The Southward Advance and Going to War with the United States: The Road to World War II

Abstract

This chapter examines how and why Japan ended up going to war with the United States in 1941. It discusses the concept of the “Southward Advance,” highlights the linkage between developments in Europe and Japan’s national policies, and examines key moments in joint military-government deliberations to avoid or pursue military conflict. It concludes with a brief summary of the results and lessons of Japan’s defeat.

Japan and Rapid Changes in the European Front

As hopes dimmed for “Operation Kiri,” peace feelers seeking direct talks with Chiang Kai-shek to resolve the Second Sino-Japanese War that had become a quagmire, in Europe, Nazi Germany commenced its western offensive. The German army got the ball rolling by invading Norway in early April 1940, surmounted the defensive battle pitched by the three Benelux countries from May 10, and forced France to surrender on June 22. It had taken possession of nearly the whole of western Europe.

Many Japanese went wild with enthusiasm, as if they had forgotten Germany’s breach of trust a mere 10 months before (Germany signed a non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union, effectively blowing up moves to strengthen the Anti-Comintern Pact). They thought that Germany’s victories would lead to the collapse of the old Anglo-centric world order. They also hoped that the defeat of the home countries of the colonies in Southeast Asia—the Dutch East Indies (modern day Indonesia) and French Indochina (present day Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia)—would mean that Japan could obtain their natural resources to develop its economy.

Those forces seeking to “renovate” domestic and foreign policy, such as freeing Japan from the Anglo-American international order, toppled the pro-status quo cabinet of Yonai Mitsumasa to form another cabinet headed by Konoe Fumimaro. The key policies of this second Konoe cabinet were strengthening the national defense, reforming diplomacy, and advancing into Southeast Asia (the “southward advance”). The Imperial General Headquarters-Government Liaison Conference on July 27 adopted the “Outline of Japan’s Policy in Coping with Changing World Conditions” (“the July 27 outline”) which also considered the use of force in the southward advance. The foreign minister in the cabinet was Matsuoka Yōsuke, who could boast of a popularity among the Japanese public on par with Konoe (Moriyama 2017). Matsuoka released a statement on August 1 that set his foreign policy line on the construction of a Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere, one that also encompassed the southern areas under the Dutch and French empires (Figs. 8.1 and 8.2).

Fig. 8.1

Prime Minister Konoe Fumimaro (National Diet Library)

Fig. 8.2

Foreign Minister Matsuoka Yōsuke. (Photobook: 50-Year History of Constitutional Government)

Japan did not just make a mad dash southward in accordance with the national policy agreed at the time, however. A vague, ambiguous national policy, hurriedly adopted amid the feverish mood of Germany’s western offensive, the July 27 outline gave rise to divergent interpretations immediately following its adoption (regarding the situation of such dual competing theories of the national policy, see Moriyama 2012, 2016). The Army General Staff Office, most inclined to use force, was ready to go to war against Britain if it would hasten that country’s defeat. Yet, some held more cautious views on using military force that would, with high probability, invite military conflict with the United States as well as Britain. The Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN), notably, believed that war with the United States was unimaginable, though it did welcome the Imperial Japanese Army’s (IJA) change of focus away from its traditional northward advance policy to the southward advance (the IJN thought the latter was the basis for bolstering its own preparedness). Since all the key players held their own concept of what the southward advance meant, the stationing of Japanese troops in northern French Indochina is when the policy began to unravel.

Stationing Troops in Northern French Indochina and the Tripartite Pact

As the intentions for the southward advance became more convoluted, Japan demanded that IJA units be allowed to station troops in French Indochina, nominally to resolve the Second Sino-Japanese War. France accepted the Matsuoka—Arsène-Henry agreement on August 30, 1940, which held that, in exchange for Japan respecting its territorial sovereignty, French Indochina would engage in economic cooperation with and provide military facilities to Japan (though limited to the objective of operations against Chiang Kai-shek). However, some IJA officers who aimed to use this opportunity for seizing the region through force of arms ran amok, engaging French forces in combat. Though those responsible were reassigned, most returned straight away to IJA central. Undeniably, an atmosphere of approval did exist within the IJA regarding the desire to capture the region through military force.

At the same time, negotiations were progressing on the Tripartite Pact, an alliance between Japan, Germany, and Italy (concluded on September 27), which Matsuoka wrapped up single-handedly, unlike the talks to strengthen the Anti-Comintern Pact that the IJA was pushing for. Matsuoka was said to have been enamored of the concept of incorporating the Soviet Union into the Tripartite Pact to form an anti-Anglo-American four-country bloc.

The IJN had been firmly opposed to strengthening the Anti-Comintern Pact, but this time switched to a position of acceptance provided the issue of automatic entry into the war cleared the hurdle (in the case where Japan, Germany, or Italy was attacked by a third country—notionally the United States—that had not yet entered World War II, whether the other two countries would enter the war was thoroughly decided independently). In exchange, the IJN called on the government to complete preparations for war while using diplomacy to avoid going to war. The international environment surrounding Japan became harsher. The Tripartite Alliance severely damaged US public opinion toward Japan, and the Dutch East Indies, too, began taking a stricter attitude toward economic cooperation (which acquiesced just after the defeat of Dutch) with Japan.

Adjusting the Faltering Concept of the Southward Advance

The southward advance as conceived by the IJA rested on the premise that avoiding war with the United States was possible so long as Japan limited its war adversaries to just Britain and the Netherlands (the Anglo-American divisibility school). However, the IJN insisted that, because any move involving Britain would necessarily force US entry into the war (the Anglo-American indivisibility school), Japan should use military force only in the case of self-reliance and self-preservation. Both sides could not bridge the gap. Given the lack of agreement between the army and navy, the path of least resistance was to strengthen Japanese influence in French Indochina and Thailand by any means short of war. At that moment, the border dispute between Thailand and French Indochina flared up at the end of 1940, and Japan stepped in to arbitrate. Using this opportunity, the IJA and the IJN incorporated plans to acquire bases in southern French Indochina and to conclude a military alliance with Thailand into the national policy.

However, Matsuoka halted those plans. A vocal proponent of capturing Singapore, Matsuoka was thought to have speculated that the army and navy were not ready for war. So long as they were not prepared to seize Singapore, Matsuoka rejected the measures for Thailand and French Indochina as meaningless, and so the IJA and IJN could only back down. In addition, Britain, which misinterpreted Japan’s conduct as a military advance in the south, spread the story of a crisis in the Far East beginning in the first half of February 1941, which caused the IJN to fold (Kotani 2004; Moriyama 2016). Right after establishing arbitration to prevail on French Indochina to begrudgingly cede some territory to Thailand, Matsuoka set out on a trip to Europe, confusing the IJA and IJN.

Concluding the Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Pact and the Start of Japan-US Talks

Matsuoka received a warm and enthusiastic welcome in Germany and Italy, and on his return trip he concluded the Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Pact in Moscow on April 13, arriving home in Japan in high spirits. It appeared as though Japan, Germany, Italy, and the Soviet Union had established a quadripartite bloc. Matsuoka believed he could use this potential to Japan’s advantage in negotiations with the United States, having already laid the groundwork for such talks by reaching out to US Ambassador to the Soviet Union Laurence Steinhardt in Moscow.

Matsuoka found a draft understanding between Japan and the United States for a gradual settlement in the Orient waiting for him upon his arrival in Japan on April 22. The emperor, Konoe, and the IJA and the IJN all had expressed eager support for this quasi-private sector-initiated diplomatic proposal, which skillfully papered over the conflict between Tokyo and Washington and contained favorable conditions, such as having the United States serve as a go-between in resolving the Second Sino-Japanese War. Whether he sensed some kind of ruse or was simply vexed remains unclear, but Matsuoka sabotaged the Japan-US talks.

The Argument for Stationing Troops in Southern French Indochina and Foreign Minister Matsuoka

An attaché of the army that returned from Thailand submitted a report on April 16, “Japanese forces have little presence, still have a long way to Go” (Daihon’ei 1998). French Indochina was beginning to balk at exporting rice to Japan, citing poor pick-up as an excuse (a series of poor harvests made it necessary for Japan to import foreign rice). In addition, the Dutch East Indies had strongly rejected the broad requests that Japan had made in bilateral trade talks, which subsequently foundered. Britain began turning up economic pressure, fearing that Japan would send the resources it was obtaining from the southern areas to Germany via the trans-Siberian Railway. In order to achieve a breakthrough in this feeling of deadlock, the IJA and the IJN sought to have Matsuoka reopen policy measures toward Thailand and French Indochina that had been left unresolved for far too long.

Matsuoka rejected their request using similar rhetoric as before. And so, they escalated the content of their policy measures to station troops and establish bases in southern French Indochina. They also sought to persuade Matsuoka by expressing their readiness to go to war with the United States. Matsuoka’s bluff, which had worked until then, was no longer effective against an adversary who showed a firm determination not to give in. As a result, he was forced to act decisively. Regardless of its dramatic declaration to go to war with the United States, the IJA and the IJN, aside from just a portion, did not think that stationing troops in southern French Indochina would provoke war with the United States. Mid-level staff officers busily occupied themselves drafting documents to convince Matsuoka about the need to station troops. But these documents were so unconvincing, their drafters quipped, “those who disagreed [with the stationing] would not see the necessity after reading [the documents], whereas those who already agreed would” (ibid.).

Matsuoka briefly approved the stationing of troops in southern French Indochina, but immediately reversed himself. This transpired in the context of measures to respond to the impending start of hostilities between Germany and the Soviet Union. Matsuoka called for a reconsideration of the stationing numerous times from mid-June into July. He changed the grounds for his opposition, switching to the northward advance over the capture of Singapore, and confounded everyone around him by expounding a hardline argument that surpassed even the IJA’s hardline views.

The Start of War Between Germany and the Soviet Union and Japan’s Response

Germany commenced its attack on the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941; intelligence concerning that attack had conveyed to Japan by June 5. Confronted with the need to draft response measures, Japan determined a new national policy, “Outline of the Imperial National Policy in view of the Changing Situation,” (“July 2 Outline”) at the Imperial Conference on July 2.

The July 2 Outline made settlement of the China Incident (the Second Sino-Japanese War) a priority, yet it also mentioned advances northward and southward: “taking steps to advance south, and depending on changes in the situation, … involve a settlement of the Northern Question as well.” Moreover, since the July 2 Outline included language that “we must prepare to go to war against Great Britain and the United States,” there is a tendency to misinterpret it to mean that Japan had made a decision for war against the United States at this stage already. But, as mentioned above, the IJA and the IJN understood this as a countermeasure against Matsuoka. It is evident reading other sections of the July 2 Outline that such assertiveness was, on the contrary, nothing more than an appeal for the position of preparing for the northward and southward advances (resorting to force would be decided “independently” with regards to the German-Soviet war or possible US entry into the war) (Ike 1967). What was specifically settled was only to proceed with already established measures for Thailand and French Indochina. Yet, it became possible to move ahead with preparations for using force in both the north and south on the basis of this national policy.

The Start of the Kwantung Army’s Special Exercises

News of Germany’s steady advance reinvigorated the argument for the northward advance, especially among the Army General Staff Office. If Soviet forces in the Far East were weakened by redeployments to the Western front, it generated a once in a lifetime opportunity. The issue was the degree of Soviet weakness that would allow Japan to use force more effectively. Proponents led by Tanaka Shin’ichi, chief of the first bureau (operations), Army General Staff Office, pushed to mobilize the Kwantung Army immediately and, in concert with German actions, shake the persimmon tree, causing the shibugaki (unripe persimmons) to fall (thus, the shibugaki school of thought). In contrast, the cautious Military Affairs Bureau was of the opinion that Japan should wait until Soviet troop strength in the Far East dropped to a level where engagement became almost unnecessary (the jukushi (ripe persimmons) or “laying low and awaiting one’s chance” school of thought).

There was consensus within the IJA, however, to prepare to attack the Soviet Union. First Bureau Chief Tanaka’s direct appeal to Army Minister Hideki Tōjō bore fruit, and it was determined July 5 after the Imperial Conference that the IJA would mobilize half a million men. It was the start of special exercises by the Kwantung Army. August 9 was selected as the deadline for commencing hostilities, so as to end operations before the hard winter frost arrived. The cautious factions within the Army Ministry took it upon themselves to remain watchful until that very day, so that the Army General Staff Office would not take any unauthorized actions (Nishiura 2013).

Foreign Minister Matsuoka’s Reluctance and His Dismissal from the Cabinet

Around this period, Matsuoka was opposed to all those around him regarding the matter of proceeding with negotiations with the United States. Concerning the draft Japan-US understanding that made the disputes between the two countries artfully disappear, Matsuoka sought to negotiate by using a harder-line proposal. For instance, under the proposed draft, the United States would counsel Chiang Kai-shek toward peace linked to Japan’s guarantee of a troop withdrawal from China; the May 12 Japanese draft made no mention of this troop withdrawal and now read that the United States would counsel peace having understood and accepted the existing treaties agreements between Japan and the Wang Jingwei government. At the Imperial General Headquarters-Government Liaison Conference, Matsuoka became quite emotional by arguing that US entry into the war in Europe had to be prevented at all costs, otherwise it would be the destruction of world civilization. Thus, he asserted that the scheduled convoys (groups of transport ships with supplies to aid Britain that were protected by the US fleet) must be blocked. For those ministers and high command officers around him, putting an end to the China Incident (Second Sino-Japan War (soon to hit the 4-year mark)) was the first priority. They assumed Matsuoka is about to lose a perfect opportunity to achieve that goal.

The United States responded to the proposal of the Japanese side with an unofficial proposal on May 31 and an official counterproposal which it handed to the Japanese side on June 21. To the latter was appended an oral statement from US Secretary of State Cordell Hull saying that talks would be very difficult so long as “some Japanese leaders in influential official positions” repeatedly made pro-German remarks that influenced Japanese public opinion, and he hoped for a clearer indication that the Japanese government wished to pursue courses of peace (Department of State 1943).

Though it avoided naming him, the statement’s content challenging Matsuoka enraged him. At the July 12 liaison conference, Matsuoka demanded a retraction of the oral statement and insisted on cutting off talks, perplexing everyone around him. In the end, the liaison conference decided to continue talks and to send the Japanese counterproposal by telegraphic cable, but Matsuoka decided to send just a cable demanding the retraction of Hull’s oral statement, paying no mind to the counterproposal. Prime Minister Konoe, long exhausted by the inability to reach consensus with Matsuoka, finally decided to have his entire cabinet resign, so as to oust Matsuoka from his position as foreign minister.

The Third Konoe Cabinet and Stationing Troops in Southern French Indochina

Under the system of the Meiji Constitution, the prime minister did not have the authority to appoint or dismiss cabinet members. It was possible, of course, if the minister involved could be persuaded and consented to resign. But there was no expectation that would be the case for Matsuoka, whose had made known his desire to become prime minister (Kido 1966, Vol. 2). The second Konoe cabinet resigned en masse on July 16; the following day Konoe received an imperial order to form a new cabinet. Established on July 18, the third Konoe cabinet was seen as possibly changing course to improve relations with the United States by welcoming Navy Admiral Toyoda Teijirō, a moderate, as the foreign minister. The situation radically changed, however, when Japan stationed troops in southern French Indochina, carried out immediately after the cabinet’s creation. Washington moved to freeze all Japanese assets in the United States on July 25.

The firm US response came as a complete surprise. There had been some concern about whether stationing Japanese forces in southern French Indochina might worsen relations with the United States, as Chief of the Army General Staff Sugiyama Hajime explained at the July 2 Imperial Conference, yet the majority view was that the US reaction would probably be limited because Japan was only going so far as French Indochina and not touching Thailand (which shared a border with British Malaya, which had deep ties to Britain) (Sugiyama 1994).

The freeze order was not synonymous with an embargo. It was explained at US cabinet meeting on July 24 that US President Franklin D. Roosevelt may have frozen Japanese assets, but he did not impose a full embargo, because in fact oil export licenses were still being issued at present. The effect was, however, that not one more drop of oil flowed to Japan. Japanese domestic oil reserves stood at just 2 years-worth for peacetime consumption, and only a year and a half during wartime. The opinion emerged that Japan should seize natural resource zones through force of arms while it could still fight. It was the argument against a gradual decline. A crisis of “self-reliance and self-preservation,” the Imperial Japanese Navy’s prerequisite for war with the United States, had come to pass (Fig. 8.3).

Fig. 8.3

President Franklin D. Roosevelt

Full Embargo and Japan-US Summit

Konoe, ever indecisive and irresolute, set out on a firm course of action at this time of crisis. He proposed a Japan-US summit meeting, hoping that a direct meeting with Roosevelt would lead to a breakthrough. There was no one who could directly oppose Konoe’s extraordinary determination. Konoe sought to avoid any interference from domestic opposition, typified by the Imperial Japanese Army, by receiving the emperor’s approval immediately after securing Roosevelt’s agreement. To do so, he first had to elicit Roosevelt to Summit meeting. In response to Konoe’s proposition, Roosevelt conveyed a favorable response on August 28 that referenced a meeting venue. The Japanese side hastily move on to selecting attendants to the leaders and preparing the ship for passage.

Outline for Executing the Imperial National Policy and the Fall of the Konoe Cabinet

There were growing fears within the IJA, especially the Army General Staff Office, that Konoe might impede the army by giving up too many concessions to the Americans. Whereas Imperial Japanese Navy officers in the middle and lower grades were swept up in the momentum of an armed southward advance, naval leadership was reluctant to go to war with the United States. Nonetheless, they were fully cognizant that a naval buildup was essential to prepare for a time of emergency. The navy had submitted its proposal for the national policy to the army, with completing preparations for war as its key provision. The intent of the upper-ranking officers was unclear on the topics of the use of force and the decision to go to war, even though their proposal contained the wording “resort to force” in the case that diplomacy failed (Daihon’ei, ibid.). The IJA, however, used this as its opportunity to drag the national policy toward going to war with the United States.

The Imperial Conference of September 6 determined the Guidelines for Implementing the Imperial National Policy: in the event there were no prospects for achieving Japanese demands by early October, it was resolved to go to war with the United States, Britain, and the Netherlands. The time limit for talks was established through a bit of reverse calculation: on top of estimates for decreases in oil reserves, operations in the south had to conclude by the following spring so that Japan could prepare to attack the Soviet Union. The conditions for the United States included the Army General Staff Office’s demands to block the withdrawal of troops from China. At the Imperial Conference, Emperor Shōwa indicated his displeasure with the high-handed manner of the approach by reading a poem the Emperor Meiji had penned.¹ Thus, the government and the supreme command were required to demonstrate that they had exhausted diplomatic efforts first.

The issue was how far did they have to compromise until they could say they had exhausted diplomatic efforts? In fact, they decided at a liaison conference that it was possible to continue diplomatic efforts at the same time as the Army General Staff Office’s demands. On those grounds, the proponents for carrying on with diplomacy sought to get around those demands.

Whether the United States would agree to the idea of a summit meeting, however, was the biggest hurdle. Anti-Japanese hardliners within the US government convinced Roosevelt that a summit meeting had no merit. (These hardliners, of course, had no idea that a cornered Japan would come attack the United States directly; they were concerned about public criticism of the administration if the summit produced no results.) So that is why the US side took the basic policy of fleshing out the preconditions to meet in detail. By so doing, the IJA’s influence on the national policy could not be eradicated.

The US response arrived on October 3, rejecting the idea of a summit meeting. Konoe, Toyoda, and Navy Minister Oikawa Koshirō pushed to ease some of the conditions placed on the United States at the liaison conference held the following day, but Army Minister Tōjō refused. The IJA and IJN high commands also insisted on observing the time limit. If there had been any flaws in the determination of the September Imperial Conference, Tōjō asserted, all those responsible in the government and supreme command should resign. He publicly revealed this course of events in a cabinet meeting on October 14, too. The perception that Japan could not last long without its special interests on the continent is implied by Tōjō’s comments, “the heart of the matter is the issue of troop withdrawals,” and if that happened, then Japanese control over Manchuria and, by extension, Korea would be imperiled. It was the contemporary common sense of the Japanese people.

In the end, unable to admit a flaw or to make a decision for either war or diplomacy, Konoe abandoned his cabinet. The imperial order to form the next cabinet fell to Tōjō (Fig. 8.4).

Fig. 8.4

The Tōjō Cabinet (18 October 1941). Front row from the left: Finance Minister Kaya Okinori, President of the Planning Bureau Suzuki Teiichi, Prime Minister Tōjō Hideki, and Navy Minister Shimada Shigetarō (Mainichi Shimbun)

Tōjō Cabinet and Reexamination of the National Policy

After ordering Tōjō to form a cabinet, the emperor ordered the army and navy Ministers to reexamine the national policy. Tōjō had been elevated, from being the representative for the institutional interests of the IJA, to a position steering the entire Japanese ship of state.

He immediately began the reexamination of national policy. The Army General Staff Office took the position that, as the imperial command for a reexamination had been directed to the government, the reexamination was unnecessary. Among the cabinet ministers, Foreign Minister Tōgō Shigenori and Finance Minister Kaya Okinori opposed going to war, and both Navy Minister Shimada Shigetarō and President of the Planning Board Suzuki Teiichi at first took the position of avoiding a war. As a result of the reexamination, which lasted from October 23 until the middle of the night of November 1, Shimada and Suzuki flipped their positions and now approved of starting a war, and ultimately even Kaya and Tōgō consented. Let us summarize the discussion that took place during the reexamination.

Japan had three options at the time. One, seize the natural resource belt of the Dutch East Indies through force. Two, reach an agreement through diplomatic negotiations for the United States and Britain to lift their embargos. Three, take no action and hope for a change in the situation (gashin shōtan, which means “enduring unspeakable hardships to achieve the objective”).

The argument for option one could not hold water without prospects that the resources transported from the Dutch East Indies to Japan could sustain national power. The transport route’s flank was exposed to the Philippines and Guam (US territories), so even if Japan tried to limit its war adversaries to Britain and the Netherlands, the strategic concept would all come to naught if the United States were to attack. Therefore, Japan was forced to fight all three countries. In addition, the biggest concern was whether Japan could sustain the tonnage of shipping required to transport the resources. In the end, an optimistic forecast was put forth that shipbuilding tonnage would increase, and tonnage lost would decrease after the second year. That led to the conclusion that the war might become a protracted conflict, which caused Shimada and Suzuki to now support this option.

The argument for option two was that there was no outlook for that unless Japan largely conceded on the issue of withdrawing its troops from China. Foreign Minister Tōgō Shigenori had compiled a plan (Plan A) that compromised to a greater degree than the previous cabinet had, yet even then compromise held out only thin hopes for a rather meager success. Out of necessity, he sought a breakthrough with a backup plan, a provisional concept of a Plan B (a barter: US lifting the trade embargo for withdrawing Japanese troops from southern French Indochina). However, diplomatic negotiations would adjust according to the other party’s responses. This option, too, depended on wishful thinking (Moriyama 2012).

Of course, there was also option three, gashin shōtan. With Japan’s oil stocks sure to run dry after 2 years, however, the country would be incapable of resisting a potential attack at that time. That is not to say that the United States would have come attacking for sure. A fierce debate unfolded between Nagano Osami, the chief of the IJN General Staff, and Tōgō and Kaya at the November 1 liaison conference. Nagano, though he could not speak with certainty about the probability of victory, repeatedly said that it would be better to go to war now than later. Pessimistic predictions fearing a war that may or may not occur, as it turned out, drew that war closer, making it imminent (Fig. 8.5).

Fig. 8.5

Chief of the Navy General Staff Nagano Osami

Outlook on the War Situation and Rationale for the Choice

What was the IJN’s outlook on the state of the war? Nagano explained that, should the war be protracted owing to the absence of a decisive battle (as had occurred in the Russo-Japanese War), the outcome would be determined by the international environment and the overall national power in physical and metaphysical terms (Sugiyama, ibid.). It was obvious that Japan was incapable of surpassing the United States physically, that is in material quantities, which meant it had to resort to spiritual power (metaphysical) and praying to the gods (a favorable change in the environment). Such an attitude for a head of high command staff is irresponsible, to say the least, and is no way to form a basis for a decision to secure an advantage in war. Just as Nagano had advocated, however, Japan plunged into starting the war. Why was that?

One reason is that the third option (“enduring hardships”) lacked clear prospects for success; it was, in fact, associated with certainty of loss. Since we Japanese today know of the actual losses that defeat brought upon us, we can compare results and decide to choose the relatively better option of “enduring hardships.” It is hard to assess this before the fact, however, since avoiding war by “enduring hardships” does not result in any losses. On the contrary, as the oil runs dry, you run the risk of being blamed, that you should have fought when you had the time. In contrast to that scenario, diplomacy and war were options that gave some hope, no matter how little. That, however, was grounded in wishful thinking of rather rosy predictions and falsified statistics.

In the course of the discussions, Nagano repeatedly stated that the outlook 3 years hence was uncertain (more precisely, the third year was 2 years later), and spoke no further regarding the outlook. In 3 years, one could easily imagine the United States coming for a counterstrike having prepared itself with overwhelming military might, even greater than at present. However, they stopped their conception right before that moment, locking themselves away in an imagined future that was to their liking. People who are anxious to avoid loss tend to take the far riskier, more speculative option for expected value, according to research results (Makino 2018). It is hard to simply attribute the decision to go to war against the United States as an idiotic choice taken by men who had ways of thinking different from our own.

Losing the War: Results and Lessons

Defeat meant Japan lost all its colonies and special interests on the continent that it had worked so hard to acquire since the Meiji period. In addition, China turning Communist meant that the lands supplying natural resources and markets that were developed with the support of Japanese capitalism disappeared on the other side of the “bamboo curtain” (the border dividing the Communist camp from the anti-Communist camp in Asia). Then numerous soldiers and civilians (approximately 6.6 million) returned to a devastated homeland. And yet, Japan later achieved miraculous economic growth even without colonies or special interests on the continent (Tanaka 2010).

Is this the hindsight of history? Not necessarily so. In the course of the reexamination of the national policy, Foreign Minister Tōgō insisted that if only the United States eased its conditions slightly and Japan accepted them, everything would take a turn for the better (Sugiyama, ibid.). There was no one, however, who would listen to him at that time. It was the understanding of everyone, aside from Tōgō, that Japan would become a third-rate country if it lost its continental interests. People who take the long view, being neither overly pessimistic nor optimistic—such people were in short supply at the center of Japanese policymaking. And what came of that? Many are the lessons that should be taken from the outcome of the war that cost an unimaginable number of victims.

Bibliography: For Further Reading

Daihon’ei rikugunbu sensō shidōhan. Gunjishi Gakkai hen (eds). 1998. Daihon’ei rikugunbu sensō shidōhan: Kimitsu sensō nisshi. jōkan (Imperial General Headquarters, Army Division, War Guidance Section: Secret War Log [First Volume]). Tokyo: Kinseisha.

Department of State. 1943. Papers relating to the foreign relations of the United States, Japan, 1931–1941, Volume II. Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office. As referenced at: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1931-41v02/d271

Ike, Nobutaka (trans., ed.). 1967. Japan’s Decision for War: Records of the 1941 Policy Conferences. Stanford: Stanford University Press. [This reference, a translation of the Liaison and Imperial Conference documents from 1941, was used for English wording.]

Kido, Kōichi. Oka, Yoshitake (eds). 1966. Kido Kōichi nikki jōge-kan (The Diary of Marquis Kido Kōichi, [Two Volumes]). Tokyo: The University of Tokyo Press.

Kotani, Ken. 2004. Igirisu no jōhō gaikō: interijensu towa nanika (British Intelligence and Diplomacy: What is Intelligence?). PHP Shinsho.

Moriyama, Atsushi. 2012. Nihon wa naze kaisen ni humikitta ka: “ryōron heiki” to “hi kettei” (Why Japan Decided to Enter the War with the United States). Tokyo: Shinchōsha.

An analysis of the characteristics of Japan’s complicated policy-making system of the time: incorporating incompatible policy options and indecision. The book focuses on the period following the freezing of Japanese assets in the United States in late July 1941.

Moriyama, Atsushi. 2016. Nichibei kaisen to jōhōsen (Intelligence War before the Japan-US War). Kōdansha.

An analysis of the decision-making process in late 1940 for measures toward Thailand and French Indochina and the stationing troops in southern French Indochina, centering on Matsuoka Yōsuke’s role. In addition, the book sheds light empirically on the intelligence war between Japan and the United States over going to war.

Moriyama, Atsushi. 2017. Matsuoka yōsuke: popyurisuto no gosan (“Matsuoka Yōsuke: Miscalculations of a Populist”) in Tsutsui, Kiyotada (eds). Shōwashi kōgi3 (Showa Lectures 3). Chikuma Shobō.

Nishiura, Susumu. 2013. Shōwa sensōshi no shōgen: nihon rikugun shūen no shinjitsu (Shōwa War History Testimonial: The Truth about the Final Days of the Imperial Japanese Army). Tokyo: Nikkei Bijinesujin Bunko.

Sugiyama, Hajime. Rikugun Sanbō Honbu-hen (eds). 1994. Sugiyama memo. hukyū-ban, shinsō-ban (The Sugiyama Memo [new, mass market edition]). Tokyo: Hara Shobō. (First published in 1967.)

Tanaka, Hiromi. 2010. Fukuin, hikiage no kenkyū: kiseki no seikan to saisei e no michi (Demobilization and Repatriation Studies: the Miraculous Survivors and their Road to Recovery). Tokyo: Shin Jinbutsu Ōraisha.

Additional Bibliography

Kitaoka, Shin’ichi. 2015. Monko kaihō seisaku to nihon (The Open Door Policy and Japan). Tokyo: The University of Tokyo Press.

In the concluding chapter, “The aims and points of dispute in the Pacific War,” the author points out that conflict between Japan and the United States was over their principles only. It was not over concrete interests, and thus resolution through negotiation was difficult. This important study first appeared in print in Hosoya Chihiro et al (eds). 1993. Taiheiyō sensō (The Pacific War). Tokyo: The University of Tokyo Press.

Makino, Kuniaki. 2018. Keizai gakushatachi no nichi-bei kaisen: akimaru kikan “maboroshi no hōkokusho” no nazo o toku (Economists on the Start of the Pacific War: Solving the Mystery of the Akimaru Unit’s “Illusory Report”). Tokyo: Shinchō sensho.

Why didn’t the Akimaru Unit comprising Japan’s leading economists prevent the war? An economist’s high-level overview through the war’s end that reveals the true aspects of the unit’s “illusory report.”