Abstract
2012 marks a pivotal year in Djibouti’s history: the year when China Merchants officialised its partnership with the regime by purchasing the latter’s stake in the Port Autonome International de Djibouti. It was from 2012 onwards that China Merchants and a host of other Chinese SOEs began making their presence felt in Djibouti. 2012 also goes down as the year when the regime’s relationship with Dubai Ports World (DPW) would pass the point of no return. The Emirati firm has claimed that these events—China Merchants’ Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)-induced infrastructure forays (culminating in the Doraleh Multipurpose Port ecosystem) and DPW’s ultimate removal by force from its stake in the Doraleh Container Terminal (DCT) ecosystem—are not separate acts but instead form part of a chain reaction. DPW’s legal team claimed as much in their deposition to the Hong Kong High Court, where they insinuated that China Merchants induced the regime into its forceful removal from the DCT ecosystem due to the coercive threat of the BRI “debt trap” hanging over the regime. This Chapter assesses this latest legal spat before examining the political economy and geopolitical ramifications of Djibouti’s decision to overwhelmingly anchor its modernisation drive around Chinese investments.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
Towards which the 2006 Framework Agreement signed between the Ethiopian government and the China ExIm Bank largely contributed as it facilitated the advent of numerous Chinese infrastructure projects such as the national sports stadium, the country’s first six-lane highway, the underground and light rail system (Addis) and numerous skyscrapers (Cabestan, 2012: 54; Quinn and Akyol, 2021: 1098). 2006 was also the year when the PRC was elevated to the rank of Ethiopia’s main trade partner (Cabestan, 2012: 57).
- 2.
Chinese contracts in Ethiopia accumulated to more than USD $23.6 billion worth of investments between 2005 and 2018, with investments really taking off post-2010 when the impact of Chinese-funded industrial parks across the country began to be felt (Le Gouriellec, 2018: 535–536; Ziso, 2020: 916). It is therefore of little surprise to learn that from 1992–2016, FDI originating in China ranks first in Ethiopia in terms of number of projects and capital invested (Ziso, 2020: 910).
- 3.
Author’s translation.
- 4.
Reiterating an earlier plea made by former PRC President Hu Jintao in 2012 encouraging Chinese firms to participate in infrastructure construction so as to support Djibouti’s economic and social development in response to a call made by Guelleh for investments in Djibouti’s ports, railways, energy sectors and human capital (Xinhua News Agency, 2012a).
- 5.
All errors, inaccuracies and omissions in this table are mine.
- 6.
Opened in 2014 (Soudan, 2014).
- 7.
In 2008, reports surfaced of a possible USD $2 billion deal for an unnamed Chinese infrastructure group to build four casino hotels on Moucha Island targeting Chinese expats working in Ethiopia and the Gulf (Soudan, 2008).
- 8.
Designed to deepen civil, naval and military ties (Styan, 2020: 195).
- 9.
Having been part of one or more of Aptidon’s own state visits to China, of which there were three in 1979 alone (Styan, 2020: 194).
- 10.
Where Guelleh paid visits to the Chang’an Automobile Company Ltd. and the Zongshen Motorcycles Corporation (Xinhua News Agency, 2001a).
- 11.
During his trip to Shenzhen, Guelleh was addressed by then Mayor, Yu Youjun, about the city’s economic development (Xinhua News Agency, 2001b).
- 12.
Dileita visited the Waigaoqiao Harbour and Zhongxing Telecommunication Equipment R&D Centre during his trip (Xinhua News Agency, 2005).
- 13.
A deal reportedly thrashed out in CMP’s management centre in Shenzhen (Chan, 2018a).
- 14.
This figure is a readaptation of Fig. 2 from Barton (2021: 369).
- 15.
With follow-up discussions held the following year to examine the prospect of strengthening it further (allAfrica.com, 2013c).
- 16.
Where Guelleh made a stop following his participation in the 2012 Beijing FOCAC Summit (Ballong, 2012).
- 17.
In 30 months to be precise (Darras, 2017).
- 18.
Author’s translation.
- 19.
Such as livestock, grains, cooking oils, fertilisers, chemicals, vehicles and heavy machinery.
- 20.
Indeed, as far back as 2013, Shanghai Zhenhua Heavy Industries had delivered two dockside cranes and eight-yard cranes (allAfrica.com, 2013b).
- 21.
Or to be more specific, the Addis-Djibouti railway line actually comes to a stop 12 kms from the DMP. The rest of the journey requires transshipment at the Nagad railway station (Pairault, 2022a).
- 22.
This was a topic of interests not only for the twenty-first century but also during the twentieth century and Cold War era when former French President Charles de Gaulle reportedly offered assistance to Addis to build a rail link to increase the use of the line as a means of guaranteeing Ethiopia’s commitment to Djibouti’s development (Shilling, 1973: 628). The French had already agreed in 1959 to relocate the railroad’s headquarters to Addis (Shehim and Searing, 1980: 214).
- 23.
Although coming across as somewhat smooth sailing, the deal’s success was in part contingent on a compromise being reached in relation to where the cost of the railroad’s electrification would lie (with Djibouti or the Chinese SOE). This snag was resolved by the Chinese SOE taking an equity stake in Djibouti’s portion of the rail operating company (Styan, 2020: 196). Generally-speaking, the terms of the Addis-Djibouti railway were less favourable to the regime than it would have liked, if Zach Vertin is to be believed, while IMF officials recommended against it (2020: 11).
- 24.
Former PRC Ambassador to Ethiopia.
- 25.
This makes for rather ominous reading when considering that the Ethiopian Railway Corporation had reportedly amassed debts of USD 3.6 billion by late 2016 (Fowler, 2019: 180).
- 26.
It was these problems which had initially delayed the line’s operations until January 2018 (Fowler, 2019: 180).
- 27.
Such as manufacturing, transport and financial services while incorporating hotels, tourist centres, residential housing and conference facilities to host exhibitions of international repute.
- 28.
Similar to the DMP and the Addis-Djibouti railway line, most of the materials and workers used to build the DIFTZ would stem from China (EIU, 2017a).
- 29.
A scenario The Economist deemed “unlikely” (EIU, 2017a).
- 30.
Companies such as Wilmar (agribusiness, Singapore), Osram (luminous devices, Taiwan), Golden Africa (agribusiness, Kenya) and Cevital (agribusiness, Algeria) (Darras, 2017). This figure, however, comes across as extravagant when considering that by the end of 2019 (a year after it was officially opened), only 80 companies were in fact registered in the DIFTZ (Dow Jones Institutional News, 2020a).
- 31.
Including, reportedly, a USD $7 billion investment from CGCOC (Sun and Zoubir, 2021: 688).
- 32.
According to Pairault, IZP Technology was established in 2008 under the supervision of the National Information Centre (part of the National Development and Reform Commission) and with an initial focus on data mining before converting to big data in the scope of the Silk Roads (2018: 71). In 2014, it obtained a license to provide cross-border payment services via the USD $150 million acquisition of Globebill, an electronic payment platform based in Shenzhen. In December 2015, CMG went on to purchase a 15% stake in IPZ (Styan, 2020: 201).
- 33.
Involving China Merchants Investment Development (CMID), Cheer Signal, GHIH and the DPFZA (Company Data Report, 2019). Cheer Signal is a wholly owned subsidiary of CMSIZH and an indirect subsidiary of CMG whose principal activities span construction, development and operation of industrial zones and cruise industries. CMID’s assets were later transferred to CMSIZH which is mostly in charge of managing CMG’s assets and international investment portfolio (Dow Jones Institutional News, 2019). GHIH is a company incorporated in Djibouti and is a subsidiary of the DPFZA (Dow Jones Institutional News, 2020b).
- 34.
In effect, as per Pairault: “the DIFTZ is intended to be an outgrowth of the Qianhai Shekou Free Trade Zone, as illustrated by the “twin zone network” […] of the business-to-business transaction platform Djimart.com developed by CMP. The platform offers a one-stop solution for logistics, warehousing, and payment-settlement issues related to the import into Africa of products made in China” (2022b: 83).
- 35.
This table is inspired by Fig. 1 from Pairault (2018: 64).
- 36.
A development which was largely of symbolic value (Pairault, 2022a). An important distinction worth noting concerning the company’s origins is that the following year CMP would be registered in Hong Kong and not in mainland China (Ibid). It would actually only be incorporated to CMG in the early 1970s (Ibid).
- 37.
Defined by the slogan: “the port in front, the (industrial) park in the middle and the city behind” (cited in Pairault, 2019).
- 38.
It is important to keep in mind here that China Merchants’ strategy in Djibouti never emerged unilaterally but instead is the result of a historical process involving various multinational corporations (MNCs) not all of whom stem from mainland China (thus further degrading the value of the “arm of the state” thesis). China Merchants has in fact established very close business relationships with some of these MNCs. As mentioned in Chapter 1, this is the case in Djibouti with CMA CGM (Pairault, 2022a).
- 39.
The DSRIB was jointly initiated by Djibouti’s MOF, the Yizampu Group, the Silk Road Yishang Technology Co. Ltd., CMG and other Chinese-funded enterprises in 2016 (officially opened in January 2017) to establish closer banking cooperation between the PRC and Djibouti (Wang, 2017). It offers financial products and services to enterprises based in Djibouti, with a particular focus on assisting small and medium-sized enterprises. It was also expected that the DSRIB would offer financial services in support of trade between China and other parts of Africa (EIU, 2016). Finally, as part of its services, the bank offers conversion of Djibouti Francs into Renminbi to help boost imports and exports (Le Gouriellec, 2018: 538).
- 40.
Although bizarrely bin Sulayem ended up attending the signing ceremony of the Strategic Partnership Agreement between Djibouti and CMHI to develop and operate seaports in Djibouti and for the development of a new multipurpose terminal (Chan, 2018b: 6). Bin Sulayem also attended the signing ceremony for the DMP—both of which were followed by an email exchange between bin Sulayem and Dr Hu (Ibid).
- 41.
As Court records show, Hadi had regular contact with DPW over the DCT and DMP without DPW ever reciprocating with any form of written consent for Djibouti to proceed with the DMP and its surrounding ecosystem. In 2012, Hadi sent a letter to DPW expressing his concerns ex-post that the JVA and the Management Service Agreement (MSA) were: “unbalanced and unsustainable” (Chan, 2018b: 4). Five years later, Hadi bluntly informed DPW that the regime did not: “envisage any future business development with DP World” (Ibid: 10).
- 42.
Finally, DPW claimed in its pleadings that under Djibouti law, China Merchants would be liable for breach of Article 1391 of the Djibouti New Civil Code and, alternatively, for unfair competition (Chan, 2018a).
- 43.
No emphasis added.
- 44.
The LCIA twice ruled in DPW’s favour in terms of damages owed to it by the regime as a result of the latter’s decision to remove itself from its contractual obligations (see Table 4.3).
- 45.
Parroting the regime’s rhetoric by referring to the Boreh bribery case (Chan, 2018a).
- 46.
An observation repeated by the judges during the follow-up session in front of the Hong Kong Court of Appeal (HKCA) (Kwon & Barma, 2020).
- 47.
Only two inexperienced lawyers were able and prepared to represent DPW in front of Djibouti’s courts (Chan, 2018a).
- 48.
- 49.
Author’s translation.
- 50.
Again, the figures vary across sources. In 2015, CCECC was quoted as saying that 10,000 jobs had been created for Ethiopian nationals and only 3,000 for Djiboutians (Xinhua News Agency, 2015a). The following year, these combined figures only reached the 25,000 mark—less than half of the reported final figure quoted in-text (Caslin, 2016).
- 51.
In line with Dr Lin’s political economy philosophy, the premise underpinning the DIFTZ suggests that: “[…] an active port with an industrial free zone would attract foreign companies, which in turn would generate a demand for local labor” (Pairault, 2022b: 82).
- 52.
Vertin’s data suggests that only “three dozen” had registered in the Free Zone by 2020. In his report, he cites one foreign investor degrading the DIFTZ as a: “total pipe dream” (2020: 11).
- 53.
Something Pairault confirms when outlining the DIFTZ’s modus operandi: it is expected that most of CPM’s clients in the Free Zone will not be from Djibouti but instead from mainland China (2018: 75).
- 54.
In its recent international development cooperation white paper, the PRC’s State Council listed the promotion of vocational training and technical cooperation as one objective towards helping countries in the Global South: “[…] improve the skills of their project management personnel and localize project management” (2021: 9). According to Vertin’s report, China has “come up short” on skills and technology transfer in Djibouti (2020: 17).
- 55.
As part of the agreement, CCECC vowed to recruit graduates from the Industrial and Commercial High School which it built back in 1992 (Xinhua News Agency, 2017c).
- 56.
Author’s translation.
- 57.
Hadi even boldly forecasted in 2018 that the total volume of debt owed by the regime to Chinese policy banks would drop to 35% of the country’s total GDP by 2023 since Djibouti was seen to enjoy better repayment capacity in the context of project financing coming out of China (cited in Li, 2018).
- 58.
From ten to 30 years (Styan, 2020: 205).
- 59.
Where Wauldhauser spoke of “significant” consequences to American interests were the DCT to fall into Chinese hands.
- 60.
Supposedly undertaken as a quid pro quo in return for China having built two international airports, the Addis-Djibouti railway line and the Presidential Palace all “free of charge.”
- 61.
In line with data collected by Jean-Pierre Cabestan, French military officials based in Djibouti also reportedly share the fear of eviction by the PLAN (2020: 745).
- 62.
Author’s translation.
Bibliography
allAfrica.com. (2013a). Djibouti launches its section of the Ethio-Djibouti railway project. https://allafrica.com/stories/2013a09180368.html. Accessed 7 March 2022.
allAfrica.com. (2013b). Djibouti: New cranes delivered to Djibouti’s Doraleh port. https://allafrica.com/stories/2013b10290095.html. Accessed 4 March 2022.
allAfrica.com. (2013c, March 22). Guelleh meets with Chinese trade delegation.
allAfrica.com. (2014). Djibouti: China’s foreign minister in Djibouti. https://allafrica.com/stories/201401091410.html. Accessed 1 March 2022.
allAfrica.com. (2020). Ethio-Djibouti railway is the road to prosperity—Outgoing Ambassador. https://allafrica.com/stories/202009180772.html#:~:text=Addis%20Ababa%20%E2%80%94%20The%20Ethio%2DDjibouti,Chinese%20Ambassador%20to%20Ethiopia%20said. Accessed 8 March 2022.
Ateba, S. (2018). In Djibouti, a major contract was signed. Then the Chinese arrived. Everything changed. AfricaMetro. http://www.africametro.com/eastern-africa/in-djibouti-a-major-contract-was-signed-then-the-chinese-arrived-everything-changed-by-simon. Accessed 16 March 2022.
Bauer, A. (2017). L’avenir de Djibouti s’écrit avec la Chine (Djibouti’s future lies with China). Les Echos. https://www.lesechos.fr/2017/03/lavenir-de-djibouti-secrit-avec-la-chine-163310. Accessed 8 March 2022.
Ballong, S. (2012). Un pays en chantiers (The building of a nation). Jeune Afrique. https://www.jeuneafrique.com/26605/economie/un-pays-en-chantiers/. Accessed 27 January 2022.
Barton, B. (2021). Agency and autonomy in the Maritime Silk Road Initiative: An examination of Djibouti’s Doraleh Container Terminal disputes. The Chinese Journal of International Politics, 14(3), 353–380.
BBC Monitoring. (2006a, November 4). Chinese president discusses telecoms, harbour services with Djibouti president.
BBC Monitoring. (2006b, November 6). Djibouti president hails China-Africa cooperation summit as “successful event”.
Bengali, S., & Wadekar, N. (2020). China faces setbacks in global initiative. LA Times. https://enewspaper.latimes.com/infinity/article_share.aspx?guid=0095eb38-e7ba-4582-b85d-a22e3b943f51. Accessed 18 March 2022.
Bridge, S. (2018). Top US official backs DP World in Djibouti port dispute. Arabian Business. https://www.arabianbusiness.com/industries/transport/409864-top-us-official-backs-dp-world-in-djibouti-port-dispute. Accessed 20 March 2022.
Bridge, S. (2019). Djibouti ordered to pay DP World JV over $385m in port dispute. Arabian Business. https://www.arabianbusiness.com/industries/transport/417141-djibouti-ordered-to-pay-dp-world-jv-over-385m-over-port-dispute. Accessed 11 March 2022.
Business Daily. (2018). Djibouti port eyes Rwanda and Burundi, to resume services to South Sudan. https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/news/world/Djibouti-port-to-resume-services-to-South-Sudan/4259366-4882546-13vngd5z/index.html. Accessed 7 March 2022.
Cabestan, J. P. (2012). China and Ethiopia: Authoritarian affinities and economic cooperation. China Perspectives, 4, 56–62.
Cabestan, J. P. (2020). China’s military base in Djibouti: A microcosm of China’s growing competition with the United States and new bipolarity. Journal of Contemporary China, 29(125), 731–747.
Caslin, O. (2016). Le train chinois entre Djibouti et Addis-Abeba sort de terre (The Chinese railway line between Djibouti and Addis takes shape). Jeune Afrique. https://www.jeuneafrique.com/363011/economie/train-djibouti-addis-abeba-sort-de-terre/. Accessed 7 March 2022.
Caslin, O. (2018). À Djibouti, des fonds chinois pour construire la plus grande zone franche d’Afrique (Djibouti makes use of Chinese funds to help build the largest Free Zone in Africa). Jeune Afrique. https://www.jeuneafrique.com/591142/economie/a-djibouti-des-fonds-chinois-pour-construire-la-plus-grande-zone-franche-dafrique/. Accessed 16 March 2022.
Caslin, O. (2020). Logistique : à Djibouti, plus belle la vie sans les émiratis (Logistics: Life is better without the Emiratis). Jeune Afrique. https://www.jeuneafrique.com/mag/892905/economie/logistique-a-djibouti-plus-belle-la-vie-sans-les-emiratis/. Accessed 7 March 2022.
Chan, J. M. (2018a). In the High Court of the HKSAR, Court of First Instance, Action No. 1951 of 2018a between DP World Djibouti FCZO, Dubai (International), Djibouti FZE, Doraleh Container Terminals SA versus China Merchant Port Holdings Company Ltd. https://legalref.judiciary.hk/lrs/common/search/search_result_detail_frame.jsp?DIS=126220&QS=%24%26%2340%3BDubai%2Cport%26%2341%3B&ID=AAAB73AAIAAAXpuAAC&TP=JU. Accessed 25 February 2022.
Chan, J. M. (2018b). In the High Court of the HKSAR, Court of First Instance, Action No. 1951 of 2018b between DP World Djibouti FCZO, Dubai (International), Djibouti FZE, Doraleh Container Terminals SA and China Merchant Port Holdings Company Ltd – Appendix HCA 1951/2018b, Agreed Chronology of Key Events Dated 2 October 2019. https://legalref.judiciary.hk/lrs/common/search/search_result_detail_frame.jsp?DIS=126220&QS=%24%26%2340%3BDubai%2Cport%26%2341%3B&ID=AAAB73AAIAAAXpuAAC&TP=JU. Accessed 4 March 2022.
Cheng, A. (2018). Will Djibouti become latest country to fall into China’s debt trap? Foreign Policy. https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/07/31/will-djibouti-become-latest-country-to-fall-into-chinas-debt-trap/. Accessed 15 March 2022.
China Daily. (1998, August 19). Sino-Djiboutian ties advancing.
Chen, H. (2016). China’s ‘One Belt, One Road’ initiative and its implications for Sino-African investment relations. Transnational Corporations Review, 8(3), 178–182.
CIDCA. (2020). Wang Yi holds talks with Djibouti’s Minister for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation Mahmoud Ali Youssouf. http://subsites.chinadaily.com.cn/cidca/2020-01/14/c_448161.htm. Accessed 18 March 2022.
Company Data Report. (2019, April 16). Stock review: China merchants port holdings company decreases on slipping relative strength.
Cruz, T. (2018). Sen. Cruz pens letter to Secretary Mattis, Acting Secretary Sullivan regarding Chinese influence in Africa. https://www.cruz.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/sen-cruz-pens-letter-to-secretary-mattis-acting-secretary-sullivan-regarding-chinese-influence-in-africa. Accessed 20 March 2022.
Darras, R. (2017). Djibouti: À la conquête de la nouvelle route de la soie (Djibouti: Conquering the Silk Road). Jeune Afrique. https://www.jeuneafrique.com/mag/446579/economie/djibouti-a-conquete-de-nouvelle-route-de-soie/. Accessed 25 February 2022.
Darras, R. (2018). Logistique: Djibouti face à l’ouverture éthiopienne (Logistics: Djibouti faces up to its new Ethiopian-inspired competition). Jeune Afrique. https://www.jeuneafrique.com/mag/661092/economie/logistique-djibouti-face-a-louverture-ethiopienne/. Accessed 4 February 2022.
Deng, Y. (2017). CMG wants to make African port of Djibouti ‘new Shekou’. China Daily. https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2017-03/07/content_28455386.htm#:~:text=China%20Merchants%20Group%2C%20a%20Hong,in%20the%20Horn%20of%20Africa. Accessed 8 March 2022.
Dow Jones Institutional News. (2019, April 29). HK Bourse: Announcement from China Merchants Holdings (International) Co. Ltd.
Dow Jones Institutional News. (2020a, March 30). HK Bourse: Results announcement from China Merchants Holdings (International) Co. Ltd.
Dow Jones Institutional News. (2020b, December 29). HK Bourse: Announcement from China Merchants Port.
Downs, E., Becker, J., & deGategno, P. (2017). China’s military support facility in Djibouti: The economic and security dimensions of China’s first overseas base. CNA. https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1063680.pdf. Accessed 25 February 2021.
DredgingToday.com. (2013). Djibouti begins construction of two major ports. https://www.dredgingtoday.com/2013/09/13/djibouti-begins-construction-of-two-major-ports/. Accessed 4 March 2022.
EIU. (2003). Djibouti: Transport and communications. http://www.eiu.com/public/subscriber_only.aspx?x=1016121301. Accessed 7 March 2022.
EIU. (2008). Djibouti economy: Trade with China falls. http://www.eiu.com/public/subscriber_only.aspx?x=1243741109. Accessed 7 March 2022.
EIU. (2010a). Djibouti economy: China strengthens economic ties. http://www.eiu.com/public/subscriber_only.aspx?x=165201401. Accessed 7 March 2022.
EIU. (2010b, October 23). Ethiopia/China politics: Looking east.
EIU. (2012). Djibouti economy: Port expansion under discussion. http://www.eiu.com/public/subscriber_only.aspx?x=539015438. Accessed 7 March 2022.
EIU. (2014). Djibouti/Ethiopia politics: Quick View—Djibouti-Ethiopia relations. http://www.eiu.com/public/subscriber_only.aspx?x=451830829. Accessed 7 March 2022.
EIU. (2015). Djibouti economy: Relations with China continue to thrive. http://www.eiu.com/public/subscriber_only.aspx?x=1393349523. Accessed 23 June 2022.
EIU. (2016). Djibouti economy: Quick view—First Chinese enterprise awarded licence for an African bank. http://www.eiu.com/public/subscriber_only.aspx?x=354848419. Accessed 9 March 2022.
EIU. (2017a). Djibouti economy: Quick view—Construction on massive free trade zone begins. http://www.eiu.com/public/subscriber_only.aspx?x=1045024688. Accessed 8 March 2022.
EIU. (2017b). Djibouti economy: Quick view—Doraleh Multipurpose Port nears completion. http://www.eiu.com/public/subscriber_only.aspx?x=1225138106. Accessed 7 March 2022.
EIU. (2018, July 9). Djibouti economy: Quick view—Djibouti launches Africa’s largest free-trade zone.
FactWire. (2019). Legal battle for control of Djibouti ports comes to Hong Kong. https://hongkongfp.com/2019/02/12/legal-battle-control-djibouti-ports-comes-hong-kong/. Accessed 11 March 2022.
Fowler, J. (2019). China’s multi-faceted economic development strategy in East Africa. Orbis, 63(2), 172–186.
Ghorbal, S. (2007). ‘Un pays entre deux mondes’ (A small country caught between two worlds). Jeune Afrique. https://www.jeuneafrique.com/68779/archives-thematique/un-pays-entre-deux-mondes/. Accessed 3 November 2022.
Ghorbal, S. (2015). Logistique: Comment la Chine s’impose à Djibouti (Logistics: How China has come to lead in China). Jeune Afrique. https://www.jeuneafrique.com/mag/278911/economie/logistique-comment-la-chine-simpose-a-djibouti/. Accessed 1 March 2022.
Henderson, C. (2016). The UAE as a nexus state. Journal of Arabian Studies, 7(1), 83–93.
Huang, J. (2020). Research on the overseas investment of Chinese port operators under the Belt and Road Initiative: A case study on COSCO Shipping Ports and China Merchants Port (Dissertation). World Maritime University.
Huang, M. C. (2018). A new game started? China’s ‘Overseas Strategic Pivots’ in the Indian Ocean Region. China Report, 54(3), 267–284.
Jeune Afrique. (2017). Djibouti: Ismaïl Omar Guelleh de Pékin à Shenzhen (IOG: From Beijing to Shenzhen). https://www.jeuneafrique.com/mag/494252/politique/djibouti-ismail-omar-guelleh-de-pekin-a-shenzhen/. Accessed 9 March 2022.
Jones, L., & Zang, J. (2019). Understanding China’s ‘belt and road initiative’: Beyond ‘grand strategy’ to a state transformation analysis. Third World Quarterly, 40(8), 1415–1439.
Journal of Commerce. (2013). China Merchants buys into Africa’s port of Djibouti. https://www.joc.com/port-news/international-ports/china-merchants-buys-africas-port-djibouti_20130102.html. Accessed 11 March 2022.
Knowler, G. (2016). Djibouti calls boost CMA CGM's growing Africa coverage. Journal of Commerce. https://www.joc.com/maritime-news/container-lines/cma-cgm/djibouti-calls-boost-cma-cgm%E2%80%99s-growing-africa-coverage_20160323.html. Accessed 1 March 2022.
Kwon, J. V. P., & Barma, J. J. A. (2020). In the High Court of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, Court of Appeal, Civil Appeal No 86 of 2020 (On Appeal from HCA No 1951 of 2018), DP World Djibouti FZCO, Dubai (International) Djibouti FZE, Doraleh Containter Terminal SA versus China Merchants Port Holdings Company Ltd. https://legalref.judiciary.hk/lrs/common/search/search_result_detail_frame.jsp?DIS=141742&QS=%24%28DP%2CWorld%2CDjibouti%2CChina%29&TP=JU. Accessed 14 March 2022.
Lagon, M. P., & Sadoff, R. (2020). America must not allow China to go viral in Africa. The National Interest. https://nationalinterest.org/feature/america-must-not-allow-china-go-viral-africa-150566?page=0%2C3. Accessed 20 March 2022.
La Nation. (2019a). Cérémonie de célébration du premier anniversaire de la zone franche internationale (First year anniversary celebration of the opening of the International Free Zone). https://www.lanation.dj/ceremonie-de-celebration-du-premier-anniversaire-de-la-zone-franche-internationale/. Accessed 16 March 2022.
La Nation. (2019b). Revue de presse: « Notre souveraineté n’est pas négociable », déclare en chœur les autorités nationales (Press review—National authorities unanimously declare that: “Our sovereignty is not for sale"). https://www.lanation.dj/revue-de-presse-notre-souverainete-nest-pas-negociable-declare-en-choeur-les-autorites-nationales/. Accessed 14 March 2022.
La Nation. (2020a). Le dossier de la semaine: Djibouti à l’aube d’une économie émergeante (The story of the week: Djibouti on the cusp on becoming an emerging economy). https://www.lanation.dj/le-dossier-de-la-semaine-djibouti-a-laube-dune-economie-emergeante/. Accessed 16 March 2022.
La Nation. (2020b). Signature de l’accord d’investissement, entre Great Horn Investment Holding et China Merchants (Signature of the investment treaty between Great Horn Investment Holding and China Merchants). https://www.lanation.dj/signature-de-laccord-dinvestissement-entre-great-horn-investment-holding-et-china-merchants/. Accessed 16 March 2022.
Le Gouriellec, S. (2018). Chine, Éthiopie, Djibouti: Un triumvirat pour la Corne de l’Afrique ? (China, Ethiopia, and Djibouti: A triumvirate for the Horn of Africa?). Études Internationales, 49(3), 523–546.
Li, L. (2014). Terminal opens doors for Chinese company. China Daily. http://global.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201407/21/WS5a2fd357a3108bc8c672a69f.html. Accessed 9 March 2022.
Li, R. (2018). Djibouti denies being ‘induced’ by Chinese firm to breach contract. Global Times. https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/201811/1126250.shtml. Accessed 14 March 2022.
Manson, K. (2016). Jostling for Djibouti. FT. https://www.ft.com/content/8c33eefc-f6c1-11e5-803c-d27c7117d132. Accessed 4 March 2022.
Mooney, T. (2016). Djibouti’s Doraleh Container Terminal benefits from domestic consumption. Journal of Commerce. https://www.joc.com/port-news/terminal-operators/dp-world/djiboutis-doraleh-container-terminal-benefits-domestic-consumption_20160307.html. Accessed 4 March 2022.
Morrow, S. (2018). Djibouti—Doraleh port terminal: U.S. Congressman Bradley Byrne expresses concern about Chinese actions in Africa. Horn Diplomat. https://www.horndiplomat.com/2018/07/04/djibouti-doraleh-port-terminal-u-s-congressman-bradley-byrne-expresses-concern-about-chinese-actions-in-africa/. Accessed 20 March 2022.
Nyakazeya, P. (2018). Dubai sues China’s Merchants Port. APO Group. https://www.africa-newsroom.com/press/dubai-sues-chinas-merchants-port-by-paul-nyakazeya?lang=en. Accessed 14 March 2022.
Oxford Analytica. (2018). Djibouti: New port deal looks further east. https://dailybrief.oxan.com/Analysis/DB230565/Djibouti-looks-further-east-with-new-port-deal. Accessed 9 March 2022.
Pairault, T. (2018). La China Merchants à Djibouti: De la route maritime à la route numérique de la soie (China merchants in Djibouti: From the maritime silk road to the digital silk road). Revue Espace Géographique Et Société Marocaine, 24–25, 59–79.
Pairault, T. (2019). The China merchants in Djibouti: From the maritime to the digital silk roads. APO Group. https://www.africa-newsroom.com/press/the-china-merchants-in-djibouti-from-the-maritime-to-the-digital-silk-roads-by-thierry-pairault?lang=en. Accessed 8 March 2022.
Pairault, T. (2022a, July 27). Email exchange.
Pairault, T. (2022b). Industrial parks in Africa: Building nests for the Chinese phoenix. The National Bureau of Asian Research Special Report, 98, 78–88.
Paris, C. (2019). China tightens grip on East African port. WSJ. https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-tightens-grip-on-east-african-port-11550746800. Accessed 4 March 2022.
People’s Republic of China. (2015). China’s second Africa policy paper. http://www.china.org.cn/world/2015-12/05/content_37241677.htm. Accessed 1 March 2022.
Pilling, D. (2018). Djibouti row with DP World embodies Horn of Africa power struggle. FT. https://www.ft.com/content/bcaf5452-4f0e-11e8-ac41-759eee1efb74. Accessed 14 March 2022.
PRC Embassy in Djibouti. (2018). Ecrire ensemble un nouveau chapitre des relations sino-djiboutiennes pour un développement partagé (Opening a new chapter in Sino-Djibouti relations: Towards sustainable development). http://dj.chineseembassy.org/fra/xwdt/201809/t20180904_5707196.htm. Accessed 2 March 2022.
PRC Embassy in Djibouti. (2021). Tribune : « Continuer ensemble un développement commun sur le nouveau point de départ » Hu Bin, ambassadeur de Chine accrédité à Djibouti (Column: Starting afresh in the pursuit of common development, Hu Bin, plenipotentiary Chinese ambassador to Djibouti). http://dj.chineseembassy.org/fra/xwdt/202110/t20211010_9564600.htm. Accessed 2 March 2022.
PRC State Council. (2021). White paper: China’s international development cooperation in the new era. Beijing.
Quinn, J. J., & Akyol, S. (2021). Ethiopian foreign policy: A weak state or a regional hegemon? Journal of Asian and African Studies, 56(5), 1094–1118.
Rogin, J. (2018). Opinion: China is challenging the U.S. in the Horn of Africa—and Washington is silent. The Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/china-is-challenging-the-us-in-the-horn-of-africa--and-washington-is-silent/2018/09/27/6b5b5d10-c288-11e8-a1f0-a4051b6ad114_story.html. Accessed 20 March 2022.
Seibt, S. (2021). Djibouti et la Chine, de l'enthousiasme au mariage de raison (Djibouti and China: From enthusiasm to reason). France24. https://www.france24.com/fr/afrique/20210408-djibouti-et-la-chine-de-l-enthousiasme-au-mariage-de-raison. Accessed 2 March 2022.
Shehim, K., & Searing, J. (1980). Djibouti and the question of Afar nationalism. African Affairs., 79(315), 209–226.
Shilling, N. A. (1973). Problems of political development in a ministate: The French Territory of the Afars. The Journal of Developing Areas, 7(4), 613–634.
Soudan, F. (2008). « Djibouti n’a plus besoin de la France » (Djibouti does not need France). Jeune Afrique. https://www.jeuneafrique.com/131083/archives-thematique/djibouti-n-a-plus-besoin-de-la-france/. Accessed 27 January 2022.
Soudan, F. (2011). Ismaïl Omar Guelleh: « En 2016, je m’en irai. Cette fois, je peux vous le jurer » (IOG: In 2016, I promise I will step down). Jeune Afrique. https://www.jeuneafrique.com/189137/politique/ismael-omar-guelleh-en-2016-je-m-en-irai-cette-fois-je-peux-vous-le-jurer/. Accessed 18 March 2022.
Soudan, F. (2014). Ismaïl Omar Guelleh: « Encore deux ans et je m’en irai, mission accomplie » (IOG: I’ll stay for two more years before my mission is complete and my time is up). Jeune Afrique. https://www.jeuneafrique.com/134015/politique/ismael-omar-guelleh-encore-deux-ans-et-je-m-en-irai-mission-accomplie/. Accessed 2 March 2022.
Soudan, F. (2015). Djibouti—Ismaïl Omar Guelleh: « La France ne nous considère pas » (Djibouti—IOG: France does not acknowledge us). Jeune Afrique. https://www.jeuneafrique.com/225444/politique/djibouti-ismael-omar-guelleh-la-france-ne-nous-consid-re-pas/. Accessed 7 March 2022.
Soudan, F. (2017). Ismaïl Omar Guelleh : « Personne d’autre que les Chinois n’offre un partenariat à long terme à Djibouti » (IOG: No one other than China has offered Djibouti a long-term partnership). Jeune Afrique. https://www.jeuneafrique.com/mag/421096/politique/ismail-omar-guelleh-personne-dautre-chinois-noffre-partenariat-a-long-terme-a-djibouti/. Accessed 24 February 2022.
Soudan, F. (2018). China bashing. Jeune Afrique. https://www.jeuneafrique.com/mag/619263/economie/edito-china-bashing/. Accessed 18 March 2022.
Soudan, F. (2019). Djibouti—Ismaïl Omar Guelleh: « Nous n’avons rien à craindre du big bang régional » (Djibouti—IOG: “We should not fear the regional big bang”). Jeune Afrique. https://www.jeuneafrique.com/mag/759507/politique/djibouti-ismail-omar-guelleh-nous-navons-rien-a-craindre-du-big-bang-regional/. Accessed 18 March 2022.
Soudan, F., & Caslin, O. (2016). Ismaïl Omar Guelleh: « Les Djiboutiens m’ont interdit de partir » (IOG: Djibouti wants me to stay on’). Jeune Afrique. https://www.jeuneafrique.com/mag/311365/politique/ismail-omar-guelleh-djiboutiens-mont-interdit-de-partir/. Accessed 28 January 2022.
Styan, D. (2020). China’s Maritime Silk Road and small states: Lessons from the case of Djibouti. The Journal of Contemporary China, 29(122), 191–206.
Sun, D. (2018). China’s seaport diplomacy: Theories and practice. China Economist, 13(6), 34–48.
Sun, D., & Zoubir, Y. H. (2021). Securing China’s ‘latent power’: The dragon’s anchorage in Djibouti. Journal of Contemporary China, 30(130), 677–692.
Tadesse, F. (2014). Chinese Premier to inaugurate Addis-Adama expressway. allAfrica.com. https://allafrica.com/stories/201405080403.html. Accessed 1 March 2022.
The Maritime Executive. (2018). Djibouti opens Chinese-backed Free Trade Zone. https://www.maritime-executive.com/article/djibouti-opens-chinese-backed-free-trade-zone. Accessed 8 March 2022.
Ventures Africa. (2018). Ethiopia’s faltering dependence on China: Leading by example? https://venturesafrica.com/ethiopias-faltering-dependence-on-china/. Accessed 20 March 2022.
Vertin, Z. (2020). Great power rivalry in the Red Sea: China’s experiment in Djibouti and its implications for the United States. Brookings Institution Report. Washington, D.C.
VOA. (2018). Prospect of Chinese control of Djibouti port concerns Senators. https://www.voanews.com/a/prospect-of-chinese-control-of-djibouti-port-concerns-senators/4657768.html. Accessed 20 March 2022.
Wan, Y., Zhang, L., Xue, C. Q., et al. (2020). Djibouti: From a colonial fabrication to the deviation of the “Shekou model.” Cities, 97, 1–14.
Wang, J. (2017). 招商局集团与吉布提的故事:“中国速度”成就可喜变化 (The story between China Merchants Group and Djibouti). China Economic Daily. http://www.ce.cn/xwzx/gnsz/gdxw/201708/10/t20170810_24917912.shtml. Accessed 6 April 2022.
Williams, S. (2015). President Guelleh leads the modernisation charge. New African, 552, 59–61.
Wondewossen, B. (2020). Ethiopia: Ethio-Djibouti railway vows to reverse losses. allAfrica.com. https://allafrica.com/stories/202009230063.html#:~:text=The%20Ethio%2DDjibouti%20Gauge%20Railway,an%20effort%20to%20break%20even. Accessed 8 March 2022.
Xinhua News Agency. (2001, March 23). Djiboutian President visits Chongqing.
Xinhua News Agency. (2001, March 24). Djiboutian President visits Shenzhen.
Xinhua News Agency. (2005, September 24). Djibouti Prime Minister visits Shanghai.
Xinhua News Agency. (2012a). China vows to enhance bilateral cooperation with Djibouti. http://en.people.cn/90883/7880749.html. Accessed 2 March 2022.
Xinhua News Agency. (2012b, July 20). Djibouti expects further cooperation with China.
Xinhua News Agency. (2015a). China’s CCECC completes track laying on section of Ethiopia-Djibouti railway project. http://www.china.org.cn/world/2015-06/13/content_35816149.htm. Accessed 7 March 2022.
Xinhua News Agency. (2015b, March 23). Roundup: Djibouti-Ethiopia water project launched.
Xinhua News Agency. (2016a). Chinese-built railways in Africa become model of cooperation: FM. https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2016-08/11/content_26430397.htm. Accessed 7 March 2022.
Xinhua News Agency. (2016b). Djibouti president receives report on “Free Trade Zone” megaproject. https://www.apdnews.com/xin-hua/399535.html. Accessed 8 March 2022.
Xinhua News Agency. (2017a). China, Djibouti agree to establish strategic partnership. https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2017-11/23/content_34905168.htm. Accessed 1 March 2022.
Xinhua News Agency. (2017b). Chinese construction company to build tallest building in Djibouti. http://www.xinhuanet.com//english/2017-01/16/c_135987166.htm#:~:text=Xinhua)-,DJIBOUTI%2C%20Jan.,of%20African%20country%20once%20completed. Accessed 2 March 2022.
Xinhua News Agency. (2017c). Chinese construction firm works to hire more locals in Djibouti. http://europe.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2017-01/12/content_27934920.htm. Accessed 2 March 2022.
Xinhua News Agency. (2017d). Premier encourages investment in Djibouti. https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2017-11/25/content_34968679.htm. Accessed 1 March 2022.
Xinhua News Agency. (2020). Roundup: Chinese engagement in Djibouti's economic transformation in a nutshell. http://www.china.org.cn/world/Off_the_Wire/2020-01/10/content_75600648.htm. Accessed 16 March 2022.
Xinhua News Agency. (2021). Chinese built Ethiopia-Djibouti railway earns 29 mln USD in nine months period. http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/202106/05/c_139990849.htm#:~:text=The%20Chinese%2Dbuilt%20752.7%20km,(EDR)%20disclosed%20on%20Friday. Accessed 8 March 2022.
Xu, L. (2018). Analysis on seaports overseas cooperation: The case of CMPort and Djibouti Port (Dissertation). Erasmus University.
Ziso, E. (2020). The political economy of the Chinese model in Ethiopia. Politics and Policy, 48(5), 908–931.
Zhou, M. (2017). CMG eyes more B&R projects. China Daily. http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2017-09/21/content_32276598.htm. Accessed 9 March 2022.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2023 The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd.
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Barton, B. (2023). The Maritime Silk Road Effect in Djibouti. In: The Doraleh Disputes. Global Political Transitions. Palgrave Macmillan, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-7439-7_5
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-7439-7_5
Published:
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, Singapore
Print ISBN: 978-981-19-7438-0
Online ISBN: 978-981-19-7439-7
eBook Packages: Political Science and International StudiesPolitical Science and International Studies (R0)