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Methods in Applied Ethics

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Abstract

There are significant disagreements about the methods used in applied ethics. This chapter reviews some central methodological questions and the underlying philosophical issues. A simple account of a common approach is outlined: consider one’s initial response to a case of interest, and then apply reasoning to test or correct one’s initial response. Issues arising from this simple model include the status and reliability of immediate responses and the nature of any reasoning process, including the selection and justification of any framework of ethical values and ethical theory used. Certain features of AI itself pose particular challenges for the methodology in applied ethics, including ways in which developments in technology can impact how we understand concepts. Beliefs about the nature of ethics itself will also impact methodology, including assumptions about consistency, completeness, and clarity in ethics, and the very purpose of morality; we look at some common assumptions. The way in which cases are selected and described is critical, affecting how agency and responsibility are attributed, among other questions. We examine how narratives about AI and images of AI may influence how we approach ethical issues and how fiction, including science fiction, may be used in addressing ethical questions in AI.

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Further Reading

    Methodology in Applied Ethics

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    Artificial Intelligence, Perceptions, and Sources of Bias

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    • Cave S, Dihal K (2019) Hopes and fears for intelligent machines in fiction and reality. Nat Mach Intell 1(2):74–78

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    • https://dl.acm.org/doi/pdf/10.1145/3154485 (n.d.)

    • Lanier J (2010) You are not a gadget: a manifesto. Vintage, New York

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    Authors and Affiliations

    1. Geller Institute of Aging and Memory, University of West London, London, UK

      Paula Boddington

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    1. Paula Boddington
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    Boddington, P. (2023). Methods in Applied Ethics. In: AI Ethics. Artificial Intelligence: Foundations, Theory, and Algorithms. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-9382-4_4

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    • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-9382-4_4

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