Dr. Eberhard Sandschneider is a leading German international relations scholar and China expert. Currently professor emeritus at the Free University of Berlin and a partner in the consulting firm Berlin Global Advisors, he was a former director of the Research Institute of the German Council on Foreign Relations, dean of the Department of Political and Social Sciences at the Free University of Berlin and an advisory member of the German Federal Institute for Security Policy. Johanna Pöllath is the president of Stiftung Ex Oriente, a public law foundation focusing on popularization of Chinese culture, language and economy in Germany, and director of the Confucius Institute in Munich.

A photo presents the front profile of Eberhard Sandschneider. He stands holding an open book against the backdrop of a large bookshelf.

Eberhard Sandschneider

With Olaf Scholz succeeding Angela Merkel as the chancellor of Germany, there has been speculation on where Sino-German and Sino-European relations are headed in the post-Merkel era amid the turbulence of Sino-U.S. relations. Dr. Eberhard Sandschneider talks to Johanna Pöllath and Peng Dawei, chief journalist at China News Service’s German branch and deputy director of China News Network Research Institute, about the weaknesses in the German foreign policy and why sanctions on China or “decoupling from China” will not serve the interest of any country. Fingerpointing at China or saying that China does not live up to the West’s expectations is not a constructive way to approach relations with China and continuous confrontation with China will make everyone suffer.

CNS: What do you feel about American political scientist Samuel Huntington’s theory in his book The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order that the rise of East Asia is challenging Western dominance and intensifying inter-civilizational conflict?

Eberhard Sandschneider: Harvard professor Graham Allison has also discussed the famous “Thucydides Trap,” the concept that there is tension and even possibly war when an emerging power challenges an established one. This is nothing new in global history. I would argue that China’s rise is a perfectly normal process. Imagine a country with a population of 1.4 billion and such a large territory, and nearly double-digit average annual GDP growth for 40 years. So no one will be surprised if China translates its economic power into political influence and military capability.

It is not in the interest of any country to get caught up in a long-lasting confrontation with China, and we will all suffer from it. “Decoupling,” which means that the world’s two largest economies are untethering from each other, is a magic word that began with Donald Trump when he was U.S. president and was inherited by President Joe Biden. This approach will put German companies in an almost insurmountable either/or dilemma: Which market should they focus on, China or the United States? Which market would they have to alienate because of the U.S. sanctions on China? Therefore, it is crucial for German companies to handle the relations with China properly.

Considering what has happened in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya and Syria, where do we begin to talk about value systems with China? In these countries, our attempts to implement Western value systems into politics by force failed miserably. The sad result of these events is that the West has done more damage to its own value system than China could have ever through its criticism of the West. This is a trap of Western “values diplomacy,” in which our credibility has been severely damaged.

CNS: What’s your take on the recent attempts to de-escalate tensions between the U.S. and China? What does this mean for Germany and the EU?

Eberhard Sandschneider: The dialogue is important by itself. It’s important to avoid military friction. The standoff between the U.S. and China has not gone away, but the two sides have opened a dialogue, which is the first positive signal in a long time, and therefore very important.

Johanna Pöllath: China is already a global economic power that Germany and Europe cannot afford to bypass; on the other hand, the West has strong accusations against China on issues such as human rights and values. How can Germany maintain a judicious foreign policy despite this tense environment?

Eberhard Sandschneider: I wouldn’t give advice to China while pointing a finger at it and I wouldn’t say “China is not doing what we expect it to do.” I would try to suggest policies that China can implement for its own interests.

I think perhaps the lesson for Chinese foreign policy from the U.S. is that being criticized does not mean the end of the story. People should be able to withstand some of the criticism, responding to it constructively, and fight back where they should. But in general, withstanding criticism is something that a global power has to get used to.

On the other hand, what should the West do to improve its policy toward China? I have been observing China for more than four decades. Our biggest problem lies in expectation management. Some of my American colleagues have not changed their expectation toward China in 40 years, and when they find out that China is not “doing what the West wants,” they react with frustration, even anger.

Whether the West likes it or not, whether it thinks China is meeting its expectations or not, China has a perfectly legitimate right to defend its own interests. This means that expectation management is a major challenge for the West in terms of its relations with China.

The second problem is the internalization of the China policy. When politicians criticize China for “human rights violations,” “technology theft,” “lack of market access,” etc., they are likely to be applauded at home, but it has nothing to do with what they are criticizing. The lack of “China-Kompetenz” (China competency) means that we have not made the effort to understand this vast country in a way comparable to its size, and this has contributed to the obvious arrogance that characterizes our discussions around China. We believe that our value system and political system is also applicable to China, but China does not accept it. In the context of Chinese domestic politics, this arrogance of the West over the years is reminiscent of the humiliations the West imposed on China throughout past history.

If we are looking for a concept to summarize a multidimensional policy toward China, rather than a black-and-white one, I would like to quote Michael Schaefer, former German ambassador to China, who has a remarkable understanding of China: “Equal and respectful dialogue.”

There is no alternative but dialogue. Are sanctions an alternative? I can’t find a single instance where the sanctions imposed on China by the West for various reasons ultimately served the purpose envisioned.

In 2022, Germany and China marked the 50th anniversary of their diplomatic relations. While a long list of problems can be drawn up in retrospect, it must also be acknowledged in all fairness that in 1972 no one could have imagined the level the bilateral economic and political relations have reached today. Hopefully, ultimately dialogue will come from goodwill on both sides, from the willingness to learn from each other, so that the difficult challenges can be successfully resolved.

Johanna Pöllath: Many in the West fear that with China’s global economic expansion, its political influence is growing as well. How strong is that influence? Does Western democracy need to be “defended”?

Eberhard Sandschneider: Democracy certainly needs to be defended, but the defense of democracy needs to be done with more confidence. The controversy surrounding the Confucius Institute is a good example to illustrate this point. China is allegedly trying to “exert great influence on Western society” and the Confucius Institute is one of the means to achieve this. Is that really true? Well, the Confucius Institute has publicly stated that its mission is to present a positive image of China to the world. But is this a uniquely Chinese approach? Not really. What is the Goethe-Institut of Germany doing? What are the major political foundations of Germany doing? And what is the German development aid agency GIZ doing?

It is normal practice worldwide for a country to try to present as positive an image of itself as possible. The United States does it; Europe does it, and now China is doing it too. We shouldn’t criticize China for that.

In the process, the skeptics reveal a lack of confidence in the attractiveness of their own values. Having said that, I would like to go back to Michael Schaefer’s remark that dialogue must be conducted in a respectful manner.

Johanna Pöllath: What will Germany’s foreign policy in the coming years be like?

Eberhard Sandschneider: From many aspects, German foreign policy is undoubtedly in a period of significant change. First of all, there is the change in transatlantic relations. We have already seen the latest direction of the U.S. foreign policy, and Europe is no longer the core ally of the U.S. Biden has not even bothered to ask Europe—whether it is Paris or Berlin—before making key decisions, which has had a shocking effect on German and EU foreign policy. Second, there is confusion within the EU. We have a European External Action Service, the EU’s diplomatic service, but we lack a foreign policy; we have the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, but no one can really claim that the EU has a unified foreign policy. So Germany’s foreign policy faces a huge challenge.

The Chinese political system is meritocracy-based. It is impossible for an official to be in charge of the Chinese foreign ministry if they cannot demonstrate appropriate competence and experience. In this respect, China is result-oriented. In Germany, it is possible to have a foreign minister with no diplomatic experience if the government formation negotiation comes at a wrong time or under undesirable circumstances. That won’t happen in China.