknowledged all other people’s moral status as equal to their own. Inequality of acquired dignity is not inequality of moral status. Acquired dignity is not a moral status. It just makes one more respectable.

The inequality of acquired dignity will never threaten the equality of universal dignity, but will instead protect the equality of universal dignity. One’s acquired dignity is associated with whether one shows respect to others’ universal dignity and if yes, to what extent. To pursue higher acquired dignity, one needs to be more respectful to others’ universal dignity. Thus recognition of different degrees of acquired dignity does not produce inequality but strengthens the idea of equality.

3 Two Ways to Achieve Equality in Confucianism

The Universal Declaration grants equal moral status to “all members of the human family” regardless of their other features, like race, gender, intelligence, faith, age, etc. The simple fact of “belonging to the human species” is a sufficient condition for equal moral status. Since the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was issued, the claim that all human beings have equal moral status has been universally recognized and has had a significant social impact. This idea helped to ground countless legal and moral decisions. It has inspired and paved the way for the adoption of more than seventy human rights treaties, applied today on a permanent basis at global and regional levels (all containing references to it in their preambles).Footnote 36 Although the claim has been widely recognized, it has not yet been adequately justified. To demonstrate the equality of human moral status is exceptionally difficult. Every ethical tradition fails to provide sufficient proof, and each demonstration attempt contains contradictions.

Nearly all philosophical positions base human moral status on typical human attributes one has, especially morally relevant attributes. No matter what attribute we hold as the basis for human moral status, there must be some individuals who cannot show this attribute, thus leading to the failure of the justification for the moral status of these individuals. Philosophers tend to find themselves either agreeing that not all human beings are rightsholders or adopting what Peter Singer and others have called a “Speciesist” position. Without further justification, we have reason to refuse to include people who seriously lack or completely lack the typical human attributes in the protective range of moral status. Obviously, “Speciesism” is not a convincing way to argue for the moral status of human being.

Contemporary biomedical technologies have constantly been challenging the moral demands of equality among human beings. With the development of technologies such as gene editing, it’s unprecedentedly easy for us to influence people who have no contact with us at all, people who we have no chance to discourse with, and even to control and influence future generations that do not yet exist. The development and application of technologies like human enhancement incline us to equate the inherent value of human beings with human capacity, which may lead to the resurgence of eugenics. All the above problems have posed serious challenges to the notion that all human beings have equal moral status. To cope with these challenges, we need in-depth reflection on the philosophical basis of the equality of human moral status. The basis of equal moral status of human beings is the most precious value for us to cherish and protect. Only after recognizing this fundamental value can people distinguish between the benefits and harms brought about by the application of new technologies.

3.1 Equality Ensured by the Dignity of the Human Species

A very promising approach to the justification of equal moral status of all human beings in contemporary ethical research should be to claim that all human beings have moral status in virtue of belonging to the kind of beings that typically have the relevant attributes that grant moral status. The human species is a natural kind having an essential feature that can grant moral status, so the human species have moral status. Therefore, membership in the human species is a sufficient condition for sharing this moral status equally. This view is seconded by many. Bernard Williams, for example, has said that “there are certain respects in which creatures are treated in one way rather than another simply because they belong to a certain category, the human species.”Footnote 37 Thomas Scanlon said, “the class of beings whom it is possible to wrong will include at least all those beings who are of a kind that is normally capable of judgment-sensitive attitudes.”Footnote 38 Daniel Sulmasy has provided the best demonstration for this approach as he emphasized the moral implication of natural kind. He maintained that “the logic of natural kinds suggests that one picks out individuals as members of the kind not because they express all the necessary and sufficient predicates to be classified as a member of the species, but by virtue of their inclusion under the extension of the natural kind that, as a kind, has those capacities.”Footnote 39 Therefore, dignity is based on the simple fact of membership in a natural category. For all people, there is no difference in their membership in the human species, so there is no difference in the status granted by this membership.

This position is also held by Confucian ethics. Moral potential is the typical attribute of the human species as a natural kind. It grants special status to the human species as a whole. Then, membership of humankind is a sufficient condition for everyone to share this status equally.

In Confucianism, moral potential is essentially the typical feature of the human species as a natural kind. Mencius argued that, “as all humans like similar tastes, sounds and sceneries, their minds are fond of similar things too, which are moral rules and righteousness. Moral rules and righteousness are common in the minds of all human beings. It pleases our mind as meat pleases our mouth” (Mencius · Gaozi I).Footnote 40 Mencius believes those who do not cherish moral potential are not conscious of human nature. Mencius said, “Here is a man whose fourth finger is bent and cannot be stretched out straight. It is not painful, nor does it incommode him at all. If there were anyone who can make it straight, he would go to him no matter how far, because his finger is not like the finger of other people. When a man's finger is not like those of other people, he feels dissatisfied, but when his mind is not like those of other people, namely he does not understand moral rules and righteousness as well as others, he does not feel dissatisfaction. This is called ignorance of his nature category” (Mencius · Gaozi I).Footnote 41 Those who do not cherish moral potential erred on ignorance of human nature. In Mencius’ analysis of features of the human species as a natural kind, moral potential is an essential part of human nature.

Moral potential, as a typical feature of the human species, grants the entire species moral status. In the statements like “Among all the creatures in the world, the human being is the most precious” (The Book of Filial Piety · ShengZhi),Footnote 42 “The human being is the heart of heaven and earth” (The Book of Rites· Liyun),Footnote 43 “The human being” refers to the human species in the primary sense. Confucius said, “The one who first made puppets to bury with the dead should die without descendants”, because these puppets are made in the image of human beings, but to be buried with the dead (Mencius · Lianghuiwang I).Footnote 44 The use of puppets for burial did not directly violate the dignity of any individual human being. However, those who initially used puppets for burial were considered to deserve severe punishment in Confucian culture, such as childlessness, because this practice did not pay due respect to the dignity of the human species as a whole.

The theory that holds the moral status of human individuals comes from the typical human features displayed by individuals cannot justify the moral status of human members who have not yet shown such features. This difficulty can be resolved if the moral status of individuals comes from the moral status of the human species as a whole. This argument provides us with a reason to extend the scope of moral protection to all members of the human species, and also demonstrates that every human member has equal moral status. However, a crucial link in this argument is that we need to defend the existence of the nature of the human species that gives moral status to human beings as a whole. There have always been diametrically opposed views on whether there is anything called human nature. Many theories have questioned the existence of the so-called human nature. If the nature of the human species has great moral significance, then this fact gives the human species as a whole a special moral status. However, if the so-called human nature does not exist at all, then this argument will not stand.

Firstly, one of the doubts about “human nature” is that human beings are always shaping their own nature and human nature is constantly changing. Therefore, if “we assume a clearly defined set of natural human characteristics and qualities”, then we “cannot do justice to the manifold forms of human existence and their historic capacity for alteration”.Footnote 45 Secondly, human nature should be the innate attribute of human beings. However, in reality, it is difficult to distinguish what is innate, naturally possessed and what is acquired. Fukuyama, for example, pointed out that most of the debates on human nature “have revolved around the age-old question of where to draw the boundary line between nature and nurture”.Footnote 46

Confucian ethics can better responds to the above doubts about human nature. Firstly, by regarding human nature as a range of potentialities, we can not only obtain a definite human nature, but also take into account the diversity of human existence and historical development. Potential per se implies development. Depending on different environments and conditions, potential can be developed to different degrees. Different degrees of development lead to the diversity of human existence in different historical periods and different social environments. However, under diversity, there is still something that every member of humankind always shares, namely the potential for development. Secondly, the distinction between “nature” and “nurture” can also be interpreted as human potential and its development. Human abilities and qualities are acquired, but the possibility of developing such abilities and qualities exists in the “nature”. For example, the potential of language is natural, but it can only be converted into the capacity of language in the environment of human society. The same is true of moral ability. Evolutionary biologist Francisco J. Ayala once argued that “humans are ethical beings by their biological nature: that humans evaluate their behavior as either right or wrong, moral or immoral, as a consequence of their eminent intellectual capacities, which include self-awareness and abstract thinking. These intellectual capacities are products of the evolutionary process, but they are distinctively human.”Footnote 47 The concrete moral content is shaped by culture. The development of the potential can be viewed as “nurture”. However, the potential to develop is “nature”. By regarding human nature as potential, Confucian ethics makes a better argument for the existence of a definite human nature.

On the one hand, holding potential as the basis of moral status enables the establishment of moral status for humankind as a whole. On the other hand, holding potential as the basis of moral status, Confucianism can justify the moral status of an individual only by the moral status of the human species, but not directly by the potential owned by an individual. Potential is a characteristic that cannot be fully confirmed by experience. If a person's moral status is judged by whether she shows her potential, then just as other theories that justify the individual's status by the displayed capacity, the equality of human moral status cannot be fully proved.

Moral potential is owned by human beings exclusively. No other species owns moral potential as the nature of their kind. Therefore, Confucian ethics not only argue for the equal moral status of human beings, but also demonstrate that the moral status of human beings is higher than any other species. This is not speciesism, because if we find another species who has moral potential as the nature of their kind, Confucian ethics would agree to grant equal moral status as the human beings to all members of this species.

3.2 Equality Revealed by the Obligation of Moral Subjects

No matter moral status is based on individual attributes or on the essential attributes of the humankind, we are essentially discussing what in a moral patient can grant her moral status. Besides the above-mentioned approaches, the Confucian concept of human dignity can provided a different perspective to explain the origin of equal moral status. According to the moral demand of human dignity that imposing on a moral subject, a moral subject should acknowledge and respect the equal moral status of every human being, whether they have showed any attribute that can grant moral status.

Since everyone has a duty to develop their moral potential, everyone should give moral consideration to others. The perfect virtue manifested as “do not do to others what you do not want to be done to yourself” and “To be able to get to know others’ needs by one’s own needs”. To nourish the “four hearts” in oneself, one must treat others as their moral equivalence. As Zhang Qianfan had proposed, respect for others is the natural extension of one’s self-respect and the necessary condition for one to preserve her value.Footnote 48 Ni Peimin also holds that “we cannot treat others inhumanely without reducing our own humanity, nor can we disgrace ourselves without hurting others”.Footnote 49 Confucian selves are associated with their obligations to the various groupings to which they belong.Footnote 50 Therefore,“whether we exclude these people from our humanitarian consideration is therefore more a test of our own humanity than a judgment about whether these people are still human beings. We respect their dignity not so much on the basis of their qualification as human, as it is on the basis of being human ourselves”.Footnote 51 Even to those who seem to lack virtue, “we will make efforts to include them rather than trying to find if they are one of us… An exemplary person would first demand self-perfection and doing one’s best to others”.Footnote 52 Therefore, Confucian ethics could transform the issue from why we should grant moral status equally to every human being to what we should do to develop moral potential in ourselves. It can be an explanation for equal moral status despite individuals have attributes that grant moral status to different extents.

To recognize people who lack capacities as having equal moral status as we do imposes on us one-way obligations and forces us to give up certain self-interest under some circumstances. In an age when human enhancement is broadly applied, the difference in ability among all human beings will be greater; correspondingly, the conflict of interests will be greater. As Allen Buchanan proposed, “If a large majority of biomedically enhanced cooperators come to shape the mainstream economy and the most important political processes in their own image,… the functioning of the dominant cooperative framework will make it increasingly hard for unenhanced cooperation to thrive.”Footnote 53 Furthermore, if the enhanced “had interests that were as much more complex than ours as our interests are compared to the interests of rats, then it would be permissible for them to sacrifice us for their sake, in cases where tragic choices must be made.”Footnote 54 Facing such a circumstance, “rights talk” which sees the self as essentially separate from others can hardly provide an argument for equality between individuals who own capacities to totally different extents, while the Confucian concept of human dignity that based on moral consideration for other human beings can defend the equal moral status of the unenhanced in such situations. If the dignity of the enhanced imposes on her the obligation to develop her moral potential in herself, then the duty to respect other human beings is also a duty to herself. That is a reason for the enhanced to respect the unenhanced, also a reason for anyone to respect all those less abled. Furthermore, “a legitimate public institution must fulfill the duty to provide favorable social conditions and a compatible legal framework so that everyone has the basic opportunity to develop the inner worth and become a dignified member of the community”.Footnote 55 A theory that holds moral potential as the origin of the inner value of human beings can help to dissolve conflicts of interests between individuals in a social circumstance in which the difference of capacities, value and life style among individuals are ever increasing, and promote the formation of a society with mutual respect.

4 The Confucian Argument for Equal Human Dignity and the Moral Meaning of the Integrity of the Human Species

The main obstacle in arguing for the equality of human moral status stems from the fact that not all human individuals exhibit typical human characteristics. To justify the equality of human moral status, one has to demonstrate why we should grant equal moral status to those individuals who do not exhibit typical human characteristics. Holding the dignity of individuals comes from the value of the species offers a promising solution to this problem. If the fact that we are from a single species plays a prominent role in the justification for equality, then the integrity of this species is of great moral significance. When homo sapiens is no longer a well-defined natural kind, it will be very hard to find a basis for equality and most of other fundamental values that cherished by people today.

The term integrity of species has entered the context of ethical research with the development of gene technology since the 1990s. The infringement on the integrity of species refers to a kind of infringement on animals that unrelated to animal welfare. For example, turning hens into senseless laying machines is a classic example where people make ethical judgment by resorting to integrity.Footnote 56 Such genetic modification reduces rather than increases the pain of animals, but most people agree that this is morally wrong. Obviously, the existing theories on animal rights are not sufficient to explain people's moral intuition that genetic modification does harm to animals. The concept of integrity can fill the gap between moral theory and moral intuition. Integrity of species provides a perspective of moral evaluation beyond the theory of rights.

The normative contents of the integrity of species are mainly to protect the telos and typical capacities of a species from infringement. Telos here is a word borrowed from Aristotle that denotes an end that biological creatures work to achieve. In pursuing this telos or end, plant and animals display a specific way of living a complete life typical of their own kind, which is the distinctive purpose that defines their fundamental nature. Protecting the integrity of the species also requires protecting the typical capacities of the species. Only these capabilities can ensure the realization of the telos.

The term integrity of species plays an important role in the ethical discussion on how to protect human beings from the harm done by new technologies. Many scholars argue against human cloning, stem cell research, heritable gene intervention and other technologies by appealing to the principle of protecting the integrity of the human species. For example, people appeal to integrity to oppose research that could possibly make human-nonhuman chimera: “Certain human bodily components that are closely connected to the capacities associated with human dignity might be transferred to human-nonhuman chimeric beings and in that setting would be severely restricted in their exercise or even destroyed.”Footnote 57 People believe human enhancement may threaten human dignity because “There are human goods that stem from our awareness of ourselves as finite, limited beings.” “Being limited makes possible perseverance through adversity, aspirations of fulfilling a calling, and being part of (worthy) causes greater than oneself.”Footnote 58 The application of human enhancement technology may damage the telos of human life by continuously reducing the finiteness of human beings.

At the turn of the century, protecting the integrity of the human species has even become the moral demand of human dignity. UNESCO Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights of 1997 proclaimed in the first Article that the human genome is “the heritage of humanity”. This expression means that the international community has a duty to preserve the integrity of the human species from improper manipulations that may endanger it.Footnote 59 Protecting the integrity of the human species became a position that received extensive recognition. Resolution on Ethical, Scientific and Social Implications of Cloning in Human Health (WHA 51.10) reaffirms that cloning for the replication of human individuals is ethically unacceptable and contrary to human dignity and integrity.

If we want to restrict or prohibit the application of certain technologies by appealing to the integrity of the human species, we must explain why we have an obligation to respect the integrity of the human species. Some scholars explained this from the perspective of the rights framework. For example, Lantz Miller maintained that we have a moral obligation to respect individual’s right to live as a member of a group. The United Nations Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous People clearly states this right of any individual. If the group that an individual wants to belong to and therefore hopes to preserve is exactly the original human species, then the protection for the essential characteristics of the human species can be justified by the rights framework.Footnote 60

Nevertheless, the concept of human rights is not self-evident. Before one takes “rights” as standards to judge other moral notions, one needs at least to describe why they are qualified as criteria for assessing other things.Footnote 61 Confucian ethics agrees on the principle of protecting the integrity of the human species, but justify this principle in a different way than the above theory. Confucian ethics justifies it through the moral obligation of protecting human dignity rather than human rights. In several crucial documents we find the view that human dignity is the basis of human rights, as in Articles 22 and 23 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights where it is stated that “everyone…is entitled to realization…of the economic, social and cultural rights indispensable for his dignity”, and that these are rights “ensuring…an existence worthy of human dignity”. If dignity is the foundation of human rights, then saying that an act violates human dignity provides a stronger and more authoritative reason for avoiding the act than saying that it violates human rights.

The most important argument for artificial interventions on typical human features is that such interventions can increase the intrinsic value of human beings. We can indeed draw such a conclusion according to certain theories of human dignity. Some theories hold human features such as rationality and agency as the basis of dignity; as no one has these features to a full extent, it is reasonable to believe that the intrinsic value of human beings can be increased by enhancing these features, like the ability to reason. In contrast, according to the Confucian view on dignity, it is the potential as typical feature of human species but not certain competence that displayed by individuals endows people with human dignity. Every individual as a member of human species is born with moral potential to a full extent, and therefore has been endowed with supreme intrinsic value. The supreme intrinsic value cannot be further increased even by enhancing typical human features or by any other means.

Mencius believed that “everything is complete in me” (Mencius · Jinxin I),Footnote 62 from which we can infer that people can achieve the perfection of life without external things and that natural talent has provided us with sufficient conditions to realize an ideal personality and a perfect life. Therefore, “there is no other way to learn, but to get back to the inherent kindness” (Mencius · Gaozi I).Footnote 63 All kinds of learning are for a single purpose: to realize and develop the inherent moral potential. This purpose decides the right way to learn. Mencius puts forward that “If what you are searching for is outside of yourself, you will not benefit from searching. One can only get good results by developing something inherent in herself” (Mencius · Jinxin I).Footnote 64 That is to say, no one benefits from artificial infringement on human nature. In Confucian ethics, all people have already possessed the feature that can grant dignity to a full extent; the artificial enhancement of important human capabilities therefore cannot increase the intrinsic value of people.

On the contrary, artificial intervention in typical human features will seriously obstruct people’s endeavor to pursue acquired dignity. The way to pursue acquire dignity lies in developing moral potential into mature virtue through one's own efforts. Interventions in typical human features will hinder this development in various ways.

Firstly, the intervention in typical human features may result in people’s denial of their inherent tendency. “Benevolence”, the core virtue in Confucianism, comes from the development of the moral potential of “sympathy”. However, the widespread usage of enhancement technologies will definitely damage the necessary conditions for the development of “sympathy”. On one hand, not every individual will receive artificial enhancement. On another, people enhanced by technologies are enhanced in different aspects and to different degrees. The widespread usage of enhancement technologies will cause significant differences in people's body structure and function in various aspects. Therefore, it will become more and more difficult, even impossible at all, to feel the same way as others. Under such circumstances, “sympathy for others” will become an arbitrary imagination without empirical basis. The most important moral potential in Confucianism thus can be denied by reason. Sympathy bring others’ well-being to bear on our moral evaluation. It is a crucial moral motivation. “Confucians stress the moral motivation of people, because for them what is morally significant is the cultivation of moral lives and virtues as a whole, and not merely the performance of right acts.”Footnote 65 Those who lack of the capacity of sympathy are not living a moral life even they never fail to comply with moral commands.

Secondly, intervention in the typical features of human beings might veil the ultimate goal of developing moral potential and cloud people’s pursuit of acquired dignity. In Confucian ethics, the ultimate goal of the development of moral potential is mature virtue. This is the telos of the human species and the highest realm of human life constructed by Confucian ethics. Life is worth living, precisely because it is believed to be a process of continuous actualization of the unique potential worth present in every human life.Footnote 66 Artificial intervention in typical human features will significantly change our views on virtue and other important human spirits, and even lead to the disappearance of virtue. Take abstinence as an example. Abstinence is generally held as a virtue, and at the experience level, this belief can be proved by the fact that abstinence makes people healthier. However, if some people become immune to nicotine and alcohol due to genetic enhancement, or if gene technology makes it difficult to convert excessive calories into fat and cholesterol in some people, they will lose sufficient reasons to regard abstinence as a virtue. The living condition of human beings and the relationship between human beings and the environment, which are determined by all the typical features of human beings, are the basis for the forming of virtues. As Aristotle argues, if we were gods, we would lead a nonfinite life. This would mean that virtues such as justice and moderation have no application to us. The fact that they do is part of what makes us human. Virtue is shaped by human existence. A coherent set of virtues must be a complete series of human traits or qualities that enable humans to do the right thing at the right time in the right way in pursuing the good life suitable for human nature.Footnote 67 Fundamental changes in physical and psychological features will eliminate virtues from human life or make it difficult to realize virtues.

In Confucian ethics, to develop moral potential into virtue is not only the moral demand of universal dignity, but also the origin of acquired dignity. Infringement on the integrity of the human species will hamper the development of moral potential, run counter to the moral demands of human dignity, and thus hinder our pursuit of acquired dignity. Acquired dignity provides the necessary protection for universal dignity. Failure to get acquired dignity will inevitably endanger universal dignity.

5 Conclusion

The Confucian concept of dignity is twofold: it includes universal dignity and acquired dignity. Universal dignity means the moral status that human beings generally possess due to their inherent moral potential. Acquired dignity refers to the value one gets by the development of natural moral potential. Acquired dignity is not a moral status, but a realm of life worth pursuing, which sets a lofty goal for people's moral accomplishments. Through the discussion of universal dignity and acquired dignity, Confucian ethics not only answers why human beings should be treated with respect, but also provides a crucial impetus for respecting human dignity.

Confucian theory of human dignity contributes to the study of two important issues in contemporary ethical research. Firstly, the Confucian theory of human dignity presents strong arguments for the equality of human moral status. In Confucian ethics, moral potential, as the essential feature of humanity, grants special moral status to human beings as a whole, and then every human individual equally shares the moral status of their kind because of their membership of the human species. Furthermore, Confucian ethics requires everyone to give moral consideration to all other human beings unconditionally. This obligation implies that all human beings should be treated equally. Secondly, Confucian theory of human dignity justifies the moral obligation to protect the integrity of human species. We have the moral obligation to protect our moral potential and promote its development. Infringement on the integrity of the human species will inevitably hinder the development of our moral potential and ruin the basis of equality. Therefore, we should set limits for the application of technologies according to the principle of protecting the integrity of the human species.