1 Introduction

GCC states have diverged significantly in their policies in the last two decades, particularly since the Arab Spring. The policies of KSA, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) were different from the Qatar’s vision (Coates-Ulrichsen, 2014). During the post-Arab Spring disagreements, Oman and Kuwait remained neutral states, while the aftermath deepened the intra-GCC differences (Zweiri & Doğan-Akkaş, 2021). In 2014, three GCC member states and Egypt recalled their ambassadors from Doha. However, after Kuwait’s mediation, Qatar and KSA signed the Riyadh Agreement with the assistance of Sheikh Sabah of Kuwait. Despite the conflicting parties came to an agreement as a result of Kuwait’s efforts, the disagreements were not resolved (Coates-Ulrichsen, 2020). The GCC crises deepened and, in 2017, three members of the GCC (and Egypt) declared an embargo on Qatar. Mehran Kamrava (2018) analyzes the impact of the 2016 U.S. elections on the Gulf and highlights the timing of the embargo. He argued that the blockade was a sign of the failure of U.S. security arrangements in the Gulf region. Since Kuwait was concerned about the security and the unity of GCC, Sheikh Sabah and Kuwaiti officials made diplomatic trips to both the sides. Even though other countries offered mediation, the acceptance of Kuwait as a mediator by both sides gave Kuwait a critical position in the dispute.

Ibrahim Fraihat (2020) examines the mediation of Kuwait and the United States in the 2017 Gulf crisis, Fraihat (2020) mentions four main features of the mediations: timing, power, legitimacy, and the interests of the mediators. Concerning the interests of mediators, he claims that Kuwait mediated the crisis because it wanted to keep the GCC secure (Fraihat, 2020). A proper mediation of the crisis would provide an impetus to the functioning of GCC (Fraihat, 2020). Fraihat (2020) claims that informal mediation by Kuwait started even earlier than the crisis itself, which began on June 5, 2017, when the Emirs of Qatar and Kuwait met on May 31 to discuss the issues among the Gulf States and the ways to diffuse the growing tension between member states (Fraihat, 2020).

Abdulhadi Alajmi (2018) explains that Kuwait’s primary objective in mediating the Gulf crisis of 2017 was to keep the GCC secure because of Kuwait’s own fragile situation. Kuwaiti Emir, Sheikh Sabah, stressed on Kuwait’s reluctance to allow other countries to intervene in the issue, albeit Egypt was formally, and Turkey and Iran indirectly, a part of the crisis. Kuwait’s attitude can be considered as a desire to protect the unity of the GCC, which had become a raison d’être for the Kuwaiti state after the invasion of Kuwait by Iraqi forces in 1990. Hence, it could be said that Kuwait’s mediation efforts were led by its security concerns (Alajmi, 2018).

Kuwait’s impartial position and historical ties made Kuwait an acceptable choice for a mediator to the conflicting parties. Despite, Oman was also a neutral Gulf state in the conflict, its issues with the UAE and KSA left Kuwait the prime choice to act as a mediator. In the conflict and mediation process, one of the aims of the Kuwaitis was to prevent the entry of external powers, even though the latter offered help in the mediation. Kuwait’s view was that the internationalization of the dispute could cause unresolvable, even more radical, situations, like those seen in Syria, Iraq, and Libya (Alajmi, 2018). The timing was also crucial for Kuwaitis; they knew that the longer the crisis endured, the more unsolvable it would become (Alajmi, 2018).

While Kuwait resorted to shuttle diplomacy to prevent the escalation of the crisis, the lack of power and the involvement of multiple external factors, effected mediation efforts negatively (Kabalan, 2018b). As Fraihat (2020) emphasizes, legitimacy without power cannot solve problems in an international crisis.

The relationship between the small-state foreign policy of Kuwait and that of other Gulf States during mediation in the 2017–2021 Gulf crisis will be examined in this study. The contribution of this study to the literature will be the theoretical examination of Kuwaiti mediation in the case of the 2017–2021 Gulf crisis.

The first section provides the overview of the Gulf crisis and presents the theoretical background of the study. The theories used are Small State Theory and neorealist conceptualization of small states’ external attitudes, band wagoning, power balance, and threats. The soft power concept also provided a broad perspective to the researcher. The second section introduces the qualitative interview-based method used in the research. The third section examines the reasons disputants accepted Kuwait as the mediator. In the section, the researcher addresses the small-state foreign policy strategies of disputants and Kuwait. The fourth section of the study clarifies our view on the logic behind Kuwait’s mediation.

2 The 2017 Gulf Crisis and Theoretical Issues

The Gulf region has played a crucial role in contemporary world politics. The historical importance of the sheikhdoms, emirates, and states are derived from their geostrategic position and natural resources (Barnes & Jaffe, 2006). The withdrawal of the British from the region in the 1970s paved the way for the small Gulf monarchies to achieve statehood. State formation created space for development and progress in the region. The Gulf states’ strategies gave them opportunities to develop and exert their influence regionally and globally. To exert their political importance, small states adopted the policy of mediation. Small Gulf states, such as Oman, Qatar, and Kuwait, often play the role of mediator in international disputes.

The geopolitical location of Oman (which shares the Strait of Hormuz with Iran) and its impartiality in the Sunni–Shia power struggle in the region have allowed the country to follow a more distinct foreign policy in the region (Windecker & Sendrowicz, 2015). As a GCC member, strong economic and political relations with Iran characterizes Oman’s balance of power strategy. Moreover, Oman is the most ardent supporter of keeping the GCC a cooperative body rather than transforming it into a union (Cafiero & Yefet, 2016). Oman builds its foreign policy on diplomatic partnerships and negotiations, and mediation is one critical element of this policy. Oman attempted to mediate between Qatar and Bahrain in 1992, which helped it to maintain strong economic and political partnerships with both the countries (Allen & Rigsbee, 2002). Muscat has been the negotiation platform for Iran and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), initiating diplomatic relations in 1988 after the Islamic Revolution (Al-Khalili, 2009). Moreover, Oman’s most crucial mediation attempt was its mediation between the European Union (EU), United States (US) and Iran on the nuclear deal, Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) of 2015. Even though the mediation did not move further than facilitation, Oman mediated the nuclear deal to maintain its balance of power strategy as a small state (Al Zubair, 2017).

Qatar has followed somewhat the same diplomatic strategies to gain the international community’s support since the late 1990s. Since Qatar is a small state, mediation is seen as one of its efficient tools for diplomatic success (Kamrava, 2011). Qatar has been trying to solidify its place as a reliable mediator in the region. The first significant example of Qatari mediation was the talks between Hamas and Fateh of Palestine in 2006 (Barakat, 2012) followed by the talks in Yemen between the Houthis and the Yemeni government in 2008, and the mediation efforts in Lebanon in 2008 (Coates-Ulrichsen, 2013). Furthermore, Qatar’s hosting of the Afghan talks in 2020 was critical for the regional security(England, 2021). Qatar also used its economic power, media, as well as the personal skills of its diplomats to mediate the crises (Barakat, 2014).

Regional dynamics have led Qatar to follow a more independent path than other Gulf states. Mohamed Tirab (2014) identifies the main reasons for this divergence as Qatar’s geopolitical location, its resistance to the Saudi hegemony in the region, the ideological dimensions of the Middle East, security concerns, and the threat perception of the state after the Arab Spring. However, these differences have also created disagreements between Qatar and the other Gulf states. Rory Miller (2018) explains the foreign policies Qatar adopted to survive the siege by KSA, the UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt from 2017 to January 2021. He underlines that a solid national identity, a popular leader, and the roust financial policies of Qatar ensured the country survived the blockade despite its small size. He further argues that an extended crisis could have increased its vulnerability (Miller, 2018). Tirab (2014) also mentions Qatar as a mediator, although specifying, that at times, Kuwait stepped up to mediate disputes between other GCC members.

Kuwait’s geographical location between the Middle East’s three most significant powers (Iran, Iraq, and the KSA) has led it to follow a more pragmatic and tolerant foreign policy as a small state. Kuwait has been acting as problem-solver in the Middle East. For instance, Kuwait offered Baghdad mediation after the Iraq–Iran War, emphasizing its neutrality. It also participated in mediations in other conflicts, such as between Egypt and KSA in North Yemen in 1968, the dispute between factions in the Lebanese civil war 1975–1991, and the dispute between Turkey and Bulgaria over the Muslim population in Bulgaria in 1989. This shows a legacy of mediation in Kuwaiti history and the use of mediation as soft power by Kuwaiti politicians (Al Saleh, 2000; Kostiner, 2009).

Small states began to appear on the international scene after the First World War, and their emergence accelerated after Second World War. Various small states were established in the former lands of empires that had been divided into smaller parts. However, these countries were generally seen as satellites of greater during the Cold War. Several small states came into existence after the dissolution of Soviet Russia in 1991(Galal, 2020).

Some social scientists describe small states by numbers, usually referring to population, territory, and economic size (Crowards, 2002; Jalan, 1982; Kuznets, 1960). However, this paper shares Galal’s (2020) view that quantities do not explain small states’ effectiveness in international relations. Small states make alliances with powerful countries to avoid threats from other powers. Joining regional and international organizations are examples of these alliances (Vaicekauskaitė, 2017). Creating unique places or features in the sphere of global public opinion is also essential for small states’ foreign policies (Roberts, 2012). Small countries cannot compete with the greater powers in terms of military power or hard power. Thus, small states apply soft powers to exert their influence in international arena (Chong, 2010). Small states use a variety of methods to survive and gain regional and global influence, some of which overlap with those used by medium powers. The strategies that this chapter explores are band wagoning, balancing power, being a hallmark, and soft power policies.

Some small states’ lack of power and economic sources leads them to align with greater powers. If these states imitate the policies of the great powers in return for their protection, it is called as band wagoning. Walt (1987) argues that small powers are probably band wagoning with aggressive great powers for their security.

Unlike band wagoning, balancing power is based on the diversification of alignments. This policy leads small states to join coalitions against aggressive forces. Balancing powers provides small states room to maneuver diplomatically (Bar‐Siman‐Tov, 1980).

A hallmark can be described as the uniqueness of a country. Small states use this strategy to increase their importance in international society. Services, commodities, or some other features of a state can be considered its hallmark. For example, Kadıoğlu and Bezci claim that New Zealand created its hallmark to prevent dependence on any greater power (Kadıoğlu & Bezci, 2020). An act of mediation is also count as hallmark strategy (Abu Laila, 2017).

In the late twentieth century, after technological developments military intervention has become more expensive and ineffective than the previous times. Nye gives the example of U.S. involvement in Iranian politics to exemplify this development. The United States managed to restore the Shah’s authority in the 1950s; however, after the 1979 Revolution, they considered and discarded the idea of military intervention to keep Shah in power (Nye, 1990). Hence, a new type of power, referred to as “soft power” became necessary. According to soft power theory, states can influence other countries or international societies with cultural, technological, ideological, and strategic tools. Unlike hard power, soft power can also be used by smaller states because it bypasses small states’ limitations and makes them influential in politics. The tools of soft power can be listed as media, education, investments, and mediation (Amirbek & Ydyrys, 2014; Eliküçük Yıldırım & Aslan, 2020; Flew, 2016; Vukovic, 2015).

3 Research Methods

The research objective is to give an accurate depiction of Kuwait’s mediation efforts in international relations. The case has been assessed through expert interpretations of international relations, especially those found in Gulf studies. Those interviewed for the purpose of this research are scholars and experts of the Gulf region. The primary motivation for selecting this pool of interviewees was to interview those who have both theoretical knowledge and field experience. Besides, interviews with experts provided practical answers to the questions. The researcher followed an inductive method in the interviews to formulate a comprehensive analysis of the topic. Interviews were conducted with academics from diverse backgrounds, including Western scholars working in Europe and the United States, Kuwaiti scholars, Khaleeji scholars, and non-Khaleeji Arab experts. Abdulhadi Alajmi, Abdullah Baabood, Ali Bakir, Christian Koch, Courtney Freer, Hamdullah Baycar, Kristin Diwan, and Zafer Alajmi participated and allowed the researcher to use their names, while some of the interviewees asked to remain anonymous. Semi-structured questions were asked with some specific themes, for example, what Kuwait’s role (if any) was in the resolution of the crisis; why Kuwait initiated such an undertaking; why the other parties accepted its mediation; and whether Kuwait was a good candidate for the mediation. The meetings were held both in-person and virtually, according to the availability of the participants. The author recorded face-to-face meetings on his mobile phone, while the virtual meetings were held via Zoom software and recorded for transcription.

4 Why Did the Disputants Accept Kuwait as a Mediator in 2017?

The nomination of the mediator is one of the most challenging parts of dispute resolution. The first step in the process is that both sides agree on the mediator. If one of the sides is not satisfied with the mediator, intermediary action will be of no avail. The 2017 Gulf crisis serves as an example of the mediator being apparently chosen even before the problem emerged. The crisis started officially on 5 June 2017, but the issues that led to the embargo had been in place since the Arab Spring when Kuwait was already a mediator between the disputants. This section explains why the disputants accepted Kuwait as the mediator of the crisis.

4.1 Qatar

Due to the years-long disagreement between Qatar and the blockading countries, KSA, the UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt, the blockade was not unexpected for experts, especially after the UAE and KSA withdrew their ambassadors from Doha in 2014. Indeed, growing tension indicated the possibility of such an action. The Saudi-led group had some “unfinished business,” although the ambassador recall crisis was solved in 2014 (Kabalan, 2018a). Qatar’s initial reactions to the blockade show that it also expected that growing disagreement could possibly turn into an embargo. In the aftermath of the embargo, the first reaction of the Qatari administration was to make a statement about the crisis, which was expected to be made by the Qatari Emir, Sheikh Tamim. However, when Kuwait’s Emir telephoned and advised him not to make any statement that day, Sheikh Tamim agreed, and the Foreign Minister of Qatar made the statement instead (Al Jazeera, 2017a). It indicates that the primary partner Qatar relied on was Kuwait. Qatar’s early commitment to the Kuwait’s Emir was a strong reason for it to accept Kuwait as a mediator. The current research argues that (1) the personality of Kuwait’s Emir, Sheikh Sabah, (2) the country’s neutral stance, and (3) its political maturity, which ran parallel to the Qataris’ vision, are the three principal reasons Qatar accepted, and even welcomed, Kuwaiti mediation.

During the interviews, the personality of Sheikh Sabah was one of the most important factors, if not the single most important factor, mentioned by participants to explain why Kuwait’s mediation was legitimate and effective. Abdullah Baabood, a famous Omani professor of International Relations, mentioned: Sheikh Sabah’s U.N. award in 2014 for his humanitarian efforts in aiding Syrians and Iraqis demonstrate that the respect Sheikh earned extended beyond the Gulf. Sheikh Sabah first served as Kuwait’s Foreign Minister for 38 years (1965–2003) then the Prime Minister for three years (2003–2006), and then as the Emir of Kuwait for more than a decade. These various positions solidified the Sheikh Sabah’s respect in the Gulf and among its people. Participant A, a well-known Khaleeji scholar, said:

The tribal dimension played a role in Kuwaiti mediation because of the age of the Emir at that time. Sheikh Sabah was one of the elderly leaders in the region. Besides, he was the one who was looking at the crisis as damage in his home, the Gulf region. He felt that he was responsible because he was one of the eldest of the leaders. Thus, his personality played a key role in acceptance because they knew where Sheikh Sabah was coming from.

The observations made by the author of this research on the day Sheikh passed away clearly exemplify the sentiment expressed by Participant A. The national mourning for Sheikh Sabah was evident from the attitudes of Qataris. Indeed, in one of his statements, the Foreign Minister of Qatar professed that the Sheikh was not just a political leader respected by Qataris but more like a “father” of the nation (KUNA, 2017). Christian Koch, a well-known European scholar of Gulf politics, mentioned:

There is a transition going on in the GCC monarchies to a new generation of leadership. At the time when the crisis broke out, it was basically Sheikh Sabah of Kuwait, one of the old guard in the GCC, who always represented the benefits of the Gulf beyond the ideology. He was a member of the crew when the GCC was created. He has always played a role to bridge differences to bring about reconciliations. And these were all important for gaining trust for the role he played.

Abdulhadi Alajmi, a famous Kuwaiti historian who is an expert on the contemporary history of Kuwait and the Gulf, said:

This (mediation) was a part of Sheikh Sabah’s character. He gave great attention through his long experience. Being a member of organizations, and by protecting these organizations and the role of Kuwait in these organizations, he created a way of thinking that affected the state’s foreign policies. For example, the Arab League summit in Mauritania. Most of the leaders were absent from that meeting. Still, Sheikh Sabah attended and gave money to the Kuwaiti embassy in Mauritania for the summit to make sure this organization would not lose its function and importance. Again, with the GCC, he tried to make it work. It was a very harsh moment for intra-GCC relations. But he kept on going and kept supporting the organization [GCC].

In this regard, the Qatari Emir and other officials saw Sheikh Sabah as a critical consultative authority for regional issues beyond the Gulf crisis.

Kuwait chose to be neutral in the GCC despite the growing partnership of three member states, Bahrain, KSA, and the UAE. The mediation efforts of Kuwait in the 2013 and 2014 diplomatic crises of the GCC proved Kuwait’s willingness to be impartial and enthusiastic for the stability of the Gulf (Kabalan, 2018b). The attendance of Qatar’s Emir at the first summit of the GCC after the blockade, which was held in Kuwait in December 2017, was a sign of that trust. Professor Ali Bakir, a well-known scholar in Middle East politics and security from Qatar University, said that “despite the pressure that the blockading side imposed to join them, Kuwait’s neutral standing in the crisis led Qatar to trust the mediation of Kuwait.” Participant A stated:

One of the reasons that this crisis happened was the support of Qatar for the Muslim Brotherhood movements. But if you look at the Kuwait Muslim Brotherhood, it has played a role in Kuwaiti politics for a long time; they have been in the political system. However, Kuwait has never particularly supported these movements, though it has accepted them as part of the political system in Kuwait.

Kristin Diwan, a well-known scholar of Gulf politics, said:

Oman always stands a bit apart from the GCC, so they were not really in a position to play the role of mediator, and I think Kuwait was eager for that role. Qataris trusted Kuwait, and Qatar saw it as very important to keep Kuwait on the side. I think Qatar appreciated Kuwait playing the mediation role because of that.

Considering the Qatari position of being under a blockade, their support for a third party that did not take issue with their ideological view would be crystal clear.

Among the demands that the blockading countries made to Qatar were to close media corporations, including Al-Jazeera. In an interview, the spokesperson of the Qatari Foreign Ministry claimed that this was an attack on the diversity of thought in Qatar (Al-Khater, 2019). The vision of creating a sphere for freedom of speech in the Gulf was not only the vision of Qatar but for the region itself. An effective parliament and robust political activities, in contrast to their Khaleeji counterparts, place Kuwait at the apex of democratic levels in the Gulf (Herb, 2016). The vision itself could be interpreted as adopted from Kuwaiti political developments. Professor Courtney Freer, a well-known U.S. scholar of Gulf politics, especially Kuwait’s, said:

The pluralism in Kuwait was seen as an important element for Qataris as an insurance of their standing against the blockade. Because the similar dynamics, or even further ones, count for Kuwait

Participant B, a famous expert in Gulf politics, said:

Some of the internal groups in Kuwait were accused of being supporters of Qatar’s popular movements in the region. However, being a mediator, being in the middle, was very popular and supported in Kuwait, even among the opponents of the Emir.

Even though the parameters that define each country’s domestic politics are different, Kuwait’s tolerance is seen as primary reason Qatar accepted of its mediation.

Kuwait’s political maturity, intra-GCC impartial policies, and the personality of the Kuwaiti Emir were central pillars of Qatar’s acceptance of and trust on Kuwait as the mediator. Sheikh Sabah had occupied an important place among Khaleeji people since the foundation of the GCC in 1981. Qatari diplomats and even nationals also respected the Sheikh. The political choices which Kuwait has made are seen as an important sign of confidence in Qatar. Moreover, the domestic political maturity of Kuwait is seen as indirect support for the Qatari vision of promoting diversity of thought.

To conclude this section, Qatar accepted Kuwait as the mediator because of the personality of Sheikh Sabah, the impartiality of Kuwait, and the diversity of thought. The Qatari Emir and high-level officials often stated their commitment to the mediation of Sheikh Sabah. For example, not making a statement at the beginning of the crisis demonstrates the Emir of Qatar’s respect for him. Attending the 38th GCC summit, the first summit after the blockade, at the invitation of the Kuwaiti Emir also indicates that the personality of Sheikh Sabah was important to the Qatari Emir. Hence, the personality of Sheikh Sabah could be interpreted as a soft power exercised by Kuwait toward Qatar. The second reason is seen as the impartiality of Kuwait, which could be construed as one of the results of Qatari foreign policies. Qatar had declined to join the KSA bandwagon, which could be one of the justifications for the blockade. Due to this, Qatar needed a third party that followed impartial policies. The third reason that counted is the multiplicity of thought. One of the demands made by the Saudi-led bloc on Qatar was to shut down certain Qatar-based media corporations, including Al Jazeera, which had helped Qatar exert its soft power in the Arab world. Therefore, the soft power strategy of Qatar was also an essential element in Qatar’s resources. Qatar supported mediation from Kuwait to keep its soft power safe.

4.2 The Blockading Countries

Qatar’s position in regional politics had been questioned by Bahrain, KSA, and UAE since the beginning of the Arab Spring. The Qataris expected the Gulf crisis, as mentioned above, while the embargoing countries had been preparing themselves to impose such restrictions for many years (Hearst, 2014; Naylor, 2014). However, in the first days, there was an assumption that the crisis would be solved quickly. A senior KSA official visited the Emir of Kuwait, Sheikh Sabah, on the day of the blockade with a “message” that immediately made the Kuwaiti Emir call Sheikh Tamim of Qatar (Gambrell, 2017). The day after the embargo was announced, Sheikh Sabah visited KSA and UAE. The first statements by the embargoing countries about mediation were that Kuwait was the only possible mediator for the crisis. KSA and UAE had some critical reasons for nominating Kuwait as the mediator, namely (1) to keep trouble within the Gulf, (2) to prevent Kuwait from becoming a partner of Qatar against them, (3) the international support that Kuwait received for mediation, and (4) Kuwait’s limited power to manipulate the situation. All four reasons are addressed in more detail below.

The blockading party’s main reason for sending an official to Kuwait on the first day of the crisis was to keep the problem within the Gulf. Two impartial GCC states were seen as possible mediators: Kuwait and Oman. However, one of the reasons that the blockading countries did not accept or ask for Omani mediation was Oman’s relation with Iran. In the demands—made two weeks after the blockade—of the embargoing countries, severe aspersions were cast on the relationship between Qatar and Iran. It was obvious this crisis would not be solved by a party that had apparent relations with Iran. Moreover, Oman was not supportive of changing the GCC from a council into a union (Kholaif, 2013). These two points made Kuwait the only choice for KSA, Bahrain, and UAE. Keeping the crisis within the Gulf was also emphasized by the embargoing countries. Baabood stated:

The blockading side aimed to keep the crisis inside the Gulf in two aspects. First, the mediator should not gain interest from the crisis. The candidates that could be a mediator in this regard were Oman and Kuwait, and neither aimed to gain from the crisis beyond the unity of the Gulf. But if an outside party offered mediation, the Saudi-led side could not be so confident about the mediator. Second, traditional and historical links with the Gulf States led them to keep the crisis inside the Gulf. The health of Sultan Qaboos of Oman at that time and Oman’s foreign policy approach made Kuwait the only option for them.

The blockading countries’ aim to keep the crisis within the Gulf derived from the desire to control the blockade as they wished. This was further confirmed when the Emirati Minister of State for Foreign Affairs posted a tweet one year after the embargo which mentioned that “any non-Gulf mediation would not be accepted. Qatar should go back to its roots for the solution of the crisis” (Gargash, 2018). His statement showed that non-Gulf mediation could be seen—or they wanted it to be seen—as disrespect of the Khaleeji identity by the blockading side, even as they embraced U.S. efforts to find a solution. Bakir said:

They (the blockading countries) had no chance to reject Kuwait’s offer to mediate because if they did so, they would reflect an aggressive image, an image of a side that does not want to resolve the crisis. Plus, they also blocked officially and publicly accepted a Kuwaiti offer to stop any other mediation offer outside the Gulf.

The commitment of Kuwait to the GCC was crystal clear. The most successful operation in the region by the GCC since the foundation was the United States-led operation for the liberation of Kuwait in 1991. Koch mentioned the efforts of Kuwaitis in the early 1980s in the establishment of the GCC and added, “the GCC is somewhere in Kuwait’s DNA.” Thus, if there is one state that most strongly supports the GCC entity, it would be Kuwait.

The second reason for the acceptance of Kuwaiti mediation was to keep Kuwait away from any potential partnership with Qatar. Kuwait and Qatar had a more similar approach to each other’s foreign relations policy than to that of the Saudi-led bloc. Kuwait had not intended to support the growing aggression in the region. Even though Kuwait initially supported the Saudi operation in Yemen against the Houthis, it later withdrew its support and offered mediation to both sides. Kuwait’s foreign policy has been constructed on the necessity of stability since the foundation of the country, which was contrary to the Saudi-led group’s regional foreign policies, especially after the Arab Spring. In the early part of the blockade, the KSA-based Al-Arabiya website posted an article that contained Kuwaiti activists’ call for the Kuwaiti government to join the blockade against Qatar (Jarrah, 2017). Participant C, an expert in Gulf security, mentioned the pressure of the blockading quartet on Kuwait to join them in the early days of the blockade, which he described as “if you are not with us then you are against us,” adding “however, that was unrealistic, so it can be said that they pushed Kuwait to at least keep its distance from Qatar.” Even though Kuwaiti support of the siege was almost unimaginable, one of the motivations for accepting or promoting Kuwaiti mediation was to keep the country an impartial third party.

The third reason the Arab quartet wanted Kuwait mediation was Kuwait’s lack of hard power. Even though the personality of Sheikh Sabah and Kuwaiti officials’ positive reputation in the Gulf could be counted as soft power, Kuwait could not use any hard power to force the disputants to start negotiations. Also, while the commitment of Kuwait to the GCC gave the state legitimacy to intervene in the crisis, Kuwait’s lack of power resulted in a limited range of mediation (Fraihat, 2020). Zafer Alajmi, a famous Kuwaiti scholar who is an expert in Kuwait’s foreign policy and Gulf security, said:

They preferred to see Kuwait instead of any foreign country intervening in this matter, especially those with their own interest. Because the Americans might jump, the British might jump, even some Arab countries might see this as a chance to play the good guy to solve this problem but gain their own interests.

Thus, any solution which excluded the blockading countries’ demands would not happen in a crisis mediated by the Kuwaitis, which gave the blockading side room to maneuver.

The fourth reason argued by this research that Kuwaiti mediation was accepted by the embargoing countries was international powers’ support of it. After his statements about the crisis, the U.N. secretary-general mentioned the organization’s support of Kuwait. The U.N. also released a report about the situation in which the importance of Kuwaiti mediation was underscored (see appx. C). The then U.K. Foreign Secretary, Boris Johnson, stated the disputants would help Kuwait in mediation after a meeting with the Emir of Qatar with the stated goal of “assisting Kuwait’s important efforts” (Al Jazeera, 2017b). The then Vice President of the EU, Federica Mogherini (2014–2019), in a press release issued after she visited Kuwait on July 23, 2017, emphasized the support of the E.U. for Kuwait’s efforts and called on the sides to negotiate for the resolution of the crisis (EEAS, 2017). The support of U.S. officials was solid from the beginning of the blockade, despite President Trump’s inconsistent attitudes (Lee, 2017).

Furthermore, Kuwait always discouraged foreign leaders from visiting either side of the crisis. The leaders of China, Russia, Turkey, Italy, and many other countries publicly stated their support for the mediation efforts of Sheikh Sabah and Kuwait. One news article from the Kuwait National News Agency bore the stunning title “Kuwait turns into political Mecca,” further emphasized how regional and international actors paid attention to Kuwait’s mediation (Mahmoud, 2017). It can be said that widespread support of Kuwait’s mediation pushed the blockading countries to accept it. Participant A said:

Kuwait used smart diplomacy to get international support, which led the quartet to accept Kuwait as the mediator to not give the image of being bullies in the eyes of the international community.

However, some of the interviewees mentioned that the quartet accepted Kuwait as a mediator but made things difficult for mediation. For example, Kristin Diwan used the phrase “limited strategic acceptance,” Participant C said, “they were not happy about Kuwaiti mediation,” Participant B said, “their acceptance was cosmetic.” Participant A used the word “formality” to describe their acceptance.

Thus, the current research found that the primary reasons for Kuwait’s mediation from quartet’s perspective were keeping the crisis inside the GCC, preventing Kuwait from partnering with Qatar against the blockading countries, Kuwait’s limited power to push them to agree, and international support. The blockading countries aimed to be free from the pressure of any external power, to keep the crisis inside the GCC, to leave Qatar alone, to manage the problem without any forceful intervention from the mediator, and to decrease international pressure in negotiations with Qatar for the solution.

The blockading side of the crisis consisted of three GCC member states, Bahrain, the UAE, and KSA, plus Egypt, each of which had played considerable role in the blockade. However, this research focuses on the mediation process of the crisis. To summarize the discussion above, the reasons that the Saudi-led bloc accepted Kuwaiti mediation are varied: keeping Kuwait impartial, the lack of Kuwait’s hard power, and international pressure, as well as to keep disputes inside the Gulf, despite the fact that Egypt was not a member of the GCC. The GCC was formed as an organization of six countries: five small states plus KSA. As the only non-small state, KSA was the dominant figure in the group. Thus, the Saudi-led bloc saw a dispute inside the Gulf as easily manageable. Even though the other states were small states, keeping them separated, if not under Saudi hegemony, was also crucial for the dominant power. As to the concerns Kuwait’s lack of hard power, the blockading countries were satisfied to have the crisis mediated by a party that could not force them to make any concessions. Moreover, international society fully supported the Kuwaiti mediation. Kuwait’s acceptance as mediator was the result of its soft power strategy, which is expanded on below. Overall, Kuwait as a small state was a perfect candidate for the mediation from the blockading side’s perspective.

5 Why Did Kuwait Become the Mediator?

The late Emir of Kuwait, Sheikh Sabah al Ahmad, did not hesitate to initiate mediation between the disputants from the very beginning of the crisis. The mediation process is described later in this study, yet this early reaction by the Sheikh and the country shows the enthusiasm of Kuwait to be the mediator. The impartial foreign policy of Kuwait in the GCC motivated the Kuwaitis to mediate. In addition, Sheikh Sabah believed that an extended crisis would damage the Gulf’s security and economy. Indeed, the political sphere of Kuwait was threatened by the growing aggression in the region. The reasons for Kuwaiti willingness to mediate in this research are thus clearly delineated: (1) the foreign policy of the state, (2) economic concerns, (3) security concerns due to the extension of aggression on the region, and (4) the domestic sphere.

5.1 The Foreign Policy of Kuwait

The first reason for Kuwait’s willingness to be the mediator was its foreign policy approach. The crisis highlighted the foreign policy differences of Qatar on one side and Bahrain, the UAE, and KSA, on the other. However, as mentioned in the literature review, the third wing of the GCC regarding foreign policy was comprised of impartial states, namely Oman and Kuwait. Kuwait’s foreign policy had been built on that approach since the foundation of the country. Despite the threat of the expansion of Iranian influence after the Islamic Revolution, Kuwait recognized the Islamic Republic of Iran. In the Iran–Iraq war, despite its initial support for the Iraqis, Kuwait became more neutral as a means to offer mediation. Diwan said:

To some degree, the mediation was Kuwait’s way of balancing. I don’t think they could openly confront the UAE and Saudi Arabia as more powerful parties. But on some level, Kuwait felt that if things went badly for Qatar, at some point, Kuwait’s own sovereignty—or at least room for sovereign action—would be limited. So, Kuwait used mediation to balance against that.

Saudi domination of the GCC led other countries to follow the foreign policy of KSA. However, partnership with the United States and the provision of military facilities to the Americans led the country to operate more independently of the GCC. Christian Koch said:

Kuwait was the one who offered an initiative to contain the Gulf States before the GCC. The first establishment of the Gulf, the Gulf Postal Service, was in Kuwait. The first Secretary-General of the GCC was a Kuwaiti, Abdullah Bishara. Kuwait was one of the most active countries during the foundation of the GCC. The invasion of Kuwait by the Iraqis deepened the relation of Kuwait with the GCC. After the invasion, the need for the GCC was positioned at the heart of Kuwaiti foreign policy.

Participant C mentioned that the 2017 crisis was a threat to Kuwaiti foreign policy and said:

Kuwait was the founder of the GCC in the first place. Kuwait was one of the early supporters of the organization. For Kuwait, having an organization apart from Western allies, which sometimes seem hesitant or late to take actions in regional incidents, was crucial. The question is, are all GCC members on the same level in the organization? Of course not. The Kuwaitis think that Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, smaller states should be influential in the organization so as not to face Saudi hegemony. So, this organization was built on the idea that we are all equal, although we are different in some ways.

Even though the Kuwaiti government did not wholly support Qatari foreign policy, the domination of one group, and demand that another should change its foreign policy led Kuwait to act as a third party to set a barrier. Moreover, Hamdullah Baycar, an expert in Gulf politics at the University of Exeter, said that:

My Kuwaiti sources told me the Kuwaitis are now building their foreign policy on being a known mediator beyond the Gulf. This is very embedded in the Kuwaitis’ foreign policy approach. We can compare the mediation of Kuwaitis to the foreign direct investment of Doha and Abu Dhabi in Europe. Mediation is a strong tool for diplomacy nowadays for Kuwaitis.

Kuwait has been impartial inside the Gulf and even in the Middle East since the Iraqi invasion in 1990. This impartiality in the region is based on the country’s partnership with external forces. However, being a member of the GCC gives the government a feasible area of focus for the construction of foreign policy. Kuwait follows the balance of power strategy inside the Gulf as a small state. Although the crisis has been interpreted as the beginning of the end of the corporation, the balance of power-based methods, and impartiality of Kuwait, have created space for an effective GCC. The high importance of the GCC summit was apparent in the research. It can be said that Kuwait’s foreign policy is based on the balance of power inside the Gulf, and the GCC, as an establishment, is a power that has solidified the country’s soft power. In addition to this, being an internationally recognized mediator gives Kuwait a hallmark in regional issues.

5.2 Economic Concerns

The second reason Kuwait wanted to be the mediator in the crisis was the country’s economic concerns. The GCC countries’ wealth primarily derives from their natural sources. Regarding this wealth, the states maintain governance over the income share to nationals. The fluctuation in the price of natural sources has led countries to find new solutions for sustainability. Like the other GCC states, Kuwait is trying to develop a new economic strategy. Since the mid-2010s, this has included adjusting the policy of government-provided subsidies for citizens (Krane & Hung, 2016). In this context, the economic importance of the GCC for Kuwait is undoubtedly a fact. Even though the GCC was established as a means of security cooperation, it has turned into a means to cooperate economically rather than over security. Baabood described the situation further:

The crisis did not damage the Kuwaiti economy. However, the lack of integration in regional trade seemed to be a problem in the long term for Kuwaiti officials. They could not transport their product as they did before. The multilateral economic agreements of the GCC were suspended, and redistribution—which is highly important for the region—was not effectively done because of the sanctions. So, Sheikh Sabah’s statement that the crisis wounded our economy should be interpreted in that way.

As a member of the GCC, Kuwait is one of the countries that most benefit from the economic cooperation of the Gulf. Diwan said:

There were dual boycotts against companies: If you do business with Qatar, then you cannot do business with us. There were, definitely, some demands like that early in the blockade. I think the United States pushed back against this very strongly. But these actions make it more difficult for foreign investors in the region as they effectively have to choose between two sides.

Since the oil and gas exports of the GCC countries depend on political stability, any disagreement in the GCC could cause fiscal problems in the Council. This was considerable concern in the 2017 crisis.

As mentioned above, the Kuwaiti economy is based on natural resources, as in other GCC member states. The fluctuations in prices led the countries to take a variety of measures, including reforms, new strategies, and economic cooperation. However, low oil prices, political instability, and the COVID-19 restrictions have had negative impacts on that economic transition strategy. Considering that the economic power of Kuwait, like that of the other GCC countries, has been a soft power since the discovery of oil, keeping that power stable is also critical for the state to achieve its future aims, both domestically and internationally.

5.3 Security

The third reason Kuwait made endless efforts to mediate the crisis from the beginning of the situation until a solution was found was the fear of growing aggression in the region. After the Islamic Revolution of Iran, Arab countries in the Gulf were furious. Even though Iraq, as a powerful Arab country, stood against the expansion of Iran, Saddam Hussain’s vision of becoming an influential leader in the region and the anti-monarchical and populist ideology of his Arab Socialist Ba’ath Party made Iraq another unreliable source for the Sheikhs (Al-Kayssi, 1998). After the Iran–Iraq war, six Arab monarchies declared the establishment of the GCC. The Iran–Iraq war prevented both countries involved from intervening in the GCC countries. However, after the end of the war, Saddam Hussein marched into Kuwait. The invasion of Kuwait by Iraqi forces was the first incident to shake a GCC country since the establishment of the GCC. The members of GCC called on Western powers to expel the Iraqi forces from Kuwait. Providing military bases to the troops that carried out the operations and building diplomatic relations with other Arab countries against Iraqi aggression were among the indirect benefits Kuwait received from the GCC during the invasion. Moreover, some GCC states took part in the direct military intervention (Hellyer, 2001). After the rescue, the GCC was crucial for Kuwait. Participant A said:

One of the main interests of Kuwait was security; Kuwait does not want to see a weak GCC. Of course, they (Kuwaitis) were genuine to help the brothers, but the security dimension of the Kuwaitis’ approach was very important within the umbrella of the GCC. So, we can say the main aim of Kuwait in that mediation was to maintain the structure of this regional organization; if it collapses, I think Kuwait would be very much in trouble

However, at the same time, being invaded led Kuwait to follow a fairer foreign policy to avoid any repeat of the experience. One way or another, most of the participants in the interviews conducted by the researcher mentioned Kuwait’s fear of being “the next target” of growing regional aggression. For example, Freer said:

I think Kuwait is very cautious that it can be and has been invaded. It does need to have strong partners in the region, and being a mediator, a neutral party, is a really good way to maintain relationships with neighbors. So, if anything happens in the future, it would be protected. I am always surprised how fresh the memories of invasion and occupation are, and that makes Kuwait very hesitant to take a side or lean too much to one side or another, so Kuwaiti mediation is the way to maintain its position.

Participant C said, “if the blockade had resulted in the Qataris stepping down, the new targets would have been Kuwait and Oman.” Participant A said:

After the invasion [in 1990], all the calculations of Kuwaitis [were] based on the security of the region in order to not face similar things. And what happened in the crisis reminded them of their experiences, and they became the mediator to not be on any side in such a dispute.

The progressive policies of Kuwait turned into a more stable policies after the invasion by Iraq. Any security threat to the country or region reminded Kuwait’s government and citizens of the trauma of that invasion (Alterman, 2007); hence, its leaders and people were rendered uncomfortable by the crisis. Participant B said:

Kuwait and Qatar are similar vis-à-vis financial capacity, not needing anyone else. However, they are in the same position of need or weakness vis-à-vis the Saudis, who are the backbone of the GCC. So, for the Kuwaitis, protection of the Qataris is the protection of any unequal relations in the GCC.

Considering some of the thirteen demands which the blockading countries made on Qatar, it can be said the crisis also threatened Kuwait because some also related to Kuwaiti policies (Barakat, 2018). Besides this, the Yemen operation of KSA, intervention in Bahraini uprisings, and support of autocratic leaders could be seen as being in the interests of the leaders of the blockading countries (Darwich, 2018). Thus, the people and administration of Kuwait noticed that a resolution to the crisis was crucial for their national security. The previous sections have presented the most traumatic incident in Kuwait’s history as the invasion of the state by the Iraqi forces. Even though the state made international partnerships to overcome its fragility, instability in the region threatens it. The growing aggression in the region has been seen as a threat by some regional powers to jump on the bandwagon. Kuwait’s fair balance of power strategy has stood strong against increased aggression. Also, the state offered to solve the crisis for de-escalation and intra-GCC instability. Thus, the security concerns of Kuwait have led the country to follow more tolerant foreign policies based on the balance of power strategies. As a small country, Kuwait does not want to be on the bandwagon of any regional actors. Its mediation in the crisis allowed the state to reduce the risk of security threats.

5.4 Domestic Sphere of Kuwait

The fourth reason that Kuwait agreed to be a mediator was to maintain domestic safety. Kuwait was the first Arab monarchy to adopt a written constitution. Besides this, the political activity in the country is unique among the GCC countries. Political parties, the National Assembly, and the political maturity of Kuwait all date back to Sheikh Abdullah al Salim al Sabah (Herb, 2016). Even though it has fluctuated in the decades since the Iraqi invasion, the relation between state and society is more stable than in the other Gulf monarchies. Participant A claimed that the Kuwaiti society supported Qatar in the crisis, and this support reflected the pressure on the government to play an active role in the solution. Also, Kuwait has a considerable Shia population, which makes the state concerned about any sect-based conflict. In 2015, a terrorist attack targeted the Shia Imam al-Sadeq Mosque in Kuwait. Immediately afterward, Sheikh Sabah visited the place, spoke with the injured, and stated that this security attack did not target only the Shia population but the whole population, as well as Kuwait’s tolerance (Hafidh & Fibiger, 2019). The sectarian attitude of the blockading countries and their disturbance of the Kuwaiti political sphere led Kuwait to play a role in preventing the dominance of either side. Baabood said:

The foreign policy itself is the mirror of the states’ domestic policies. Kuwait has different societal groups. Shia, for example, although they are not very large, they are not very small either, or they seem pretty close to the ruling elites. And they have got the merchants, they have the Bedouins, and they have the Palestinians… So, any conflict inside the region between countries can have implications for Kuwait’s domestic policies. Trying to maintain domestic peace is very important, and that has a reflection on the foreign policies of the country.

Kuwait’s security concern was one of the reasons that the state mediated the crisis. Any aggression and instability in the Gulf would have been the greatest threat to the Kuwaitis since the Iraqi invasion. The tolerant political sphere and demography of the country were other motivations for mediating. The fiscal situation of the country and the region made the crisis intolerable. Moreover, Kuwait’s foreign policy pushed the country to be an intermediary power in the Gulf.

Kuwait’s domestic sphere has been examined in two dimensions. The first dimension is the political development of the country, and the second is tolerance of the sectarian identity of the nationals. The country’s political development indicates that Kuwait has built a more accountable system than the other Gulf states. The establishment of an effective parliament, recognition of a written constitution, and tolerance of political diversity could be seen as among the sources of Kuwait’s soft power. Although its level of influence is not pervasive, it can be said that Kuwait is unique in the GCC. The tolerance of sectarian differences affected the country’s decision to be a mediator. The growing anti-Shia campaign in the Gulf pushed Kuwait to alleviate the dispute for the sustainability of their impartial policies. Thus, being a mediator gave the country a soft power to keep its domestic sphere free of regional conflicts.

6 Conclusion

Thus, this research argues that Kuwait found diplomatic means to carry out its policies, which are mostly related or due to the size of the country. Kuwait desired to make the Gulf free of insecurity for reasons of economy, domestic issues, and national security. The economic and domestic sphere of Kuwait has been seen as the soft power of the state; the national security is sustained by diplomacy, which could be interpreted as a balance of power strategy as a small state. Moreover, the research indicated that Kuwait uses its mediation power and experience as a soft power tool.

The research indicates that Qatar accepted Kuwait as the mediator due to the personality of Sheikh Sabah, which was seen as a soft power of Kuwait. The impartiality of Kuwait and diversity of thought were other reasons for Qatari acceptance, as they were considered helpful for the Qataris in maintaining their balancing power and soft power. From the perspective of the embargoing countries, Kuwait was a prominent contender for the role of mediator due to its commitment to the Gulf and impartiality. These two features were seen as necessary by the Saudi-led bloc for navigating the conflict and the politics inside the Gulf. The research also concludes that the blockading countries aimed to maintain the balance of power inside the Gulf, if not to leave Qatar alone. In addition, Kuwait’s lack of hard power encouraged the blockading side to accept a mediator that could not force them to make a deal. Moreover, international support for Kuwait was perceived as being among Kuwait’s soft power sources, which made the blockading side accept Kuwaiti mediation. The Kuwaitis agreed and even wanted to be the mediator to keep the country from being a part of the disagreement, which could be seen as a balance of power strategy. The economic power of the state was threatened by regional instability. The government aimed to solve the crisis to maintain the primary source of Kuwait’s soft power. The research claims that the trauma of being invaded has shaped the foreign policy of Kuwait since the Iraqi invasion. Consequently, the political sphere of the country required any aggression in the region to be decreased. Kuwait uses mediation as a soft power to maintain security and keep its domestic sphere untouched by external actors.