Keywords

1 Introduction

... there is the idea that without these people [South Asians] we won’t have what Dubai is today, we need other people to be health provider, as educators, as construction workers and so on. (Emirati woman, age 28)

... we [Emiratis] are a minority in our country now, we see these people coming from all over around the world, not just let’s say as labourers, just to work here. I mean, my opinion is that these people have built and are building our country, what could we do? What would Dubai be without them? Really, that is the truth. (Emirati woman, age 19)

The above quotations, recorded in Dubai in 2014 and 2015, exemplify how the social transformation processes occurred in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) were linked to international migration, and this has greatly contributed to the development of the country. Indeed, this acknowledgement is relevant insofar as it emphasises the need to conceive of migration as a socially embedded phenomenon. It is rather unlikely to get a better understanding of migration if we do not consider it as part of the transformation processes.

The contemporary dynamics of migration and how the ethnic and cultural heterogeneity is managed in the UAE require a historical analysis. Currently, in the UAE, foreign residents are always temporary and, regardless of the length of their stay, they cannot acquire permanent rights and are rather unlikely to get Emirati citizenship (Lori, 2019). Migration is regulated by the sponsorship system (kafāla), which requires a local sponsor, and characterised by temporariness (Errichiello & Nyhagen, 2021).Footnote 1 Temporariness is a permanent status affecting all migrants, and the “demographic imbalance” meaning that migrants (88.5%) outnumber nationals (11.5%) (De Bel-Air, 2018) has pushed the UAE authorities to not implement any state policy aimed at integrating them in the social fabric.Footnote 2 Regardless of exclusion and segregation affecting some migrants who are incorporated in the UAE labour market (Fargues, 2011), Emiratis and migrants, in their everyday life, cross the boundaries and interact “in the domestic sphere, in the workplace, in the service industry, in restaurants, in malls, in mosques, on the streets” (Lori, 2019, p. 155).

It is undeniable, however, that migrants represent the main component of the transformation processes affected the UAE in the last forty years. It is thus necessary to understand the historical evolution of migration in the country, and in order to do so, it is important to conceptualise migration as socially embedded meaning that migration has to be understood as part of transformation processes that a society undergoes. Migration cannot be detached from the economic, political, social and cultural factors. At the core of the transformation-migration nexus, there is the need to reconceptualise the dynamics of international migration by looking at this phenomenon in the light of global changes and its local effects. In other words, it means moving beyond methodological nationalism to emphasise the adoption of a multi-scalar approach which should question “fixed analytical frames that prioritize national territory and belonging over other scale of belonging” (Williamson, 2015, p. 29).

This chapter, which relies on the archival materials consulted in the British Library between September 2021 and January 2022, and some of them contained in the Records of the Emirates (BRE), aims at addressing the transformation-migration nexus in the UAE, and the case of Abu Dhabi and Dubai is relevant because it shows how migration transformed in relation to the socio-economic transformation processes affecting both emirates. In the following section, I theorise the transformation-migration nexus before discussing the economic environment characterising the Trucial States at the beginning of the twentieth century. Having framed the socio-economic aspects, I then focus on the case of Abu Dhabi and Dubai whereby the economic trajectories that both emirates have followed, as discussed in the following section, help us to understand that migration, socio-economic, historical and cultural factors are linked to each other.

2 Theorising the Transformation-Migration Nexus

Migration as a social phenomenon affects countries and contexts all over the world. However, migration has always been conceived as disembedded from the social reality and processes occurring in society; migration research was thus “compartmentalised” (Castles, 2010, p. 1569) and fragmented where interdisciplinarity, even though advocated, was more a discussion of each disciplines’ methods and analysis rather than an inclusive and “overarching synthesis” (Castles, 2010, p. 1569). Additionally, migration has become an issue of the political agenda, and this has further contributed to its fragmentation and compartmentalisation and fostered a migration bias due to the politicisation of the migration debate and policy-driven research that have often provided “simplistic, short-term remedies to complex, long-term social issues” (Castles, 2010, p 1571). The close relationships with the political realm have created a bias towards migration research and scholars. This bias has been, of course, detrimental for advancement in understating migration beyond its descriptive nature and thus excluding migration studies from the mainstream social science (Castles, 2015).

The classical approach to international migration requires adopting different frameworks in line with changes occurring globally. For Castles (2010, p. 1566), “we do not have a common conceptual framework that could serve as the starting point for intellectual debates and the formulation of hypotheses and research questions”. In the last few decades, migration has accelerated due to globalisation, and inequalities have emerged which seem to drive the understanding of the migration phenomenon from the South to the North.

Connected to the discussion of migration is the social change, which has recently received much attention. Portes (2010) argues that migration induces an evident superficial change in receiving societies, but it does not affect and even reinforces the central structures and institutions of those societies. In other words, the pillars of society remain intact, and migration induces only a superficial change mostly evident “in the new sights, sounds and smells that a growing foreign population brings along” (Portes, 2010, p. 1556). Instead, Castles’ (2010, p. 1568) approach revolves around the idea that migration should not be viewed as separated from social processes and changes, it has to be conceived of as “a normal part of social relations … as a part of complex and varied processes of societal change”. It, thus, requires treating migration as embedded in broad understanding of society and its changes. Hence, the need to introduce the notion of social transformation as a framework to embed rather than disembed migration from the social context. Social transformation is:

[a] shift in social relationships so profound that it affects virtually all forms of social interaction, and all individuals and communities simultaneously, it is a ‘step change’ that goes beyond the normal processes of change that are always at work. (Castles, 2015, p. 4)

In the above definition, it is evident the inclusive and dynamic nature of social transformation, which is driven by economic, political, military and technological advances. Social transformation is so pervasive that it affects simultaneously “culture, social relationships, social institutions (such as the family), personal and community identities, ideologies and politics” (Castles, 2015, p. 4). Therefore, migration “is not a result of social transformation, nor a cause of it, but an integral part of transformation processes” (Castles, 2015, p. 10). For Castles (2015, pp. 9–10), the main point of social transformation approach relies on the concept of embeddedness meaning that migration “should be understood as an essential component of change, shaped not just by economic factors but importantly also by complex historical, cultural and social factors”. Therefore, the concept of embeddedness is of primary importance to advance and understand migration as a social phenomenon closely linked to social theory. But, the migration bias has impeded the full inclusion and understanding of migration from mainstream social science. Several studies have, however, emphasised the links between migration and social theory by focusing on structure and agency and their mutual relationships (Bakewell, 2010; Morawska, 2007; O’Reilly, 2012). This is evident in the notion of “migration project” that links together migration studies and social theory (Errichiello, 2021). It focuses on migrants’ agency, but at the same time, it also considers how structures affect and shape human agency. This entails acknowledging that “society shapes individuals and, simultaneously, the individuals shape society in the ongoing process of mutual (re)constitution” (Morawska, 2007, p. 12). The migration project represents the set of choices, decisions, mechanisms, procedures and institutions through which migrants plan, shape and modify their migration experience; therefore, it is created and recreated every day. It values the agency of individuals, groups and households to mobilise resources in order to migrate and their knowledge of structures that can enable and constrain their agential capacity. The idea of migration as a project seems to endorse the perception of a deterministic approach; however, the migration project is not immutable because migrants evaluate the situation and project their actions accordingly, and they act in relation to the structural context, new circumstances and events taking place before undertaking the migration, during the journey and upon their arrival (Errichiello, 2021).

In conclusion, due to its focus on structure and agency, the migration project is linked to social transformation because it enhances the global, the national and local levels. Migrants bend their habitual responses and future-oriented projects to their evaluation of the practical circumstances of the moment. As Morawska (2007) points out, this evaluation relies on their capacity to appropriate, reproduce and potentially project in relation to their interests, circumstances, events and their knowledge of the structural context. This capacity, which is a common feature of socially embedded actors, is based upon cultural orientations and resources available in a specific time and place. In other words, social transformation approach is greatly relevant because it helps us to map the economic, social, cultural and political factors that influence the individual’s migration project and understand “the connections between these factors” (Castles, 2010, p. 1582).

3 From Pearling to the Oil Economy

At the core of social transformation, there is the multi-scalar approach meaning that migration results from global processes with local effects (Williamson, 2015). Such an approach entails rethinking migration as intimately connected with and part of economic, social and political factors thus contributing to overcome the limitations and constraints of methodological nationalism and, therefore, more in tune with global and mobile society (Castles, 2010). This approach is relevant when considering the socio-economic transformation occurred in the Trucial States from the pearling industry to the oil economy.

At the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries, in the Trucial States, the pearl fishing was

the principal or only source of wealth among the residents of the Arabian side [of the Gulf]. Were the supply of pearls to fail … the ports of the Trucial ʿOmān, which have no other resources, would practically cease to exist; in other words, the purchasing power of the inhabitants of the eastern cost of Arabia depends very largely upon the pearl fisheries (Lorimer, 1915, p. 2220).

In the pearl fishery are evident “the signs of indigenous capitalist development” (Davidson, 2005, p. 8) being organised around two main classes: financiers and operatives. This capitalist system relied on the ownership of the pearling boats and the profits were distributed between the capitalist/entrepreneur and the labourers. A wealth entrepreneur owned and fitted the boats “who received a large part of the take at the end of the season, leaving the rest to be divided among the crew” (Heard-Bey, 2004, p. 208). The increasing profits deriving from this economic activity led to establish the class of the private financiers who invested their own money to sustain the operations and the crew of the boats. Persian and Indian merchants invested their money in the pearling industry and established in Abu Dhabi and Dubai (Davidson, 2005).

The class of operatives was the crew of the boat. It included the captain, the divers, the haulers who were sometimes assisted by other people and an apprentice who had to attend duties such as fishing and cooking (Lorimer, 1915, pp. 2227–2228). The divers (ghāṣah) were “mostly poor Arabs and free negroes or negro slaves; but Persians and Balūchis are also to be found among them, and in recent years, owing to the large profit made by divers, many respectable Arabs have joined their ranks” (Lorimer, 1915, p. 2228). Many Africans and even Baluchis arrived in the Trucial States to work as divers as well as for domestic duties. The British ban on slavery established in 1847 was, however, tolerated by the local rulers “because business of many pearl-boat owner in the coastal towns had grown to depend almost exclusively on slave divers” (Heard-Bey, 2004, p. 231).

In both classes, the presence of foreigners is evident. The trade and export of pearls was an important aspect of the pearl industry, and the knowledge of this provides a good and clear insight of the social stratification of the ports on the Trucial States (Heard-Bey, 2004). In this process, the role of merchants was prominent because they bought and sold the pearls in the trade markets (Lorimer, 1915, p. 2236). The most important trade markets in the Persian Gulf until 1902 were Manama and Lingah (Southeast Persia), “the former drew to itself all the trade of the middle, the latter that of the lower Gulf” (Lorimer, 1915, p. 2236). The market of Lingah was, however, bound to be supplanted by Dubai, when in 1902 the stringent customs tariff severely affected the commerce of the port, and many Sunni Persian merchants “found no alternative but to close down their stores in protest and to emigrate to Dubai” (Abdullah, 2016, pp. 232–232). The Indian market was equally important, the local Arab merchants (tujjār) sold to the Indian pearl merchants who took the pearls to Bombay to sell them on the world markets (Onley, 2014), and thus, the Indian ports, especially Bombay, became the trading ports of the Gulf’s pearls. The interconnectedness between the Arab and Indian merchants led some of the latter to establish themselves in the Gulf port cities where they took up the residence (Heard-Bey, 2004). The Persian and Indian merchants were both part of the social context of the Trucial States, and they were socially and legally outsiders but fully economically integrated; however, such an influx of migrants created a segmented society where local Arabs, Persians and Indians were involved in a profitable economic activity and coexisted by sharing spaces and interests (Heard-Bey, 2004).

In the 1930s, however, the pearling industry was severely affected by the international economic depression and the prevalence of the less expensive Japanese cultured pearls. Many pearl merchants were affected by both events. It was reported that “60 diving ships of Dubai failed to put out to sea owing to financial difficulties”.Footnote 3 In December 1929, in Bahrain, “the slump on Wall Street has had a serious reaction upon the world’s pearl trade, the Bahrain merchants who took pearls to Bombay have sold very little”.Footnote 4 The other important event that affected the pearling industry of the Gulf was the growing presence of Japanese cultured pearls that were less expensive than the natural ones of the Gulf. In 1930, it was, for example, reported that the “outlook of the pearling season continues gloomy”, and this was due to the “Japanese cultured pearls, and it is said that they have found some artificial stimulus which cannot be detected by reflection like the present mother-of-pearl centre. If this is true, the results will be very serious for the Arab Coast”.Footnote 5

Against this economic crisis affecting the Gulf port cities, the oil concessions in the 1920s and 1930s represented a turning point in the region. In 1922, the British authorities signed an agreement with the Trucial rulers who committed themselves to not grant any oil concession agreement other than the British companies (Heard-Bey, 2004). This agreement made the presence of British oil companies in the southern shores of the Gulf constant and pervasive, and oil concession agreements were signed by the Trucial rulers and the Petroleum Concessions Ltd. (PCL) between 1937 (BRE, 1937, pp. 561–638; Errichiello, 2012), when the first agreement was ratified between the then ruler of Dubai Said bin Maktum and PCL, and 1952, when the last agreement was signed between the then ruler of Fujairah, Shaikh Muhammad bin Hamad, and the PCL (Heard-Bey, 2004).

As recognised by Lori (2019), the control of migration flows started before the UAE federation was created in 1971, and the British authorities used their power to favour their commercial and economic interests. The recruitment of foreign workers represented the only feasible way to develop the oil industry, and it was regulated by the nationality clause, which requested that all the oil companies had to employ local nationals as far as possible, while reserving the right to introduce and employ foreign workers, if the local labour market could not supply the skills requested by the company. Not only did the nationality clause foster recruitment of workers from foreign countries but also encouraged the intra-Gulf labour mobility because locals were suffering unemployment as a consequence of the decline of the pearling industry and, with this clause, the local rulers tried to transfer the benefits of oil concessions to the local populations (Errichiello, 2012).

However, this clause created a problem for the British oil companies insofar as Persians were easier to employ than the Indians, as the former “came at their own expense, did not have any certified contract with the company, and could be hired and fired almost at will” (Errichiello, 2012, p. 398). Indeed, the British encouraged and supported the migration of Indians. The Political Resident in Bahrain, in 1938, Hugh Weightman, urged the British to see the Gulf countries as a good market for “Indian products and a small but potentially increasing field of employment for Indians”.Footnote 6 There were good job opportunities for skilled Indians, and he encouraged the British to adopt a system to support a regulated rather than an unregulated migration from India. The presence of skilled Indians in the Gulf countries was due to the lack of skills among the local population, as mentioned by Weightman in relation to the visit of the Vice-President of the Bahrain Petroleum Company (BAPCO) in India with the aim to systematically recruit skilled workers. Therefore, skilled Indian workers were employed in all oil companies (Seccombe & Lawless, 1986).

The intra-Gulf labour mobility was not completely new, as seasonal labour in the pearling industry was traditionally characterised by a circulation of workers throughout the Gulf region. Whereas the new migration was driven by the discovery of oil which provided a new kind of job (industrial), it allowed individuals to be hired no longer for seasonal period, but for a long time, so that they could acquire new skills and abilities. During the 1940s and 1950s, many Omanis emigrated from the interior zones of Oman to the other Gulf countries and to Saudi Arabia. The Omani migration was directed to Kuwait, where Kuwait Oil Company (KOC) resumed its operations in 1945. As KOC was of joint Anglo-US ownership, it received priority as part of the Allied war programme. Thus, KOC recruited its workers from Oman, even though not directly. Many Omanis were laid off from BAPCO when its refinery expansion programme came to an end, and KOC decided to hire them. Omanis also moved to Qatar when in Dukhan and Umm Said fields, drilling activity was resumed (Seccombe & Lawless, 1986), and in 1949, many migrant workers also moved from Trucial Coast to Qatar, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia; in particular, a high percentage of travel certificates (3,000 certificates) were issued to subjects coming from Sharjah (Seccombe & Lawless, 1986). During the 1940s and 1950s, many people of the desert areas in Abu Dhabi moved to work either in Saudi Arabia or in Qatar, and in the 1960s, the ruler of Abu Dhabi implemented measure to prevent that those who had worked in the oil companies elsewhere in the Gulf could return to Abu Dhabi, “because those who had stayed behind were afraid that they might lose their job to those who came back armed with experience in the oil-field work” (Heard-Bey, 2004, pp. 206–207).

In conclusion, the pearling industry exemplifies how the understanding of migration is linked to the socio-economic environment where the presence of foreign workers became functional to the development of this economic sector. The oil economy, which required the recruitment of skilled and unskilled workers, was undoubtedly one of those factors of social transformation and, because of its characteristics, migration transformed, and new skills and abilities were required to work in the oil industry. Migration was thus a necessary part of the change, and not only was it due to the socio-economic factors, but it also related to historical events and affected the socio-cultural context (Castles, 2015).

4 The Sheikhdoms/Emirates of Abu Dhabi and Dubai

Migration is part of the social transformation processes occurring in a society, and in order to understand such processes, we need to focus on the historical, socio-economic and cultural factors of the global cities like Abu Dhabi and Dubai.

Abu Dhabi was formed as a small village in 1761 and its origins are related to the Liwa and Buraimi oases (Davidson, 2009). In 1939, it had a population of 10,000 inhabitants which had grown at the beginning of the twentieth century having benefited from the boom in the pearl industry in the previous years.Footnote 7 Abu Dhabi grew in size and its population changed, and it became the permanent residence of the Bedouin families that decided to spend their winter in town, and the development of the pearling industry encouraged many other individuals coming from other parts of the Gulf and Trucial States to work in the pearling industry or collateral activities to move and settle in Abu Dhabi. There were 500 Persians living in town, and some of them were originally from Arab tribes living in Persia and owned 40 of the 70 shops within the suq of the town (Heard-Bey, 2004). Because of the economic and political pressures they suffered in Persia, many merchants relocated their businesses and families in the Gulf port cities like Abu Dhabi (Nadjmabadi, 2010).

Hindu merchants, as Persians, arrived in town during the boom of the pearl industry that represented the biggest change in the socio-economic structure of the local population (Heard-Bey, 2004). They were seasonal residents, and in winter, they tended to return to India; however, some of them settled down in Abu Dhabi.

In the 1920s and 1930s, pearl diving and fishing were in sharp decline (Errichiello, 2012); the growing presence of international competitors (Japanese cultured pearl) and the adoption of modern technologies and techniques not existing in Abu Dhabi made the economic condition of local merchants awful and it worsened to the extent that the pearl expeditions stopped entirely (Davidson, 2009). Therefore, the then ruler of Abu Dhabi, Sheikh Shakhbut bin Sultan (1928–1966), in order to cope with the growing financial difficulties that the local population was experiencing, and after long and exhausting negotiations, signed an oil concession agreement with the PCL in 1939. Oil was found in 1958 and it sold in 1962 (Davidson, 2009). However, the ruler maintained his authority by paying subsidies or gifts to tribal chiefs. Thus, “Shakhbut tried neither to alter the tribal infrastructure of society, nor to abandon traditional means of securing loyalty, such as marriage and subsidies” (Rabi, 2006, p. 42). Indeed, Shakhbut “conceived that the rapid social change would corrupt the people and lavish finite national resources on unnecessary” (Rabi, 2006, p. 44). His detractors, such as members of his family, contested his politics of austerity, and British complained that he left his people in miserable conditions (Davidson, 2009). For this reason, his youngest brother, Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan, with the support of family members and tribal sheikhs who refused to accept subsidies and gifts from Shakhbut, in 1966 became the new ruler of Abu Dhabi.

Zayed reigned (1966–2004) during the period of transition from the British withdrawal to the birth of the federation in 1971. He realised that it was necessary to pacify the tribes disappointed by the politics of austerity pursued by his predecessor and made locals enjoy the benefits deriving from oil wealth by cancelling, for example, all taxes imposed by his brother (Davidson, 2009). Zayed’s politics was mainly based upon the need to reinforce the tribal bonds and re-establish a sense of belonging among tribal sheikhs and local population. His decision to send personal invitations to those tribes that during Shakhbut’s reign left the sheikhdom, as they disagreed with his politics, is a proof of Zayed’s will “to boost Abu Dhabi’s population and repair more of the damage done by his predecessor” (Davidson, 2009, p. 53). Zayed has led the country in its transition, and this was made possible because he was able to earn support from the tribes and local population by adopting a politics of distribution of wealth and jobs in important positions within the federal state. Davidson (2009, p. 111) argues that

the rulers of Abu Dhabi continue to draw great legitimacy from their roles as tribal leaders rooted in the history and culture of the lower Gulf, and thus many powerful government and military portfolios remain in the hands of the non-ruling tribal elites.

Even his successors, like Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed Al Nahyan, continued to draw great legitimacy from distributing wealth and prestigious positions to tribal groups. This has created the allocative state meaning that the ruler is considered as a father who looks after the local population, in a sort of paternalistic spirit (Davidson, 2009).

In the nineteenth century, Dubai was one of the port cities of the Arab side of the Gulf where merchants, fishermen and traders settled down and where goods coming from South and Southeast Asia were shipped throughout the Gulf region and the Indian Ocean. In 1833, Dubai became independent from Abu Dhabi. Members of the Al-Bu Falasah tribe, which is a section of the Bani Yas tribal confederation (Heard-Bey, 2004), left Abu Dhabi when Sheikh Khalifa bin Shakhbut Al Nahyan (who ruled from 1833 to 1845) suppressed a coup, and Khalifa’s revenge “was so extensive that many of the perpetrators and their families had no option but to leave Abu Dhabi” (Davidson, 2009, p. 13). Thus, members of the Al-Bu Falasah tribe led by Maktum bin Buti Al-Falasi and his uncle Ubaid bin Said Al-Falasi (and with other tribes) settled in Dubai, which was proclaimed independent from Abu Dhabi, and they started the new dynasty, the Al Maktum (Davidson, 2008).

In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, many foreigners settled down in the sheikhdom and became part of Dubai’s social fabric. In 1939, Dubai had a population of 20,000 inhabitants, and the local population was formed of members of local tribes but also some Kuwaitis, Bahrainis and migrants from Al-Hasa (Saudi Arabia). In the sheikhdom, there were also 3,000 Persians, about 1,000 Baluchis, Hindus and Khojas. The pearl diving and fishing were the main economic activities.Footnote 8

In 1902 in Persia, a new law introduced high dues on imports and exports on goods going through Persian ports to the Trucial States (Heard-Bey, 2004). This led the port of Lingah to decline in its strategic and economic importance. Thus, goods from India were shipped straight to Dubai, and because of the decline of shipping, many Persian merchants were forced to leave their country and move to Dubai (Davidson, 2008). They came especially from the Bastak district in Persia, and even though they lived in Persia, they “belonged to various Arab tribes and were Sunni” (Heard-Bey, 2004, p. 245). This convinced the ruler of Dubai, Said bin Maktum (who ruled from 1912 to 1958), to invite them to establish permanently in the sheikhdom (Davidson, 2008).

The recent presence of Indians in Dubai dates to 1865 when they “first arrived as the representatives of British companies in India” (Davidson, 2008, p. 89). In Dubai, the presence of Indian merchants was a consequence of the Indian government’s decision to “levy duties on precious metals, which led to India’s losing its position as Asia’s primary gold market” (Davidson, 2008, p. 70). The formation of the Indian community in Dubai was the result of favourable elements, such as “trade routes, economic opportunities, local demands, religious tolerance and the policies of the local ruler” (Onley, 2014, p. 247).

Dubai was also a recipient of merchants from other sheikhdoms. In the 1920s, because of increasing taxes imposed by the ruler of Abu Dhabi, Sheikh Hamdan bin Zayed Al Nahyan (who ruled from 1912 to 1922), many merchant families decided to move their activities and migrate to Dubai where the economic environment was more convenient than in Abu Dhabi (Davidson, 2009). Indeed, many other merchant families left Abu Dhabi during the Sheikh Shakhbut bin Sultan Al Nahyan’s reign because of his reluctance to investing money, derived from oil concessions to develop the sheikhdom thus sharing the benefits with the local population (Davidson, 2009).

In the twentieth century, the major economic activities in Dubai were pearl diving, fishing and trading. These niches of the labour market were occupied by locals because they were seen as prestigious jobs (Al-Sayegh, 1998). Indians were mainly employed in the banking sector and in retail trading activities, and Persians controlled the retail trade and food commerce (Al-Sayegh, 1998). The merchant class has been important in Dubai’s economy, and it has also played a key role in shaping Dubai’s multi-cultural environment (Vora, 2013). The importance of the Indian and Iranian merchant class was directly proportional to the political influence that they wielded on rulers. “By an open-door policy Indian, Persian and Pakistani merchants were as free to trade in Dubai as the local inhabitants … It was the initiative of the Persians which got trade off the ground at a time when the Arabs here were content to put their trust in pearls, and it was the contacts with Pakistanis and the Indians which produced the smuggling business to their home countries which is now the basis of Dubai’s economy” (BRE, 1964, p. 254). The current ruler of Dubai, Sheikh Muhammad bin Rashid Al Maktum, “has continued to develop Dubai as a haven for people from any background while diversifying the state’s portfolio of income-generating activities away from oil” (Lori, 2019, p. 86).

In both cities, the social transformation processes took place because of the historical, socio-economic and cultural factors and, as we have seen, migration transformed along with the transformation processes that both sheikhdoms were experiencing. This endorses the perspective that migration is socially embedded and cannot be detached from the social context.

5 The Transformation-Migration Nexus

In the twentieth century, Abu Dhabi and Dubai have been greatly interested by migration. Until the decline of the pearling industry, the role of foreigners in Abu Dhabi and Dubai was seen as functional to the development of both sheikhdoms, and their migration and “integration”, at least in Dubai, were encouraged by the local rulers (Jamal, 2015).

The British, however, aimed at controlling migration in order to avoid economic penetration of other Western powers. Hence, it was necessary to establish a set of rules to clearly identify who were foreigners; therefore, in 1946, the Trucial States Order in Council was issued, and with this official document, the British and the rulers could define the category of foreigners.Footnote 9 This document, along with the nationality clause, which was included in the oil concession agreements, established the nationality of foreigners who could work in the oil industry and reside in the Trucial States. However, the Order in Council originated an ambiguity, and disputes arose between the rulers and the British, and among the rulers.

The first dispute related to the need to understand whether some residents had to be considered as Trucial States subjects or they fell under the British jurisdiction (Lori, 2019, p. 69). This is illustrated by the case of Persians, who, according to the Residency Agent in a letter to the Political Resident A. C. Galloway, in 1946, represented 30% of the total population of Dubai, 20% in Sharjah and Kalba, 10% in Abu Dhabi and 5% in the rest of the sheikhdoms, and the majority of them were born in the Trucial States.Footnote 10 However, 82 Persians had obtained the Trucial States passport to easily travel to India for their business. Thus, the Persians were categorised in those who were “born and bred on the Trucial Coast”,Footnote 11 others were issued documents to travel and others were considered foreigners under the British jurisdiction irrespective of how long they have lived in the country. This contrasted with the British’s view that, instead, considered Persians under their jurisdiction. However, for some of the rulers, especially in Dubai, Persians, who were formed of wealthy merchant families, had been so important for the development of the trade that they intended to consider them as Trucial States subjects. In the 1960s, the situation of Persians worsened due to the oil discovery. In Dubai and Abu Dhabi, indeed, a different approach in relation to the illegal Persians emerged. The former was not interested in requiring a visa for them, they were considered as “subjects of countries of the Gulf” (BRE, 1968, p. 422), so in Dubai there was “a defacto visa abolition” (BRE, 1968, p. 421). The latter was much more concerned because those arriving in Dubai without a visa tended to move to Abu Dhabi illegally, and the ruler proposed to drop “and separate visas introduced for Dubai and Abu Dhabi” (BRE, 1968, p. 421).

The ethnic and cultural heterogeneity in both sheikhdoms was managed differently, according to their historical, socio-economic and cultural factors. The oil concessions encouraged the rulers of the Trucial States to better define the tribal allegiance and the territorial boundaries. This became evident in Abu Dhabi, when Sheikh Zayed Al Nahyan started to redistribute the rents deriving from oil and to invest in some development projects. Indeed, families from the other Trucial States decided to move to the city due to the increasing job opportunities and financial benefits associated with their allegiance to Abu Dhabi. During the reign of Shakhbut, some families left the sheikhdom because of his austerity policy to move to Dubai to work in the trade sector. However, when the situation changed, and Sheikh Zayed invested the oil rents in improving and providing benefits to the local population those who had migrated in the past and transferred their allegiance to Dubai decided to return to Abu Dhabi (Lori, 2019). This internal migration originated tensions among the rulers of the Trucial States because of the risk of depopulation that some of them were experiencing. In order to cope with it, Sheikh Zayed encouraged the would-be migrants to leave their family behind, and he diverted “Abu Dhabi’s resources to finance the establishment of security forces and state institutions in the remaining emirates to support economic growth outside of the capital” (Lori, 2019, p. 74). The discovery of oil in Abu Dhabi and the ensuing economic growth and financial benefits shifted the balance of power from Dubai as a centre of trading routes to Abu Dhabi where new job opportunities attracted internal and international migrants.

In the divergent economic trajectories followed by Abu Dhabi and Dubai, it is possible to frame the migration phenomenon (Lori, 2019).Footnote 12 However, from a social transformation perspective, the economic factor is not enough to understand the different way both sheikhdoms incorporated foreigners within their social context; we, thus, need to consider the historical, socio-economic and cultural factors. Jamal (2015) argues that the politics of divide et impera pursued by the British in the Trucial States originated the construction of nationality and of the tiered citizenship which is today evident in the UAE. This related to each Trucial State’s capacity to issue visa and “its own passport. And ultimately, to better control the issuance of passport, they encouraged the development of a citizenship law limiting who could become a “national” and attain a passport” (Jamal, 2015, p. 27). The discovery of oil in Abu Dhabi and the following development projects created security issues in the sheikhdom where, according to Sir William Luce, British Residency in Bahrain, foreign population was increasing rapidly. He clearly noted that the problem of illegal migrants could become acute

since more and more people will be attracted to Abu Dhabi by tales of easy wealth. ... We do not want to find ourselves in the position where native Abu Dhabians find themselves in the position of being outnumbered by indigent and jobless foreigners. ... An obvious way to tighten control is to provide more efficient checks at the points of entry. I do not think this would meet the case. Part of the trouble is caused by people being surreptitiously landed at night by dhows. ... Again, a major difficulty is that many people enter legally with a visa, which then expires (BRE, 1966, p. 621).

This document emphasises one element of security that it is today evident in the UAE, that is, the demographic imbalance (Lori, 2019). This is strictly connected with the presence of illegal migrants, especially Persians that arrived in Dubai without visa and then moved to Abu Dhabi.Footnote 13 In 1967, Abdul Ghaffar, who was appointed as Chief Immigration Officer in Abu Dhabi, proposed to issue two different residence permits. “The first is a pure and simple permit, to be endorsed in the passports of all alien residents …. The second is designed to cope with the fairly large numbers of long term residents who are without passports or other documentation” (BRE, 1967, p. 147). Therefore, the second permit allowed long-term residents who were illegal and had spent between five and ten years in Abu Dhabi, to obtain a document before getting a proper passport.

The socio-cultural context along with the economic environment is important to better understand the different way foreigners were incorporated in Abu Dhabi and Dubai. This is evident in the British records, when, in 1967, the Political Agent, D. Roberts, associated the stability of Dubai to its trading and commercial perspective, which required the contribution of all foreign communities thus leading the local population to accept their presence, whereas a xenophobic attitude and intolerance against the foreigners were evident in Abu Dhabi (BRE, 1967, p. 126–130). The ethnic heterogeneity in both sheikhdoms was accommodated differently, and this can be attributed to their different economic environment (Lori, 2019). The independent economic development path followed by each emirate determines the attitude towards foreigners and their incorporation or the lack of thereof. This perspective is proposed by Lori (2019, p. 86), who argues that the Dubai’s economic development based on assets, trade requiring mobility of capital and labour has led to “policies of abolishing visas for key trading partners or issuing passports to facilitate the travel of merchants”. However, the Abu Dhabi’s development plans based on a fixed asset like oil has led the ruling elites “to adopt more restrictive incorporation practices, including greater barriers to citizenship and migration controls” (Lori, 2019, p. 86).

The laissez-faire approach or open-door policy adopted by the rulers of Dubai resulted from its economic environment and trajectory based on trade and commerce developed with Iran, India and East Africa. The different migrant groups (Iranians and Indians) were active members of the society and were “integrated” within the local social structure. According to the British Residency, Mr Pelly, the merchants and the ruler “give one the impression that they are not dissatisfied with present blessings and that they view the future hopefully” (BRE, 1950, p. 637). Since the beginning of the twentieth century, the rulers of Dubai have recognised migrants’ contribution to the development of the emirate by attributing benefits, advantages and also gifting pieces of land (Davidson, 2008). For example, at the beginning of the twentieth century, the Iranian merchants in Dubai were naturalised and the then ruler, Sheikh Said bin Maktum (who ruled from 1912 to 1958), invited them to establish permanently in Dubai, and they were offered an area on the Dubai Creek that was known as Bastakiyyah (from the province of Bastak in Iran from where they came). However, this area has now been renamed “Al-Fahidiyya” due to the process of “Arabisation” of the historical area (Lori, 2019). The India Club was established in the 1960s on a piece of land gifted to the Indian community by the ruler of Dubai, Sheikh Rashid Bin Said Al Maktum (who ruled from 1958 to 1990), and in 1973, he gifted a piece of land to the Pakistani community where they established the Pakistan Association Dubai (Errichiello & Nyhagen, 2021). Thus, it was a way to recognise their social status within the sheikhdom and the prominent role and contribution of the Iranian and Indian merchants, and the Pakistani seamen to Dubai’s development (Errichiello, 2021).

In a different perspective, Abu Dhabi, because of its economic trajectory and the need to protect oil wealth, focused more on protecting and closing the boundaries. This strategy originated from the lack of trade and commercial routes like in Dubai, but this attitude also related to the income deriving from the families who were subjects linked to Abu Dhabi, and this was important “for the redistribution of oil wealth, since by 1967, in an effort to quell migration to Abu Dhabi, the British suggested creating a system of family allowances to redistribute the wealth from oil without increasing income levels” (Lori, 2019, p. 88). As noted by the British Political Agency in Abu Dhabi, Sir Stewart Crawford, since 1966, the ruler, Sheikh Zaid bin Sultan Al Nahyan, distributed the wealth to citizens in two ways: “directly by cash grants … and indirectly by providing them with work in the oilfields and on development projects” (BRE, 1966, p. 311). Therefore, the rulers of the sheikhdom were much more reluctant and stringent in issuing passports and in their interpretation of who was qualified as a Trucial State subject (Lori, 2019).

In conclusion, Lori (2019) explains that the different way migration is managed in both emirates resulted from their different economic trajectories. However, from the social transformation perspective, it is evident that the way migration is managed resulted from the combination of historical, socio-economic and cultural factors. In the case of Abu Dhabi and Dubai, the ethnic and cultural diversity is managed differently in the light of the divergent socio-economic trajectories, historical events, cultural factors and the rulers’ attitude.

6 Conclusion

This chapter focused on the transformation-migration nexus in the UAE in order to emphasise the links between social transformation processes and migration. The starting point is the acknowledgement that migration as a socially embedded phenomenon can be understood and cannot be detached from the historical, socio-economic and cultural context.

The transformation-migration nexus in the UAE is historically relevant, because migration resulted from a combination of global, national and local levels. The pearling industry and its decline, the development of the oil economy and its socio-economic relevance led to a transformation in the migration processes. In the evolution of the socio-economic environment in the UAE, it is possible to see how migration transformed. This endorses the perspective that to overcome the migration bias we need to conceive of migration as a socially embedded phenomenon. The historical evolution of Abu Dhabi and Dubai shows that migration has to be understood in relation to the socio-economic, historical and cultural factors. It is thus of primary importance to move beyond methodological nationalism; as advocated by Castles (2015), migration has to be embedded within a broader context that considers the global, the national and local levels.