Abstract
This paper aims at a cross-cultural comparison between friendship in Aristotle and friendship in Buddhist traditions. Aristotle’s thorough analysis of friendship results in Buddhist concepts of friendship necessarily a sub-category as Aristotle deems friendship within religious communities to be a niche category of friendship. Although Buddhist notions of love and compassion are universally prescribed, monastic friendship is necessarily highly selective to be between like-minded individuals within a Buddhist community pursuing the shared end of enlightenment. Buddhism however offers three categories of friendship: lay community friendship, monastic friendship and spiritual friendship. Buddhism, therefore, while unavoidably a sub-category of Aristotelian concepts of friendship, reveal nuanced approaches to friendship depending on an individual’s place in the Buddhist tradition.
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Notes
- 1.
Terence Irwin’s translation has Aristotle saying: “Some communities—religious societies and dining clubs—seem to arise for pleasure, since these are respectively, for religious sacrifices and for companionship.” NE 1160a20. Irwin adds in an endnote that “‘Religious societies’ are associated with dining clubs because the religious sacrifice of animals would be an occasion for a common meal” (Irwin 1985, 363).
- 2.
Early Buddhism is “variously styled as ‘Pāli Buddhism,’ ‘Canonical Buddhism,’ ‘Southern Buddhism’ and Theravāda (i.e. Sthavira-vāda, ‘the doctrine of the elders’).” Mysore Hiriyanna notes “it is clear from the inferiority indicated by the word hīna (‘low’) that the names were devised by followers of the Mahayana” (Hiriyanna 1993, 133).
- 3.
The “Good” here involves both reason and the appropriate virtue for a given act. With regard to ‘soul’ or psuchē Irwin notes: “Aristotle does not regard soul and body, as Plato does, as two separable substances” (Irwin 1985, 426). Rather, the soul is a characteristic activity or function with rational and non-rational parts. Here, soul can be generally understood as one’s character.
- 4.
Keown writes, “The difference between the laity and monks, then, is not that the former are benefitted by non-moral goods while the latter are not, but that certain non-moral goods are incompatible with the monastic vocation” (Keown 2014, 112).
- 5.
As mentioned in a previous footnote, Aristotle’s understanding of the soul is more closely understood as one’s character; activity in accordance with reason. Irwin explains that Aristotle did consider his multiple explanations to be analogous and that “the soul is the characteristic functions and activities that are essential to the organism and explain… the other features it has” (Irwin 1985, 426).
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Taylor, K. (2021). Friendship in Aristotle and Buddhism: Confluences and Divergences. In: Hongladarom, S., Joaquin, J.J. (eds) Love and Friendship Across Cultures. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-33-4834-9_3
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