The First Sino-Japanese War and East Asia

Abstract

This chapter covers the First Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895, a “watershed in world history,” according to the author. It uses maps of the Korean Peninsula to shed light on other conflicts in Northeast Asia that both preceded and followed this war, which the author suggests remains unfinished and affects current geostrategic thinking. In tracing the road to war and the consequences of it, the significance of Manchuria in relation to the security of the Korean Peninsula is highlighted and the “historical deficiency of mutual understanding” lamented.

From Three Maps

The First Sino-Japanese War, which started in 1894, is one of the major events in the modern history of Japan. There are a great many books that go into the details and place it in the context of Japanese history. So it would probably be repetitive and serve little purpose for me to address the war in detail from the framework and perspective of Japanese modern history, reproducing old theories that lay somewhat outside of my particular field of expertise. Were I to discuss the topic again in my own way, I would prefer to proceed from a slightly different point of view, by asking how we should consider the First Sino-Japanese War and its significance, and then offering an answer. I should think that this approach would be more productive and constructive, if not entirely sufficient.

First, by way of an introduction to the topic, please look at the following maps. All three are maps of the Korean Peninsula; furthermore, they all depict wars that occurred there. Just getting a sense of the broad picture is fine for now. Figure 2.1 is of the First Sino-Japanese War, which, as you can tell, was fought over the Korean Peninsula. It is not the only war in history waged over the peninsula. Figure 2.2 depicts Toyotomi Hideyoshi’s dispatch of troops to Korea; Fig. 2.3, the closest to us in time, is of the Korean War, which broke out in 1950 and has yet to be concluded legally, with the peninsula remaining in a state of belligerence today.

Fig. 2.1

First Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895)

Fig. 2.2

Toyotomi Hideyoshi’s dispatch of troops to Korea (Bunroku War, 1592)

Fig. 2.3

The Korean War (1950–1953 Armistice)

You can tell just by looking at these three maps side by side that the current situation on the Korean Peninsula is a product of history. It is rather intriguing that, viewed holistically, there are commonalities running through the course of events and conditions during the 400-plus years between Hideyoshi’s troop dispatch and the Korean War, notwithstanding the completely different eras and contexts in which these wars happened. The aggressor may have differed—north or south, by land or sea—but a reaction would always ensue if one side gained superiority. Against an attack from the south, military force from the continent would appear, attempting to block it from going north.

At the same time, this discussion of the three wars focuses on merely one, rather temporary, aspect of the state of affairs. However, when placed side by side for consideration, we may perhaps elaborate from a longer-term perspective that is historical and geopolitical. The status of division and conflict between the north and south on the peninsula is closely related to the balance of power of their respective hinterlands. There are examples of wars induced by changes in the power hierarchy of the continent to the north and the islands and sea to the south. In summary, this has been the situation for the past 500 years.

The Korean Peninsula at the Center

Long before this period, the Korean Peninsula basically had never been made the battlefield for or the object of a fight between external powers historically speaking, with the exception of the Battle of Hakusukinoe in classical times. The sole example that involved the peninsula is the Mongol Invasions of Japan (1274 and 1281), when Japan fought the Mongol Empire. After gaining total control over the peninsula, continental forces then attempted to invade the Japanese archipelago; the archipelago, for its part, could not just stand and watch, it was forced to meet the invasion. This was the case up until the seventeenth century.

However, Hideyoshi’s dispatch of troops to Korea at the end of the sixteenth century completely changed the situation, reversing the flow of movement from the archipelago across the seas toward the peninsula and continent. Leaving aside the question of whether this was good or bad, it signifies how powerful the archipelago had become. This was a situation without precedent in the histories of East Asia and the world. During its Warring States Period (fifteenth to seventeenth centuries), the Japanese archipelago had experienced a sort of high-growth period and turned into a military powerhouse. Once again East Asia had to readjust its balance of power in response to the sudden rise and emergence of the sea power, Japan.

The situation finally settled down in the mid-seventeenth century under the Qing dynasty’s reign in China and the Edo government’s sakoku national policy of severely limiting all foreign interaction; Tokugawa Japan, Qing China, and Joseon Korea each established various bilateral relations with the others. Sakoku-period Japan did not undertake political intercourse with the Qing court, maintaining trade relations only. Japan did have diplomatic exchanges with the Joseon dynasty, though relations between the central governments were little more than ceremonial. The Tsushima domain, involved with both sides, constantly kept up its ties to the peninsula.

The tributary system that had existed under the previous Ming dynasty continued between the Qing and the Joseon. It was a ceremonial, hierarchical relationship in which they referred to each other as “suzerain” (Qing) and “vassal”¹ (Joseon) and, as a rule, the suzerain did not interfere in the vassal’s domestic or foreign affairs. This was how the Joseon court could almost establish diplomatic relations with Japan independently without concern for the Qing, for instance. Since the three governments were largely stable, relations between the archipelago, the peninsula, and the continent endured without any serious incidents for over two centuries.

But in the latter half of the nineteenth century, Western powers encroached on East Asia. The continent’s, the archipelago’s, and the peninsula’s negotiations with the Western Great Powers had an impact on all their governments to a greater or lesser degree, thus necessitating another change in the existing balance of power. What arose out of that process of trial and error were the First Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese wars.

The twentieth century began in East Asia with the Boxer Rebellion in China and the Russo-Japanese War. A victor in both, Japan could seize the Korean Peninsula at last. Subsequently, Japan began exerting its influence on the continent and its conflict with China gradually became all encompassing. This development was not unrelated to the peninsula. Japan’s fixation on Manchuria underlay its geopolitical and national security interests of how best to secure its Korean colony.

The power map of the region underwent radical change as soon as Japan, defeated in World War II, lost Manchuria and withdrew from the Korean Peninsula. Once again it was time to recalculate the balance of power among the archipelago/sea, the peninsula, and the continent. The Korean War broke out for that purpose. The outcome still defines the international situation in East Asia.

When considered like this, the trajectory of the Japanese archipelago is a critical factor in the battles fought over the Korean Peninsula. Historically since the time of its emergence in the sixteenth century until today, whenever Japan’s national strength has waxed or waned, it has always meant trouble on the Korean Peninsula. It is this process that I would like to take up in addressing the First Sino-Japanese War.

Watershed in World History

I have described the First Sino-Japanese War elsewhere in my writings as a “watershed in East Asian history” and a “watershed in world history.” Understanding why only requires a brief glimpse at some simplified conditions. The war completely changed the way East Asia and the world looked between the end of the nineteenth century and at the start of the twentieth. In world history, the main players changed, with major non-Western European countries displacing the Western Europeans; in East Asia, Japan emerged as a major power. This is the moment when imperialism, or what might be called a unification or structuring of the world, finally spread to East Asia.

In general, China’s modern era, in the context of East Asian or Chinese histories, begins with the Opium War in 1840. This is only the Chinese government’s official historical stance, and nothing more; there is no obligation or need for Japan’s study of history to adhere blindly to it. We need consider only that which conforms to historical fact. It would be best not to summarize this history from an overarching perspective as something to the effect of the Western Great Powers gained direct access to China after the Opium War and subsequent events, or their spreading influence resulted in major changes in China. That was true roughly throughout the nineteenth century.

Instead, it would be preferable to note the role of Japan, which modernized under the West’s impact. It is more expedient and appropriate, at least from a big picture view of history, to assume the course of events being that the continent and peninsula both began to change at last under Japan’s impact. It was after the First Sino-Japanese War that comprehensive modernization on the continent finally became an issue and even accelerated. The peninsula entered a completely new era as a Japanese colony. From this perspective, the First Sino-Japanese War can be taken as a watershed in East Asian history. We should consider the two roughly 30-year time spans before and after this watershed event. Each forms one historical cycle: the Meiji Restoration [1868] is the starting point and the Manchurian Incident [1931] the end point. We then might designate the 30 years that precede the First Sino-Japanese War “the road to war” and the 30 years that follow “after the fight.”

The Road to War

The stance adopted by Meiji Restoration Japan was that the country had to modernize, to construct a national system as well as international relations in the Western style. The nearby peninsula and continent were the first hurdle at the time, especially for the Meiji statesmen. That is, their task was how to interact with the Joseon and Qing dynasties. The top fear for the Japanese islands then was a military threat reaching the archipelago via the Korean Peninsula. Such a threat on the peninsula closest to Japan engendered a great sense of crisis, whether it originated from Qing China or the Russian Empire.

If the archipelago felt that way, it would not be strange for the continent to think that way, too: that Japan, and by extension the Korean Peninsula, posed a threat to the government in Beijing. Moreover, this thought did not start with the Meiji Restoration in the latter half of the nineteenth century. The quintessential historical evidence is perhaps that the Ming court boldly sent reinforcements at the time of Toyotomi Hideyoshi’s Korea expedition. What was special this time was that Japan was rapidly modernizing, with “Rich Nation, Strong Army” (fukoku kyōhei) its slogan. Strengthening the armed forces was the most important goal, and the resultant expansion of military power was remarkable. Surely that was the view of the Japanese islands the Chinese side had from across the sea.

Much as Meiji Japan feared a reappearance of a Mongol invasion, the continent and China feared a return of Hideyoshi’s Korea expedition. It is clearly written in the Chinese historical archives: we must by no means repeat the mistakes of the Ming period. In summary, each side viewed the other as a military threat. A structure of mounting mistrust and suspicion, mutually held, lay at the root of this state of affairs. It was in this context that Japan, seeking to build modern international relations, concluded treaties with the Qing Empire and the Kingdom of Joseon. Being that this was the 1870s, these negotiations were held in a peaceful context. Yet progress was not always smooth: Japan resorted to using military force with its Taiwan expedition and it settled the matter of the status of the Ryūkyū Kingdom by incorporating the islands into its territory.

Each instance was the process of Japan exercising its control as a modern state. The Qing dynasty must have viewed these incidents as Japan rudely destroying the Chinese system of world order. So far as the Chinese side saw it, the Ryūkyūs, being separated from the continent by the sea, was not an urgent or pressing matter requiring immediate attention. What they took as an impending crisis was the Kingdom of Joseon, with the same rank in their tributary system as the Ryūkyūs. Geographically proximate to Beijing and contiguous with its territory, the peninsula had long been a militarily strategic point. The Qing government, suddenly more concerned, began strengthening its presence and pressure on the Korean Peninsula in the 1880s on the basis of their existing relationship.

These developments left the Kingdom of Joseon’s statesmen and leading policymakers most perplexed. They also were the seed for remarkable factional struggles, with some advisors seeking to exploit the pressure they received from the Qing dynasty and others moving to use Japan or another Great Power. One example is the conflict between Sadae Party and the Independence Party. The armed clash between the two sides, in which both Japan and the Qing became embroiled, was the Gapsin Coup that took place in December 1884. Japan and the Qing dynasty concluded the Tianjin Convention as a response to this incident in which their forces engaged each other. Itō Hirobumi and Li Hongzhang agreed that, for the time being, both sides would pull their troops from the Korean Peninsula and would not make any moves there. This kept the peace in East Asia for the next 10 years.

After the Fight

Both sides pushed ahead to expand their military armaments as they continued to eye each other warily. The global balance of power had also shifted. Even if it had not, Japan was in the inferior position. It did not welcome any additional pressure on the Korean Peninsula from the Qing Empire or others. This was also tied to Japan’s Foreign Minister Mutsu Munemitsu’s strong motive for waging the First Sino-Japanese War. As he wrote, in order to “maintain the balance of power” in Korea with the Chinese and avoid any detrimental imbalance of that power relationship, Japan had to be prepared “to send a substantial number of troops to the peninsula.” Mutsu also characterized the war as a clash between the existing old-world order of the continent and the modern international order of the archipelago:

While we need not rehearse in detail here the origins of the long-standing Sino-Japanese struggle for power in Korea, this much should be noted: the efforts by each of the two empires to maintain its respective influence on the peninsula were virtually incompatible. Japan always regarded Korea as an independent and sovereign state, and sought to terminate Korea’s ambiguous vassal-like relationship to China. China, on the other hand, loudly proclaimed that Korea was one of her tributaries by virtue of the long history of relations between the two countries. Despite the fact that Sino-Korean relations lacked several important ingredients usually recognized by international law as necessary in a suzerain-vassal relationship, the Chinese pressed for at least nominal recognition of Korea’s vassalage (Mutsu 1982, p. 7–9).

In following Western-style international relations, Japan viewed Joseon as an independent state and sought to separate it from the influence of the continent. In contrast, the Qing dynasty sought to maintain the existing ceremonial, hierarchical relationship, and on those grounds tried to keep a free hand militarily on the Korean Peninsula. Ultimately, regardless of the party, the intention or goal became how to construct a balance of power with respect to the peninsula. We must not overlook this point.

Japan, as you know, won the First Sino-Japanese War. Yet, its influence on the Korean Peninsula suffered a major setback, caused by the enlargement of Russian influence stemming from the Triple Intervention. Japan felt it had to secure the Korean Peninsula at the very least, since it related to the security of the archipelago. Although it negotiated with Russia to demarcate their respective spheres of influence, they were unable to come to any agreement. And this is what led to the Russo-Japanese War.

Unchanging Essence

Japan’s military victories over the Qing and Russia had an enormous influence on Qing China. Many believed that China could become stronger provided it undertook reforms like Japan’s and set up a form of government like Japan’s. What they were aiming to create was, in a word, a Japanese model of modernization. The biànfǎ (Wuxu Reforms) and xīnzhèng (New Policies) reform efforts are such events in Chinese history. Nationalism was a natural outgrowth of this process. For that reason, momentum was growing in China in the twentieth century seeking the return of concessions held by the Great Powers. We can understand the deepening conflict with Japan and its evolution from the Manchurian Incident to the Second Sino-Japanese War in this context. Until the First Sino-Japanese War, the balance of power in East Asia consisted of the existing order under China and the continent and the modern Western-style international relations maintained by the archipelago (Japan). In the twentieth century, in contrast, it became a clash of nationalisms, nation versus nation, especially after the Manchurian Incident. A truly monumental shift.

We must not overlook the fact that the Manchuria question was a persistent problem throughout. To secure the Korean Peninsula, it was necessary to exert control over Manchuria (what the Qing called their “Eastern Three Provinces,” which roughly corresponds to today’s Liaoning, Jilin, and Heilongjiang provinces and parts of eastern Inner Mongolia). And from the continent’s perspective, securing the northeast required controlling the Korean Peninsula. We can see this in the case of the First Sino-Japanese War, when Japan forced the Qing government to cede the Liaodong Peninsula, and Russia forced Japan to return the concession in the Triple Intervention (with Germany and France). This linkage between the peninsula and contiguous areas on the continent is a critical issue in the construction of the balance of power, as was apparent in the rationale for controlling both Manchuria and Korea rather than yielding Manchuria to Russia in exchange for Japanese control over the peninsula, two strategic arguments during this period.

From that perspective, we should have no trouble perceiving the Russo-Japanese War as a recurrence of the First Sino-Japanese War. The way events unfolded, Manchuria became the battlefield for the Russo-Japanese War because of Japan’s stance: since it would not yield the Korean Peninsula, it deliberately started the fight from there. If that is the case, it seems as though we might also say that the First Sino-Japanese War is not over yet; the Korean War has not been officially concluded yet. After Japan renounced its colonial rule, the Korean War broke out and China came down from Manchuria to fight, a reversal of what happened in the Russo-Japanese War, from the Japanese standpoint. Yet the same interests were still at stake. The Chinese recaptured Pyongyang, long lost to them since the First Sino-Japanese War, but they were unable to keep Seoul. When considered this way, the current geopolitical balance of power is endowed with the unchanging essence of being the First Sino-Japanese War, yet unfinished.

Insufficient Understanding of History

Were I to elaborate on another of the unchanging aspects, it would be the historical deficiency of mutual understanding. This is true for the continent and the peninsula both. Frankly, I often cannot understand their words and actions. This is the case at present as well as when I read history, to the extent that it feels as though the more I study, the less I know.

In the case of the peninsula, whether the Joseon dynasty of the past or the two governments in the north and south now, there are many things beyond my grasp. It is likely that these things are specific challenges that lie in wait for us now and in the immediate future. If so, more than half the problem is in recognizing and understanding them. Trying to force understanding typically results in superficial knowledge, misunderstandings, and misinterpretations. Thus, correct understanding can only begin with the realization that we have not yet reached understanding.

It is the same as how I have addressed the problems in this chapter. For instance, earlier I touched on Chinese nationalism that emerged in the twentieth century. Though we call it nationalism, there are many points we cannot understand if we make assumptions using Western concepts of a modern state or the standards and norms for international relations. It is the same for the Korean Peninsula. How should we attempt to understand and deal with these issues, then? I believe a historical approach is effective and expedient. When thinking about the modern nation-state or about modernization, we must look back to the past, well before the turn of the twentieth century.

In the case of Japan, one must account for the fact that the political system and social structure of the Edo period became the foundation for its modernization, modern constitution, and constitutional form of government. Something similar could be said for the peninsula and the continent, though the details and situations vary. Their modernizations rest on the foundations of the political systems and social structures of the preceding Joseon and Qing periods.

Considering political systems, the rule of law tends to be a problem in both China and South Korea. Their concepts and developmental foundations for constitutional government and the rule of law are not the same things we consider them to be. The issue may be long-held and deeply embedded social structures and modes of thought. If so, a better understanding of each other will be quite a challenging undertaking, impossible to achieve overnight.

If we assume that Japan is so different from the continent and peninsula, it would not be too far a stretch to call it a “clash of civilizations.” But such a conclusion has the potential to lead to another war, perhaps once again “by fate,” as with the dispatch of troops to Korea and the First Sino-Japanese War. It is necessary to put mechanisms in place and figure out ways to avert such a catastrophe.

There is no reason to have expected mutual understanding between Japan and China before the First Sino-Japanese War at the end of the nineteenth century, or even well before that during the Edo and Qing periods. Nevertheless, there were long periods when peace held. Under what conditions was that possible? In that sense, there are still many things left to learn from this history. From that point, the characterization and designation of the First Sino-Japanese War is one of the events marking a change of era that continues today.

I would like to conclude this chapter by expressing the rather ordinary desire for professors who teach history to pay greater attention to history. That, I firmly believe, is one of the most important things that can be done.

Bibliography: For Further Reading

Mutsu, Munemitsu. 1983. Kenkenroku. Tokyo: Iwanami Bunko. [Published in English as: Mutsu, Munemitsu. Gordon Mark Berger (trans). 1982. Kenkenroku (Kenkenroku: a Diplomatic Record of the Sino-Japanese War, 1894–95). Princeton: Princeton University Press.]

Additional Bibliography

Okamoto, Takashi. 2008. Sekai no naka no Ni-Shin-Kan kankeishi: kōrin to zokkoku, jishu to dokuritsu (Contested Perceptions: Interactions and Relations between China, Korea, and Japan since the Seventeenth Century). Tokyo: Kōdansha sensho metier. [Published in English as: Okamoto, Takashi. The Japan institute of International Affairs (trans). 2022. Contested Perceptions: Interactions and Relations between China, Korea, and Japan since the Seventeenth Century. Tokyo: Japan Publishing Industry Foundation for Culture.]

Okamoto, Takashi. 2017. Sōsho higashi-Ajia no kingendaishi1 Shinchō no kōbō to chūka no yukue: Chōsen shuppei kara Nichi-Ro sensō e. (The Modern History of East Asia Library (Vol. 1)—The Qing Dynasty and the Trajectory of China: from Hideyoshi’s Korea Expedition to the Russo-Japanese War). Tokyo: Kōdansha.

Okamoto, Takashi. 2019. Zōho Chūgoku “han-Nichi” no genryū (The Origins of “Anti-Japaneseness” in China [Expanded edition]). Tokyo: Chikuma gakugei bunko. (First edition 2011.)

I would like to suggest the three books of mine listed above. They are all historical overviews of roughly the same time span, the sixteenth century through the start of the twentieth century. I attempted to approach the subject from different perspectives. The first book is a history of international relations focused on the Korean Peninsula. The second, while a history of East Asia with emphasis on the rise and fall of the Qing dynasty, also includes a view of the relations of Inner Asia. The third volume sketched out the societal structures of Japan and China and the political processes that shaped them. For those wishing to know more, I would encourage them to read the sources cited in these books.