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Myanmar’s Unwanted Ethnic Minority: A History and Analysis of the Rohingya Crisis

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Managing Conflicts in a Globalizing ASEAN

Abstract

The Myanmar army’s disproportionate use of military force in response to attacks in 2016 and 2017 by Harakah Al-Yaqin (Faith Movement) drove some 700,000 Rohingya Muslims from Myanmar’s western state of Rakhine across the border to Bangladesh. While not the first military-driven exodus of Rohingya from Rakhine, the current humanitarian crisis is linked to violence that broke out in 2012 between the Rohingya and another Myanmar minority, the Rakhine Buddhists, who first came into conflict during World War II. This chapter aims to present an understanding of the conflict in Rakhine, including the factors that have shaped it over time until the present, its incompatibilities, and their management. The first part of the chapter discusses competing Buddhist-Muslim perceptions of history and identity, which form a core incompatibility in the conflict, the long history of Buddhist-Muslim relations in the state, and the effects of British colonial policy. The chapter then turns to the post-independence period and examines the triangular nature of the conflict, the ‘Burmanization’ programme that followed Ne Win’s 1962 coup, discriminatory measures introduced by the government, the introduction of the 1982 Citizenship Law, the role of the ‘War on Terror’, and the tenuous links of Rohingya militant groups to international terrorist organizations. The final part focuses on the build-up to the 2012 violence and the current crisis, including the role of international media.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    I use both Arakan and Rakhine in this chapter to refer to the geographic area of the current conflict, generally using Arakan in historical contexts.

  2. 2.

    Recent data from the Bangladesh government suggests the number of Rohingya in refugee camps could be as high as one million (The Straits Times 2018).

  3. 3.

    The term Burman, or Bamar, refers to Myanmar’s dominant ethnic group who make up about two-thirds of the population and control the military and the government.

  4. 4.

    See, for example, Aye Chan (2005) and Khin Maung Saw (2011).

  5. 5.

    See Yunus (1994) and various short articles found on the Arakan Rohingya National Organization website, http://www.rohingya.org/~rohingya/portal/index.php/scholars.html

  6. 6.

    Cited in Leider (2015: 19).

  7. 7.

    Human Rights Watch (2013a). Ardeth Maung Thawnghmung (2016) presents an analysis of the two reports.

  8. 8.

    The earliest inhabitants of the Arakan region were probably various Chin groups, such as the Kam, Mro, and Sak (Daingnets) (Gutman 1976: 9), who are official Myanmar ethnic groups and continue to inhabit the region.

  9. 9.

    In legendary accounts found in Arakan chronicles, the word kala is used in reference to rescued shipwrecked sailors who then settled in Arakan. While some (see Zaw Min Htut 2003: 11) writers have attempted to equate this with Arab settlers, the term kala appears problematic as it “denotes Indians in general and Muslims in particular, but more broadly foreigners from the West” (Leider 2015: 17).

  10. 10.

    Van Galen (2008: 34) notes that the circumstances of Man Co Mwan’s return are particularly vague and the Arakan chronicle stories are not corroborated by Bengali sources. Further, there is little evidence of any tributary status, which is unlikely to have extended beyond Man Co Mwan’s short reign after his return.

  11. 11.

    Some writers have attempted to estimate, or simply make up, the number of soldiers who settled in Arakan. As far as I am aware, there is no reliable data concerning numbers. It seems reasonable to suggest that a proportion of them would have been Man Co Mwan’s own men who had fled to Bengal with him.

  12. 12.

    The 1931 British census distinguishes the Kaman from Arakan Muslims and people from Chittagong and Bengalis, recording some 2686 of their descendants living on Ranree Island, who “follow Arakanese language and customs, though they practice the Islamic religion” (Bennison 1931).

  13. 13.

    Two subsequent British campaigns of 1852–1853 and 1885 led to the complete annexation of Myanmar.

  14. 14.

    Various data and estimates regarding Arakan’s population and its ethnic and religious make-up at the onset of British rule are problematic and often contradictory. The first reliable data appears in later British censuses (see below).

  15. 15.

    Under British rule, acreage in rice production increased from 359,000 acres in 1867 to 916,000 by 1920 (Cheng 1968: 27).

  16. 16.

    By no means did all of Arakan’s Muslims support this rebellion, even if they did want the establishment of a separate Muslim zone (Yegar 2002: 39).

  17. 17.

    Muslim leaders claim the authorities invented this in order to stop Muslims displaced by the rebellion returning. Yegar (2002: 45) notes that Myanmar authorities tended not to discriminate between displaced returnees and new immigrants, simply sending all Muslims back regardless.

  18. 18.

    Union Citizenship Act, 1948 at Art. 3(1), http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs/UNION_CITIZENSHIP_ACT-1948.htm.

  19. 19.

    Buchanan’s article was in 2003 reprinted by the SOAS Bulletin of Burma Research.

  20. 20.

    There are numerous estimates of the Rohingya population in Arakan, ranging from 750,000 to 1.2 million (Lewa 2009: 11; Dapice 2015).

  21. 21.

    While this can be seen as an attempt to appease Arakan nationalists, in terms of any autonomy it was meaningless as the one-party system enshrined in the new constitution, and in existence since 1962, meant there would be no separate governments within the union.

  22. 22.

    The Bangladesh media attention focused on what initially appeared to be an expansion in RSO activities along the border linked to training camps. It later became evident that such training camps were not only used by a small number of Rohingyas but by various other Islamist groups and that the RSO were not then engaged in fighting inside Myanmar (Lintner 2003: 11).

  23. 23.

    See Selth (2004) for details of various international anti-terrorist commitments made by the SPDC.

  24. 24.

    Selth (2004: 115) presents several examples of exaggerated and sometimes erroneous reporting, notably Zachary Abuza’s 2002 paper, “Tentacles of Terror: Al Qaeda’s Southeast Asian Network”, in which he stated, “the largest Al Qaeda cell in Southeast Asia is said to be in Myanmar”.

  25. 25.

    For example, MaBaTha leader, U Wirathu, was jailed in 2003 for inciting anti-Muslim violence in his hometown that led to ten Muslims being killed (Marshall 2013).

  26. 26.

    The ANP also won 12 out of 17 seats in the national lower house but fell just short of an outright majority at state level (Mathieson 2016).

  27. 27.

    See Leider (2017) for an in-depth analysis.

  28. 28.

    The ARU was formed with strong support from the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) in 2011 in Jeddah as an umbrella organization for various international Rohingya following a series of meeting that took place over the preceding years and is led by Wakar Uddin, an American-based academic originally from Arakan (the http://rohingyaunion.org). The BTF is a campaign of Justice for All, a Muslim NGO based in Illinois set up in 2010 (https://www.burmataskforce.org/). The ERC, launched in Denmark in 2012, brought together various Rohingya activists in Europe under a single organization to “strive for the Rohingya cause” (http://www.theerc.net/).

  29. 29.

    See http://www.rohingya.org/portal/index.php/who-we-are.html for a list of the ARNO’s aims and objectives.

  30. 30.

    See the ARU’s mission statement: http://rohingyaunion.org/about-us/.

  31. 31.

    The Arakan Army is an ethnic Rakhine military organization established in 2009 and based in Laiza in Kachin State. Its stated intention is “to return the motherland to the Arakan people” (Lawi Weng 2017).

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Correspondence to Stephen C. Druce .

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Druce, S.C. (2020). Myanmar’s Unwanted Ethnic Minority: A History and Analysis of the Rohingya Crisis. In: Oishi, M. (eds) Managing Conflicts in a Globalizing ASEAN. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-32-9570-4_2

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